

THE PLACE OF SOCIAL IDENTITY IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA IN THE LIGHT OF LIBERAL AND
CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES

A Master's Thesis

by

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September 2001

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to describe the positions of diverse social identities in Turkey concerning Turkey’s foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era. This exercise will be placed within the framework of the theoretical propositions of liberal and constructivist International Relations (IR) theories with special references to their emphases on the role of identity on foreign policy making in a comparative manner. For liberal theoreticians, key concept is “state preferences” in the formation of foreign policy. They argue that state preferences are formed in the process of the competition of views among social identities in the society as well as by the constraints resulting from the preferences of other states. In the constructivist theory, a key concept is “national interests” which are constructed and negotiated socially by the discourses among different national identities. In this context, it will be examined the impact of diverse social identities, namely, *Kemalist, liberal, nationalist, Kurdish and Islamic* identities on the Turkey’s foreign policies towards Europe and Eurasia.

Keywords: Identity, Turkish Foreign Policy, Liberal International Relations Theory, Constructivist International Relations Theory

ÖZET

LİBERAL VE KONSTRÜKTİVİST YAKLAŞIMLARIN IŞIĞINDA SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI TÜRKİYE’NİN DIŞ POLİTİKA SEÇENEKLERİNDE SOSYAL KİMLİĞİN YERİ

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Bu tez, soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye’de çeşitli sosyal kimliklerin Türkiye’nin dış politika seçeneklerinin oluşumundaki yerlerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu uğraş içerisinde liberal ve konstrüktivist uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin, özellikle kimliğin dış politika yapımındaki rolünü vurgulayan teorik çerçevelerinden karşılaştırmalı olarak yararlanılacaktır. Liberal teorisyenlere göre dış politika yapımındaki anahtar kavram “devlet tercihleri”dir. Onlar, devlet tercihlerinin toplumdaki farklı sosyal kimliklerin görüşlerinin rekabeti sürecinde ve diğer devletlerin tercihlerinden kaynaklanan sınırlamalarla oluşturulduğunu iddia ederler. Konstrüktivist teoride anahtar kavram farklı kimlikler arasındaki söylemlerin bir neticesi olarak inşa edilen “ulusal çıkarlar”dır. Bu çerçevede, başlıca, *Kemalist*, *liberal*, *milliyetçi*, *Kürt* ve *İslamcı* olmak üzere çeşitli sosyal kimliklerin, Türkiye’nin Avrupa ve Avrasya’ya yönelik dış politikalarının oluşumuna olan etkileri üzerinde durulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik, Türk Dış Politikası, Liberal Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Konstrüktivist Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to describe the positions of diverse social identities in Turkey concerning Turkey's foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era. This exercise will be placed within the framework of the theoretical propositions of liberal and constructivist International Relations (IR) theories with special references to their emphases on the role of identity on foreign policy making in a comparative manner. For liberal theoreticians, key concept is "state preferences" in the formation of foreign policy. They argue that state preferences are formed in the process of the competition of views among social identities in the society as well as by the constraints resulting from the preferences of other states. In the constructivist theory, a key concept is "national interests" which are constructed and negotiated socially by the discourses among different national identities.

Liberal and constructivist theories suggest that national identity encircles the mindsets of the decision makers by drawing boundaries between "self" and "other." The accentuation of these borders emphasizes some characteristics of the identity and provides some continual patterns in the behaviors of nations. These characteristics become the elements of continuity in foreign policy making. Since the national identity is the creation of social interactions through drawing boundaries between "self" and "other," it is a dynamic phenomenon that can change over time. The change of the identities incites the states to produce new patterns of foreign policies that also change the structural characteristics of the international system. Accordingly, identity generally prepares the cognitive backgrounds for the formulation of national interests by determining friend and enemy elements

according to the ideological priorities of the state and the historical and social constructions of the state and the society. In this formula, national interest includes not only the external interests of the state, but the internal priorities also takes an important place.

The end of the Cold War had diversified the strategic options Turkey had confronted. During the Cold War, a strategic culture against the enemy of Communism under the NATO umbrella had been evolved. However, after the end of the Cold War, the options of United States and Western Europe had been varied as well as of Turkey. Thus, the patterns of Turkey's relations with the West in general and with Europe in particular have changed. On the other side, the demise of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has opened new opportunities and strategic possibilities for Turkey. There have been realized traditional and historical affinities between Turkey and the newly founded states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. As a result, Turkey has found itself between two fundamental foreign policy options: (i) to accentuate its centuries-old European orientation by integrating with the European Union, which is claimed to be the institutional representation of the European identity; (ii) to have a sphere of influence and to be leader of the newly independent Turkish Republics in Eurasia.

Within this context, this study consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, I will try to describe the theoretical background to explain the impact of identity on foreign policy. In this respect, I will firstly explore the concept of identity and its role in the conduct of foreign policy; and expose how identity determines the elements of continuity and change in foreign policy. Then, I will respectively explore the

theoretical assumptions of liberal and constructivist IR theories with special reference to their emphases on identity. And finally I will draw upon the propositions of these theories; and expected foreign policy behaviors in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy within the theoretical borders of these theories.

In Chapter 2, I will examine Turkey's European option with special respect to the explanations of liberal and constructivist IR theories. In this context, firstly I will search for the institutional and historical contexts that have been influential in the construction of Turkey's European identity. Then, I will review Turkey's relations with Europe in the post-Cold War era within the context of differentiating discourses debate among diverse identities in Turkey toward Turkey's place in Europe. In so doing, I will touch upon how Turkey's preferences and interests towards Europe have been constructed within the frameworks of liberal and constructivist IR theories.

In Chapter 3, I will examine the Eurasian option in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. I will begin my analysis by reviewing the Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia in the post-Cold war era. Then I will examine the discourses and debates among different social identities influential in the formation of the state preferences and construction of national interests in Turkey's foreign policy towards Eurasia with special references to the liberal and constructivist IR theories. After Chapter 3, in the concluding chapter I will draw upon the conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER 1:

IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY:

LIBERAL AND CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES

In this chapter, I will present the theoretical background to explain the impact of identity on foreign policy. In this context, I will firstly explore the concept of identity and its role in the formation of foreign policy. Then I will expose how identity determines the elements of continuity and change in foreign policy. After the examination of the role of identity on foreign policy, I will present the theoretical assumptions of liberal and constructivist IR theories with respect to their approaches to the role of identity on foreign policy. I will conclude this chapter by the section, in which it will be explored the way of implementation of these theoretical assumptions to the Turkish foreign policy analyses in the post-Cold War era.

1. IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

1. 1. Defining Identity: Drawing Borders Between “Self” and “Other”

Identity is a concept, which is constructed in the social and historical contexts by the creation of the differences between self and other as the outcomes of their interactions. It influences the individuals or groups who identify them with that identity. In particular circumstances, identity becomes the instrument for certain individuals or groups to conceive their similarities to some actors and their differences from others. Thus, the two pioneering concepts of identity to be explored

are “self” and “other,” among which a dialectical relation exists. Creation of the boundaries between self and other also constitutes the process of the construction of identities. There had been developed some explanations to find answers why people live in certain identified groups. There are psychological, sociological and philosophical explanations for the construction of identities.

Firstly, identity psychologically rescues individuals from the instability of the world. By means of identity, life becomes more predictable. The individuals become informed “how their behavior will affect others’ behavior toward them” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991 cited in Chafetz et al., 1998/1999: ix). The mechanism, which provides the stability within the identity, stems from the accentuation of organic relations within the group, which facilitate the separation of the borders between in-group and out-group. The construction of boundaries is the primary stage since “they mark the difference between inside and outside, strange and familiar, relatives and non-relatives, friends and enemies, culture and nature, enlightenment and barbarism” (Giesen, 1998: 13). This causes positive perceptions towards the in-group, and at the same time negative perceptions towards the out-group.

Secondly, since individuals live in social context, all the identities are constructed by some social incitements. Individuals identify themselves with others in groups. This identification within the social context is shaped by “values, norms, beliefs, role conceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, and other cognitive, affective and motivational phenomena” (Turner, 1985: 80 cited in Chafetz et al., 1998/1999: x), created through the social interaction. In the political scene, identifying with a group serves for the sake of cohesion in the community. Hedley Bull (1977) introduces the concept of the

“stability of expectations” when he explains the creation of social identities. He argues (1977: 3-52) that government bureaucracies and society cannot function without a minimum level of stability of expectations. To provide the minimum level of stability of expectations, “political communities develop powerful myths and institutions designed to enhance and defend their roles and to foster citizen identification with those roles” (Chafetz et al., 1998/1999: xii).

Thirdly, some philosophical approaches have been made to elucidate the construction of relations between “self” and “other.” In this respect, Simmel (1970) introduces “strangers” as the basic reason of identity construction. Strangers, as a marginalized term for the group in question, play an important role in collective identity formation in the sense that strangers become the determinants of the borders between self and other (1970: 144 cited in Neumann, 1998: 8). Schmitt (1963), on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of the “enemy” as providing coherence in the domestic politics. Accordingly, a state needs to draw differences between itself and its “enemy.” He claims (1963: 14 quoted in Neumann, 1998: 12) that by means of the enemy, the political entity entails integration within itself. Nietzsche (1992), contrary to Simmel and Schmidt’s constructions, dissolve the categories that explain the formation of self/other relations. He argues that “knowing” the relations as they are in that way is the reason of them; and stresses (1992: 46 quoted in Neumann, 1998: 12) that the world does not simply present itself to human beings; rather, the activity of knowing is a formulation of the world.

After examining the motives encouraging the distinction of “self” and “other,” one should answer to the question of how this distinction results the construction of

identities. In other words, what are the requirements for the construction of identities? However, in the examination of this problematic, our consideration will be the national and state identities that are the basic subjects of the foreign policy making. Since identity has two dimensions of 'self' and 'other,' the answer of this question is twofold: on the one hand, there are certain factors influential in the accentuation of 'self;' and on the other hand 'otherness' is the result of certain differences between the groups. An elaborate explanation of identity construction requires examining the factors that accentuate 'self,' as well as the differences that create 'otherness.'

Nations, as social groups, derive a sense of identity due to the aforementioned reasons. Although national identity is a dynamic phenomenon that can change over time, it has some stable characteristics that have resistance to change; and give the self-schema of the identity. There are some factors that form this national self-schema. Smith points out (1991: 21) six main factors: "a collective proper name, a myth of a common ancestry, shared historical memories, one of more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific 'homeland,' a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population."

The internalization of these factors results the construction of identity. However, in internalization process, one of these factors, which shape the nature of the identity, is generally more emphasized than the others. For instance, if the nation emphasizes a myth of a common ancestry, then ethnic nationalism will be basic tenet of national identity, whereas if the nation emphasizes the homeland, then civic nationalism will

be the basic tenet of the national identity (Yurdusev, 1997: 26).¹ This identity reflects the historical and cultural backgrounds of the states to adopt certain behaviors.

Although this constructed self-schema provides preconditions to form a national identity, it is the interaction with other nations that facilitates nations to evolve a sense of national uniqueness. As in Derrida's point of view (1992: 9-10) all the identities exist within their differences from the other ones; and there is no cultural identity that has not any 'other' (cited in Yurdusev, 1997: 20). Yurdusev (1997: 20-21) depicts that sometimes the role of the 'other' in the construction of national identities is exaggerated by some societies, in which the 'other' determined the basic characteristics of the identity rather than their self-characteristics. He (1997: 20-21) continues his argumentation over the cases from the history. For instance, Helens identified themselves with their differences from the Persians. Furthermore he (1997: 20-21) reminds us that the 'others' usually gave the names of the national groups. For example, 'Turk' is not a name from the Turkish language, but from the Chinese language. Thus 'other' is as important as 'self' in the shaping of national identities.²

¹ Scholars of ethnicity and nationalism generally deduce two main types of national identities: ethnic and civic nationalisms. In the words of Charles A. Kupchan (1995: 4) "ethnic nationalism defines nationhood in terms of lineage. The attributes that members of an ethnically defined national grouping share include physical characteristic, culture, religion, language, and a common ancestry. Individuals of a different ethnicity, even if they reside in and are citizens of the nation state in question do not become part of the national grouping." On the other hand, "Civic nationalism defines nationhood in terms of citizenship and political participation. Members of a national grouping that is defined in civic terms share participation in a circumscribed political community, common political values, a sense of belonging to the state in which they reside, and, usually, a common language." Thus, "a citizen is a national, regardless of ethnicity and lineage."

