

UTILIZATION OF OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS
IN THE STUDY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

A Master's Thesis

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ABSTRACT

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Operational code analysis constituting a framework for systematic study appears to inaugurate a long-awaited approach aiming at understanding, unfolding and potentially anticipating the motivational and behavioral constitutions of non-state terrorist organizations. However, operational code constructs known so far do not appear to be compact in respect of the methodology, which could be utilized within the studies of operational codes of organizations different than governmental. Into the bargain, the scholarly evolution of operational code analysis presents an inconsistency associated with the interchangeability of individual and organizational levels of analysis. Addressing these limitations, this thesis seeks to offer an alternative approach by appreciating the instrumentality of beliefs about organizational structure, its potential for determining the style of decision-making and for anticipation of the decision-makers' logic of political action. This study concludes with a section, which expands the parameters of operational code research incorporating a structural context and discussion of its implications for research on terrorism.

Key Words: Operational code analysis, non-state terrorist organizations, perceptions, organizational structure, methodology.

ÖZET

OPERASYONAL KURAL ANALİZİNİN TERÖR ÖRGÜTÜ ÇALIŞMALARINA YARARI

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Sistematik çalışmaların yapısını oluşturan operasyonel kural analizi, uzun zamandır beklenen bir yöntemi ortaya koyarak, günümüzde uluslararası sistemin işlevini tehdit eden terrorist organizasyonların güdüsel ve davranışsal yapılanmalarını anlamayı, ortaya çıkarmayı ve önceden tahmin etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ancak bugüne kadar oluşan operasyonel kod yapılanmalarının metodolojik açıdan tam bir bütünlüğü olmadığı görünmektedir. İş bu yüzden operasyonel kod yapılanmaları devlet yönetmelikleri ile değil organizasyon içi yönetmelikler ile faydalı hale getirilebilir. Ayrıca operasyonel kod literatürü analiz düzeyinde birey ve organizasyonu birbiri yerine kullanarak tutarsızlığa sebebiyet vermektedir. Bu tezin amacı, bahsedilen kısıtlamalara da değinerek, farklı bir yaklaşım sunmaktır. Bu yaklaşım; örgütsel yapıda inanç sistemlerinin önemine, operasyonel kuralların karar alma tarzları üzerindeki etkisine ve de siyasi eylem sırasında karar alıcıların muhakeme gücünü idrak edebilmeye dayanmaktadır. Bu çalışma operasyonel kural araştırmalarındaki değişkenleri arttırıp konuya yapısal içeriği dahil ederek, terör çalışmalarında operasyonel kurallarının yerini tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Operasyonel kural analizi, devlet dışı terör organizasyonları, algı, örgütsel yapı, metodoloji

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Overview	9
1.2 Methodology	11
CHAPTER II: NON-STATE ACTORS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, TERRORISM	16
2.1 Classification of Influences of Non-State Actors	17
2.2 Asymmetric Nature of Threat from Non-State Actors	20
2.2.1 Asymmetric Threat and Terrorism	22
2.3. Research on Terrorism Within Non-State Actor Literature	24
CHAPTER III: MAPPING RESEARCH ON TERRORISM	27
3.1 The Anatomy of Research on Terrorism.....	32
3.1.1 Motivational Research	33
3.1.2 Behavioral Research	37
3.1.3 Counter-Terrorism Research	40
3.2 Implications for Future Research on Terrorism	41
CHAPTER IV: OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS	44
4.1 Evolution of Operational Code Analysis	46
4.2 Utilization of Operational Code Analysis for Terrorist Organizations	56
4.2.1 Operational Code and Beliefs About Organizational Structure.	65

4.2.1.1 Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Code Analysis	66
4.2.1.1a Strategic Decision-Making in Non-State Terrorist Organizations	69
4.2.1.2 Structure Follows Strategy and Strategy Follows Structure	70
CHAPTER V: TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES	74
5.1 Bureaucratic Organization	79
5.1.1 Bureaucracy and The State	83
5.2 Non-Bureaucratic Organizations.....	86
5.2.1 Organic Organization	88
5.2.2 Adhocracy	90
5.2.3 Networked Organization.....	92
5.2.3.1 Inter-Organizational Networks	93
5.2.3.2 Intra-Organizational Networks	96
5.2.3.3 Hybrid Networked Organizations	99
5.2.4 Typology of Networked Structures	103
5.3 Non-Bureaucracies, State and Non-State Actors.....	106
5.3.1 Non-Bureaucracies and Terrorist Organizations.....	113
CHAPTER VI: AL QAEDA'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	119
6.1 Evolution and Devolution of Al Qaeda	123
6.2 Road to September 11, 2001	132
6.3 Al Qaeda's Network after September 11.	142
6.3.1 Leadership	145
6.3.2 Al Qaeda's Span of Control	149
6.3.3 Communications and Recruitment	157
CHAPTER VII: SUBSUMING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE INTO OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS	165
7.1 Cognitive Approach to Decision-Making as Frame of Reference	166

7.2 Prevalent Approaches to the Role of Cognition and Organizational Structure in Organizational Decision-Making.....	168
7.2.1 Rational-Actor, Organizational and Governmental Politics Models of Decision-Making – Allison (1971)	169
7.2.2 Cognitive Limits on Decision-Making.....	172
7.3 Organizational Cognition	175
7.3.1 Organizational Cognition in Non-State Terrorist Organizations	182
7.4 Towards a New Frame of Reference for the Study of Decision-Making within Operational Code Analysis	184
7.4.1 The Role of Perceptions on Organizational Setting – Snyder et al. (1962).....	185
7.4.2 Management Styles and Models – George (1980).....	188
7.4.3 Organizational Structure Through Bounded Rationality	190
7.4.4 Possible Advantages of the Present Scheme	192
CHAPTER VIII: THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF OPERATIONAL CODE	194
8.1 The Structural Query of an Operational Code Construct	195
8.2 Reinforcement of Other Operational Code Beliefs	207
8.3 The Specification of Beliefs About Organizational Structure for Al Qaeda	208
CHAPTER IX: THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF AL QAEDA: STRUCTURAL CONTENT.....	210
9.1 System of Action.....	210
9.1.1 Preeminence of Effective Organization.....	212
9.1.2 Danger of Being Infiltrated	215
9.1.3 Defense Against Being Infiltrated.....	216
9.1.4 Danger of Isolation From The Public	218
9.2 Loyalty and Separation	220

9.2.1 Preeminence of Leadership.....	221
9.2.2 Substitution for Leadership.....	222
9.3 Guidance.....	223
9.3.1 Danger of Programmed Behavior.....	224
9.3.2. Common Method and Common Program.....	224
9.4 Autonomy and Continuity.....	225
9.4.1 Danger of Specialization.....	226
9.4.2 Primacy of Continuity	226
9.4.3 Talent for Terrorism.....	227
9.5 Unity and Universality.....	228
9.5.1 Unity of Struggle.....	229
9.5.2 Universal Commitment.....	230
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION.....	231
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	243

LIST OF TABLES

1. Leites' Model of Operational Code	233
2. George's Model of Operational Code	235
3. Proposed Model of Operational Code	238

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Pyramidal Organizational Structure of Bureaucracy	82
2. Types of Networked Organizations	103
3. Hybrid Network Organizational Structure	106
4. The Hierarchical Representation of Early Organizational Structure of Al Qaeda Central	136
5. Simplified Organizational Chart of Al Qaeda Organization (1998-2001)	139
6. Global Jihadist Network	151
7. Al Qaeda's Span of Control	155

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the advent of the second half of twentieth century, forces of bipolarity not only impinged upon the perceptions of leadership elites, but also provided a framework for innovative academic studies venturing into assessments of international threats. In deep considerations of perceived threats to the international society, Nathan Leites (1951, 1953) undertook an extensive study of the political elite in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) attempting at a greater understanding of the underlining premises governing its actions. Emphasizing Soviet belief system in implicit relation to decision-making processes of Soviet ruling party, the Politburo, Leites' (1951, 1953) operational code construct emerged as a study, not only insightful and pre-eminent in examination of decision-making but also unique in its methodological design. The complexity of Leites' (1951, 1953) analysis, however, despite academic praise and acknowledgement of political elites, constituting "a gigantic stature that is likely to *faire école* in politics and the other behavioral sciences for many years to come" (Kluckhohn, 1955: 117) inspired only limited efforts for similar research of political decision-making elites.

Over a decade later, the methodological essence of operational code analysis was extracted by Alexander George (1969), furnishing the approach with sound means for generating comparable measures of belief systems. George's (1969) construct embracing a set of questions for examination of philosophical and instrumental contents¹ of political belief system constituted a solidified foundation for future studies of operational codes, which embarked to appear widely within the field of foreign policy decision-making.

In a manner analogous to Leites' (1951, 1953) perceptions of USSR as a threat to peace and stability of international system, contemporary challengers of the *status quo*, the non-state terrorist organizations merit a closer examination in respect of the underlining principles governing their political behavior. Operational code analysis constituting a framework for systematic study appears to inaugurate the long-awaited approach aiming at understanding, unfolding and potentially anticipating motivational and behavioral constitutions of the non-state terrorist threat². The applicability of Leites' (1951, 1953) and George's (1969) pioneering constructs in understanding decision-making processes of state-leading elites, however, leaves considerable questions concerning the utility of operational code analysis for the study of non-state terrorist actors.

¹ The operational code comprises "philosophical" and "instrumental" contents consisting of ten typological questions, answers to which identify the political actor's attitude towards politics (philosophical questions) and response repertoire (instrumental questions) (George, 1969). The questions are available in Chapter 4: The Operational Code Analysis p. 45-46.

² The term "terrorism" in the subsequent chapters of this thesis (Chapter II: Non-State Actors, Political Violence, Terrorism and Chapter III: Mapping Research on Terrorism) will be used in reference to non-state terrorist organizations, rather than to state or state-sponsored terrorism.

Operational code constructs known so far do not appear to be compact in respect of methodology, which could be utilized within the studies of operational codes of organizations different than governmental. This point becomes of significance in the light of the observation that non-state actors in general, and terrorist organizations in particular display high degrees of de-bureaucratization. Into the bargain, the scholarly evolution of operational code analysis ceased to follow comprehensive inclusiveness of Leites' (1951, 1953) model associated with the organizational level of analysis he adopted. Subsequent operational code analysis converted insubstantially only in consideration of beliefs sets and response repertoire of individual decision-makers that claimed to constitute an influence upon decision-making processes of that actor.³

The fundamental aim of this study is to conduct a preliminary research into the kinds of information that would enrich operational code analysis and bestow for its applicability equally to state and non-state terrorist actors. Contending the potential contribution of operational code analysis for subsequent research on non-state terrorist organizations, this thesis attempts to compensate for these limitations by explicating various components of the operational code and complementing it with beliefs about organizational structure in a way that enhances and improves the operational code construct for non-state terrorist organizations.

³ The operational code analysis have experienced the most extensive growth from mid-1970 until late-1990 with a series of comparable case studies of American decision-makers modelled upon Leites-George paradigm that eventually formed categorization of operational codes. A review of operational code literature is presented in Chapter IV: The Operational Code Analysis.

This thesis seeks to offer such an approach by appreciating the instrumentality of beliefs about organizational structure, its potential for determining the style of decision-making that fundamentally answer the question George (1969: 198) himself asked, namely: “How do political leaders in varying political culture and institutional structures approach the task of making calculations, of deciding what objectives to select and how to deal with uncertainty and risk?” This is to demonstrate that study of conceptions of organizational structure held by political actor is a relevant and direct venue to the delineation of the logic of actor’s political action.

In this study the thesis states that the utility of operational code in studying terrorist organizations depends upon the validity of the following propositions:

Proposition 1: The conceptions of political strategy are particularly significant portion of political actor’s entire set of belief about political life.

Proposition 2: The conceptions of political strategy are equally amenable to influence by the perceptions on organizational structure and processes as by the beliefs about strategy and tactics of political action and attitudes towards politics.

Proposition 3⁴: Due to different perceptions concerning the effectiveness of organizational structures and processes that come into influent contact with existent behavioral patterns in organizations, the decision-making of non-state terrorist organizations should not be amenable to the same kinds of analysis that inform about foreign policy decision-making in states and state institutions.

Proposition 4: General beliefs and response repertoire can be extracted with the existent models for operational code analysis.

Proposition 5: In order to provide for the grounding differences between decision-making of states and non-state terrorist organizations and acquire comprehensive knowledge of the rules of conduct of studied entity it is necessary to incorporate into operational code analysis the conceptions of organizational structures embraced within political actor's rules of conduct.

As both states and non-state terrorist organizations are complex political entities that engage in decision-making processes their motivations and behavior are demonstrably impacted by the set of general beliefs regarding their political world, set of specific beliefs regarding the response repertoire and conceptions of

⁴ This proposition is grounded in the general observation that states are essentially structured as bureaucracies (Snyder et al. 1962: 109) while non-state actors, among which non-state terrorists actors can be distinguished particularly, present a tendency to deviate from bureaucratic structuring into other forms of organizational constitutions (Arquilla and Zanini, 1999). This premise is elaborated in full in Chapter V: Typology of Organizational Structures, and empirically validated with the case study of Al Qaeda in Chapter VI: Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure.

behavioral patterns intersecting beliefs and responses within a cognitive realm of decision-makers. While both Leites (1951, 1953) and George (1969) codified the cognitive influences upon decision-making, it is of outmost importance to signify the essence of operational code analysis as cognitive at its core. Non-cognitive organizational influences, despite their recognized capacity to have an effect on the character, development or behavior of the decision-making in organizational setting, are not addressed in this study. A representative review of the non-cognitive influences of organizational structure will be presented in contribution to the literature review;⁵ however, it will not be incorporated into the frame of reference for the construction of operational code belief system.

A body of inter-related and traversing rules from which reader extracts premises governing the entirety of actor's conceptions of political strategy will be conducted within a framework of cognitive limits on decision-making. However, to denote on the interconnection and mutual reinforcement of cognitive and non-cognitive realms, an analysis will be provided to denote the linkage between operational code belief system, conceptions of organizational structure and evidence for patterns of behavior in organizations. The notion of organizational strategy, as presented in this thesis, will provide for that connection. This is due to the nature of operational code beliefs, which embrace the *conceptions of political strategy* (Leites, 1953: 15) and the premise widely agreed upon within the field of organizational studies that strategic decision processes reflect patterns of

⁵ A review of non-cognitive influences of organizational structure on decision-making is presented in Chapter VII: Subsuming Organizational Structure into Operational Code Analysis.

behavior that develop in organizations (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984: 400). Contrary to the majority of operational code researches that have attempted to provide for the linkage between beliefs and behavior, the presented operational code construct accounts for the incorporation of the cognitive affirmations of the conceptions of organizational structure as they relate in turn to behavioral patterns within the framework of operational code belief system.