² "Identity" is a more complex social phenomenon than is described here. It subsumes elements of ideology as well. In other words, the borderline between "identity" and "ideology" is not absolutely clear. The two interact and interpenetrate each other in intimate ways. Take for example the identity of a Marxist, a capitalist, and a liberal. Each identity is shaped by a heavy dose of ideological value systems about how society should be organized. One's definition of the "self" and "other" in these instances are strongly influenced by one's ideological view of the world. For purposes of brevity, I shall merely acknowledge the presence of this "grey area" between identity and ideology and not discuss it any further.

1. 2. Identity and the Formation of Foreign Policy

The creation of the national identity from the borders drawn between ‘self’ and ‘other’ is crucial for the link between identity and foreign policy making. Here, it is required to make a distinction between state identity and national identity. State identity reflects the official considerations of the state about its identity, while national identity reflects the diverging features of the nation. For instance while Islam is a part of national identity in Turkey, it is not a part of state identity, which has been drawn upon by the Kemalist principles. State identity is more influential in the formation of foreign policy, while diverging parts of national identity has a little impact on it according to the competition within the country. The way a state interprets its differences from the others influences its policies towards them. At this point a question arises: what is the role of the system in the formation of identities, and consequently in the formation of foreign policies?

Since the states are social actors interacting with the other states, with international institutions, and also with their public, these interactions create certain patterns of norms. Both the states and the international systemic dynamics contribute to the creation of these particular norms. However, since the states are the forerunner and builders of the institutions, their identities are the most important factor in the establishment of the system. Furthermore, as system becomes strengthened gradually by means of norms created by the states, it also gains particular mode of identity, which impacts the way the states behave. This dynamic model determines the logic of international relations.

What identity adds to the conventional views, which assert that the distribution of material capabilities are crucial in world politics, is its emphasis to conduct parameters of how states make rational choices within the burdens of their historical, cultural, social and political backgrounds. States interpret the material capabilities and rank their priorities within the borders their identities establish. Identity, in such a formulation, defines the priorities of the states in question. These priorities put constraints on foreign as well as domestic decisions of the states.

1. 2. 1. Identity and Elements of Continuity in Foreign Policy

As explored above, national identity encircles the mindsets of the decision makers by drawing boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other.’ The accentuation of these borders determines the characteristics of the state identity and provides continual patterns in the behaviors of states. These characteristics of the identity affect the elements of continuity in foreign policy. For instance, Turkey’s approach towards Europe since the nineteenth century brought Western-orientation as a continual element of Turkish foreign policy.³

Prizel (1998: 24), in analyzing the links between identities and foreign policies of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and parts of Central and South America, tries to draw upon the continuities in foreign policies of these countries, stemmed from their identities. Accordingly, a strong sense of cultural and political

³ Turkey, by the end of the eighteenth century, began to pretend the European civilization and Turkey’s struggle to be regarded as European continued in the following decades. This process of being European accelerated by the Tanzimat era and reached its peak point by the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Turkey’s Europeanization project included a Western oriented foreign policy by the end of the Second World War. From the end of the war onwards, Turkey aimed to be included all European institutions.

ressentiment, channeled to the external countries and the identities inherited from the history play a crucial role in the formation of foreign policy. He argues that the *ressentiment* in these countries has produced a feeling of social and political injustice. They strongly react to the attribution of the Western Europe that sees their civilizations as peripheral and marginalized within the international system. As a reaction to this attribution, they construct 'noble origins' from the history for themselves. This brings the emphasis on the cultural processes that create a certain romanticism embedded to the state identity, and the constraints on the foreign policy decision making processes.

1. 2. 2. Identity and Elements of Change in Foreign Policy

Since the identity is the creation of social interactions through drawing boundaries between 'self' and 'other,' it is a dynamic phenomenon that can change over time. Complete change of identity is not possible, however, historical process has the ability to change the state identity gradually. The change of the identities incites states to produce new patterns of foreign policies that also change the structural characteristics of the international system. Yet, identities gradually change over time, however there are some reasons that cause rapid transformations and drastic identity shifts in a short period of time. At this point a question arises: When identity transforms into different patterns? It can be deduced five reasons for the identity shifts of the states.

Firstly, military and diplomatic defeats can bring rapid transformations in state identities (Prizel, 1998: 34). Since defeats are acknowledgement that there is

something wrong with existing system, the public and elite make reconsiderations in the postwar periods. The disappointment and negative legacies of war weaken the cohesion of national identity; and impose new patterns of behaviors. At these times states obtain new perceptions about their role in the international system. Prizel gives France to exemplify this. Accordingly, as the result of France's defeats in Indochina (1954) and Algeria (1962), France has shifted from the self-perception of 'civilizing empire' to one of the components of 'larger European entity' (Prizel, 1998: 34).

Secondly, one important element altering the identity of a country is "the metamorphosis or the total disappearance of the 'other'" (Prizel: 1998: 33). For instance, the disintegration of the USSR affected the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the Central European states. This shift in their domestic and foreign policies is a natural result of the change of the meaning of 'Western Europe' as 'other' for them during the Cold War years. Western Europe and modern European liberal values become covetous models for these countries; contrary to the Cold War years, when these values were the 'other' of them. This led the pursuit of these states to be the members of NATO and European Union.

Thirdly, the systemic or regional drastic changes that create new interests or drawbacks alter the state identity. The new opportunities emerged after regional or systemic changes accentuate the underemphasized interests of states and incite elite and the public to seek for new interests or planning. For instance the disintegration of Soviet Union reinforced pragmatic policies of Iran for new economic and trade interests. Because the fall of Soviet Union created newly independent energy centers,

especially in Central Asia (Ramazani, 1998). This incited Iran to be effective in these areas by improving its economic relations with these states.

Fourthly, in the crises times, states suffer identity crises, after which new considerations would change the identity patterns. This is frequent especially the global transitional periods such as transition from feudalism to capitalism; or important wars that are influential in the geographic formation of a new order such as the Hundred Years' Wars. Besides these, the domestic crises such as revolutions, coups and economic crises are also influential in change of the state identity. Campbell (1992) explains the emergence of modern states system not as a mechanistic result of Westphalia as is conventionally known, but by identity transformations in Europe. He argues that the gap created by the defeat of the church against Enlightenment forced the European states to seek new forms of identities instead of the theological ones. While God filled the gap in the previous one, reason, experience, science and modernity determined the new patterns of state identity by the Enlightenment period. Thus, states emancipated from the will of God and became independent and sovereign by the Enlightenment (Campbell, 1992: 43-51).

Finally, generational changes can also alter the identity of a polity (Prizel, 1998: 35). Prizel (1998: 35) argues that the custodian of the collective memory is vital in the evaluation of this memory. The change of custodian of a national identity influences perceptions of the past and, consequently, the parameters of the national interest. For instance the shah of Iran utilized Darius's universalist and enlightened legacy to justify the modernization in Iran. In the following generation the Shite clerics utilized

the Islamic background of Iran to consolidate the sharia. In both cases, both policies were executed by inspirations from the Persian identity despite of their differences.

In sum, the theoretical model that attaches importance to the role of identity on foreign policy argues that the tandem of international and domestic environments both shape state identities and foreign policies. Identity as “the state of being similar to some actors and different from others in a particular circumstance” (Chafetz et al., 1998/1999: viii) is constructed after psychological and sociological processes; and gives the shape of foreign policy through its assessment of the features of the identity. Foreign policy is inherently formulated from the borders between ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Although there are some continual characteristics of foreign policies as a result of identities, these policies along with the identities can change over time due to several reasons: Military and diplomatic defeats can bring rapid transformations in state identities; another important element altering the identity of a state is the metamorphosis or the total disappearance of the ‘other’; the systemic or regional drastic changes that create new interests or drawbacks also alter the state identity; in the crises times, states suffer identity crises, after which new considerations would change the identity patterns; generational changes can also alter the identity of a polity. In the remaining parts of this chapter, it will be examined the liberal and constructivist approaches with respect to their emphases to the role of identity on foreign policy.

2. LIBERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Liberalism is fundamentally a tradition of political philosophy, emerged more or less in the eighteenth century Europe against the traditional privileges of cosmopolitan aristocratic elite with a set of practical goals and ideals (Lerner et al., 1988: 809). The liberal tradition prioritizes the individual over the state with claimant of some rights. Accordingly state plays a limited role in the society as only an arbiter in the disputes among individuals and the state. According to the liberal conception of political science, the issues are presented to the public opinion; and the consensus as a result of debating these issues within the clash of ideas and interests constrains the state behaviors (Yayla, 1999). The numerous persons representing a multitude of interests compete to influence the decision-making processes. Rationalism constitutes the cognitive bases of liberalism. While competing for more interests, the individuals and groups are assumed as rational to increase their interests.

Liberalism has filtered into the discipline of International Relations by emphasizing the importance of changeable political processes (Keohane, 1989: 10). Liberals have sought to establish an international democratic society. By means of this democratic society it has been aimed the protection of civil liberties and the maintenance of free market economic relations for the establishment of a peaceful global order. As Burchill (1996: 31) summarizes liberals concluded that the prospects for the elimination of war lay with “a preference for democracy over aristocracy, free trade over autarky, and collective security over the balance of power system.”

However, for many decades, especially by the impact of the legacy of the IR studies in the 1920s and 1930s, the self-proclaimed ‘realists’ of the time, and the neorealists

have disparaged liberalism as a form of ‘idealism’ or ‘utopianism’ (Griffiths, 1999: 51). The negative attributions towards liberalism as being not structural and well-defined IR theory did not finish after the end of the Cold War, despite liberals have found the opportunity to assess the legacy of their intellectual tradition and its relevance by the collapse of the Soviet Union (Griffiths, 1999: 51). For instance, Robert Keohane, who is fundamentally liberal, asserts (1990: 166 quoted in Moravcsik, 1997: 515) that “in contrast to Marxism and Realism, Liberalism is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural theory.” Moravcsik (1997: 514) attributes the reason for this as the “lack of a paradigmatic status” of the liberal IR theory. He reminds (1997: 514) us that the earlier attempts to formulate a liberal IR theory (different approaches pertaining the priority to be given to democracy, economic interdependence and the international legal regulation of security and economic issue-areas) have generally ignored as a major paradigmatic alternative.

Moravcsik, in his article (1997), attempts to reformulate liberal international relations theory in a “nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science” (1994: 513). Accordingly, the fundamental premise of liberal IR theory is that “the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences” (Moravcsik, 1997: 516). The ‘configuration of state preferences’ constitutes the place in liberal IR theory what the ‘configuration of capabilities’ constitutes in neorealism, and the ‘configuration of institutions’ constitutes in neoliberal institutionalism. The liberal IR theory locates the identity as an input in the formation of the state preferences. Identity plays a crucial role in the determination of the nature of the relations

between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society. Because the characteristics of the state and the society are not exempt from the identities of them, which constitutes the cognitive bases of the actors embedded to state and society.

Liberal IR theory, reformulated in Moravcsik (1997), depends on three main assumptions, which specify, respectively, the nature of the societal actors, the nature of the state, and the nature of the international system. The theoretical mechanism, constituted by the interaction of the premises of these theoretical assumptions, is claimed to explain the ongoing of world politics from a liberal standpoint. Let us respectively examine these assumptions.