While the ability to utilize operational code analysis for examination of non-state terrorist actors becomes a significant contribution in itself to the research on terrorism, this project also addresses a notion that the field of terrorism studies has made only limited headway in developing any kind of robust theory or interpretation relevant to the terrorism. Reviewing a number of theoretical attempts within the field of terrorism accurately reflects the claim that they cannot fall into the category of a grounded theory, primarily, as Ranstorp (2006: 6) noted, due to the fact that the terrorism studies often constituted “publicly repeated assumptions or theories that had become conventional wisdom within the field [of terrorism] without ever being based on any serious or tested quantitative or qualitative field research or survey results.” This statement represents the actuality of a lack of serious theorizing in studies on terrorism presenting numerous gaps of methodological and contextual nature. Operational code analysis, providing proposed additions to its methodology, would constitute for an insightful approach of study non-state terrorist organizations within the framework of systematic, reliable and testable study, imparting in turn he

comprehensive framework for analysis of the non-state entities constituting a threat to the peaceful conduct of world affairs today.

In terms of the above consideration of beliefs about organizational structure as factors of influence on decision-making of organizations, what emerges is a redefined and restructured concept of operational code that constitutes a new research construct for empirical validation of influences on decision-making and focuses on the interrelated structural and procedural conceptions influencing organizational rules of conduct. Combining the two fields of emphasis, would not merely examine terrorist organization in framework of structures and functions, but in systematic way would provide for the inclusion of a larger framework of organizational set of beliefs that embrace of beliefs about organizational structure provide the organization with a cohesive capability of distributing threat on international scale. A distinguished portion of this thesis, aims at the complementation of the theoretical and methodological construct of operational code analysis provided by George (1969). With the independently delineated questions concerning organization's structural and procedural contents, the proposed structural changes into the operational code constitute for a significant theoretical contribution to the studies of the operational codes. In this respect, a proposition is made that an initial paradigm embracing a structural query about the nature of political actor's beliefs about organizational structure in detail allows for preliminary remarks intended to be representative in this regard.

The aim of this study is neither, as it might appear, to present a mere review of Leites' (1951, 1953) and George's (1969, 1979) studies, nor to contribute to the existing knowledge of Al Qaeda, as a subject of this study *per se*, but rather the aim is to use their operational code paradigms as a vehicle for assessing their contribution to our understanding of international political actors that they spawned: the application of operational code analysis for the assessment of the threat non-state terrorist organizations pose on international *status quo*. Fidelity to this project requires that we take a bearing for revision of operational code analysis and make mid-course corrections for its greater utility value in studying of contemporary threats.

1.1. Overview

This project begins with a brief introduction into the emergence of non-state actors within the international system, and means through which non-state entities attempt to influence the courses of political developments of global affairs. Within Chapter II, particular attention is given to terrorist organizations, as non-state actors, which's functions and patterns of violence present a significant threat to international peace and stability. Chapter III progresses to the assessment of the research on terrorism attempting to address and understand the nature of terrorist threat through identification of major scholarly contributions to the field. Identification of a lack of consensus over most terrorism issues and clear classification of the research on terrorism consequently leads to the proposition that operational code analysis as a study can contribute significantly to the

resolution of the conceptualization problem in terrorism studies by allowing a comprehensive incorporation of specific research questions into a unified systematic approach. Chapter IV provides a background on operational code analysis, accounting for the in-depth understanding of the approach as it transformed from its initial appearance in Leites' works (1951, 1953) into contemporary studies. Consequently the chapter ends with the identification of inconsistencies through the evolution of operational code analysis and proposes solutions, with particular emphasis on the operational code-strategy-structure relationship. This is to denote the significance of beliefs about organizational structure for the conceptions of political strategy of political actor extracted by operational code analysis. In a following manner, Chapter V continues with a presentation of variances in organizational structures and presents, upon evidence, different organizational structure of state institutions and non-state terrorist organizations. Chapter VI comprises a case study of Al Qaeda, which aims at the empirical validation of the argument stated that non-state terrorist organizations are governed by diverse structural underpinnings than state institutions. Chapter VII progresses into delineation of theories on decision-making with the cognitive frame of reference aiming at the incorporation of structural beliefs into factors bounding rationality of decision-makers. Chapter VII consequently discusses the theoretical approach providing for the incorporation of the aforementioned differences within a sound methodological structure of operational code analysis. The proposed methodological addition to operational code analysis, formatted as additional questions modeled on the operational code methodology by

George (1969) is consequently evaluated in respect of their influence on information-processing for decision-making purposes. Conclusively, Chapter IX comprises the portion of the operational code of Al Qaeda constructed to identify the structural content of its conceptions of political strategy. In recognition of the fact that this study presents a preliminary project it does not lead to the construction of a complete operational code for selected terrorist organization.⁶ Rather it provides for a representative portion of the operational code addressing the structural content becomes a significant contribution to the terrorism studies as it could significantly assist future research on terrorism through utilization of operational code analysis as an effective and insightful approach. In the conclusive chapter, the premises of the study are delineated in light of the precedent analysis, concluding that operational code approach, providing the methodological additions, is appropriate for study of non-state terrorist organizations.

1.2. Methodology

The research of this dissertation applies heuristic case study in order to generate fruitful and supplementary insights into the study of operational code of political entities. Heuristic case study as a methodology of research does not assume the aim of theory building and generalization, but rather provides for the “serendipitous additions to existing theories in order to cover puzzling aspects of

⁶ The operational code of Al Qaeda has been constructed by Picucci (2008). The study was quantitative in nature and modelled upon George’s (1969) philosophical and instrumental questions. It is important to note that this thesis attempts to re-examine Leites’(1951, 1953) original construct, which has been significantly different than Geroges Picucci’s (2008) work is acknowledged yet not subjected to revision as Al Qaeda is not addressed per se, rather the operational code methodology.

a case” (Eckstein, 1975: 143). The heuristic method simply attempts to separate the inquiry from the wider context and apply it to the recommended study to “stimulate the imagination toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions” (Eckstein, 1975: 143). Importantly, Eckstein’s (1975: 143) describes the attributes of the heuristic methodology indicating that:

Such studies, unlike configurative-idiographic⁷ ones, tie directly into theory building and therefore are less concerned with overall concrete configurations that with potentially generalizable relations between aspects of them; they also tie into theory building less passively and fortuitously than does disciplined-configurative study, because they potentially generalizable relations do not just turn up but are deliberately sought out.

In this respect, the present study represents a research of complementary nature to the existing body of knowledge on operational code that aims at the initiation of essential line of thinking indispensable for the creation of the comprehensive theory improved by nature through the proposed additional construct tying operational code analysis to organizational theory.

The generation of the research insights stems from the application of creativeness to the examination of a case study, or multiple case studies in non-comparative manner, since the heuristic research allows for the seriatim application of the case study by “the so-called building-block technique in order to construct increasingly plausible and less fortuitous regularity statements” (Eckstein, 1975: 143). As the technique, attempts to study cases in an individual manner, it

⁷ Configurative-idiographic case studies are single-case studies often associated with area studies. They are highly descriptive aiming at understanding and interpreting a single case as it stands solely, rather than developing broader theoretical generalizations. The configurative-idiographic studies are inductive in a manner that “they involve a minimum of a priori theoretical preconceptions, and the interpretation emerges from the case itself” (Levy, 2002: 135).

should not be mistaken for the premises of comparative studies. While comparative study seek to analyze similarities and dissimilarities among studied subjects, through a systematic inquiry, the heuristic case study attempts to unfold gradually a better solutions for theoretical constructs through study of individual cases. As Eckstein (1975: 144) noted:

A construct, based on a single case, is unlikely to constitute more than a slim clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to achieve better case interpretation; and this process is continued until the construct seems sufficiently refined to require no further major amendment or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative study.

Due to the fact that theories do not come directly from data, but rather from “theorist’s imagination, logical ability and ability to discern general problems and patterns in particular observations” (Eckstein, 1975: 145), the heuristic analysis not being bounded into the extensive set of variables is able to increase the degree of insights, potentially finding correlations and variables of crucial importance to the attempted field of inquiry. The primary argument for the choice of a case study for examination might appear to constitute a premise against the general law formation within the scientific discipline. Nevertheless, importantly as “certain kinds of cases may be regarded as more instructive for theory building than others” (Eckstein, 1975: 146), the claim in general will be made to the selected case and the contribution to the general theory accordingly acknowledged

with the identification of the subject to subsequent rigorous inquiry for “grounded theory building.”⁸

On that account, methodological application of heuristic case study, in this research allows for the identification of a case study, Al Qaeda representing a selected non-state terrorist organization. Al Qaeda, perceived in history as threat and representing distinctive organizational structure is selected based on the nature of the theory that is being constructed, namely the supplementary elements of operational code analysis, rather than on particular case that is otherwise of the interest to the researcher. In this manner, the focus of this thesis is directed specifically at the theory rather than specifically on the case studied. The nature of the heuristic study of the proposed case aims at the investigation that would develop testable hypothesis without guaranteeing a theoretical outcome. The purpose for evaluation of the selected case study as representative of a distinctive organizational structure aims at the development of generalizable theory from particular instance of the chosen case. Limiting the examined variables to beliefs about organizational structure this study is able to shed light on the operational code construct, allowing the emphasis to be directed to the configurative elements of the cases in order to test the mechanisms of operational code analysis. Therefore, the case study of this thesis does not constitute a point of departure but rather supplements an attempt at the generation of hypotheses, which can form the basis of new theory.

⁸ “Grounded Theory” refers to theory that is initially derived from observation rather than spawned wholly out of logic and imagination (Eckstein, 1975:147).

The choice of the theory and theme for this thesis are intertwined; when choosing the theme, I implicitly chose to build upon Leites' conception of operational code analysis that would become a step towards verification of the proposed construct. Based on the analogous nature of the inquiry to that of Leites (1951, 1953), the methodology of thesis in Chapter IX will constitute a qualitative method employing content analysis. Through qualitative approach to Al Qaeda, this thesis aims to aid not merely to the understanding of studied adversary, but primarily to illustrate that the operational code approach should not be restricted to quantitative inquiries, which became to be predominant following the rise of positivism in the discipline of international relations.

In this context, the essential goal of heuristic and qualitative research, thus, is not to quantify data or to produce statistical results for generalizable application to all studied entities; rather it aims to explore the essential characteristics of studied phenomena and them to the attention of the future scholars. The underlining aim of this thesis, thereby, aims at the establishment of a unique, creative synthesis resulting from the grounded analyses that would constitute a sound basis for efficient application of the heuristically realized construct in the subsequent research.

CHAPTER II

NON-STATE ACTORS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, TERRORISM

The cross-section of contemporary international arena is characterized by heterogeneity of influences, governances and structures. Recognizing that twenty-first century political arena is no longer confined solely to state actors becomes of prime significance to the future of relations among international entities (Ataman, 2003: 42). The forces of globalization had set up a global communications network, increased flows of goods and peoples around the world, and made weapons and other materials more available to variety of international actors. This has enabled a dynamic improvement of communications and technological development and thus new ways of organizing people (Grygiel, 2009: 38). The effect of these changes facilitated rise of political movements that are increasingly capable of playing a strategic role in international relations and provided them with greater capabilities to project themselves across the world. Primarily, in wage of globalization, structural interconnectedness of people across the world and the underlining premises of information revolution produced increased opportunities for non-state actors to acquire significant roles,

accountability and representativeness for influences and political action (Flanagan, 2001: 15). And it is the nature of the distribution of non-state actors' influences into the driving forces of international affairs that becomes of essential consideration for the security challenges arising from the emergence of diversified international actors. The starting point of this thesis is, therefore, that any interpretation of methods and approaches in international relations should take into account the significance of non-state actors operating transnationally.

2.1. Classification of Influences of Non-State Actors

"States and non-state actors form broad opposing categories... yet defining non-state actors chiefly by their independence from states and state authority would be misleading" (Josselin and Wallace, 2001: 2), constituting for evolving relationship among state and non-state actors as one of the fastest moving dimensions of contemporary international politics (Higgot et al. 2000: 11). Among all, the anatomy of this relationship embraces diverse forces of influence in consideration of world's political agenda, essentially with variety non-state actors significantly contributing to the strengthening of political, economical, social and security mechanisms, and those that regrettably constitute the challenges to those mechanisms stemming from the implicit direction of their activities against individually, nationally and internationally recognized values. As Josselin and Wallace (2001: 2) noted at one end of the non-state spectrum there are "companies and organization the activities of which meet with full approval and support from one or more national governments; at the other groups and movements

seen by the governments of most territories in which they seek to operate as threats to established order.” While the former group signifies transnational corporations (TNC’s) and multinational corporations (MNC’s) existing beyond and within nation-states that penetrate the public and private realms, the picture of non-state influences extends to inter-governmental organizations (IGO’s) entering into a formal and legally binding agreements with think-tanks for policy advice and with non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) for conveyance of assistance, advice and delivery of services. Conversely, the latter group encompasses revolutionary and violent non-state actors (VNSA) such as terrorist organizations, militias, insurgents and organized crime organizations, that have learned to exploit the international space and emerge into challengers capable of bringing about fundamental change of the nature of warfare and conflict in contemporary world (McAllister, 2004: 297).

In this thesis, therefore, the working definition of non-state actors would signify actors, which “at least in principle autonomous from the structure and machinery of the state, and of the governmental and intergovernmental bodies below and above the formally-sovereign state: transnational, rather than trans-governmental” (Josselin and Wallace, 2001: 3). The focus of the thesis, however, is on those non-state actors that utilize the means of resistance to nation-state often manifested through violence-stimulated influences. Bull (1977: 268-70 as cited in Devetak, 2005: 237) reminds us that the exercise of violence by non-state actors remains an enduring aspect of international relations, which began

to increasingly account on the changing character of the perception of VNSA's and their influence on global affairs. Inherent in nature of politics the line between peaceful and persuasive means of influence and hostile antagonism, which resorts to disruptive and violent means, is often crossed; for that reason it is important to highlight the political context of terrorism and the ultimate implications for the use of violence in that context. Whether bound by cultural, religious or historical perceptions, or based on pursuance of political, idealistic or economic rewards the choice of violence by non-state actors represents a shift in attributions and influences to the sphere of conflict and security considerations.

Facilitated by the premises of information revolution, the radical breakthroughs among non-state actors become essentially facilitated. While information revolution essentially brings profound changes in the communication and transport sectors, the international actors become increasingly directed towards utilization of new technologies for advancement of organizational innovation and survival. McAllister (2004: 300) stated that in face of global encroachment of information technologies, the tactical and organizational innovation becomes "necessary in order to take advantage of the force multipliers offered by the information revolution." In a manner analogous to the transformation of business environment to ensure organization's ability to adapt to increase in information flows, the new entrants into the sphere of conflict essentially adopt a complex adaptive systems (CAS) directed at the management of information interconnectivity through diverse organizational structures in a manner revolutionizing the

affairs governing conflicts (McAllister, 2004: 301). The essential correlation between technology and information becomes increasingly pronounced in the methods of engagement in conflict, placing emphasis on the information as a material power rather than on resources (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997: 150-152) fundamentally changing and magnifying the effectiveness of organizational designs to manage and conduct the warfare. Facing an adversary, with distinctive utilization of information, technological innovations and structural organization for management of affairs, the imperatives of conventional military conflicts embracing underlining rationale behind targeting and execution of an offensive action becomes essentially challenging to the counter attempts of conventional military means, enhancing the asymmetry among adversaries of contemporary conflict.

2.2. Asymmetric Nature of Threat from Non-State Actors

Traditionally understood considerations of national and international security were conceived in terms of inter-state relations (Grygiel, 2009: 42). In contemporary world, following the decline of the throbbing polarity between Western democracies and Soviet block countries, non-state violent actors gained their status as an adversary through the violence-driven animosity, that represent a powerful and overreaching challenges to peace and stability of international arena (Williams, 2003: vii). Facing enemies conversely diverse and substantially dissimilar to traditional-war-waging actors bring about a non-traditional security challenges, increasingly characterized by the elements of asymmetry as a weapon of choice (Blank, 2004: 357). No longer fearing solemnly challenges imposed by

actors defined by past precedents, states began to face asymmetric adversaries, with considerable military potentials and threatening capabilities, which September 11, 2001 illustrated at its highest capacity of non-state violence. Opposing the conventional understanding of war that emerged out of general practices and handling of inter-state affairs through application of military force as a mean for advancing or defending one's objective provides for the fact that conventional military force were and remain largely "designed, trained and equipped to fight near mirror of themselves: forces with broadly similar infrastructures" (Bellamy, 2002: 152), that are not so quite asymmetrical in nature. The newly risen non-state challengers in conflicts denote the type of warfare, implying a relational quality of opposed structures or units of analysis not being designed against each other (Blank, 2004: 348); therefore they, constitute a great challenge for contemporary world in respect of the assemblage and conduct of counter efforts. With non-state asymmetric threats presenting different means, ends and vulnerabilities of the parties involved (Bellamy, 2002: 154) the conventional wisdom of countering violence becomes insufficient in its application to contemporary violent non-state challengers. As Williams (2003: xii) noted that "in the new security environment, container defense might be more important than ballistic missile defense" attempting to portray that contemporary counter effort against organized violence requires acting, organizing and thinking differently in order to grasp the understand the opponent, grasp his weaknesses and gain an effectiveness of action. Asymmetric adversary represents a threat emanating from

different strategic realm, disparate from the one in-built in the approaches of the contemporary countering forces.

2.2.1. Asymmetric Threat and Terrorism

Terrorism as an archetypal non-state asymmetrical adversary (Thornton, 2007: 25) remains substantially the greatest challenge to the stability of international system, not merely through increased scope and lethality of violent activities since 1960's, or increased notoriety of Al Qaeda but primarily through the mechanisms by which the terrorist manifest the element of violence (Stepanova, 2008: 1-2). Terrorist non-state organizations complement the element of violence with the elements of asymmetry that allows them do deploy threats and violence against enemies using "means that outside of the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime" (Tilly, 2004: 5). Inherently devoted to "disruption of norms, the violation of generally accepted standards of decency, including the rules of war as they apply to the innocent and the helpless" (Kupperman and Trent, 1979: 15), terrorism aims at purposeful ignition of shock and terror as a mean for achievement of intended objective, thus, becomes no less significant than the dangers of conventional war or any other political violence. The challenge of the terrorist violence is enhanced with the fact that terrorists sophistication requires terrorists to use a selective violence, in order not to damage their political cause, as well as, conduct the acts of violence in an environment where becoming known to the counter-terrorists would jeopardize their political and operational objectives (Shapiro, 2007: 2).

Typically terrorists win their outrages through generally minor, as contrasted with extraordinary attacks of September 11, 2001 on World Trade Centre (WTC).⁹ Actuality of WTC attacks graphically and tragically validated the point that most inferable threats are not necessarily the most dangerous or urgent ones, and that world contemporary faces threats reaching beyond limits of conception and execution. In the wage of globalization, however, the terrorist use of violence becomes increasingly more powerful in means and ends, as globalization enhances not only the use of new technologies, extensive-reach for financial support and ability to reach across international borders, but also aids to the perceptions of political objectives reaching globally and notions of expressive violence, as a symbolic and communicative to the wider audience (Cronin, 2002: 46-51). The modern non-state violence, and that of international terrorism in particular is especially dangerous because of the inherent enhancement of information technologies it potentially derives from globalization. As a violent non-state actor terrorism exists in an environment that influences it and is influence by it (Thomas et al., 2005: 9), thereby, the essence of influences on terrorism from the environment become an essential aspect for the understanding of the direction in which terrorism will be heading in the future of global affairs. In recognition of the fact that the acclimatization of terrorist organizations to the constantly changing international environment and increase in counter-terrorism efforts on international scale cannot be isolated from the objective which terrorists aim to advance,

⁹ The number of deaths in WTC attacks is believed to be 2,976, while in general single terrorists attacks until 2007 did not account for more than 400 fatalities (Global Terrorism Database available online: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/>)

the international society's confrontation with terrorist violence is likely to continue on a routine basis.

2.3. Research on Terrorism Within Non-State Actor Literature

Discussion of non-state threat development presents terrorism as arguably the most important security challenge of 21st century. As at the outset of Cold War the world was characterized by polarized perceptions marked by propensity and pessimism, the evolution of terrorist threat and greater in destruction international appearances of terrorist violence brought the 21st century's attention of scholars and politicians outside of realm of state violence. In this respect growing animosities of non-state actors and increase in the potential of terrorist threat necessitate for the diversion of focus within academia and political spheres into the effective means of understanding, analysis and countering it.

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon characterized by uncountable dimensions, therefore, acquirement of deeper understanding of the terrorist threat and its evolvment in utilization of violence for achievement of political purposes becomes crucial for projection of closer developments of terrorist threat. Cronin (2002: 58) noted that,

Terrorism is an unprecedented, powerful non-state threat to the international system that no single state, regardless of how powerful it may be in traditional terms, can defeat alone, especially in the absence of long-term serious scholarship engaged in by its most creative minds.

Motivated by the words of Cronin (2002), this research attempts to add up to the non-state literature on terrorism primarily from the perspective of countering the threat emanating from new security environment. However, in order to effectively deal with terrorist threat, which is generated by, related to and used as a tactic in asymmetric conflict, it is not only indispensable but also satisfactory to address the fundamental causes of the emergence of conflict and the underlining resort to violence by belligerent parties. Recognizing the importance of influences a violent non-state actor acquires from its environment, underlining structural causes and their concrete manifestations become a primary contribution to the study of violent non-state actors.

The following chapter, dedicated to the construction of the fairly accurate representation of a field of terrorist studies, is intended to illustrate primary approaches and general tendencies among scholars engaged in research on terrorism and provide reader with a snapshot of the field. The subsequent chapter addresses cohesiveness of existing academic body on terrorism, the gaps and limitations and possible solutions in an attempt that would provide for accurate description, understanding and potential predictions of the terrorist actions. This is to adequately prepare for the solidification of the persistent level of the terrorist phenomenon against which the theory of operational code can be distinguished, in particular.

It is important to provide evidence for the equal relevance of operational code to the issues of categorization and definition in doubt, as well as, to the significance of the role of beliefs within the processes governing terrorist organizations. On both accounts, operational code analysis bares significant implications and innovative appurtenance to the formation of effective counter-terrorism strategies presenting therefore theoretical, methodological and practical potential for the future of terrorist studies. The following overview does not aim to illustrate a definite anatomy of research on terrorism but rather attempts to generate observations concerning gaps and limitations of current body of knowledge on terrorism and precipitate new research agenda that would harness the importance of incorporation of decision-making processes of the terrorist organizations, and its potential for informing counter-terrorism efforts.

CHAPTER III

MAPPING RESEARCH ON TERRORISM

The present-day body of knowledge embodied within the field of terrorist studies has been a result of progressive and gradual accretion of data based on past analyses and observations. Thirty years of scholarly contribution uncovering the terrorist phenomena inadvertently provided for the construction of an amalgam of knowledge of terrorism allowing for diversity, steaming from interdisciplinary contributions. Two prominent academic journals *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* in the greatest extent contributed to two decades of systematic attention to the subject of terrorism within the discipline of International Relations. Although a diversified academic attention has been consistently present in past decades, “the size of academic community interested and committed to building a sustained body of knowledge remained resiliently very small” (Ranstorp, 2006: 3), pointing out the resemblances to the volume of literature and research in the fields taking on terrorist studies, namely political science, international relations, sociology, psychology and military strategic planning. Mapping terrorist research, Alex Schmidt and Berto Jongman

(1988: 179) have identified 32 prominent academics primarily leading terrorism research and numerous one-time contributors to the field. In similar manner, Reid (1997: 97-99) observed that in three decades in history of terrorist studies between 1970's-1990's the academic research on terrorism were characterized by either moribund or flourishing tendencies depending on the waves of contemporary terrorist activism and its respective media coverage, as well as, financial support for the research.

The significant rebound of attention into terrorist studies, from peripheral considerations into forefront of policy and academic interest came swiftly with the events of September 11, 2001. Since the terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre in New York, the enormous body of literature encompassing highly diverse approaches provided for the emergence of terrorist studies as an established area of specification and expertise worldwide (Silke, 2007: 78-79). Terrorism studies were ultimately comprehensively analyzed in the traditions of diverse academic departments.

The contemporary body of literature on terrorism presents a high diversity of techniques and approaches to different aspect of the terrorist phenomena in recognition of the existing problems associated with studying the terrorist phenomena. However, the large dimensional academic contribution remains constrained within the applicability of state-centric theoretical foundations to study of terrorism. Plessis (2001: 134) argued that the existent international relations theories,

more often than not, adopt state-centric approach, therefore, encounter difficulty in adjusting to the circumstances where diverse international actors increasingly face adversaries other than states. In order to identify a set of distinct observations for entirety of terrorism and make assertions about the underlying reality that brings about and affects it, it is necessary to undertake an extensive theory building in terrorism studies. Embracing the entirety of terrorism phenomena within an approach with a system of ideas intended to explain terrorism, especially one based on general principles independent of the explanation of terrorism, would constitute a concrete step forward for credible accountancy for terrorism within a range of description, explanation and potential forecast of wide range of actors.

Contemporarily, the biggest challenge for terrorism as an academic phenomenon steams from the intricacy of the dominant theories of international relations, which failed to take full account and explanation of persistence of terrorism within international arena. Some scholars, such as Gray (2002), Richmond (2003) and Brenner (2006) attempted to adjust the aforementioned theories and allow for the incorporation of terrorist element into the solid theoretical composition. Their effort, however, proved to be possible only to the limited extent. Gray (2002) essentially refusing the notion of an unknowable violent entity illustrated that modern terrorism is a product of modernization stemming from the forces of globalization and capitalism, by indicating that terrorism represents merely a relic of the past rather than distinctively new phenomenon emerging within the

sphere of political influences and exercise of violence. Conversely to Gray (2002), Brenner (2006) identified that contemporary terrorism constitutes a *sui generis*, *pathological* form of politics exercised by the states and offered the application of monster-adjustment¹⁰ theory to extend the scope of realism beyond centralized territorial states. Brenner (2006) based his argument on the prepositions that new pathological forms are, like states, constrained by the structural anarchic conditions, uncertain environment and aim primarily to survive. Conversely, Richmond (2008) attempted to promote cross-fertilization between conflict analysis and terrorism studies as against the traditional perceptions of state-centric framework in order to encourage multi-divisional approach to the study international relations. In summary, all of the abovementioned represented merely alterations to the existing theories in international relations, rather than proposing a new paradigm for studying terrorism within a distinct theoretical framework. The approach presented in this thesis aims in turn at the direction of terrorism research to progress towards the development of a novel theoretical framework, within the boundaries of operational code analysis, hypothesizing the possible requirements for studying diversity of actors on equal manner.

Stemming from the needs for theory-building through adaptation of methodological aspects, a small nucleus of scholars, the earliest of which Merkl (1986) and the latest Silke (2004) concentrated on addressing the methodology of

¹⁰ The central premise of monster-adjustment theory aims to re-describe an outlandish counterexample in such a way that it ceases to be outlandish and thereby ceases to be a counterexample (Sarkar and Pfeifer, 2006: 438).

research. Both, theoretical adjustments and methodological directions of research on terrorism remain limited and constitute an inadequacy in the grounding foundations of terrorist studies, the foundations that within most academic disciplines are prerequisite for further research. Of equal importance for research on terrorism, as noted by Crenshaw (2000: 405) is the lack of internationally agreed definition of terrorism. As long as the consensus in defining terrorist organization is not reached, the cohesive and cumulative theory of terrorism will not gain a prominent sound and universal explanatory power, leading to the solemn evaluation of event-driven research of individual events (Crenshaw, 2000: 405). The significance of reliance on the event-driven research constitutes for the deficient predictive capacity of the terrorist theories, and therefore, hinder upon the “critical function in educating the broader public, politicians and the counter-terrorism communities about terrorism in its broader strategic context” (Ranstrop, 2006: 10). Within both, policy-driven and theory-driven approaches the academic value arises both from specific context of the terrorist incidents, but also from generalizations that would allow for development and maintenance of research continuousness allowing scientists to present new ideas and hypotheses, both intra and inter-disciplinary in nature.

The body of knowledge belonging to present academic efforts becomes increasingly directed towards augmentation of terrorist research through incorporation of studies from outside of specialty. The research questions are formulated developing the premises of historical development and its effect on terrorist

practices, as well as, roles of political geography and application of theories of social construction to present innovative approach to the subject matter. It is important to move beyond merits of different approaches to reach truly innovative knowledge in future terrorism research. As Ranstorp (2006: 13) argued, “understanding the kaleidoscope of various forms of terrorism is a complex academic exercise and various aspects of the field are in many ways still embryonic in its development.” And in this context, incorporating the research approach of operational code into the research inventory of terrorist studies, would redirect the field in its interdisciplinary essence into vitally state-of-the-art field of terrorist studies. However, whatever path the operational code approach directs, its success relies strictly on the feats and fractures of past research which becomes an indispensable for the construction of comprehensive body of knowledge on terrorism. The sections below, aim at the representation of the field of terrorism studies through delineation of the segregate areas of focus within the field of terrorist studies, in order to present the absence of a unified theory that would embrace all below-mentioned categories into a coherent network for understanding of terrorist phenomena, through channels of research aimed at description, explanation and forecast.

3.1. The Anatomy of Research on Terrorism

Terrorism studies cannot be thought about and drawn toward being a separate academic discipline. The field of research on terrorism is segregated into different categories associated with different points of reference. While attempts to

define the motivational underlining of terrorism design the research to answer the question of why terrorism happens; the category encompassing behavioral terrorist studies attempt to understand how terrorists operate, while the counter-terrorism studies constitute attempt to answer the question on how to prevent or eliminate terrorism effectively. In this section I will attempt to examine the aforementioned categories briefly in order to present the extent of the reach, examine a possible coherency of a theory embracing all these aspects and propose further implications for research within field of terrorism.