2. 1. The Primacy of Societal Actors

The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik, 1997: 516).

In the liberal IR theory, fundamentally, the demands of the individuals and the societal groups have the priority over politics. As Moravcsik (1997: 517) recalls, the “bottom up” view of politics shapes the very nature of the liberal theory. Accordingly, political arena is assumed as a battleground for competing interests; and political action is constituted by the aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with “differentiated tastes, social commitments, and resource endowments” (Moravcsik, 1997: 517). Thus, for the place of identity in liberal IR theory, we can conclude that social group identities in a given country play an important role in the construction of the state preferences in a “bottom-up” direction.

In the competition among different social groups within and between states, the identities, acquired through historical and social processes, determines the priorities of these groups. Through the social interactions in the formation of political actions, the individuals are treated as rational, as defined in Kantian rationalism (Kant, 1970).

The promotion of differentiated interests of these different domestic and transnational social groups is executed under the constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence. In this vein, the conditions of stability in the international order can be deduced. The situation of fundamental beliefs (complementary or divergent), the amount of material goods (relative abundance or extreme scarcity), and the distribution of political power (inequality or equality) are the basic constraints that influence the occurrence of cooperation and conflict. In this respect, while complementary beliefs promote cooperation in the domestic and international society as well, the differentiating beliefs about the provision of borders, fundamental political institutions, social practices and culture promote conflict. Relative abundance promotes cooperation; because in such a situation, the actors have the lower propensity to enter into risks for material resources. In the condition of extreme scarcity, the actors have the cost not to enter into risks. So extreme scarcity promotes conflict. If the distribution of power among the societal actors is equitable, then the actors will be more cooperation seeker to continue the existing situation. However, if the power is inequitably distributed, then actors will take risks to cause conflict, even if the costs are very high (Moravcsik, 1997: 517).

2. 2. Representation and State Preferences

States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics (Moravcsik, 1997: 518).

Liberal IR theory adds the concept of state preferences to the liberal conception of domestic politics, according to which the state is a representative institution “constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors” (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). The institution of representation plays a crucial role on the formation of state policy, which is composed of the preferences and social power of individuals and groups (Moravcsik, 1997: 518).

Concerning the institution of representation, it can undoubtedly be claimed that the dominant individuals and groups are more fully represented by the government than the other groups (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). The ‘fully represented groups’ are determined by the domestic free competition in the country. In contrast to the conventional liberal theories, the representation is not necessarily applied in a democratic manner. There exist many representative institutions from tyranny to democracy. The nature of the representative institutions and practices determines the preferences of the states in the international arena (Moravcsik, 1997: 518).

The change of the ‘state preferences’ is conditional on the competition among the societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices. The societal pressures can also be the results of the international interactions, but not only the outcomes of the domestic interactions among the society (Moravcsik, 1997: 519). Preferences constitute a key concept in the liberal IR theory in the sense that the

theory focuses on the preferences to shift the behaviors of the states other than the strategic circumstances under which the states situate.

2. 3. Interdependence and the International System

The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior. (Moravcsik, 1997: 520)

States formulate their foreign policy behaviors according to the societal formulation of their preferences. The cooperation or conflict in the organization of world politics is constituted according to the interactions of state preferences. However, this does not mean that all the states have the freedom to implement foreign policies according to the ideal policies of them. Contrarily, each state seeks to realize its own preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states (Moravcsik, 1997: 520). Thus, the configuration of the interdependent state preferences determines the behaviors of the states in the international realm.

As can be understood, according to the liberal IR theory, it is assumed that the patterns of the interdependent state preferences impose constraints on state behaviors (Moravcsik, 1997: 520). The strategic situations are determined by the patterns of the interdependence. Moravcsik divides (1997: 520-521) three broad categories for the patterns of interdependence, according to the strategic situation that results. Firstly, if the preferences of the differentiating states are compatible or harmonious, then there will be strong incentives for coexistence with low conflict. Secondly, if the state preferences are deadlocked, in other words, realizing the preferences of dominant social groups in different countries imposes costs each other, then, there will be low mutual gains among governments and high potential for interstate tension and conflict. Thirdly, if there is an ambiguity and mixed situation in the motives of the

dominant social actors of different states, then there is the possibility to negotiate among the actors of the international system.

3. CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Constructivism is the view that prioritizes ideas over materials (Walt, 1998: 40); and is the view that claims human action and interaction, corresponding the dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world, shapes and shaped by the material world (Adler, 1997: 322). In recent years, especially by the end of the Cold War, a great appeal has been given to the constructivist approach. A great literature has been formed on this theory especially in the post-Cold war period.⁴ We have experienced “the constructivist turn in IR theory” (Checkel, 1998: 326) in which the proponents of this theory have opened up “the black box of interest and identity formation,” and have argued that the state interests emerge from the interactions among the states and the international system.

Constructivism is a theory that stands between modern and postmodern IR theories. Reminding that modern IR theories are positivist/materialist while postmodern ones are idealist/interpretive, constructivism is an attempt to build a bridge between them (Adler, 1997: 323). It aims to show how the subjective, intersubjective and material worlds interact in the construction of reality, and the interactions between the structures and agent’s identities and interests (Adler, 1997: 330). Accordingly, by suggesting the concept of intersubjectivity, constructivist theory claims that the social relations are established in reciprocal bases among the actors interacting, and it

cannot be pure objectivity between the knowledge and reality. Thus, international politics is contingent to the historical and social context. It is impossible to speak of unchangeable international structures. The international structure, namely the international system stemmed from the interactions among states, renews itself according to the ongoing its relations with the states. The identity plays a critical role in the creation of the boundaries of subjectivity in this equation. As Wendt portrays (1994: 385) core assumptions of constructivist IR theory can be formulated as follows:

1. States are the principle units of analysis for international political theory;
2. The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; and
3. State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature of domestic politics.

The argument of “the mutual constitution of agents and structure, states and international system” underlies at the very beginning of constructivism (Banchoff, 1999: 261). Thus, drawing upon conclusions about the nature of the state and the nature of the international system, independent of each other, as in the liberal IR theory is impossible in constructivist theory. In the following paragraphs I will try to qualify the afore-mentioned assumptions in two headings. The first one is devoted to figure out the role that is given to the state in constructivist theory with respect to the state identities and interests. The second one will clarify the system question with special concern to the agent-structure debate.

⁴ For instance see: Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1998; Jager, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Kratochwill, 1989; Kubalkova et al., 1998; Wendt, 1992, 1994; Berger, 1996; Finnomere, 1996; Johnston, 1995, 1996; Weldes, 1996; Ruggie, 1997.

3. 1. State, Identity, and Interests

Like the mainstream theories of IR, constructivism accounts the states as the unit of analysis, which operates in a social structure that is qualified by three elements: “shared knowledge, material resources, and practices” (Wendt, 1995: 73). In the this formulation, structure constitutes the context composed of the shared knowledge, material resources, and practices as an outcome of the result of intersubjective relations between states and the international system. Diverse identities of each state are the main reason of the intersubjectivity.

Constructivism treats identity to be theorized within the social and historical context. The self (it is what binds the group together) and the other (what situates the group with respect to others) dimensions of the identity matters much in constructivism. The identity creates a set of “shared norms and narratives that sustain ‘we-ness’ through time” (Banchoff, 1999: 268). By means of identity, the state finds the opportunity to situate itself relative to other states and international institutions (Banchoff, 1999). This provides the state to locate its position in the intersubjective relations with the other international actors. The crucial observation here is that “the producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning” (Hopf, 1998: 173).

The interstate relations are not sufficient to identify intersubjective meanings, but the political and historical context is also influential in the formation of these meanings (Weldes, 1996: 280). This historical and political context led us again to the identity. Weldes, at this point, suggests (1996: 281) the term of ‘representations’, which emerge on a wide array of already available cultural and linguistic resources; and contribute to the construction of state identity and interests. These representations

serve firstly, to populate a national vision with a variety of discourses, including to accentuate the differences between the self and others; secondly, posit well-defined relations among diverse discourses; and finally, locating a vision through well-defined relations with the others, the state provides convenient background to define national interests (Weldes, 1996: 281-282). The representations make clear to the country who and what it is, and who and what its enemies are.

Constructivism suggests that “collective identity shapes the content of state interests and the course of state action” (Banchoff, 1999: 262). Accordingly, since state identity, as a view of a state's place in the world, informs particular conceptions of the proper ends and means of its foreign policy, articulation of identity serves, at the same time, to specify state interests (Banchoff, 1999).

Weldes (1996), while explaining the establishment of the link between identity and interest, suggests the terms of ‘articulation’ and ‘interpellation’. According to Weldes (1996: 284), articulation and interpellation constitute the main dimensions of the representations, which are influential in the formation of state identity and interests. Accordingly, articulation refers to the “process through which meaning is produced out of cultural raw materials or linguistic resources”(Weldes, 1996: 284), whereas interpellation refers, situating this meaning to the social world to specify the location of the state identity in the world level. Articulation and interpellation results the construction of national interests through producing and situating the meanings.

3. 2. The International System

According to the constructivist IR theory, states and the international system dialectically influence each other. Contrary to the neorealist assumption, according to which systemic structure mostly defines the national interests and foreign policies, constructivism suggests a mutual constitution. This is functionally adapted from the agent-structure debate in social theory to the international politics as explained by Wendt (1987: 337): “all social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the ‘agent-structure problem,’ which situates agents and social structures in relation to one another.” Wendt has argued that it is impossible to deduce security-oriented conceptions of state interest from the systemic condition of anarchy; contrarily, “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992: 395).

Structure affects the state identities as well as state interests and policies. At the same time, state identities have the capacity to impact the structure as well as foreign policy and interests. Rules, as the links between states and structure, and practices, as the method of dealing with rules, form a stable pattern suiting agents’ intentions (Onuf, 1998: 61). To summarize with Wendt (1995: 81):

To analyze the social construction of international politics is to analyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures –cooperative or conflictual- that shape actors’ identities and interests and significance of their material contexts.

To sum up, reality is constructed by the “mutual constitution” of states and the system; i.e. codetermination of agent and structure. As a result of this theoretical assumption, constructivism does not give the ontological priority to any of these (agent or structure). Consequently, constructivists, for instance, accept the anarchy as a structural pattern as neorealists, however, according to them anarchy is “mutually

constituted by actors employing constitutive rules and social practices” (Hopf, 1998: 173). Thus, prevailing social practices at home and abroad become the constraints to the state actions in the foreign policy realm. The table below from Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein’s study summarizes the constructivist arguments (1996: 52-53):




Figure 1: The summary of the argumentations

Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996: 53)

1. Effects of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states’ environments [...] shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states.
2. Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environments [...] shape state identity.
3. Effects of identity (I). Variations in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states.
4. Effects of identity (II). Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities.
5. Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure.

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: ANALYZING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

In this study, it is aimed to figure out where diverse social identities stand in the foreign policy making processes in Turkey in the post-Cold War era. This will be done by examining Turkey's foreign policy options according to the main premises of liberal and constructivist IR theories. As we have already examined, liberal and constructivist IR theories emphasize the role of identity on foreign policy to a considerable extent. Before analyzing the approaches of these theoretical frameworks towards Turkish foreign policy, it is necessary to identify the major social identities participating in Turkey's foreign policy making processes.

In this study, it will be considered basically five identities influential in Turkey's foreign policy making processes: *Kemalist, liberal, extreme nationalist, Kurdish nationalist and Islamic* identities.

The reason for selecting these identities is the high degree of their acceptance in the Turkish society as reflected, for example in national and local elections and in the media. In other words, each is a legitimate part of the political system with important social roots. Here, we should recall a confusion in terminology and the problem it creates in drawing up precise classifications concerning social identities –a point briefly mentioned in Section I. As previously examined, “identity” is constructed on the basis of an understanding of the separateness of the “self” and the “other.” Often times, however, identity operates as a substitute for the expression of one's ideology or worldview, thus making the conceptual distinction between the two problematic. For example, Turkish liberals and Kemalists come under in this category. Do they reflect or represent an identity or an ideology when they define their “self” and the

“other?” They both represent an identity and an ideology. Having noted this analytical difficulty, I shall nevertheless treat them as social identities.