The focus upon motivational, behavioral and counter-terrorism categorization stems from the identification of the primary research questions concerning understanding and preventing the threat arising from terrorist actors. Recognizing that the field of terrorism incorporates variety of research embracing for example historical perspectives (Wiktorowicz, 2006), the influences of ideological figures upon engagement in violent action (Zimmerman, 2004) or theories of strategic thinking (Hegghammer, 2006) as sub-categorical classifications remains essentially excluded from the descriptive attempt of this section in order to constrain the picture for a general delineation rather than factual representation of the field.

3.1.1. Motivational Research

The category of terrorist motivations, attempting to explain on why terrorism happens is divided to numerous sub-categories, embracing the condition that

give rise to terrorism or root causes, the organizational choice of terrorism and individual motivations. Since the motivational studies in terrorism encompass broad-range of sub-topics it is a generally accepted premise that the causes of terrorism are complex and interrelated rather than single and decisive (Newman, 2006: 751). The prominent scholar in the field of motivational studies concentrating on the root cause aspects of terrorism would be Bjorgo (2005), whose edited book, evolving out of a meeting of a number of international experts on terrorism, who gathered in Oslo in June 2003, delineated several root causes of terrorism among which there were non-democratic environment, charismatic leadership and extremist ideological orientation. In a similar manner, Hippel's (2007) root cause indicators for terrorism embraced poverty, religious extremism, social injustice and inequality and political governance of weak states among many others as significant in the evaluation of terrorist motivations from the perspective of structural conditions.

Many other contributors to the root cause studies identified that personal development (McCormick, 2003: 492), poverty, lack of education (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Newman, 2006), and clashes over cultural modernization (Mousseau, 2002) are among many interrelated factors frequently listed in consideration of causal, more often than not, indirect relationship to the emergence of terrorism. In a similar manner to scholars studying root causes, there are number of academicians who attempted to evaluate the existing theories on the basis of their validity. Prominently, among all, the studies of Hudson (2002) and

Bergen and Pandey (2006: 118) argued, in partial contrary to the above theories, that majority of terrorist leaders had middle or upper class backgrounds and acquired university degrees, thus weakening the link between terrorism and low-class, low-education background of individuals. An important attention within root cause studies should be given to the rise of religious extremism and its igniting impact on terrorism (Laqueur, 2003: 25-28).

In respect of the impact of religion on terrorism, the prominent study was conducted by Juergensmeyer (2000: xi) who identified that any religion can be presented in a manner that would impact terrorism given the condition that a believer assured of his actions and the existence of activist notions within a religious community to which one belongs. Scholars such as Lo (2005) opposed the notion of direct linkage between religious faith and terrorism indicating in turn that religion brought into the realm of politics becomes fundamentally changed in its underlining premises leading, thus, indirectly to the emergence of political violence. And it is this political aspect of terrorism that many authors identify as critical for the emergence of terrorism can be best understood within the context of organizational goals.

Atkins (1992: 2) once noted that “as long any group can find reason to declare war on existing state of affairs, terrorism will always remain an available weapons.” And this very premise becomes the underlining foundations for the evaluation of how organizational goals lead to terrorism. This aspect of motivational

research represents terrorism as a tool and available option for successful goal attainment for a particular group or organization (Garrison, 2004: 260), based on the premise that terrorist “share a common understanding of the utility of terror.” Terrorist groups’ motivation in respect of calculable choices of available tools and strategies of political violence are often associated with group’s self-identification and self-rationalization as a weak entity against the powerfulness of the state and with lack of resources the terrorism becomes the an attractive strategic option (McCormick, 2003: 475), resulting in turning their perceived weakness into a “political strength by pursuing an offsetting strategy of high-profile violence.” In general manner, scholars pointing at terrorism as an available mean for achievement of political goals assume the rationality of terrorist collectives.

In consideration of the individual motives for terrorist action, the proposed approaches more often than not extensively rely on the interdisciplinary research incorporating psychological and sociological aspects into political arena for terrorist studies. The most prominent and widely-recognized name in the field of individual motivations is Jerrod Post (1990), who identified in detail the psychological aspect of terrorists, including elements of terrorist profiling and comparative-psychology studies. Post (1990: 27-31) argued that factors such as self-image, personality type, psychological motivations can become significant for individuals to join, yet cannot be generalized as to encompass a wide-spectrum of organizations with which terrorists affiliate. Other factors in individual motivations

were enlisted as threat to group's identity or existence, inter-group dynamics, influence of group-leadership and other characteristics of group behavior (Post et al., 2002: 73), 'individual identity' (Post, 1990: 33-34) or 'social identity' inclusive of in-group based identity (Stets and Burke, 2000: 227). With unlike motivational dimensions of individuals, however, it is generally accepted that terrorists do not present different mental state to non-terrorist counterparts and thus are regarded in principle as 'normal individuals.'

3.1.2. Behavioral Research

Within the study of terrorist practices academic scholars in general engage in studying the decision-making processes and evaluating the existing data from precedent attack to decode patterns in terrorist activities. Within the field of decision-making as previously mentioned some scholars regard the terrorism as a strategic choice undertaking research to elaborate on behavioral dimensions of this notion. An important observation within this category indicated that terrorist's objectives and actions correspond in an indirect manner (McCormick, 2003: 483). Elaborating on this argument, the elements of media, publicity and over-emphasis of terrorist attacks help the terrorist cause indirectly by diverting the attention to the public and discrediting state actors for the achievement of desired concessions. The implication of this research establishes terrorism as a mean rather than end-in-itself.

An important sub-category of behavioral research on terrorism associated both with the previous section on motivations and the view of terrorism as a 'mean' for achievement of political action is devoted to the study of suicide terrorism. Although in part the research involves considerations of motivational factors including the evaluations of profiles of suicide attackers (Pape, 2003), and psychological aspect of prestige associated with 'martyrdom' as identified by the members of terrorist organizations (Post et al., 2003: 179-180). A considerable amount of research has been conducted on becoming a suicide terrorist and organizational processes associated with that end (Sprinzak, 2002). From the instrumental research designs, incorporating organizational conditions, the research on suicide terrorism often embodied the indication of increased advantages of suicide terrorism to those of conventional attacks (Pape, 2003: 349), providing terrorist with increased leverage over their adversaries.

In proximity to motivational studies, a number of scholars attempted to identify the relationship between individual terrorist and affiliated groups concluding that terrorist in general present loyalty to their organizations and substitute organizational goals for their own (Crenshaw, 1988: 19-20). Within the research devoted solely to behavioral considerations, the specific dimensions of research on terrorist behavior include organizational structure of terrorist organizations (Arquilla et al., 1999); terrorist financing activities (Pieth, 2002); utilization of denial and deception (Jesse, 2006), terrorist education (Bergen and Pandey, 2006) or utilization of Internet (Cronin, 2002), as well as, support of failed states

(Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002). The researches indicated that terrorism's organizational network structure significantly impinges upon its behavior and counter-terrorism efforts (Arquilla et al., 1999: 81); terrorist resort to illicit organized crimes, such as oil and drug trades in order to obtain the majority of funding (Pieth, 2002: 6); terrorist operate on complex strategic and tactical levels in order to achieve their objectives (Jesse, 2006: 368); contemporary terrorists are often educated in the West (Bergen and Pandey, 2006: 123); the Internet provides facilitated access to information for training, recruitment and organization of attacks, as well as, carrying out 'cyber-terrorist attacks' (Cronin, 2002: 46). Additionally, on the account of terrorist behavior, Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) studied the success of terrorist utilization of the failed state environment for acquisition of self-sufficient infrastructure.

Amid research indicating future prospects for behavioral research also found its admirers within the discipline. Among many, the utilization of weapons of mass destruction has been increasingly apparent topic, with among many Parachini (2003), Jenkins's (2006) and Gressing's (2009) contribution to the notions and underlining principles for possible resorting to nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. Additionally, Dolnik (2003) explored a link between suicide terrorism and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

3.1.3. Counter-Terrorism Research

In respect of the research on counter-terrorism, the essential focus of studies has been directed at the prevention and elimination of the terrorist threat. Much of the research in relation to the elimination of the terrorist threat has been directed towards the notion of disengagement of individual terrorists from the pursuance of organizational objective. In particular Horgan (2005) attempted to identify the psychological providing for the increasing incentives of individual members to separate from the course of terrorism. Across the line of prevention and elimination, Horgan (2005: 150) further argued that “physical disengagement” such as capturing or killing of member of terrorist organizations would constitute another counter-terrorism tactic of pre-emption and eventual elimination of the terrorist threat.

The counter-terrorism debate has become increasingly incorporated the arguments identifying the negative effects of countering terrorism with the military force of states. On that account, a vast body of literature denoting the asymmetric character of terrorism and consequent difficulties that state encounter with facing threats emanating from non-state actors (e.g. Bowen, 2004; Delpech, 2002, Gray, 2002) accounted for increasing perceptions that use of military force could represent only but partial counter-terrorist strategy, next to political strategy aimed at successful prevention and elimination of terrorist threat (e.g. Cronin, 2002: 55; Mousseau, 2002: 5). The general arguments signify that terrorists operate on different operational level than states presenting states with

impossibility of countering terrorist units in the same manner as countering military forces of another state. An example argument presented by Hoyt (2004: 162) illustrated that “it is a mistake to assume that high-technology tools of conventional conflict can be utilized freely and easily in opposition to the forces of transnational terrorism today.” Among the non-military options, the prominence of international infrastructure of cooperation and processes that could effectively cut the terrorist from considerable finances or disable them from utilizing valuable resources, such as organized crime, including narcotics trafficking to fund terrorist attacks (Biersteker et al., 2008). On the other aspect of counterterrorism, Takeyh and Gvodev (2002: 105-107) identified that while terrorist organization utilize failed states for refuge, proposing an aspect of nation building that would rehabilitate failed states and provide effective military and security assistance, which in turn would disable civilian population from entering a terrorist network of global reach. The extent, however, to which the abovementioned constrains on terrorist action can eliminate or prevent terrorism is highly disputable and necessitates the simultaneous efforts directed at the motivational and behavioral dimensions of terrorism in full recognition of the complexity of the terrorist threat.

3.2. Implications for Future Research on Terrorism

The existing traditions within the research on terrorism present that the field of terrorism studies made only a limited headway in developing any kind of robust theory or interpretations relevant to the challenges posed by terrorism, by

providing independent accounts to the questions of terrorism related motivational, behavioral and counter-action aspects. There is, however, no apparent theoretical and methodological framework within the social sciences in general and political science and international relations in particular that would constitute for a comprehensive illustration of terrorism incorporating the subcategories into a wider theoretical framework.

The break-through into the field of terrorism studies in an effort to construct a general theory, however, can be identified with the action of turning to and adopting a distinctive approach of operational code construct as a method originating in "policy sciences." Snyder et al. (1962: 33) noted that "if one wishes to probe the 'why' questions underlying the events, conditions and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is necessary." Since the underlining premises of any research aims at better understanding of the phenomena, the institutions and academics in proximity to the world of real decision making, should be provided with a considerable place within the discipline, for not only the underlining frameworks for examination of decision-making processes, but also for a fruitful and reliable advise for decision-makers. The systematized applications of operational code analysis for construction of a general theory represent a step forward in the progressing towards the achievement of the grounded theoretical reality for research on terrorism embracing the elements of motivational and behavioral aspects of terrorist organizations in general, and equally constituting a value for counter-terrorism research.

Operational code analysis, substantially does not rely on event-driven research, but rather promotes a general narration of terrorist action that would not only represent an educative tool for researchers and broader public and politicians but also constitute a significant predictive capacity. Through delineation of the rules of conduct which govern the internal forces of terrorist organizations, and external relationships that terrorist organizations assume to provide for the greatest efficiency for the desired political outcome, the operational code analysis markedly constitutes a foundation for a sound and cumulative theory progressing towards the greater research consciousness through acquirement of new ideas and additional hypotheses within and across the fields of academic inquiry.

Operational code analysis significantly requires further improvement for achievement of true academic value, as its evolution has significantly followed the path of state-centrism, although its original design was viable for inclusion of threat-imposing non-state actors. The following section, thus, provides an introduction to operational code analysis, presents its in-depth evolution and systematization and consequently reaches back to its origins in proposition of further progress and systematization of the operational code construct towards its utilization for studies on terrorism.

CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS

Identified by the premises of cognitive studies a manner in which decision-makers perceive the external world is of fundamental significance in determining the content of their relations with the outside world. A former United State's State Department planner, Louis Halle (1960: 316) wrote that decision-makers address themselves not to the external world, but rather to "the image of the external world." Contemporary approaches in international relations often do not account sufficiently for the importance of images that reflect tendencies and preferences for scientific methodologies. Nevertheless, despite of often non-inclusiveness of the images in analytical frameworks, in general, scholars of international relations accept the preposition that political behavior is shaped by the manner in which decision-makers perceive and interpret social and physical environments. The underlining logic behind operational code analysis refers directly to the portion of subjective beliefs that are likely to constitute for significant influences on political and social behavior. In recognition of cognitive processes and psychological variables, foreign policy scholars attempt to extract

individual's beliefs and ideas in relation to the nature of politics and appropriate political actions. Operational code analysis constitutes a distinctive approach to study of political beliefs and rules of conduct constraining the rationality of decision-makers. Belonging into the category of cognitive studies, next to cognitive mapping,¹¹ image theory¹² and conceptual complexity analyses,¹³ operational code analysis distinguishingly appears among the theories of foreign policy as making a venture to understand a significant portion of decision-maker's political beliefs that affect the overall policy process and final decision outcomes. However, without a systematic methodology it is often difficult to present these beliefs and response repertoire with clarity in order to determine how these beliefs affect political behavior. As Peter Hall (1989: 4) noted, "those who seek to expose the bare conflicts of interests hidden behind political rhetoric or historical nostalgia admit that ideas play an important role in affairs of state. But that role is not easily described." Extracting belief systems of individual leaders and leadership groups with a well-defined and systematic method, operational code analysis enables analysts to identify organizing principles behind decision-maker's subjective beliefs and thus provides means to anticipate the decision-maker's response to the incoming stimuli from the environment.

¹¹ Cognitive mapping, as defined by Axelrod (1976: 55) is "a specific way of representing a person's assertions about some limited domain, such as policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of the person's causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow from this structure." Cognitive mapping attempts to illustrate the network of concepts as they are in turn connected with each other through causal linkages.

¹² Image theory was first introduced in works of Cottam (1977). Image theory assumes that individual behave in perpetually patterned ways. The patterned cognitive constructions in turn filter information for policy decision-making purposes and thus decision-maker's images enter into causal relationship with his/her behaviour.

¹³ Conceptual complexity analysis focuses upon structure and evaluation of a degree of complexity and interconnectedness of individual's cognition as expressed in his/her belief system. A contextual complexity appeared initially in the work of Driver (1977).

4.1. Evolution of Operational Code Analysis

Incorporating diverse cognitive variables into empirical research on decision-making have been characterized by sharp differences over the questions of theory, scope and methodology.¹⁴ One landmark work, which differed in important respects from other cognitive approaches, was the two-volume study of Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953), through which he de-coded a beliefs system of Soviet ruling elite. In its first appearance the term *operational code* referred to “rules which [a political actor] believe to be necessary for effective political conduct” (Leites, 1951: xi) and “conception of political ‘strategy’” (Leites, 1953: 15).¹⁵ In the preface to *Operational Code of Politburo* (1951) Leites wrote that the book had two main aims: to identify those aspects of Bolshevik beliefs that relate to the strategy and tactics of political action and to single out Bolshevik attitudes toward politics as directed towards the external world as well as intra-Party governing relationships. Within the general composition of the subsequent study on operational code of Politburo, *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953), Leites attempted to relate both aims to the personalities and historical experiences that shaped Bolshevik approach to politics.¹⁶

¹⁴ A comprehensive overview of existent theories of cognition in international relations literature was presented in Young and Schafer (1998).

¹⁵ First and foremost is the surprising uncovering of an immense misguidance within the tradition of operational code analysis concerning Merton’s theoretical framework. Despite the extensive reference to Merton’s (1940, 1952) works within many of studies on operational code (Walker and Murphy, 1981: 24; Walker 1983: 200; Walker, 1990:403; Young and Schafer, 1998: 69; Crichlow, 1998: 688; Cairo, 2004: 240), I have found that Merton have not used the concept of *operational code* in any of the cited works.

¹⁶ In contrast to the *Operational Code of Politburo* (1951), Leites in *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953) enriched his inquiry into operational code beliefs through exploration of psychoanalytic and psychocultural sources of Soviet actions.

The two-volume work of Leites (1951, 1953) composed of list of maxims, thus, emerged as the initial paradigm composed of the *general rules* of Bolshevik conduct focusing upon “world-view” and “response repertoire” shared among role incumbents of a political organization (Walker, 1990: 403). Importantly Leites’ (1951, 1953) both works embraced interdisciplinary complexity of analysis, with the amalgam of political, organizational and psychological realms that approach study of decision-making elites. The particular employment of psychoanalysis accounts for complexity of its design of Leites’ (1953) researches, where Leites’ (1953) focused on deliberate delineation of preconscious and conscious content of Bolshevik doctrine in his construction of an account for the origins of Bolshevik character (George, 1969: 194; Walker, 1990: 404) as it was manifested in personalities of Lenin and Stalin (Walker, 1990: 404). The prominence and sophistication of Leites’ (1951, 1953) approach, however, was widely limited by the lack of structuring and synthesis of Bolsheviks’ believes about politics and rules of conduct associated with the concept of operational code. As George (1969: 196) observed, Leites (1951, 1953) “did not clarify sufficiently the order, hierarchy, and interrelationships among the various elements of the code,” which in turn hindered upon reader’s identification of its structure and research mode.

Sixteen years later Leites’ (1951, 1953) works were re-visited and distilled by Alexander George (1969) into series of questions to guide subsequent inventories of the operational code for assessment of actors posing international threats. George’s (1969: 193) revision was grounded in his observation that “while

complexity of the [Leites'] work adds to its richness and intellectual appeal, it has also made it unusually difficult for readers to grasp its structure or to describe its research mode." To fully understand the concept of operational code George (1969: 197) identified the term as "a political leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical development can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics."¹⁷ Attempting for greater parsimony of Leites' (1951, 1953) construct, George (1969) brought the operational code analysis into separate being that existed along the lines of "ten different 'beliefs' formulated as questions, the answers to which, he argued, essentially captured the operational code of Bolsheviks"(Young and Schafer, 1998: 70). The ten-beliefs construct of George (1969) composed of five 'philosophical' questions and five 'instrumental' pertained beliefs about political actors, nature of political universe and beliefs concerning planning and strategies for effective action respectively. According to George (1969: 201-216), a decision maker's operational code analysis consists of his answers to the following questions:

Philosophical beliefs:

P-1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

¹⁷ George (1969) pointed out the fact that beliefs embraced within the operational code of a political actor embrace only a significant portion of actor's set of beliefs about political life. Particular attention should be, thus, given to the beliefs referring to the classical problem of political action.

P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score? And in what respect the one and/or the other?

P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

P-5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental beliefs:

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

I-2. How are the goals of actions pursued most effectively?

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?

I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?¹⁸

¹⁸ George (1979: 97) in his further defence differentiated the belief system of operational code from political attitudes held by the actor. Operational code beliefs have gained the status of "central beliefs" rather than object and context-specific. As noted by George (1979: 100), the individual beliefs of the operational code are "bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" thus aggregate to form a unabridged "belief system."

Based on the structure of 'ten-belief system', George (1969) simply drew a parallel between Leites' (1951, 1953) studies and 'answers' to the abovementioned questions. In evaluation of other political leaders and leadership groups, the philosophical questions aim at the anticipation of actor's diagnosis of a situation, while the instrumental questions aim at the anticipation of actor's perceptions on appropriate responses. To extend the underlining premises behind the concept George (1969: 191) further noted that "these beliefs... provide norms, standards and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action." Importantly, however, the rules embraced by the operational code cannot be regarded as prescriptive, as the definitions may imply, but rather should be seen as a guide to political decision-making. The belief system embodied within the operational code does not unilaterally determine the actions of political-actors, nevertheless, remains an important, but not the only, variable that shape decision-making processes.

George (1969) himself represented the operational code as a revision of Leites' (1951, 1953) construct: experimental, exploratory, and preliminary in his purpose to chart a course for others to follow. Thus, in excerpting the operational code portion from the works of Leites (1951, 1953), George (1969) acknowledged that he was excluding some of its politically less relevant features. The major contribution of George's (1969) study was to elucidate operational code analysis through making it primarily cognitive in conceptualization and exclude the

psychoanalytic aspect of its features by focusing on the maxims of political strategy solely as the beliefs implicitly or explicitly held by the political actor. Operational code construct has thus become representative of “an attempt to isolate the most politically relevant aspects of individual’s cognitive map and conceptualize them so that they become a set of general beliefs about political life”(Walker, 1990: 130). This was intended to make political actor’s beliefs and perceptions more susceptible to investigation and analysis through methods available to political scientists.

In a study published ten years later, George (1979) further elaborated upon his operational code construct, and differentiated the beliefs in the operational code from political attitudes. In George’s (1979) understanding the political attitudes are contextual in nature and inclusive of object-specific considerations, while operational code extracts general beliefs embraced within a *belief system* structure in which “individual beliefs are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (George, 1979: 100). In consequence, both Leites’ and George’s analytical studies have addressed “important theoretical and real-world questions which were anomalies within the rational actor paradigm’s traditional theoretical context” (Walker, 1990: 407). Both, Leites’ (1951, 1953) qualitative content analysis and George’s (1969, 1979) re-defined belief-inventory constitutes undoubtedly a solidified foundation for the gradual development of operational code analysis as a research focus for the assessment of cognition in international relations.

The operational code analysis have experienced the most extensive augmentation in mid-1970, with Leites-George paradigm guiding a series of comparable case studies of American decision-makers that eventually generated a typology of operational codes (Holsti, 1970; McLellan, 1971; Hosti, 1976, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Walker, 1977; Stuart and Starr, 1981; Starr, 1984; Walker and Falkowski, 1984; Walker, 1995; Walker, Young and Schafer, 1998). In respect of theoretical developments, Loch Johnson's (1977) study of Senator Franck Church introduced new aspects for the considerations within operational code analysis. The most important of the insight of Johnson (1977) was the suggestion that the beliefs in operational code were arranged along a continuum making the answers to philosophical and instrumental questions applicable to interval-level scales, thus facilitate comparison among political actors (Young and Schafer, 1998: 70). In this respect, the initiation of quantitative approach to study of operational code was grounded within the theoretical considerations of Johnson (1977). The second important theoretical contribution of Johnson (1977: 89) accounted for the change and degree of change in operational codes stemming from changes in environmental aspects creating psychological impact and pressure circumstances. The accountancy of change in the operational code inspired significant comparison studies of changing operational codes, one of which was conducted by Stephen Walker (1998), in which he identified changes in Jimmy Carter's belief systems throughout his time in the office.

In terms of methodological arsenal, the history of operational code analysis presents significant evolutionary patterns. Leites' (1951, 1953) methodological techniques followed subjective and interpretive reviews of the writing of Bolshevik's two most important leaders, Lenin and Stalin. Most subsequent studies of operational codes were conducted in a similar way, using qualitative content analysis guided by George's (1969) five philosophical and five instrumental questions. In addition to the above, some scholars (McLellan, 1971; Johnson, 1977) in addition to the information acquired from official publications, authors acquired data from private communications and from interviews with the studied leaders and their colleagues. As Young and Schafer (1998: 71) noted, "in several cases, researchers (e.g. Johnson, 1977; Walker 1977; Stuart and Starr, 1981) were interested in materials produced prior to the leader taking office and have examined honors theses, interviewed parents and classmates, and explored personal papers from this period." In all studies of operational codes, however, George's (1969) ten-belief framework served as the organizing manual and guide for the identification of the evidence. The high-costs, time-longevity, questionable reliability and virtually impossible comparison of existing researches stemming from the methodological foundations soon transformed the operational code analysis into a different methodological sphere.

In respect of methodological developments, operational code analysis significantly developed with Ole Holsti's (1977) quantitative construct for study of operational codes. The primary reason for the implementation of quantitative

methodology was to provide future operational code analyses with reliability of research which up to this point was limited by the generally difficult to replicate and compare methodological foundations. Basing his construct on George's (1969) philosophical and instrumental questions, Holsti (1977) constructed a coding manual in order to apply a three-step strategy to formulate six political belief systems for operational code analysis. The six-type typology of Holsti (1977) categorizing the beliefs into six categories derived from the juncture of two master beliefs concerning fundamental nature of political universe and fundamental sources of conflict (Holsti, 1977: 156-157) was designed as a scheme for specification of George's (1969) construct.

The basic point of reference in analysis in Holsti's (1977) typology was "individual behavior constrained by the decision maker's belief system" (Walker, 1990: 409). Holsti (1977) adopted the key philosophical and instrumental questions from George (1969) and complemented his construct with significant insights. Primarily, Holsti (1977) identified a pattern of cognitive consistency, from which are derived two general propositions, namely that beliefs reinforce one another and that under specified conditions beliefs influence final decision-making by constraining a range of alternative choices. It is an important development to identify linkage between philosophical and instrumental beliefs and perceive them in a coherent manner rather than as separate sets of beliefs. In order to prove his initial observations, Holsti (1977) analyzed quantitatively compared number of existing qualitatively constructed operational codes in order to

test his typology. Due to a lack of extensive quantitative data, Holsti's (1977) analysis attempted for indirect-validation of the new operational code typology, resulting in coherent operational code design, however, embodying some ambiguities and overlapping beliefs (Stuart, 1979; Walker, 1983). The deficiencies of Holsti's (1977) construct, however, were soon corrected by Stephen Walker (1983) whose works significantly solidified foundational aspects of research for subsequent operational code researches of quantitative nature.

The availability of qualitative and quantitative methodologies for studying of operational code facilitate in the greatest extent comparison studies that attempt to explore links between political action and beliefs. As quantitative approaches identify reliable patterns of behavior, the qualitative methods, however, can also reflect not less important idiosyncrasies of the beliefs, lost within the scientific and number-based structures.

Understanding in essence the anatomy and evolution of the operational code analysis, the following section consequently progresses towards delineation of limitations of the construct, its original underpinnings and proposed solutions, that already apparent in the initial operational code construct represent a significant establishments for further inquiry into utilization of the approach for studies on non-state terrorist actors.

4.2. Utilization of Operational Code Analysis for Terrorist Organizations

The contemporary operational code analysis emerged markedly different in its theoretical and methodological design than originally intended by Leites (1951, 1953). Initially, Leites' (1951, 1953) references to "the Bolsheviks," "the Party" and "the Politburo" indicated that he attempted to analyze and decode a social group, a collective body of individuals sharing common perceptions and beliefs. Leites (1951, 1953) attempted to uncover operational rules of Bolshevik conduct through finding evidences of the perceptions on governing relations of the Party towards outside world, as well as, within the Party itself. George's (1969) attempt to reuse the operational code analysis as a residual methodology from its traditional status at the outset displays a significant inconsistency, which should be brought to the notice of the researchers. George's (1969) definition of the operational code, despite its prominence, presents a significant flaw of correspondence to Leites' (1951, 1953) works and his definition. George (1969: 197) stated that

Political leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical development can be shaped, and his notion of correct strategy and tactics – whether these beliefs are referred to as "operational code," "Weltanschauung," "cognitive map," or an elite's "political culture" – are among the factors influencing that actor's decisions.

The recognition of the quality of George's (1969) work should be given to the unprecedented conceptualization of operational code, yet it should be noted significantly that the definition of the concept refers to individual decision-makers, rather than a collective body. Thus George (1969) restructured Leites' (1951, 1953)

operational code from signifying rules and patterns within a group and shared perceptions on the outside world of individuals within that group to consideration of individual operational codes without the connection to the group dynamics. In this respect, George's (1969) conceptual framework has largely failed to take up Leites' (1951, 1953) original design by relegating the level of analysis to individual rather than sub-group or organizational. In spite of the fact that in *The "Operational Code: A Neglected Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making"* (1969) George had not explicitly intended to relegate operational code into individual level of analysis, in his consequent work on operational code *The Casual Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: "The Operational Code" Belief System* (1979) he unequivocally pronounced his intended level of analysis through association of operational code belief system with cognitive schemata of individuals.¹⁹ As the question of the units of analysis is critical for most areas of cognitive science, the fundamental critique addressed in this study embraces a question of whether aggregated forms of cognition can account for a mere reflection and articulation of collective-level of analysis as presented by George (1969, 1979).