The Kemalist identity, based upon secularism, modernization and nationalism, has a foreign policy vision taking the geographical location where the new regime was set up, the National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*), as its reference (Aras, 2000: 35). The military and bureaucratic elite, People’s Republican Party in the political realm, associations such as Association of Atatürkist Thought, and some journalists such as Mehmet Ali Kışlalı and Toktamış Ateş in the social realm, represent the Kemalist identity today. As I have expressed above, the state identity is the most influential one in the construction of foreign policy. In the case of Turkey, the Kemalist identity as the underlying state identity is the most influential one in the formulation of foreign policy decisions.

The liberal identity, aiming the integration with the capitalist system, amelioration of human rights and democracy, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of different groups in the country, and constraining role of military in politics, is represented by the center-right parties such as Motherland Party and True Path Party, and recently Liberal Democrat Party in the political realm, Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association, Association for Liberal Thinking, and journalists such as Mustafa Erdoğan, Mehmet Barlas, Cengiz Çandar and Etyen Mahçupyan in the social realm.

The extreme nationalist identity, which supports a model of Turkish nationalism that goes far beyond Kemalist territorial and civic nationalism, favors cooperation and even integration with what is perceived to be the historical homeland of the Turkish

people (Aras, 1998: 36). This identity is represented by Nationalist Action Party in the political realm, associations such as Eurasian Center for Strategic Studies and Ideal Hearths and some writers such as Yücel Hacaloğlu and Muzaffer Özdağ in the social realm.

The Kurdish nationalist identity, claiming the acknowledgement of the fundamental rights of the Kurds as a recognized ethnic identity by the central authority, is represented by the People's Democracy Party in the political realm and writers such as Mehmet Metiner and Abdülmelik Fırat in the social realm. Some leftist groups of non-Kurdish origin in Turkey and in Europe also support this identity.

The Islamic identity, searching for the incorporation of Turkey into the "Islamic community of nations," and projects Turkey as a potential leader of the Islamic world, is represented by the newly-founded Happiness Party and Justice and Development Party⁵ in the political realm, and by Islamic sects known as *tarikats*, media corporations such as Kanal 7, STV, Yeni Şafak, Zaman and Akit, and writers such as Ali Bulaç and İsmet Özel in the social realm. Their anti-Western and anti-EU foreign policy vision changed over time to support for Turkey's EU membership.⁶

After examining main theoretical considerations of liberal and constructivist IR theories and qualifying the features of diverse social identities participating the foreign policy making processes in Turkey in the post-Cold War era, I shall attempt

⁵ The Welfare Party was the major Islamic-oriented political party in the 1980s and 1990s. It was banned in 1998. Its banner was taken up by Virtue Party which too was banned in 2001 for unconstitutional acts. The Happiness Party was established in Summer 2001, but one faction defected to form the Justice and Development Party.

⁶ Although I have tried to figure out the representatives of different social identities in Turkey, there are not strict borders between these groups. This creates some practical problems in the analyses. For

to deduce some implications to explain Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In the following lines, I will review the basic propositions of liberal and constructivist IR theories, and then considering these propositions I will try to draw upon the hypotheses that will be instrumental to explain Turkey's foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era.

4. 1. Liberal IR Theory and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War

As we have already examined, the liberal IR theory defined in Moravcsik (1997) depends upon three fundamental assumptions, namely:

1. The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik, 1997: 516).
2. States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics (Moravcsik, 1997: 518).
3. The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior. (Moravcsik, 1997: 520)

Considering these assumptions, we can conclude the following propositions:

1. If there are divergent fundamental beliefs among the competing domestic and/or transnational social identities, then conflict among international actors is more likely to happen rather than the cooperation.

instance, I could not locate the Democratic Left Party, which share the power in Turkey today, into one of these five identities.

2. If the international actors are competing for scarce material goods, then conflict is more likely to happen.
3. If the power to influence social life is unequally distributed among the international actors, then conflict is more likely to happen.
4. If the preferences of different international actors are converging, then cooperation is more likely to happen.
5. If the preferences of different international actors are deadlocked, then conflict is more likely to happen.
6. If the preferences of different international actors are not conditional to each other, then negotiation rather than conflict or cooperation is more likely to happen.

If it is to be identified the independent variables resulting the state behaviors in Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy analysis in a liberal theoretical framework, the competition among the domestic identities (Kemalist, nationalist, liberal, Kurdish and Islamic), the transnational and international identities influencing this competition, and the amount of material goods have to be counted. These variables draw upon the constraints for the formation of state preferences, which are the main instruments of foreign policy making. According to this conceptual scheme of foreign policy making, we can hypothesize that Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era will evolve in the following way:

1. Although the dominant state (care that not national) identity -Kemalist identity- plays the crucial role in the formation of foreign policy behaviors, the other competing identities (liberal, national, Kurdish and Islamic identities) in the

domestic realm have considerable impact on the foreign policy decision making processes.

2. The material scarcity in the foreign and security environment around Turkey constraints the success of cooperation and increases the potentials of conflict. This material scarcity, here, implies especially in the diverging views about the transfer of the natural resources of Central Asia and Caucasus to the West.
3. The underlying differences of divergent identities between Turkey and its environment (for instance Europe, Russia, Iran, Iraq) increase the potentials of conflict and decrease the potentials of cooperation.
4. Since the state preferences of Turkey, the European states, and the Eurasian states are not in deadlocked position (not zero-sum game) and are diversified, negotiations are to be expected as foreign policy behavior rather than conflict or full cooperation.

4. 2. Constructivist IR Theory and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War

As we have already examined, the constructivist IR theory depends upon the following fundamental assumptions, namely (Wendt, 1994: 385):

1. States are the principle units of analysis for international political theory.
2. The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material.
3. State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature of domestic politics.

Considering these assumptions, we can conclude the following propositions:

1. If there exists a change in state identities, then the state interests and, to a some extent, the structure are reconstructed.

2. If there are great debates and discourses in one state, then the international system will also be affected from this discourse to a certain extent.
3. If the configuration of the state identities carries an heterogeneous structure, then the conflicts among these states are more likely to happen.
4. If there are exogeneous effects given to the states, then the identities and interests of the states will change to result in changes in foreign policy behaviors.

If it is to be identified the independent variables resulting the state behaviors in Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy analysis in a constructivist framework, social identities formed in social and historical context (again Kemalist, liberal, nationalist, Kurdish and Islamic identities), and the international structures that impose upon constraints on the formation of identity and interests of the states have to be counted. These variables draw upon the constraints for the formation of state identities, which are the main instruments of foreign policy making through constructing national interests. According to this conceptual scheme of foreign policy making, we can hypothesize that Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era will evolve in the following way:

1. The discourses out of the diverse social identities (Kemalist, liberal, nationalist, Kurdish and Islamic identities) have impacts on the construction of national interests, and concomitantly foreign policy behaviors. These behaviors also influence the structural patterns through constructing norms.
2. The identities that influence the construction of interests and foreign policies are constructed in the social and historical context in which Turkey is situated.

3. The transnational and international social and political ideas (such as globalization or nationalism) have impact upon the construction of state identities (for instance, accentuating the liberal or nationalist discourses) and interests (for instance, imposing some behaviors to close Turkey to Europe or Eurasia).
4. The configuration of the identities in Turkey, Europe, Eurasia and other regions, where Turkey is interrelated, has considerable impact upon the construction of Turkey's identity, interests and foreign policies; and in turn the structure of the interactions.

These hypotheses will provide us analytical frameworks in the following chapters, when it will be analyzed the place of identity in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era within the propositions of liberal and constructivist IR theories. In this respect the following chapter will examine Turkish foreign policy towards Europe; and the last chapter will examine the other option, namely, Eurasian option.

CHAPTER 2:

TURKEY'S EUROPEAN OPTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR

ERA

The end of the Cold War had diversified the strategic options that Turkey had confronted. During the Cold War, the United States, the Western European countries and Turkey had the same strategic aims. A strategic culture against the enemy of Soviet Union under the NATO umbrella had evolved. However, after the end of the Cold War, the options of United States and Western Europe had been varied as well as the options of Turkey. Thus, the patterns of Turkey's relations with the West in general and with Europe in particular have changed. The priorities of the United States and Europe varied. Turkey has found itself in an ambivalence strategic equation between these varying approaches and its own priorities. On the other side, the demise of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has opened up new opportunities and new strategic possibilities for Turkey. There has been realized the traditional and historical affinities between Turkey and the newly founded states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This incited the nationalist reflexes in Turkey and brought nationalism as an important input into Turkish foreign policy. As a result, Turkey has found itself between two fundamental foreign policy options: (i) to accentuate its centuries-old European orientation by integrating with the European Union, which is claimed to be the institutional representation of the European

identity; (ii) to have a sphere of influence and to be leader of the newly independent Turkish Republics in Eurasia.⁷

In this chapter, I will examine Turkey's European option with special respect to the explanations of liberal and constructivist IR theories. In this context, firstly I will search for the institutional and historical contexts that have been influential in the construction of Turkey's European identity. Then, I will review Turkey's relations with Europe in the post-Cold War era within the context of differentiating discourses and debates among diverse identities in Turkey toward Turkey's place in Europe. In so doing, I will touch upon how Turkey's preferences and interests towards Europe have been constructed.

1. INSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS

Turkey, since the Ottoman times, had the common issues with Europe. As Aydın points out (1999: 160) that in the course of the history, “the Turks have been connected to the West, first as a conquering superior and enemy, then as a component part, later as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally.” Ottoman Empire gradually lost its dominant status against Europe and began to perceive Europe as the source of modernization. This perception left its place the process of the internalization of Europe. From the *Tanzimat* era onwards Ottoman Empire commenced to imitate Europe in socio-cultural, political and legal spheres. Giving rights to the minorities in the empire, implementing Western

⁷ For a literature on the options of Turkish foreign policy see: Sayari, Fall 2000; Mango, 1994; Makovsky, 1999.

oriented laws with the proclamation of the Constitutional monarchy can be counted as the examples of this change.

This Europeanization project reached its culmination point by the founding of the Republic. Especially, establishment of political organization in the form of nation-state, which can be assumed as the political extension of the Enlightenment thought of Europe, was perceived as the way of progress. During all the times before the Republican era, Ottoman Empire was in Europe but was not a part of Europe in the sense that the two parties were parts of different civilizations (Aktan, 1999: 56). These two civilizations negatively conceived of each other as being the ‘*other*’ of each (Yurdusev, 1997: 68). It can be said that by the Kemalist reforms, the aim of the Turkish elite was to remove this difference and to create a new “*modern*” and “*civilized*” nation.

From the proclamation of the Republic onwards, Turkey’s reforming elite has perceived Europe as a source of “enlightenment and modernization, and the key driving principles for a future Turkish state” (Fuller, 1999: 161). Along this perception, the founding principles of the Republic were drawn from the Enlightenment thought of Europe. The basic characteristics of the welcomed state identity in the early Republican era moved Turkey toward Europe. These were nationalism and secularism.

Analyzing these characteristics, it can easily be seen that the aim of the modernizing elite was to be integrated within the European states system, incorporation with the Western-centered capitalist world economy, being a part of European identity in

social terms. The first, and the most important characteristic of this project was founding a modern nation-state based on the experience of nationalism in Europe. Kemalism, as a modernization project inspired by Europe, aimed to create a homogenous society in which the nature of the relations between society and state were defined by state (Keyman, 1999: 185). In formulating such a society, elite of the newly emerged Republic attached importance to invent the unique Turkish culture. Culture was to delineate the borderlines of being Turk from the other nations of the world. In this sense, the builders of the new national identity applied an orchestrated campaign to cultivate a Turkish nation (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 23).