The fundamental observation upon which further analysis will be conducted is the fact that because lone individual rarely controls all decision-making activities even in an organization with high level of centralization of authority it

¹⁹ George (1979: 97) observed that "of the various characteristic of cognitive structure that have been employed as basic unit of analysis, I regard schemata as particularly appropriate and important in studying the role of cognitive variables in the decision-making behaviour of political leaders."

is assumed that decision-making rests (at a minimum level) with small coalition of individual decision-makers (Mintzberg, 1979). In this context, what's necessary in terms of thinking about decision-makers and their orientation to action, is to consider them as participants in a *system of action*" (Snyder et al. 1962: 86). This means that rules among and actions of decision-makers constitute some form of efficient and orderly approach to activities. This system refers to a set of ordering device that prescribes principles, procedures and relationships that contribute to the continuation of activities. Snyder et al. (1962: 87) identified this type of system as an *organization*. Ocasio (1997: in Ocasio: 2001: 42) offers a more elaborated definition of an organization stating that it comprises a "social system of collective action that structures and regulates the actions and cognitions of organizational participants through its rules, resources and social relations."²⁰ The assumption here is that both collective action and cognition in any organization are subjected to regulatory mechanism, and thus a mere understanding of organization as a monolithic actor would be insufficient in this regard. While the observation that membership in organization is represented by distinct organizational identity, organizations continuously face a challenge of consolidating divergent identities into a coherent one. Approximating the organization as a unitary actor

²⁰ In evaluation of decision-making within organizational context it is important to set up the boundaries of organizational realm. One of the most important methodological assumptions is that only those within organizational setting are to be viewed as potential decision-makers. This is important to note in respect of the organizational environment where the private public or masses – regardless of how powerful – cannot be regarded as participants in organizational decision-making unless – even on temporary basis – assume a position within an organization. Snyder et al. (1962: 99) identified an important observation on this account: "It appears to us more difficult to isolate the decision-making process (or system or unit) and to relate officials and non-officials when there is no way of assigning recognized roles to all actors."

proves often to be difficult if not impossible, as its social composition exists by virtue of the individuals whose relationships span organizational boundaries.

Lindblom (1982: 125) observed that:

Even if we imagined an individual with the knowledge-storing capacity and the information processing capacity of a large organization, the decisions which the individual would make would be different to the ones an organization would make even with the same inputs and the same initial definition of the problem

On this account, to the extent that aggregation of individuals emerges as a pivotal feature of any organization, the analyst should abandon the notion of an organization as a unitary actor with a well-defined and unambiguous preference ordering. As this understanding treats both individual and the organization as legitimate levels of analysis, the issue of aggregation from the individual to the organizational level becomes a concern when the organization is perceived as a unitary political actor.

George (1969) certain that he have exposed an engine that drives cognition of individual leaders forward, never seems to ask whether, next to philosophical and instrumental, there is another category of beliefs to be incorporated into operational code paradigm. Confident that he has identified a direction in which operational code analysis is proceeding – assessment of individual leaders - George (1969) does not tell us explicitly how he have identified and how he arrived at what the ultimate destination actually is. It appears that, George's (1969) interest in operational code analysis in evaluation of individual leadership has grown largely out of George's (1969) adaptation of Brim et al. (1962) paradigm within

which the authors depict personality variables related to decision-making processes. George's (1969) work parallels – and in terms of theoretical potential holds up considerably better than – Brim et al. (1962) differentiation among *epistemological* and *instrumental* beliefs – at least in respect of particularly significant portion of political actor's entire set of beliefs about political life. Brim et al (1962: 49) brings epistemological and instrumental under variable of decision-maker's personality.²¹ This is to denote that while borrowing a paradigm from Brim et al (1962), George (1969) inherited the level of analysis as well.

As stated previously, Leites' (1951, 1953) concept of operational code has historically been collective in its level of analysis. Notwithstanding the fact that it appears as Leites (1951, 1953) portrayed Politburo as unitary, purposive actor, his underlining conclusion was that Politburo's behavior was not in line with the course of ideal rationality that would be chosen by a unitary rational actor. Leites (1951: xi) relegated the concept of unity to represent a shared belief system guiding Bolshevik reasoning, by inviting the reader to think about the "governing relations within the Party as well as with the outside world."²² While the external influences represented merely an impact of the image of the outside world on decision-making, the internal relations provided a mean

²¹ Brim et al. (1962: 54) identifies epistemological and instrumental beliefs as explanatory variable for personality characteristics, in addition to abilities and motives. The similarity of Brim et al (1962) and George's (1969) models of beliefs is substantial. For Brim et al (1962: 54) epistemological beliefs are those concerned with the characteristics of nature, while instrumental with the relationship of means and ends.

²² Although Leites (1951: xi) specifies that the first study "deals mainly with the relation between the Party and the outside world rather than with the Party's internal relations" the following paragraph denotes that a subsequent study will address the inside-rules governing the relations of the Party.

of acknowledgment of the shared nature of beliefs bearing an effect on the process of policy formulation.

The aim of this thesis is however, not to demean George's attempt. After all, he had the courage to venture clear methodology-based approach to operational code. In fact, George (1969) recognized that Leites (1951, 1953) operational code analysis referred to the "perceptions or maxims of political tactics and strategy that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics" (George, 1969: 193), emphasizing the group level of analysis, he continues to emphasize an individual approach to study with an implication that "this I shall attempt to do here [establish framework for finding answers about actor's political beliefs and relation of knowledge to action] in order to facilitate similar studies of other leaders and other leadership groups" (George, 1969: 199). Taking upon Leites' (1951, 1953) seemingly references to Politburo as a unitary rational actor, George's (1969) conceptualized the applicability of operational code analysis equally to individuals and decision-making collectives.

Interchanging units of analysis becomes a convincing reason to believe that George's (1969) reformulation is not useful as, let alone analytically superior to Leites' (1951, 1953) model, in relation to its utilization for non-state actors. The existent reliance on George's (1969) conceptualization does not provide a solid resolution to the problems in question and more recent theory-based frameworks

in the operational code literature have also not addressed this problem directly.²³ It is unfortunate that George's (1969) successors have focused overwhelmingly on this model all but ignoring the underlying logic behind Leites' (1951, 1953) approach to study of conceptions of political strategy held by the political organization (their operational code).

Despite sharp differences over the questions of theory, scope, and methodology for disparate levels of analysis, both models and subsequent operational code studies have been primarily state-centric. This aspect is closely related to the problem of the level of analysis, since George's (1969) model significantly omits how operational code analysts deal with the problem of implicit assumption that states are bureaucratic (Snyder et al., 1962; Allison, 1971; Frazmand, 2009).²⁴ The obedience of state institutions to strict bureaucratic structures relies on the lack of structural capabilities necessary for rigid management of units and the social, political and economic paradigms that account for emergence and maintenance of bureaucracy as the most efficient organizational system for

²³ The existent operational code studies have primarily focused upon the development of George's belief-set paradigm and improvement of methodological soundness of operational code. The first theoretical change is found in Loch Jonson's (1977) study of Senator Frank Church where the authors attempted to arrange the operational code questions along a continuum in order to facilitate the application of interval-level or ordinal scales to the data. The second and third theoretical changes found in operational code research addressed the problem of change in operational codes (Johnson, 1977) and topical and target-specific, rather than general nature of the beliefs system (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998).

²⁴ The bureaucratic structure of state institutions is axiomatic (Farazmand, 2009). This collection of essays in a descriptive and exploratory manner identifies durability and dependability of state institution on bureaucratic structures and focus on the multifunctional role of bureaucracies in socio-economic, political, cultural and ideological spheres of public relations. Additionally, Allison's (1971) Organizational Process Model of Decision-Making substantially addresses the notion and mechanisms of how existing governmental bureaucracy limits decision-making processes of the state.

governmental institutions throughout centuries. Across the spectrum of non-state terrorist organizations, the structural defining of organization presents an increased adaptability and re-formatting of organizational structure aimed at changing the components of inner functioning that maintain or improve the linkages with other components. Non-state terrorist actors are essentially unbound by the necessity for rigid and stable organizational management, presenting a spectrum of organizational structures deviating in various degrees from bureaucratic structure. Although, the ideal types of both bureaucracy and networks are often the creations of theoretical speculations, non-state terrorist organizations present essentially increased capabilities to approach higher degree of de-bureaucratization than states.²⁵

For greater utilization of operational code analysis for studying of non-state terrorist organizations Leites' (1951, 1953) motivating intuition that beliefs about organizational dynamics are important should be vindicated. To the recognition of the researchers should come the fact that beliefs about organizational characteristics are strongly grounded in the political actor's attention to the strategic implications other than those beliefs which George's (1969) model focuses. In order to account for the existent inconsistencies within the operational code approach, in respect of its utilization to study of non-state terrorist organizations, an incorporation of *beliefs about organizational structure* is proposed to be

²⁵ A comprehensive discussion on non-bureaucratic organizational structures within terrorist organization was provided by Arquilla et al. (1999) and Arquilla et al. (2001). The authors recognize that what distinguishes the new generation of conflict is the networked organizational structure of its practitioners- characterized by the element of leaderlessness and quickness of mobilization.

suggestive in this regard. Beliefs about organizational structure would not only constitute a sound account that differentiates the individual from collective level of analysis, but through delineation of the indispensable rules of organizational structuring account for the differences in the conceptions among state and non-state terrorist actors, whose structural discrepancies are axiomatic. Organizations obtain their characters from within the structure through coordination of the activities of its incumbents, and it is this character that is to be addressed within the premises of the operational code analysis. The intention, however, is not to discuss the organizational structure, as it exists, but to discover structurally defined rules which political actors believe to be necessary for effective political conduct. This is to divert the analysts attention to the perceptions through which decision-makers attempt to *bypass* the existent constraints within which they operate.

Through the cognitive recognition of internal mechanisms for decision-making and means of their improvement for effective action, the decision-makers initiate the process of adjustment and fitness of organizational activities within the environment. What should be brought to the attention of the reader in this statement is the differentiation between the *initial* and *desired* state that comprises the relationship between decision-making and organizational structure. While the initial state encompasses the current context in which decision-maker is located, namely, current structure and other contextual factors, the desired state defines the outcome preferences (MacCrimmon and Taylor, 1976). The notion addressed in this study is the process decision-makers employ, specifically the

cognitive orientation of the decision-makers through which they attempt to move from the initial to the desired stage. On this account Bobbitt and Ford (1980: 17) argue that “because the perception or awareness of a discrepancy between an initial and desired state is necessary before a decision-maker will act, factors that influence such perceptions are important.” This is to identify the direction of the research, by pertaining the theme of this thesis to the cognitive orientation of the decision-makers, that denotes the “systems of organization of information, observation and thought in the process of individual and group problem-solving” (Solo, 1967: 361). Bobbit and Ford (1980: 17) identified the relation of cognition to the conceptions of organizational structure as representative of decision-maker’s information-processing capabilities and modes of decision-making. This constitutes a direct linkage to operational code analysis which encompasses beliefs of a kind that “influence decision-making indirectly by influencing the information-processing tasks that precede and accompany the decision-maker’s choice of action” (George, 1979: 101). The annotation may be made in here concerning the analysis of decision-makers’ perceptions on the relationships and rules governing organizational behavior, accounting for the interaction of decision-makers’ perceptions with their competencies as they stem from the organizational structure.

4.2.1. Operational Code and Beliefs About Organizational Structure

According to March and Simon (1958: 170) *organizational structure* consists “simply of those aspects of the pattern of behavior in the organization that are

relatively stable and change only slowly.” Organizational structure reflects organization’s formal composition of tasks and reporting relationships that allow an organization to coordinate, control and motivate its members for the purpose of common objective (George, 2005: 505).²⁶ Each organization presents a unique structured outline that facilitates reaping of the advantages of the external environment and minimizes the disadvantages of managing the lines of time, culture and geography to survive.²⁷ The choice for beliefs about organizational structure as a selected variable to be incorporated into operational code construct stems primarily from the reciprocal relationship between organizational structure and strategic decision-making processes (Bower, 1970; Mintzberg, 1979; Duncan and Weiss, 1979).

4.2.1.1. Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Code Analysis

Central to the studies of decision-making, and thus development of operational codes is the notion of the decision. Mintzberg et al. (1976: 246) defines *decision* as “a specific commitment to action” in the context of *decision process* defined as “a set of action and dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to action.” Snyder et al (1962: 90) provides more comprehensive definition of *decision-making process* by

²⁶ In literature on organizational theory the general agreement prevails that organizational structure can be identified through three dimensions: centralization, formalization and complexity. The elements of organizational structure are addressed in detail in Chapter V: Typology of Organizational Structures.

²⁷ Facing various crises of growth and survival of the organization the leadership scans the environment and examines solutions for coping with organization’s external problems and its internal predispositions for creating of a workable set of relationship rules. This, according to strategic fit theory, is to ensure organization’s fitness or congruence with the environmental and internal contingencies facing the organization (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schendel, 1978).

diverting analyst's attention to the fact that it embraces "a selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-maker." Within organizational realm, deciding upon important decisions and linking them to strategies is known in organizational studies as *strategic decision-making* and in foreign policy decision-making studies as *policy-making*.

The use of term *strategic* aims to focus the researcher on the plan of organizational action designed to achieve an overall aim, often called the mission or a formal goal of the organization (Daft, 2004: 59). In contrast, describing specific actions as *tactics*, diverts the attention of the researcher on the action that is carefully planned to achieve a specific end. Differentiating among the content of strategies and tactics can be problematic in a sense that the two are closely related and exist on the continuum. Strategies generally embrace the planning aspects that orchestrate and/or inspire sets of action (tactics) in a response to a given problem (Paquette, 2002: 9). Mintzberg (1978: 935) importantly conceptualizes *strategy* as a *pattern in a stream of decisions*, which aims to identify the consistency behind decision-maker's preferences over time. This description allows for the general differentiation among strategic and tactical realms of decision-making based on the notion of *change*. Strategies describe more or less constant sequence of activities aimed at the planning stage of action, while tactics are continuously subjected to changes that would adjust organizational activities in respect of the fulfillment of the general goals.

Since, the concept of operational code, as intended by Leites (1951, 1953), aims to embrace the *conceptions of political strategy*, thus, signifying that it is the strategic element of organizational decision-making that is at the centre of theoretical considerations. Despite the fact that George's understanding of Leites's works leads him to conclude that operational code belief embrace precepts of political tactics and strategy (1969: 191, 193, 197, 199),²⁸ the implicit assumption both for Leites (1951, 1953), as well as, George (1969) appears to present the notion of strategy in less strict sense than understood by the scholarly definitions. Leites (1951: xi) explicitly addressed the notion of the *political strategy* in a manner that prescribes an efficient approach to political action. This implicit conceptualization suggests that the rules of tactical nature within operational code are merely complementary to strategies. To provide an example, in the introductory chapter to his work Leites (1953: xiii) observes that

The Politburo has, until now, maintained an attitude of extreme reserve and deceptiveness toward the outside world. The poker face, the exuberant cordiality of the *n*th vodka-toast, and the storm of indignation from the U.N. rostrum are all designed to conceal the real Soviet aim from the enemy.

In this particular example, taking a reserve and deceptive stance towards opponents becomes a tactic in the general plan to conceal the activities of the Politburo. However, looking at the actual rules of conduct in Leites' (1951: 7) operational code construct for the Politburo, the strategic frame becomes much explicit:

²⁸ In the only instance that George (1969: 216) explicitly refers to tactics, observing that "the tactic of rudeness was believed to be not overly risky, because in Bolshevik thought, a 'serious' powerful opponent is expected not to allow himself to become emotionally around by such tactics."

The Party, which must have “a political approach to everything,” must also assume that every aspect of itself and of its environment can be “utilized” for the enhancement of its power unless there is conclusive evidence to the contrary.

In this rule, the belief concerning means and ends that Leites (1951) identified, is presented as a general rule applicable to variety of situation, much like the pattern in the stream of decisions (Mintzberg, 1979: 935). Due to the fact, that rules within the operational code construct of Leites (1951, 1953) bears resemblance to other rules within the model, the primary focus can be identified, therefore, as addressing strategic implications of the beliefs upon decision-making processes of the examined political actor.

4.1.1.1a Strategic Decision-Making in Non-State Terrorist Organizations

The strategic frame has been widely adapted to the study of non-state terrorist decision-making. McCormick (2003: 418) stated that “[non-state] terrorism... is an instrumental activity designed to achieve or help achieve a specified set of long-run and short-run objectives.” This indicates a strategic orientation of non-state terrorist organizations not merely in the consideration that decision to employ terrorism is based on the anticipated consequences of actions; rather the strategic decision-making in non-state terrorist organization gains significance in the consideration of the fact that it is “‘preference-based,’ in the same sense that alternative courses of action are evaluated in terms of their respective impact on terrorist objectives” (McCormick, 2003: 418). Disassembled to its essentials, in the strategic view, the decision-making in non-state terrorist organizations embraces

considerations of availability of alternative courses of action, their expected consequences, the influence of these consequence upon the formal organizational objectives and decision rules, that will be employed to decide among the alternatives. The employment of strategic frame for decision-making in non-state terrorist organizations would contribute to the comprehensive analysis of organization's likely course of action through defining its objectives and operating constraints, and then identifying which course of action is most likely to be chosen by the non-state terrorist organization in order to efficiently conduct a political action with reference to expected political returns.

4.2.1.2. Structure Follows Strategy and Strategy Follows Structure

Having identified that operational code analysis is directed primarily to address the conceptions of strategic decision-making process within organization, it is important to address in detail the relationship of organizational structure to strategic decision-making as it could be in turn be evaluated through operational code methodology. Central to this evaluation becomes the enduring assumption, widely shared within the strategy formulation literature that the appropriateness of organization's strategy "can be defined in terms of its fit, match or congruence with the environmental or organizational contingencies facing [it]" (Zajac et al. 2000: 429). Facing various crises of growth and survival of the organization, the decision-makers scan the environment and examine solutions for coping with organization's external problems and its internal predispositions for creating a workable set of relationship rules. This assumption is commonly

known as the *strategic fitness* (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schendel, 1978) and it assumes that organization formulates its strategies to support and accomplish its overall objectives and for that purpose it aligns its organizational structure with the environmental and internal junctures accordingly.

Studies of the relationship between strategy and structure have identified two primary observations depending on which body of empirical evidence the scholars advance their arguments. The two arguments, without losing their validating assumptions argue either that *strategy follows structure* (Chandler, 1962) or that *structure follows strategy* (Bower, 1970). Both prepositions are important in respect of what they imply about decision-making processes in organizations. The first preposition can be summarized in the statement by Hall and Saias (1980: 153), which assumes that

With the inside/out approach they [strategists] admit that strategic choices are directly determined by the condition of the structure, and with the outside/in approach that they are influenced by the structural elements of the diagnosis.

On that account, Bower (1970) identified strategy making as a multilayered process, where managers manipulate the structural context within which the proposal generation takes shape.

The second preposition constitutes a classical model of the dynamic relationship between strategy and structure and is grounded in the observation of Chandler (1962) that internal structure of the organization must fit with the adopted strategy. Chandler (1962), however, did not perceive structure-strategy

alignment in simplistic manner, but identified that it is a dynamic and evolutionary relationship. Chandler (1962) observed that changes in organizational structure did not follow automatically from changes in the strategies, but rather are initiated through organizational crises. Importantly, the implication of this model assumes that “the recognition of opportunities [of structural content] takes place in the mind of managers and is often independent of changes in the external environment” (Burgelman, 1963: 62), that is the structural change reflects endeavors to reinforce the results of strategic behavior arrived independently of it.

For the purpose of operational code analysis it is important to recognize the dynamism of reciprocal relationship between strategy and structure, regardless of the direction of that relationship. The questions can be asked concerning the fact that if structure is to shape strategy, then what shapes the structure and *vice versa*. The operational code analysis does not address the notion of strategy formation or formulation *per se*, rather it attempts to address the conceptions of political strategy. For that reason viewing whether the strategy *originates* in the structure (strategy follows structure), or is *maintained* through it (structure follows strategy) becomes significant for operational code analysis in the fact that the structure poses significant implications for conceptions of strategy.

While the organizational theory cannot solely take upon the task of accounting how perceptions come into play in the consideration of decision-making processes, the operational code analysis enhanced by it does, and it is by

assessing the performance of the comprehensive paradigm that the researchers can ultimately judge the value of operational code for non-state terrorist actors. Adding a structural dimension to the operational code analysis yields significant analytical gains that permit general causal inferences, improve predictions and provide cogent explanations of terrorist motivations and behavior. The following chapter attempts to bring the reader closer to the concept of organizational structure and identify the typology of organizational structures in a manner consistent with the argument that non-state terrorist organizations are essentially diverse in structural constitutions than state institutions.

CHAPTER V

TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

Modern society is accompanied by the creation of more and more complex organizations, with different structures and governing processes. The organizational functioning encompasses variety of modes of application and degree of institutionalization of the rules governing organization behavior constituting for a high differentiation among organizational structures and processes. The organizational structure allows organizations to allocate responsibilities for different function and processes to different entities in a coordinated manner in order to efficiently attain organization's goals. Thus organizational structure represents somewhat a system, whether formal or informal, that coordinates the accomplishment of organizational goals.

Prominently, Max Weber's as the founder of classic organizational theory catalogued organizational structures in reference to economic and business-oriented entities. With the gradual expansion of the field, the subsequent organizational theories began to emerge and the attention began to shift to fields

beyond economics and started to attract the attention of scholars from fields of social sciences, such as sociology and politics. The growing classification of organizational forms allowed variety of disciplines to understand mechanisms and underline principal dimensions of organizational structures and processes.

The reliance upon organizational structure in an attempt to extract the conceptions of political strategy of non-state terrorist organization necessitates identification of structural dimensions as these bear in turn on strategic decision-making. In his early study, Child (1972) identified centralization, specialization, standardization, formalization and vertical span of control as dimensions of organizational structure. In his latter study, Child (1974) narrowed structural dimensionality by suggesting that the agreement exists among scholars identifying complexity, decentralization and formalization as core elements of organizational structure. A number of scholars for example Van de Ven (1976) and Ford and Slocum (1977) supported the restricted conceptualization of organizational structure, which began to embrace elements of complexity, formalization, centralization and administrative intensity. The subsequent study of Dalton et al. (1980) further designated the conception of organizational structure into narrow conceptual framework through categorization of *structural dimensions* embracing organizational/subunit size, span of control, flat/tall hierarchy, administrative intensity and *structuring dimensions* as represented by specialization, formalization and centralization.

In general, following the precedent of the abovementioned studies and supplemented with a number of consequent theoretical and empirical studies on organizational structure (Gerwin, 1981; Walton, 1981; Fry, 1982; Fry and Slocum, 1984; Friedrickson, 1986) it can be identified that the conceptualization of centralization, formalization and complexity as dimensions of organizational structure has received more attention than others in their profound impact upon decision-making.

An additional dimension of organizational structure is note of addressing, namely the aspect of communication and information within organization. This approach differs specifically from the traditional conceptualizations of organizational structure as it adds the information dimension as a criterion for judgment of organization's internal composition. In fact the choice of the control of information as the first question of the query provides for its significance as a master structural belief.²⁹ Availability of specific modes of communication and information channels presents a capability to determine, in large part, the way in which decision-making functions and/or is distributed throughout the organization for effective achievement of desired objectives (Simon, 1976). This question attempts to address the notion of increased value of information as a result of the information revolution. Arquilla and Ronfeld (1999) observe that information "matters more than ever for reasons that did not exist even 20 years ago." For the purpose of this thesis the elements of the organizational structure are:

²⁹ Master or dominant belief exercises a subtle influence on other beliefs in the operational code of political actor (George's, 1969, 1979).

- I. **Centralization.** Centralization refers to the degree to which the right to make decisions and evaluate organizational activity is dispersed (Fry and Slocum, 1984: 255). Centralization embraces hierarchy of authority³⁰ and the degree of participation in the decision-making process (Fry and Slocum, 1984: 255).

- II. **Formalization.** Formalization describes a degree of job codification and specification of work procedures as well as observation of these rules by organizational members (Hage and Aiken, 1969). Through formalization, organizations specify how, when and by whom organizational tasks are performed (Hall, 1977). Formalization comprises existence of written rules and procedures as well as mechanisms to enforce the compliance with these rules and procedures (Fry and Slocum, 1984).

- III. **Complexity.** Complexity refers to the condition of being composed of many interrelated parts (Friedrickson, 1983). Van der Ven (1976) recorded that complexity depends upon variances in dimensions such as standard deviations on unit specialization, standardization, discretion and professionalism across departments.³¹ Hall (1977) simplified

³⁰ Although historically Weber (1947) included hierarchy of authority as a separate dimension and various researchers perceive it as such, the reciprocal relationship between centralization and hierarchy of authority is combined in this study, as differentiation would not bear significant implications for this research.

³¹ Van der Ven (1976) noted that simple organization will exhibit homogenous scores on these structural characteristics, thus a highly differentiated organization need not be complex.

Van de Ven's model by directing analyst's attention to horizontal/vertical differentiation³² and spatial dispersion as potential sources of complexity.

IV. Communication and Information. As Redfield (1958: 7) stated, "modern organizations are in large part built upon and held together by communications." This is to denote, first and foremost, the organizational dependence upon the "existence on shared, similarly perceived experiences, making for the possibility of the existence of *understanding* among the members" (Snyder et al., 1962: 126). This premise indicates that through communications the existing organizational system may be maintained, altered, supplemented or destroyed. Thus the structure would encompass "the specific character of the actor's communicative activities, that is, the information communicated, the meaning attached to it, the channels chosen or, just as tellingly, not chosen" (Snyder et al. 1962: 126).

The dimension-specific approach is often used in organizational studies to denote specific types of organizations. The practical and theoretical aim of this thesis is, in this manner, to define the pattern of correlation between these variables. Labelling organizations as bureaucratic, or non-bureaucratic; would provide for intended effect of differentiation among organizational structures of

³² Horizontal/vertical differentiation and specialization are often used interchangeably in the literature (Grinyer and Yasai-Ardekani,1980).

state and non-state actors..³³ This study in its specification attempts acknowledge the typographical conceptualization and further uncover the specific effect individual perceptions of organizational structure that affect the process of organization's strategic decision-making.

The following section attempts to bring closer a review of organizational structures as recognized and accepted across the multiple fields of study and thus provide a grounding argument reflecting the broad agreement concerning the bureaucratic structural nature of state institutions and deviations from bureaucratic form of governance in organizational structures of violent non-state actors.

5.1. Bureaucratic Organization

The foundation for modern organizational design and modern management practices rely strictly upon the recognition of the need for organized behavior, orderly arranged relationships and efficiency and predictability of coordinated action that would enable high productivity and increase prosperity (Daft, 2004: 25). These administrative necessities in particular contributed to the development of bureaucracies as the most prominent organizational structures. Theoretically, the design of bureaucracy relies upon the conceptualized organizational model

³³ This is to denote the differences between structures of the state institutions and more structurally ambiguous non-state actors. Allowing for the clear cut labels of non-state actors as bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic would defeat the purpose to uncover the fundamental reasons being their decision-making. For most of the organizations the separate elements of the operational code structural content would display tendencies to be more bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic as all of the elements are mutually reinforcing each other. This approach is to address the deviation from the ideal type of the organization in search for better understanding of a political actor.

of Max Weber (1947)³⁴ who's formulative theory provided for the delineation of the primary, ideal-type dimensions of bureaucracy. In reality, bureaucracies exist across multiple of dimensions, presenting comparatively greater of lesser degree of faithfulness to the Weberian ideal-type.

Weber measured the extent of bureaucratization through organization's display of characteristics such as division of labor, hierarchy of authority, hiring and promotion based on technical competency, fixed salaries, promotion granted according to seniority and/or achievement, impersonal treatment of workers and extensive written rules governing performance of duties and behavior at work. The prominence of Weber's theoretical elaboration on bureaucratic model resulted in the fact that students and scholars of organization have used the bureaucratic model as "the basis for conceptualizing the system of interrelationships in organizations" (Hall, 1963:32).

The emergence of bureaucratic structures relied essentially upon the stability of external environment that enabled organizations to maintain their search for efficiency and order. While for the most of twentieth century the environment was perceived as "orderly and predictable and the role of managers was to maintain stability," the Industrial Age enabled essentially the prioritization of organizational growth and efficiency (Daft, 2004: 27). In consequence, organizations

³⁴ The prominence of Weber's analysis on bureaucracy, as a theoretical founder and advocate of bureaucratic structure, can be seen in the works of founders of bureaucratic theory (Friedrich, 1949; Merton 1949, Heady, 1959; Dimock, 1959), who relied on Weber's bureaucratic dimensions for their selective contributions to the theory of bureaucracy.

became large and complex becoming essentially vertical, hierarchical and bureaucratic.

Bureaucratic organizations emerging from the environmental necessities and predispositions of surfacing technologies of Industrial Age aimed essentially at the premises of interchangeability, that “shifted control of the factory away from the craftsmen on the production floor and into management” (McAllister, 2004: 300). The emergent organizational structure, the bureaucratic pyramid, provided for the re-structured and institutionalized industrial affairs aimed at the coordination of organizational activities for greater efficiency of production, allocation of resources and distribution of products across the society. The contextual aspect of organization’s size became the primary determinant for the emergence of organizational ability to control large-scale activities and personnel through rules and standardization that provided for greater organizational efficiency. Stable and ordered functioning of immense-sized organizations became achieved through stratification of relationships within an organization, subjecting the low strata to the orders and supervision of the individuals situated at the higher and narrower positions within the bureaucratic pyramid. Bureaucratic model of organization included distinguishable cultural embodiments observable in the autocratic leadership styles with clear-cut divisions among the managers, who engaged in decision-making processes, and workers, who did the manual labor was apparent. The contextual preconditions of bureaucratic structures became associated essentially with control, order and stability of the contextual elements

of industrial age organizations. Figure 1, presented below, represents the hierarchical structure of the organization and its stratification that provided for important underlining challenges that bureaucracy encountered in the changes into an information-based environment.