The second characteristic of the newly emerging Republic was secularization of the political, even social life. Secularism, by which Europe invented its ‘Europeanness’ out of a Christian legacy, is also one of the underlying features of European civilization. The most important issue that can be counted in this respect was the abandonment of Islamic elements in the formation of national identity. Since the aim in Mustafa Kemal’s understanding was to create a modern state from an empire, Islam became a threat to this formation. As Binnaz Toprak (1981: 45) conforms it was understandable that Islam, as having universal supra-national concept of solidarity, was inimical to the interests of the newly emerging nation-state. In this sense the reforms such as the abolition of the Sultanate, the proclamation of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, abolition of religious courts, dissolution of the dervish orders, reform of the calendar, adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, disestablishment of the state religion, adoption of Latin alphabet, replacing the *sharia*

with European legal codes, closing religious institutions and orders, banning the *fez* and enforcing to dress European style hat, expanding women's rights were pursued.

Kemalist project was fundamentally a modernization project. In this modernizing process, the ultimate model was Europe. Throughout the nation-building process of the Turkish Republic, Westernization (to be equal to Europeanization) has become a legitimizing factor of all the other reforms. Indeed, nationalism was itself a 'Western' concept, which had developed after the French Revolution. Atatürk, who was deeply influenced by the Enlightenment thought system of Europe, specified the "contemporary civilization" (*muasır medeniyet*) as the aim to be reached. He reflected this notion of thought to the reforms he committed. In Robin's views (1998: 152), he committed two ways in the Westernization process: borrowing the European practices of civilization and suppressing the anti-European elements in the domestic sphere.

Within the borders drawn by the afore-mentioned characteristics, elites of Turkey pursued an Europeanization strategy. After 1945, the efforts of Europeanization had also shifted to the realm of foreign policy from the cultural extents (Kubicek, 1999: 162). The main motive of this policy shift was the threat of Soviet Union, and concomitantly communism. Turkey's relations with Soviet Union had paralyzed after the end of the Second World War. Soviet Union did not accept to renew the non-aggression agreement that had been signed in 1925 and would expire in the April of 1945. This combined with the Communist expansionist ideals of the Soviet Russia threatened Turkey and had become an incentive for Turkey to prefer the Western alliance. Turkey was also important for the West in security terms to prevent the

expansion of the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Turkey implemented a Western oriented foreign policy after the Second World War. In this context, it committed the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, included NATO in 1952 and joined the Council of Europe and OECD at their inceptions. In 1959, it applied to be a member of the European Economic Community, which established as the economic axis of the Western alliance in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome; and signed Ankara Treaty in 1963 by which Turkey became an associate member and looked ultimately to gain the full membership.

By the signing of Ankara Treaty, Turkey's relations with the European Community began. Meanwhile Turkey had a strategic importance for the members of the European Community in the bipolar system of that time as being a border patrol of NATO against the Soviet Union. From the signing of the treaty to the 1970s, Turkey's relations with Europe have not experienced difficulties. In 1970s, as a result of paralyzing world economies, the Western states searched for détente with the Soviet Union to decrease the military expenditures. This détente policy slimmed the bonds between Turkey and the states of the Western alliance and the importance of Turkey in security terms relatively decreased (Eralp, 1997: 93-95).

In this era, the World Economic Crisis also harshly influenced the Turkish economy. Under these circumstances, it was very difficult for Turkey to carry out its obligations related with its relations with the European Community. The economic problems were not the sole incompatibility of Turkey with the European Community. There was also a fragmented public opinion towards the Europe in Turkey in 1970s. The businessmen who were the heritage of an isolationist tradition of Turkey and

some radical Islamic and leftist groups were against the European idea and they showed their discontents in the public sphere at those times. The businessmen and some governmental organizations such as State Planning Organization were defending to postpone the customs union not to injure the national development of the country. In this context, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit applied the Community to delay the customs union for five years. This application combined with the Greece's application to be a full member of the Community in 1975 raised the difficulties in the relations between Turkey and the European Union. Moreover by the second half of the 1970s by détente with the Soviet Union the Community initiated the democratic development in Europe and the process, in which 'democracy' is accepted as a part of 'being European', began by which Turkey would bear many difficulties in the following years (Eralp, 1997: 95-99).

Even though there were experienced some difficulties, the relations between Turkey and Europe had not been questioned deeply in identity concerns during much part of the Cold War era. The ideological concerns of the East/West distinction of the era basically colored the relations. Turkey was attributed as an important strategic partner for the containment of the Soviet Union in security terms. Security priorities had masked the identity differences between Turkey and Europe in that era. The military intervention in Turkey had played the great role in the change of the nature of the relations as well as the developments experienced in the European Community. After this time, political issues had gained the priority. Especially after the collapse of the bipolar world system in the beginning of the nineties, the difference between the Turkish way of modernization and the European civilization itself had been clearly exposed.

2. EUROPE AS A TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY OPTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

2. 1. The Review of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Europe in the Post-Cold War Era

In the Cold War years Turkey was significantly important for the European security. This was indubitable in those years and Turkey used this advantage in favor of itself to gain economic and military support from the West. However, the end of the Cold War shifted the former balance of security. By the removal of the Soviet threat, Turkey's importance for the defense of Europe relatively decreased. In 1991, Turkey committed to the Gulf War in the side of the Western alliance to show its strategic importance to the West although it lost a great deal of its economic interests in the region. However, this does not mean that Turkey became an unimportant state in security terms. The emergence of the new geopolitics also put Turkey into an important position. On the other side, the end of the Cold War decreased the importance of geopolitical issues, at least for the Europeans. The issues related with democracy and human rights gained prominence. Turkey, on the other hand, seemed to face geopolitical opportunities in the post-Cold War era. These differentiating perspectives between Turkey and Europe have become the main problematic of the relations between Turkey and Europe (Karaosmanoğlu, 1999).

Europe has greater interest in democratization in Turkey than does USA, whose strategic security concerns dominate most other interests. Richard Holbrooke, then

assistant secretary of state for Europe, in 1995 has enumerated the sensitivities of Europe with regard to Turkey. Accordingly, he has firstly emphasized the importance of the development of democracy, secular state, prosperous economy, and human rights standards. He then counts Turkey's importance for its geopolitical location that is close to the strategically important regions such as the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, Middle East, and Caspian Region (Tirman, 1998: 61).

As seen from Holbrooke's evaluations, the democratic issues have prominence over the strategic ones in the eyes of Europeans. On the other side, the prospect of membership offers an important means of influencing Turkish policy. As Larrabee writes (1997: 168), "if Turkey believes it has no prospect for EU membership, Ankara will have less incentive to improve its human rights record." Thus, for the advocates of liberalism in Turkey, it is important to keep the European Union option open even if Turkey may not be ready for admission for a long time. Besides this democratizing effect, institutionalizing the relations with the EU would provide Turkey the opportunity to balance its relations with the US and have wider space for maneuvers. Severing ties with the EU increases dependence on the US. In fact, the criticisms coming from Europe are occasionally mentioned in the US as well. A divided US Congress gives the impression that a difficult period may be awaiting Turkey in the relations with the US. Furthermore, economic ties with Europe also take an undeniable importance for a well functioning economy in Turkey. Considering these factors, there is no Western option for Turkey outside of Europe (Çandar and Fuller, 2001: 37).

However, there are some problems in Turkey's European Union option. One hesitation of Europe about integration of Turkey into the Union is the security issues that would arise upon integration. That is, Turkey's inclusion to the Union would shift the borders of the European Union towards to East that would make Middle East and Caucasus as neighbors for European Union. This also means that the security issues of aforementioned regions such as such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, Middle East peace process, unstable Iranian and Iraqi regimes, would relatively become to the European agenda. Europe is reluctant to take part in these issues. At this point it should be noted that the problems in the Caucasus are relatively important for the security of the Eastern flank of Europe. In this sense combined with the ethnic problems in the Balkans, Europe would gain from Turkey's inclusion to the Union by which it would expand its boundaries as if it contains these unstable areas.

One of the main problems on the agenda of the parties is the debate over the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The establishment of a European defense and security system independent of the NATO is leading to frictions between Turkey and the EU. Turkey wants to have a vote about the issues related with the ESDI. However, the EU members are against the participation of Turkey to the decision-making processes of ESDI until it would be a full member to the Union. Turkey is also against the use of NATO's facilities within the framework of ESDI, where Turkey has no vote for the decisions. Turkey's exclusion from even from the security architecture of Europe, raises the hesitations about the Union. Because as known, security was one of the strongest links tying Turkey to Europe and vice

versa. Thus, we have come to a period, in which the Copenhagen criteria affect Turco-EU relations regarding the security concerns.

Besides these hesitations, there are a number of reasons that create difficulties in the relations between Turkey and the European Union. Firstly, European attitudes toward Turkish membership remain ambivalent, may be for the differences between the political cultures of both parties. Thus Europe is not adopting a more proactive approach to Turkish membership. Secondly, this option also requires important changes in Turkey's own policy, especially toward human rights, Cyprus and the Kurdish issues. The nationalist impulse in Turkey is not willing to make these changes, even for the European membership. Thirdly, it would take a long time to be fully integrated with the European Union. Even under the best conditions, Turkey would be ready for the membership at least for 15 to 20 years (Larrabee, 2000: 49).

2. 2. Foreign Policy Discourses and Debates among Diverse Social Identities in the Formation of State Preferences and the Construction of National Interests

Given the afore-mentioned institutional and historical background on the formation of Turkey's European identity, and the review of Turkish foreign policy towards Europe in the post-Cold War era, let me examine the to figure out how the diverse social identities have influenced the foreign policy making in Turkey. This will enable us analytical instruments to conceive the formation of state preferences (according to liberal IR theory) and the construction of state interests (according to constructivist IR theory). Here, it will be analyzed the impacts of the diverse national

identities other than Kemalism, which is the dominant identity in the state level. Kemalism, also has an important social and political base in Turkey, however, since it is the dominant identity affecting directly the foreign policy decisions, I will not include it in the following paragraphs. There will be some references to Kemalism in analyzing the other social identities, namely, liberal, nationalist, Kurdish and Islamic identities.

2. 2. 1. Liberal Groups

The liberal identity in Turkey is represented by the center-right parties such as Motherland Party and True Path Party, and recently Liberal Democrat Party in the political realm, Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association, Association for Liberal Thinking, and some writes such as Mustafa Erdoğan, Mehmet Barlas, Cengiz Çandar and Etyen Mahçupyan in the social realm.

Liberals welcome the European option for Turkish foreign policy, in the sense that Turkey's liberal orientation would be consolidated by means of this option. According to these groups, Turkey's integration with the world capitalist system, the amelioration of human rights and democracy in Turkey, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of different groups in the country, constraining the role of military in politics, and having a well-functioning political competence are only possible with the critical decision of Turkey to prefer the European option.

Considering the main premises of liberal IR theory, the liberal groups along with other social identities have the capability to influence the formation of state preferences. Let me examine this process. The liberal identity has played some role in the formulation of state preferences; however, its role has been constrained by the borders of the Kemalist premises. For instance, Turkey has realized some liberal economic and political reforms within the context of its bid to be a member of the European Community/Union; but these reforms, for instance, have not been touched upon the acknowledgement of the ethnic identities in Turkey, which is a pro-liberal policy while anti-Kemalist policy in the sense that Kemalism does not recognize different ethnic identities in line with its homogeneous nature. However, this does not falsify liberal IR theory; because, according to this theory, the dominant social identity has the priority in the formation of state preferences.

Although liberal IR theory *does* accept the capabilities of transnational identities in the formation of state preferences, its main view on the foreign policy formulations is from state to system; i.e. a bottom-up view. Thus, when it is considered the influence of supranational trends on the formation of domestic identities and the national interests, the constructivist IR theory best explains the mechanism of the foreign policy decision-making processes. When we locate this to the impacts of liberal identities to the foreign policy making processes, we will have the opportunity to analyze the impact of globalization, as an exogenous variable, to the liberal discourse in Turkey. In this respect the following analysis will fill the gaps of liberal IR theory.

The discourse of liberalism has gained momentum after the end of the Cold War. By “the penetration of globalization into all aspects of life” (Aras, 2000: 41) after the

end of the Cold War has accelerated the process. At the same time, we should note that Turkey's bid for the European Union membership also brought the strengthening of the liberal discourse in the country. The globalization process imposed liberal democracy as if it is the "universal political standard of civilization" (McGrew, 1997). Looking at the democratization process in Latin America and Eastern Europe and the common policies of European Union on democracy, according to which democratization has become an important foreign policy instrument towards the third parties, can easily depict the strength of the liberal discourse in the world level. It is of course impossible for a country at the threshold of the European Union not to be affected from the liberalization discourse. As a result, human rights and democratization, liberal market economy, the necessity of the integration with the European Union, demands for restructuring in economic, political, cultural and social fields has dominated the agenda of the 1990s in Turkey.

As seen, the interactions of the globalization and liberal identities in Turkey approached Turkey towards Europe. This also influenced the identity patterns in Turkey. In this respect, there had been realized many liberalizing reforms throughout 1990s: Some restrictions on the use of Kurdish language were removed; the private broadcasting companies has ended the state's monopoly over broadcasting; articles 141, 142 and 163 of Turkish penal code, relating to the ideological advocacy of communism, separatism and religions based governments, were repealed; limitations on the political participation by trade unions, academicians, and students were eased; a State Ministry of Human Rights and a Parliamentary Human Rights Commission were established (Kılıç, 1998: 103).

2. 2. 2. Extreme Nationalist Groups

The national identity is represented by Nationalist Action Party in the political realm, associations such as Eurasian Center for Strategic Studies and Ideal Hearths and some writers such as Yücel Hacıoğlu and Muzaffer Özdağ in the social realm. 1990s has observed the rise of nationalism in Turkey, in parallel with the rise of liberalization policies. There are several reasons for the rise of nationalism. The new configuration of the geopolitics by the end of the Cold War, the deterioration of Turkey's relations with the European Union, and the internationalization of the Kurdish issue after the Gulf War of 1991 can be assumed as the main reasons. Some external events occurred by the end of the Cold War played an important role in the "reimagination of identity" (Yavuz, 1998). The independence of former Soviet Republics by the demise of the Soviet Union, the political reemergence of Muslim communities in the Balkans by the dissolution of Yugoslavia increased the consciousness of a national identity in the Turkish public. Besides this new geopolitical configuration, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Bosnia crisis, and recurring tensions with Greece (especially over Cyprus) have also strengthened the nationalist impulse (Lesser, 2000: 9). Turkey, in 1990s, for the first time in Republican history, considered the protection of Muslims outside its borders as an integral duty of its foreign policy (Yavuz, 1998: 37).

As a result, nationalist groups began to search for new options rather than Europe. They have shown the identity differences between Turkey and Europe as the main reason not to cooperate with the European Union. Their claims become meaningful according to the propositions of liberal IR theory. Europe's emphasis on the human

rights record and Kurdish issue in Turkey has been attributed as the main indicator of these conflicting identities. According to them it is impossible to be integrated with Europe in the existence of underlying differences between Turkey and Europe. Accordingly, in the conception of nationalists, Europe is a threat against the indivisible integrity of Turkey with its state and nation; and for this, Europe is supporting the Islamists and Kurds, under the pretext of more tolerance and freedom of action for their views (Lesser, 2000: 8). Nationalists easily ignore that the emphasis on democracy and human rights gain a meaningful assertion within the boundaries of European identity. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the problems of human rights and democracy between Turkey and Europe are sprang out of the diverging identities as liberal IR theory claims.

In a constructivist framework, we can claim that the accentuation of nationalism in Turkey, interrelated with the Europe's foreign policy behaviors, have resulted in the deterioration of Turkey-European Union relations. This interaction has created the norms of the structure of the relations. Turkey's frustration in its relations with the European Union has reinforced the nationalist impulse. Europe's position during the Bosnia crisis, and Turkey's losses after the Gulf War were the first signs of deteriorating relations between the parties. In the following years, the integration of Eastern and Central European countries to the European Union has raised the questions for the definition of "Europeanness" and contributed to the re-examination of Turkey's relations with Europe. Turkey, as a long-standing associate member of the EU, has seen former communist and newly independent states ahead of Turkey in the membership queue. The Luxembourg Summit, when it became evident that EU did not even contemplate the start of an accession process for Turkey, has deepened

the tension between Turkey and the European Union. As a result, the nationalist impulse has become an obstacle to the Europeanization of Turkey, which connotes the cohabitation of multiple identities and cultural traits within the country in a legal framework.

The perception of the nationalists toward the EU policies to attribute them the acts of intervention to the state sovereignty of Turkey creates irrevocable problems in Turkey's bid for European integration. This led the foreign policy horizons of Turkey to the U.S., which does not question Turkey concerning its domestic politics, as does the EU. However, this does not mean that the nationalist outlook allow the intensification of the relations between Turkey and US. Contrarily, the nationalist tendency has the potential to complicate Turkey's relations with the United States, especially Turkey's policies about the political status of the Northern Iraq. More active nationalist sentiment does not allow close cooperation with the United States in regional issues, including the use of Turkish facilities for contingencies in the Gulf, the Balkans, and it makes cooperation less automatic and less predictable (Lesser, 2000: 12).

2. 2. 3. Kurdish Nationalists

The Kurdish identity is represented by the People's Democracy Party in the political realm and writers such as Mehmet Metiner and Abdülmelik Fırat in the social realm. The leftist groups other than the Kurdish origin in Turkey and in Europe also support this identity. The Kurdish question of Turkey, and the debate and discourses around

this issue is one of the most important issues of in Turkey's European policy. In Nachmani's terms (1999) "the Kurdish problem confronts Turkey with a complex challenge that threatens its territorial integrity and overshadows its external relations."⁸ Sezer (1992: 30-31), also sees the issue as "intimately and often conflictually intermeshed with fundamental issues pertaining to the country's territorial integrity, the nature of its political regime and the orientation of its foreign policy." The end of the Gulf War took it in the agenda of the international society while it has completely internationalized by the flee of Abdullah Öcalan from Syria to Russia and Italy and his arrest in Kenya in 1998-1999 period.

The proponents of the Kurdish identity claim the acknowledgement of the fundamental rights of Kurds as a distinct recognized national group by the central authority. Mainly, the problem stems from the failure of "ethos of modernization to create a unitary state and the participatory society within which Kurdish ethnic and cultural identity might have flourished without challenging the state" (Sezer, 1992: 31). Although there had seen some Kurdish uprisings throughout the Republican history, by the mid-1980s, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) led the emergence of an increasingly violent Kurdish insurgency in Southeastern Anatolia. At the same time, a new Kurdish political activism has been seen across the political spectrum. Many political parties have been established in 1990s to represent the Kurdish population in Turkey. Their demand was to be granted by cultural, social and political rights, and represented equally in the society. The regime that was established following the 1980 coup has enacted a restrictive Law on Publications in Languages other than Turkish, but that law was repealed in 1991. Today, Kurdish is no longer banned in

⁸ On this issue see: Yeğen, 1998; Barkey and Fuller, 1998; Robins, 1993.

the context of cultural activities. In practice, Kurdish music, folklore, and customs are all permitted, as are publications in Kurdish in any form. Now, the main demands of the Kurds remain the formal recognition of their existence as a people inside Turkey, to allow Kurdish to be taught in schools, to allow Kurdish-language in broadcasting, and to enjoy some degree of local governance. However, Ankara sees these demands as the derivations of classification, categorization, and regulation of minority languages, and perceives as threat to the unitary structure of the country (Gündüz, 2001: 24).

Within the borders of the liberal IR theory, the competence to influence the state preferences by the proponents of the Kurdish identity have seen itself in the Turkey's foreign policy toward Europe. Although homogeneous nature of the Turkish identity does not allow for the institutionalization of minorities along racial lines, individuals may be able to realize their aspirations within the democratic system (Gündüz, 2001: 24) as a precondition to the European Union membership. The aspirations of the Kurdish groups are constrained by the dominant state identity in line with the premises of liberal IR theory. The political elite except extreme nationalists believes that there should be some amelioration in the issue at least for the EU membership. For instance, during his speech to the Diyarbakır Regional ANAP Meeting in December 1999, deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz said, "Today I am here since I believe that the road to the EU passes through Diyarbakır." Stressing that democracy is the right of both Kurds and Turks, he proposed the abolishment of the State of Emergency (OHAL) in the region (Yılmaz, 1999). However, it should be noted that still, the Turkish approach towards the Kurdish problem contrasts with the consensus

in most EU countries about the treatment of ethnic minorities after the end of the Cold War.

There are some conflicting preferences between Turkey and the countries of Europe. According to liberal IR theory, it is not expected a near cooperation between Europe and Turkey in the existence of conflicting fundamental convictions on the issue. Many parliamentarians of the European Union have difficulties in sharing the Turkish view on the issue that there are no minorities in the country except those explicitly mentioned in the treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This is commentated as a narrow legal approach to the phenomenon of identity, which is mainly based on the nature of the Turkish identity that suggests the doctrine of the indivisibility of the Turkish nation and state (Kramer, 1998: 220). The emergence of ethnic conflicts, especially in the Balkans, with the demise of the bipolar world order increased the consciousness of the European countries on the acknowledgement of minority rights. This, combined with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, has brought Turkey's Kurdish issue under closer scrutiny. The Europeans argue that the Kurds are an ethnic minority that deserves protection of its distinct identity and Turkish state should recognize their identity. On the other side the Turkish statesmen do not accept this thesis and argue that the Kurds are not minority but the equal citizens of the country, and the problem in the Southeastern region is fundamentality the problem of terrorism. For instance, Turkish foreign minister İsmail Cem's writes (1999) that "It is not an excuse or a pretext, but it is obvious that some of the difficulties were mainly due to the horrible terrorist/secessionist campaign which we faced." Cem also adds (1999) that terrorism came into its ends in Turkey, so the reform in this region will accelerate.

These diverging perspectives have exacerbated the tensions with the EU. Many Turks have convinced that Europe does not want to understand Turkey's problems. European reactions to human rights violations and military campaigns in South-Eastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq have increased "the indignation in Turkey, where the Kurdish issue is strictly viewed through the prism of the territorial integrity of the state" (Jung and Piccoli, 2000: 94). The Turks perceive the West's incitement for political solutions to the Kurdish issue as part of a tricky agenda aimed at undermining the state's unity.

The basic premise of the constructivist IR theory, namely the mutual constitution of agents and structure, has the capacity to explain the location of this issue in Turkish foreign policy making. As known, the discourses for the acknowledgement of the minority rights in Europe; and the increase of uprisings against the central authority by the Kurdish terrorist groups are the coinciding events (structuration between agent and structure). Turkish foreign policy, influenced by the crises in its Southeastern region, recreated itself against the European Union; and has been forced to situate itself as if defending the European liberal values within the boundaries of the dominant state ideology of Kemalism.

2. 2. 4. Islamic Groups

The Islamic identity is represented by the Happiness Party and Justice and Development Party in the political realm, several Islamic groups so-called *tarikats*,

media corporations such as Kanal 7, STV, Yeni Şafak, Zaman and Akit, and writers such as Ali Bulaç and İsmet Özel in the social realm. In the recent years the Islamic groups have increased their power to influence the formation of state preferences and construction of the national interests. The rise of the Islamic movements dates back to the 1980 military coup, when the military elite saw Islam as a “bulwark against communism and a substitute for class-based ideologies” (Sakallıoğlu, 1998: 17). The military government embraced Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the new state ideology. New textbooks for civilian and military schools were prepared to disseminate this ideology.⁹ In the following period, the neoliberal policies of Turgut Özal has led the rise of a pro-Islamist bourgeoisie, the formation of a new Islamist elite by the expansion of media and religious education (Yavuz, 1998: 29). In many occasions, the state has used the language of the Islamists to “examine certain European attitudes toward Bosnia Herzegovina, Chechnya, Cyprus and Turkey” (Yavuz, 1998: 33).

However, in the following years, the Islamic movements have enormously strengthened so that the state could not control them. The expansion of mass media and communications, higher education, the development of a pro-Islamist bourgeoisie have played a critical role in the new public emergence of an Islamic identity discourse in the Turkish society.¹⁰ The rise of urban *tarikats* and the development of a group of Muslim intellectuals in the post-Cold War period created a new domain for the politicians seeking votes in a more democratic system, as

⁹ For instance a textbook, Okutan and Durukan, 1981, has aimed to demonstrate a close connection between Sunni Islam and nationalism and between the Prophet Muhammed and Atatürk.

¹⁰ The market share of Islamic journals and newspapers was only 7 percent before 1980; by 1996, it had risen to 47 percent, with 110 weekly and monthly Islamist journals in circulation. In addition, there are over 16 national and 15 regional television stations, as well as 300 local ones. Radio is even more extravagant: 35 national stations, 109 regional and almost 1000 local ones. Also by 1997, there

compared the earlier periods. Many graduates of *İmam Hatip* schools have filled bureaucratic positions in the government during 1980s and 1990s. As a result of new bureaucratic structuring, the Turkish secular elite lost its former dominance and coherence in political affairs (Yavuz, 1998: 32).

On the other side, the accentuating Islamic identity has created new political opportunities for the Islamist political party of Turkey, namely Welfare Party (RP). In 1995 general elections, RP, gaining 21,4 percent of the votes, has become the leading party. And after the elections a new government, consists of RP and DYP (True Path Party), has come to power. This development gave Turkey's Middle East policy a new dimension. Prime Minister Erbakan, the leader of Refah, has made rapprochement in the relations with the Islamic world a top priority. For instance, 23 billion dollars natural gas deal was concluded with Iran in August 1996. Furthermore, he has sought to develop a Muslim economic grouping, the D-8 consisting of Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Turkey, as an alternative to the G-7. However, it should also be noted that Erbakan has been careful not to take any major foreign policy initiatives that would "seriously jeopardize the relations with the West" (Larrabee, 1997: 149). This resulted in the so-called "28 February process" in 1997, by which the National Security Council forced the government to enact a set of new laws to prevent the rise of Islamic movements to a level to jeopardize the secular nature of the Republican regime.

After the 28 February process, the pressures against the government have increased to force it to resign. Finally, the Refahyol government has resigned at the middle of

were 561 Imam Hatip schools with 492809 students; only 37 of them had been founded by the state. See: Yavuz, 1998: 31.

1997. And Welfare Party has been banned by a decision of the Constitutional Court in 1998. Then, a new party, namely Virtue Party (FP) has been founded in the same year, which would also be banned in June 2001 by the Constitutional Court. The main rationale of the foreign policy behaviors of the Welfare Party that has displayed endeavors to move Turkey towards the Islamic world was the conviction that the identities of Turkey and that of the Europe were diverging to be integrated under one umbrella. As the liberal IR theorists suggest, the divergent fundamental beliefs between Europe and Turkey were seen as the sources of friction rather than cooperation.

After the closing of the Virtue Party, the Islamic identity in the political realm has been divided into basically two separate parties, the Happiness Party and the Justice and Development Party. While the Happiness Party is insistence to continue its decades-old ideas on foreign policy realm inherited from the Welfare and Virtue Parties, which I have explained in the above paragraphs, the Justice and Development Party seeks to stand itself to the center-right position in Turkish politics. For instance, in their program, they favor the European Union membership.

On the other hand, the rise of Islam, especially in the first half of the 1990s, has played an important role for the creation of an alternative discourse against the Europeanization, namely neo-Ottomanism, to which we can analyze with respect to the constructivist IR theory. According to Hakan Yavuz (1998: 22) the interactions of the following developments led to the emergence of neo-Ottomanism: the domestic societal transformations within the emergence of a new liberal political and economic milieu; and the international developments such as the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the Cyprus crisis, Turkey's exclusion from the European Union processes, European inaction to the crises in Balkans, and the rise of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Southeastern Turkey.

In neo-Ottomanism, it can be seen the dialectical relations between the domestic and international discourses to result a new foreign policy behavior in Turkish foreign policy. These discourses intersubjectively influence each other as in the constructivist IR formulation of foreign policy. This idea suggested that Turkey could play a major role in its region by means of its Islamic identity as in the Ottoman times. As suggested in the constructivist IR theory, the policy was formulated within the social and historical context. Özal opened this debate arguing (1992:14 quoted in Yavuz, 1998: 24) that:

Just as it was during the Ottoman Empire, it is possible today to transcend ethnic differences through Islamic identity. I believe that most powerful single constituting element of identity in this society is Islam. It is religion that blends Muslims of Anatolia and the Balkans. Therefore, Islam is a powerful cement of co-existence and cooperation among diverse Muslim groups... Being a Turk in the ex-Ottoman space means being a Muslim or vice versa.

Here it is needed to note that there are some permeabilities between the liberal and Islamic identities. The events that resulted the rise of neo-Ottomanism are the results of the accentuation of liberalism in Turkey. Furthermore, some liberal writers such as Cengiz Çandar is publicly known as the advocates of the neo-Ottoman foreign policy vision (Yavuz, 1998).

CHAPTER 3:

TURKEY'S EURASIAN OPTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR

ERA

In this chapter, I will examine the Eurasian option in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Since it has been examined the historical and institutional bases of the Turkish identity from the previous chapter, and since the countries of the Eurasian region were under the dominance of the Former Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era, I will begin my analysis by reviewing the Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia in the post-Cold war era. Then I will examine the discourses and debates among influential social groups in the formation of the state preferences and construction of national interests in Turkey's foreign policy towards Eurasia.

1. The Review of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Eurasia in the Post-Cold War Era

By the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emergence of newly independent states with which Turkey has historical and cultural affinities in Central Asia offered Turkey a new sphere of influence. Especially, the nationalist segments of the Turkish society has seen this option as a new opening opportunity for the Turkish foreign policy. As Sezer (1992: 26) anticipated in the early 1990s “the welfare and security of Turkish minorities in neighboring countries [has been] included in Turkey's foreign policy agenda.” A sense of nationalism and ethnic affinity has also been

added to the *realpolitik* nature of Turkish foreign policy. By the collapse of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, “Turkey’s influence might be extended to a loosely fashioned ‘Empire’” (Tunander, 1995: 415). Turkey, as in the era of the Ottoman Empire, has become the center of the Balkans, Caucasus and the Central Asia. It has conducted to present itself as “the first among equals –economically, culturally, politically” (Tunander, 1995: 415). The anticipations one scholar, (Sezer, 1992: 28), in the early 1990s has been confirmed in the last decade:

The gathering momentum of nationalistic undercurrents and trends in the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the Turkic republics in Central Asia could, however, challenge Turkish moderation, forcing it to take up the protection of Turkish minorities and the promotion of Turkish nationalism in the adjoining regions as a strategic goal. The combined impact of Turkey’s exclusion from Europe and the West’s apparent enthusiasm for and support of Kurdish nationalism would only speed up and reinforce this process.

The assertion, here, is not that nationalism has been the primary rationale of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s; however, it is needed to emphasize that nationalism has been an important determinant of Turkish foreign policy in this era. The new configuration of the geopolitics by the end of the Cold War, the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the European Union, and the internationalization of the Kurdish issue after the Gulf War of 1991 can be assumed as the main reasons for the rise of nationalist sentiment.

This sentiment has been visible until the Helsinki Summit of the European Union, when Turkey has been given a candidate statute to the European Union. Although Turkish foreign policy has been Western oriented throughout the Republican history, the dynamics of the post-Cold War incited Turkey to diversify its loyalties from Europe and to remember the ethnic affinities between Turkish speaking countries.

This was one way or another coincided with the rise of nationalism in the domestic politics of Turkey. Besides this nationalistic background, the new opportunities also pushed Turkey within the terms of geopolitics while European Union was emphasizing the deepening European identity on the liberal values of democratization and human rights. These differentiating perspectives also deepened the tension in the relations with Europe. Let examine the geopolitical opportunities that Turkey has found itself by the demise of the bipolar world system.

The end of the Cold War led to fundamental changes for Turkey: new influence in Central Asia and the Black Sea Region. The independence of the former Soviet Republics has created new energy potentials for Turkey. The rich energy resources of these Republics attracted Turkey. Besides these resources, the transition of them to the West also created new opportunities to Turkey. The prominent energy pipeline routes on the agenda are Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline and the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Besides these an alternative pipeline is the “Blue Stream” project, by which it is aimed to transport natural gas to Turkey underneath the Black Sea. Turkey hopes a great economic profit from these projects. However, these energy projects also resurfaced the old historical rivalry between Russia and Turkey in the geopolitical and economic realms (Larrabee, 2000: 26).¹¹ The Chechens issue has been another issue of conflict between Turkey and Russia in 1990s. Despite there existed a considerable amount of Chechen oriented citizens in Turkey, official Turkish policy toward Chechnya has been cautious due to its own problems with Kurdish separatism (Larrabee, 2000: 24). In the end of the 1990s, during Prime Minister Ecevit’s Moscow visit in November 1999, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement on this

¹¹ For an elaborate evaluation of the relations between Turkey and Russia in the post-Cold War era see: Sezer, 2000.

issue. By this agreement both sides has agreed not to support the terrorist activities reciprocally (Sezer, 2000: 66).

By the increase of ties with the Eurasian Turkic countries, Turkey opened cultural centers and schools in most of the Central Asian countries and provided training and technical assistance for thousands of Central Asian students. Ankara also expanded its television broadcasting to extend its cultural influence in Central Asia (Larrabee, 2000: 27). At those times, it was seen a tendency that an intensive cooperation with these states can also be an important alternative to the European integration, especially in the nationalist circles in Turkey. *The Economist* stated this as “Turkey's meeting with the East after 70 years of Europeanization project” (quoted in Yeşilada, 1992: 46). This was not publicly exposed by the Turkish state, however, above-mentioned tendency combined with the trend of Europe to expand towards the Eastern Europe, where the former autocratic states were shifting to the democracies, created new difficulties in Turkey’s relations with Europe. Turkey’s effort to expand its ties in Central Asia has met with mixed results.

Larrabee (2000: 27-28) enumerates the reasons for Turkey’s spotty record. Firstly, Turkey has overemphasized the linguistic and cultural affinities with the Central Asian countries. Secondly, the domestic problems such as the growth of Kurdish separatism and the challenge posed by the rise of Islamic forces in Turkish politics have diverted Turkey’s attention from the region. Thirdly, Turkey’s threat perceptions from the different countries other than the Eurasian region have also diverted Turkey’s attention from Central Asia and Caucasus. Turkey’s threat perceptions in the 1990s were basically from Syria and Iraq, instability in the

Balkans; and the deterioration of relations with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean. Fourthly, the economic scarcity and financial problems in Turkey during 1990s prevented Turkey to provide the type of large-scale economic assistance and investment that the states in the region need and want. Fifthly, the considerations of Pan-Turkis groups in Turkey who pretended to become the leader in Central Asia and the Caucasus offended some Central Asian governments, who have just emancipated from the Soviet rule.

Thus, as the time being, it was becoming clear that at least in the short run “Central Asia’s systemic dependence on Russia was more powerful than its ethnic or organic ties to Turkey” (Tunander, 1995: 414). Hence, Turkey began to use its affiliation with newly independent states as its advantage in the framework of European relations. This policy change can be seen in the expressions of Turkish foreign minister İsmail Cem (1999):

...the post cold-war political framework witnessed the appearance or the confirmation of several independent states. Out of the multitude of those “new” states, almost all –in the Balkans, in the Caucasus or in Central Asia- are those with whom Turkey shares a common history or a common language and cultural affinity. This provides Turkey with a new international environment of historical, political and economic dimensions. Turkey thus becomes a “center” for the emerging Eurasian reality and constitutes Western Europe’s major historical, cultural and economic opening to Eastern horizons.

These newly independent Central Asian countries attracted the attention of the international society due to its natural resources. Some analysts argue that the Caspian Sea Basin includes 3 percent of oil and 7 percent of natural gas resources of the world (Partridge, 2000). The transition of those resources to the world markets

brought Turkey into a significant position. Although Turkey has not rich energy resources it occupies an important position with its geographical proximity to both Caspian Sea Basin and the Persian Gulf Region. The dilemma here in European relations is that USA is the forerunning state that uses the strategic and geographic advantages of Turkey in an effective way. The Persian Gulf region and the Caspian Basin are in the strategic calculations of America more than of Europe. On the other hand the Europe sees Mediterranean Region importantly than USA in strategic terms (Holmes, 2000). In such a strategic context, EU has doubts to accept a USA led Turkey to the Union not to be used for American interests by means of Turkey. This also plays a critical role for the accentuation of Turkey's option for the strategic partnership with the United States.

In addition to the constraints in the Central Asia, there are also limits in the Caucasus for the execution of the Eurasian option for the Turkish policy makers. Turkey's poor relations with Armenia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian allegations of Ottoman massacre during the First World War pose an obstacle to an expansion of Turkey's influence in the Caucasus. Furthermore, Russia's political ambitions and military presence in Armenia and in Georgia constraints Turkey's ability to expand towards the region (Larrabee, 2000: 29). Additionally, the ambivalence of Azerbaijan's political future is another constraint towards a comprehensive Turkish influence in Caucasus.

2. Foreign Policy Discourses and Debates among Diverse Social Identities in the Formation of State Preferences and the Construction of National Interests

Given the the review of Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia in the post-Cold War era, let us examine the considerations of the social group identities on the policies towards Eurasia. This will enable us analytical instruments to conceive the role of identity on the formation of state preferences (according to liberal IR theory) and the construction of state interests (according to constructivist IR theory). As in the previous chapter, I will try to the approaches of social identities other than Kemalism, which are the most influential in Turkey's relations with Eurasia, namely, liberal, nationalist, and Islamic identities.

2. 1. Liberal Groups

As explored in the previous chapter, the European option is the main preference of liberal groups in Turkey. They approach relations with the Eurasian countries as instrumental to accentuate Turkey's relations with Europe (Çandar and Fuller, 2001). Accordingly, Turkey should utilize its priority among the newly emerged Turkish Republic as a card to be preferred by the European Union. Furthermore, Turkey should contribute to the consolidation of democratic premises in these countries; and this is only possible by the realization of European option, especially in the existence of the strong authoritarian tradition in Turkey.

As known, one of the main premises of liberal IR theory is that the material scarcity in foreign and security environment around a state constraints the success of cooperation and increases the potential of conflict. In this vein, utilizing Turkey's ethnic affiliation with the Eurasian states and Turkey's Western orientation to have great shares in the transfer of material resources of the Eurasia to Europe accounts much in the liberal conception. Accordingly, Turkey would be the more advantageous state of the region in the distribution of the materials. Liberals argue that distancing Turkey from Europe to Eurasia means distancing from democratic consolidation in the country, also accounts in the liberal IR theory. Because in the existence of Iranian and Russian identities in Eurasia, a Turkey, distanced from Europe will shift to the authoritarian tradition to compete with the preferences of these states.

The idea that Turkey would contribute to the democratic consolidation in the Eurasian states can best be examined within the context of constructivist IR theory. Accordingly, the interaction of systemic influences with the domestic dynamics would result in identity changes and these changes, in turn, would affect the foreign policy behaviors and the patterns of interaction. In this vein, the influence of Turkey on the democratic consolidation in these states would improve their systemic ties with Europe, which will contribute to the accentuation of the democratic discourse in the domestic and international realms. Thus, when it is considered the influence of international trends on the formation of domestic identities and the national interests, the constructivist IR theory becomes important. Here, the liberal RI theory also sufficient to explain this interaction. Because the interdependence between the

international actors constraints the behaviors of the Eurasian countries to implement the democratic implementations.

2. 2. Extreme Nationalist Groups

The nationalist impulse seen in 1990s can be observed in Turkey's relations with the Eurasian states. The reasons of the rise of nationalism in Turkey -the new configuration of the geopolitics by the end of the Cold War, the deterioration of Turkey's relations with the European Union, and the internationalization of the Kurdish issue after the Gulf War of 1991- led Turkey to move its relations with these countries. As a result, centuries-old direction of Turkey's Western-orientation has become under scrutiny. The analysis of liberal IR theory in the previous chapter for Europe is also valid for Eurasia. Accordingly, Europe's emphasis on the human rights record and Kurdish issue in Turkey has been attributed as the main indicator of these conflicting identities. According to the nationalists it is impossible to be integrated with Europe in the existence of underlying differences between Turkey and Europe. Thus, Eurasia should be the alternative, where the nationalist groups assume the identities as converging in terms of history, ethnic origin and cultural similarities.

To evaluate the role of nationalism in the constructivist framework, we can claim that the rise of nationalism in Turkey, interrelated with the Europe's foreign policy behaviors to exclude Turkey from the European processes in 1990s have resulted in the deterioration of Turkey-European Union relations and the accentuation of the

Eurasian option. This interaction has created the norms of the structure in Turkey's relations with Europe and Eurasia. For instance, by the changing patterns of the norms, Turkey began to use its advantage in Europe's relations with the Eurasian countries.

2. 3. Islamic Groups

As I have stated with reference to its process in the previous chapter, in the recent years the Islamic groups have increased their power to influence the formation of state preferences and construction of the national interests. Islam, as a detrimental social force for secularism, situated itself against the European option from the very beginning. Although, the recent years, especially after the withdrawal of Erbakan government after 1997, they seem to support Turkey's European membership bid, this is perceived by several circles as a tactical shift. Thus, with the coming of the new geopolitical opportunities after the end of the Cold War, the Islamists in Turkey strongly supported the Eurasian option, especially under the custodianship of neo-Ottomanism (Yavuz, 1998). However, in the conception of the Islamists, Eurasia was defined as to contain the Islamic world as well.

As I have summarized the features of the neo-Ottomanism in the previous chapter, the social transformation of the Islamists by the liberal political and economic discourses in Turkey, combined with the fundamental international developments by the end of the Cold War (Yavuz, 1998) resulted in the change of conventional identities in Turkish society. A group so called neo-Ottomans has searched for new alternatives

rather than Europe. The Eurasia and the Islamic world have been perceived as the major alternatives. The interaction of domestic and international dynamics that resulted in this change can be explained by the constructivist terms, according to which the intersubjective interactions between agent and structure are the determining forces for the nature of the international relations. The emphasis of the Islamists on the underlying identity differences between Islam and European civilization, which is an outgrowth of Christianity, as an excuse not to politically integrate with Europe can be explained by the liberal IR theory, according to which the underlying differences of divergent identities between a state and its environment increase the potentials of conflict and decrease the potentials of cooperation.

CONCLUSION

In this study, I have tried to figure out the place of identity in the Turkish foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era. Throughout the study, liberal IR theory and constructivist IR theory, as two underlying approaches that attach importance to identity have been utilized for the analyses of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In so doing, I approached the premises of these theories comparatively. In this context, I have firstly explored the concept of identity and its relationship to foreign policy. Then I tried to draw conclusions from the main assumptions of liberal and constructivist theories concerning possible courses on the direction of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, and the role of identity in those courses. Finally, I have analyzed Turkey's foreign policy options, namely European and Eurasian, with special respect to the main premises of these theories (liberal and constructivist approaches). From this study, it can be drawn upon the following conclusions:

1. Both liberal IR theory and constructivist IR theory acknowledge the place of identity in the formulations of foreign policy decisions. While, liberal theory accepts the competition among the social identities as the inputs of the state preferences, which are assumed as the main constraints of foreign policy behaviors, the constructivist theory approaches identity as both input and output for the construction of national interests and the formation of foreign policies. Accordingly, while liberal theory conceives identity in an "inside-out" approach, constructivist theory conceives it in a "structuration" approach, according to which agents and structures mutually constitute identities, interests and foreign policies.

2. Considering the identity changes in Turkey and their impact on foreign policy making processes, constructivism presents a more concrete model rather than the liberal theory to explain them, because all social group identities are shaped by the mutual constitution of the domestic and international dynamics. For instance, concerning the post-Cold War Turkey, it is impossible to delineate the neoliberal globalization in the world and liberalism in Turkey; the establishment of new nation-states in the post-Cold War era in the world and nationalism in Turkey; the acknowledgement of the minority rights in Europe and Kurdish nationalism in Turkey; and Islamic fundamentalism in the world and Islamic movements in Turkey. Liberal theory, by means of its assumption that the configuration of the state preferences constraint the preferences of individual state, can partially explain the interactions between global and domestic trends. However, contrary to constructivism, it fails to develop a model by which the domestic and global trends would influence the construction of the international affairs mutually, without any prioritization of one to the other.

3. In the 1990s, the social identities in addition to Kemalism, the dominant state ideology, have impacts upon the formulation of foreign policy decisions in Turkey. However, their impact is constrained by the premises of Kemalism. In other words, their capability is reduced only to qualify Kemalism to bring it close to their ideology, but not impairing or destroying Kemalism. This is meaningful in the liberal conception of IR, according to which the dominant state identity has the more initiative to determine the state preferences. However, when it is investigated the reasons of the dominance of Kemalism, then it will be seen that constructivism will

bring the concrete explanation for this in the sense that constructivism claims that the identities, interests and foreign policies emerge in the historical, institutional and social contexts. Accordingly, Kemalism, for approximately 80 years colored the social, historical and institutional structures of the state. And for this reason it is very difficult to impair this legacy. One can challenge to this view by claiming that the other identities have also a long-awaited legacies. Yes, but in the institutional terms, they are not as strong as Kemalism. The bureaucracy and military, which are influential in formulating Turkey's foreign and security policies, have a strong Kemalist identity. Keeping this in mind, it can be argued that Kemalism as the dominant state ideology will continue to be the most influential state identity in the following years. In the direction of this, Turkey's European option has more probability to be realized than the Eurasian one due to the decades-old "modernization" ethos of the Kemalist elite.

4. The idea that the underlying differences between the Turkish and European identities would slow down the cooperation and integration between Turkey and Europe is meaningful in the liberal IR conception, according to which in the existence of divergent fundamental beliefs among the competing domestic and/or transnational identities, then the conflict is more likely to happen rather than the cooperation. This is true to a some extent. However, by having an "inside-out" approach, liberal IR theory assumes the eternality of the diverging situation of the identities, and left no place for the possibility of cooperation in the future by means of closing the diverging identities towards each other. Contrarily, since constructivist theory proposes the mutual constitution of domestic and international system, it is more likely to accept the identity changes than liberalism. Thus, the possibility of

decreasing the identity differences to build up a well-functioning cooperation is more likely to happen under the premises of constructivism.

5. Since Turkey's foreign policy options, namely European and Eurasian, are not deadlocked; i.e. since there is not a zero-sum game situation between these options, in the terms of liberal IR theory (which proposes that if the preferences of different international actors are not conditional to each other, then negotiation rather than conflict or cooperation is more likely to happen), there are middle ways between Europe and Eurasia for Turkey. For instance, Turkey's possible full membership to the European Union does not mean that Turkey would give up to develop relations with the Eurasian states. In such a situation, Turkey would intensify its relations in different realms within the borders of its responsibilities in the European Union.

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