Figure 1. *Pyramidal organizational structure of bureaucracy*

The essential structural predisposition of bureaucracies is represented in the representative channels for information flow and communication mechanisms. With the technological advancements of industrial era that predisposed the advancement in machinery facilitating the production, bureaucracies remained essentially focused upon the organizational efficiency, and essentially adapted system for information channeling enabling the essential focus upon organizational adaptability with machines and factories rather than information as value-basis for organizations (Daft, 2004: 8). Within the pyramidal structure essentially the information flows are integrated vertically, both in respect of

top-bottom as well as bottom-up informational transition. Classically illustrated bureaucratic systems of informational flows present particularly the flow of decisions from the top echelons onto the bottom strata, with socially specializing individuals revolving around the notion of hierarchy and monocratism, characterized by the system of “superior and role-relationships in which the superior is the only source of legitimate influence upon the subordinate” (Thomson, 1961: 19). Yet, the significance of the bureaucratic structure in the age of information revolution lays essentially in the transition, filtering and management of information originating in the lower levels with the destination at the highest level of decision-making. McAllister (2004: 300-301) essentially underlined the assumptions behind bureaucratic structuring of organizations while stating that information traveling vertically to the decision-making units and subsequently descending to the appropriate department is essentially subjected to the *filtering* mechanisms somewhere along the chain of command, therefore, proves essentially inefficient in managing intensive information flows.

5.1.1. Bureaucracy and The State

Although informational revolution contributed significantly into an evolution of non-bureaucratic organizational structures within the business environment, the bureaucratic forms of organization remains the oldest and prominent institution of government and administration in history (Farazmand, 2009: 1). As Farazmand (2009: xv) observed, “despite all innovations and alternative organizational system, nothing has replaced bureaucracy as the ‘core’ of government

and large scale corporate governance systems.” The reason for governmental organization to adopt and maintain bureaucratic organizational structures lies on the priorities stemming from the “dominant value patterns in the society [which] favor high centralization in governments” (Hage, 1965: 306). In this manner it is essential to reach back into the theory and emergence of a concept of the modern state.

The importance of bureaucratic structure for the apparatus of modern state is presented significantly within the idea of sovereign state. As in the pre-modern Europe³⁵ the political authority was shared among variety of actors, including secular and religious institutions and individuals such as kings, nobility, papacy, bishops, agrarian landlords etc. the modern state “aimed at replacing these overlapping and often contentious jurisdictions through the institutions of a centralized state” (Axtmann, 2004: 260). Gaining a legitimate status, through application of the theory of sovereignty, the modern state’s government claimed supremacy over other authorities and resources of a territory it controlled. The very establishment of a legal, rightful exercise of a narrow command over a broad population indicates the pyramidal structure of governance inherent in the concept of a state. Axtmann (2004: 260) additionally argued that “modern territorial state came into existence as a differentiated ensemble of governmental institutions, offices, and personnel that claims the executive power of authoritative political

³⁵ Historically the idea of sovereign states described in this thesis as modern states came to dominate political through after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, ending a Thirty Year’s War in Europe.

rule-making for a population within a continuous territory that has a clear, internationally recognized boundary.” The modern state apparatus have gained an authority to govern and achieve economic, political and social objectives of the society. And since societies consider certain social ends as more important than other, which give rise to different means for maximization of desired ends, the bureaucratic government appears to provide the efficient tool for management of complex politics (Barkey and Parikh, 1991: 526). As Eisenstadt (2004: 631) noted, bureaucratic efficiency is best maintained in the organizational functions aiming at the “organization of adequate services and co-ordination of large-scale activities, in the implementation of different goals, in the provision of resources of different groups and in the regulation of various inter-group relations and conflicts.” In this respect, the governmental provision of such services, maintenance of political elite’s strategic power over complex societal forces, control of resources and provision of political and administrative services through reliance on bureaucratic structure provide the example for governmental bureaucratic reality. The persistence of bureaucracy in governmental structure is essentially subjected to the “maintenance, continuity and enhancement of both capitalist and socialist systems: an instrumental arm of public governance and administration in both its civilian and its military-security forms” (Farazmand, 2009: xv).

While management of state affairs acquires efficiency from bureaucratic structures, the non-state actors do not present necessary pre-conditions of bureaucratic management for maintenance of organizational being. Stressing the

representation of information as essentially of existential value to many of non-state actors, equally to those oriented economically or politically (McAllister, 2004: 301) proves the significance of emergent non-bureaucratic structures not only in terms of the increased comparative advantage through efficient information flow, but also the appearances of non-bureaucratic structures in conflict. The following section constitutes an analysis of non-bureaucratic organizational structures and their subsequent contribution to threat constituency within the paradigm of conflict.

5.2. Non-Bureaucratic Organizations

The notion of an organizational structure qualitatively different from traditional bureaucratic designs is not recent. In 1961, Burns and Stalker identified organic structures of organizations as “a network structure of control, authority and communication with lateral rather than vertical direction of communication” (Burns and Stalker, 1961 as cited in Arquilla et al. 1999: 48). Since then, the non-bureaucratic organizations have increased their appearance, both in terms of methodological challenges and theoretical trajectories. Generally accepted primacy of bureaucratic model became increasingly questioned with the increasing organizational changes in 1980’s responding to the new requirements for adaptation and innovation of organizations stemming from the advent of information revolution (Travica, 1999:2). The world external to the operations of organization became more complex with increasing globalization of corporate capitalism and cultures, as well as, more complex and rapid governance structures that

essentially encountered difficulties in multi-task and increased information flow management representing a reality for organizational change and innovation in order to meet the increasing challenges.

In an era of information, the increased value of information impinged significantly upon the perceptions of efficiencies of bureaucratic structures in dealing with increased amount and flows of information (Arguilla and Ronfeldt, 1999: ix). Bureaucratic organizational structures became overloaded, with “succeeding levels further and further removed from the source of information” (McAllister, 2004: 301). Therefore, in circumstances, where the filtering of increased amounts of information increasingly isolated the distribution of information across pyramidal strata of bureaucracies, the eventual quality of decision-making became affected, necessitating a shift in fundamental structural paradigm in order to sustain the most efficient organizational functioning. With the advent of information revolution, the emergent dynamic environments did not allow organizations to remain within the controllable paradigm of bureaucratic organizations and necessitated in turn “flexible information systems to ensure the organization’s ability to adapt to ever-changing information flows” (McAllister, 2004: 300). The traditionally organized bureaucratic organizations, and newly emergent organizational entities began to transform into flat structures supportive of interconnectivity and increased information flow, eventually forming new organizational forms essentially deviating from the underlining premises of bureaucracy.

Non-bureaucratic organizations are extensively “characterized by informal social and work relationships, including minimal division of labor, de-hierarchization and ... general rules that permit flexible social control and self-regulation” (Travica, 1999: 2). It has been generally accepted that non-bureaucratic organizations fall within one of the following categories: the organic organization (Burns and Stalker, 1961), adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1979) or network organization (Morgan, 1993). And as much as bureaucratic structures deviate from the ideal-type structures, the non-bureaucracies can equally be placed on the continuum of dimensions. Despite different degrees of applicability to the abovementioned categories are applicable to different organization, the common premise differentiating them from bureaucracy establish non-democracies fundamentally within a post-bureaucratic organizational structures.

5.2.1 Organic Organization

The organic organization has a longest history within the typology of new forms of organization, constituting the first theoretical typological model within spectrum of organizations analogous to network structures. Initially defined in *Management of Innovation* (Burns and Stalker, 1961) the structural design of the organic structure reflects the “decision-making capacity to cope with changing conditions and indeterminateness” (Butler, 1991: 77), congealing the high degrees of adaptation and response to the external change and environmental uncertainties as the primary characteristic of the organic organization. Organic structures are “appropriate in unstable, turbulent, unpredictable environments and for

non-routine tasks and technologies. For organizations coping with such uncertainty, finding appropriate, effective and timely response to environmental challenges is of critical importance" (Hofler, 2006). The organic organization through adjustment and refinement of individual tasks, places emphasis primarily on the problem-solving processes within an organization constituting for reality in which encouraged employees interactively contribute to the decision-making processes through mechanisms for empowerment and initiative (Vernon, 2002: 149). In this manner, "the basic notion of regulating relations among people by separating them into specific predefined functions is abandoned... where people enter into relations that are determined by problems rather than by the structure" (Verzuh, 2003: 38). This representative "commitment to tasks" rather than "loyalty to organization" (Hage, 1965: 305) represent the new reality of organizational design to the functional realities established by bureaucratic management.

Burns and Stalker (1961, 121-122) delineated the primary characteristics of organic organization as composed of

- network structure of control with authority and communication shifted to ad hoc locations;
- mechanisms for allocation of task-required knowledge
- mechanisms for adjustment of continual re-definition of individual tasks
- communication in format of information and advice rather than instructions and decisions

- mechanisms for encouragement of responsibility for decision-making throughout the organization rather than transformation of responsibility upwards, downwards or sideways
- commitment to “technological ethos,”³⁶ rather than reliance solely on obedience for achievement of desired ends

The abovementioned delineation of characteristics of organic organization do not aim to represent additional variables into the organizational theory but rather identify the differentiation mechanisms for the ideal types of the organizations in a contrasting manner. Most bureaucratic and organic organizations will be between the two extremes. Despite sharp differences between organic and bureaucratic organizations, the organic structures are not structurally revolutionized from hierarchy, formalized rules, regulations, processes and procedures of bureaucracies (Hofler, 2006), making them not adaptable to absolute decentralization.

5.2.2. Adhocracy

Another non-bureaucratic organizational model is adhocracy, a theoretical design popularized by Toffler (1970) and advanced by Mintzerg (1979). Adhocracies, like organic organizations are easily adaptable to unstable environmental condition (Morgan, 2006: 50); yet unlike organic structures are designed

³⁶ “Technological ethos” a term coined by Jeanne Randolph (1991). Randolph describes “technological ethos” as an ideology that promotes values aimed at achieving a concrete end rather than the process for achievement. In “technological ethos” realm a “problem to be solved” is shared or dispersed amongst a collective for objectifying effect.

primarily “on the fly according to needs/purposes as they occur” (Travica, 1999:6), for temporary existential purposes. Adhocracies essentially are organized in project form, which “involve requirements regarding flexibility and learning on the basis of existing specialized knowledge and methodological know-how about project works” (Alversson, 1995: 99). For that reason, as observed by Morgan (2006: 50), “the adhocracy usually involves a project teams that come together to perform a task and disappear when the task is over, with members regrouping in other teams devoted to other projects,” illustrating the primary design of adhocracies to enhance the degree and capability of problem-solving and innovation development processes and innovation development processes. Mintzberg’s (1979) described dimensions of adhocracy as, among all:

- low formalization of behavior;
- low standardization of procedures;
- horizontal job specification;
- roles not clearly defined;
- selective decentralization;
- organization of work resting on specialized teams, and;
- emphasis on democratic culture and non-bureaucratic values.

Mintzberg’s and McHugh (1985: 161) further elaboration on adhocracies led to the identification of further characteristics of adhocratic forms of organizational design, such as increased operationalism in dynamic and complex environments; production of complex, unique products by temporary multifunctional teams of

highly trained experts; organizational coordination based on mutual adjustment and stimulated by informal structural parameters deviating from direct control and standardization mechanisms, hierarchy and formalized aspects that stimulate the organizational activities. In this manner, adhocracies rely strictly on independent and self-regulatory participative management, essentially with motivation “derived from system needs, task-related factors and peer pressure rather than from supervision” (Marriner-Tomey, 2004: 287). On this account, Jaeger and Kanungo (1990: 141) identify adhocracy as a “flexible organizational form where coordination is based on mutual adjustment as opposed to the bureaucracy where coordination is accomplished through rules and regulations.” Adhocracies are, therefore, adaptive models of project-organizations, based on flexibility of design and knowledge-intensive configuration recognizing realities and meeting them in an individual manner.

5.2.3 Networked Organization

Within recent years, a new form of non-bureaucratic organizational structure emerged, namely networked organization. Although organic organizations and adhocracies are based on the principles of networked alignment of organizational units, nevertheless, they are more specific and characterized by grounding principles, while network organizations encompass wider spectrum of organizations, to which the central principles of organic organization or adhocracy do not apply, but which are arranged on the logic of networks, nodes and interconnectiveness (e.g. Reich, 1991; Quinn, 1992). Networked organizations appear in three

distinct levels of reference, namely as inter-organizational, intra-organizational and hybrid of intra-and inter-organizational forms.

5.2.3.1. Inter-Organizational Networks

In traditional design the functions of organization such as production or marketing belonged to one organization, while inter-organizational network presupposes that the same functions are preformed by various organizations. The concept originated with the in-depth analysis of Aldrich and Whetten (1981) who represented economic relationship in three-dimensions, organization sets, action sets and networks, in an attempt to facilitate research on complex entities. Aldrich and Whetten (1981) argued that action-sets and networks, unlike organization-sets, which constitute a body of organizations with direct links, represent a group of interacting organization connected by a certain type of relationship. Aldrich and Whetten (1981: 386) note that as much as organization-sets form “neither a corporate body nor a coordinating association and thus by definition cannot act in ways that organizations or action-sets can” (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981: 386) the action-sets, which are formed temporarily and their permanent equivalent, the networks, an alliance of organizations are modeled on the relationships governing intra-organizational functioning.

The extension of the view that inter-organizational networks are more than a sum of individual links that comprise it was further advanced by Miles and Snow (1986) with the concept of ‘dynamic network,’ as referent to the proprieties

of the organizational structure with each network component (individual firm) being complementary rather than competing with each other in the market sphere. As Miles and Snow (1986: 65) noted, this “complementarity permits the creation of elaborate network designed to handle complex situations... which cannot be accomplished by a single organization.” According to this model, each individual firm’s perceived benefits of participation in the network stem from its distinctive competence and is “not only enhanced by participation in the network, [but] it is held in check by its fellow network members” (Miles and Snow, 1986: 65). The dynamics of inter-organizational network, therefore, encourage each participant, individually or collectively, to perform proficiently and maintain its responsibilities for the network as an organizational entity. The organizations as units within the model of “dynamic network” are connected with “brokers” at the centre that operate the functioning of the business network.

Similarly, Powell’s (2003) contribution to the inter-organizational network theory attempted to identify the distinctive nature of networks as a separate form from those of hierarchical-bureaucratic governance structures and market transactions. Powell (2003: 316) identified that hierarchies represent the emphasis on the relationships and previous interactions upon which new transactions are modeled with preservation of respective hierarchical position of a corporation within the economy. Similarly, in markets transactions are reflected in the competitiveness among actors approaching market relationship in an untrustworthy manner. However, network structure of inter-organizational relations, placing an

emphasis on interdependence among actors, perceptions of one's position in relation to other's and establishment of "mutual orientation-knowledge which the parties assume each has about the other and upon which they draw in communication and problem solving" (Powell, 2003: 318). The network structure, therefore, represents a structure of collaborative and concordant relationship among organization, with emphasis on trust, reliability of information, knowledge and skills acquisition realizing that each party of the network is independent on the resources by another unit, and the ability to gain from the accumulation of the resources. Particularly, the element of trust becomes the distinguishable cohesive tissue of inter-organizational networks (Powell, 1987: 82). Approaching the subject of networks from the perspective of its distinctiveness from markets and hierarchies, Antonelli (1989) analyzed restructuring of Italian industries in terms of development of marketing networks competing against each other. In Antonelli's (1989) analysis the importance of Information technology made its appearance as both enabling and sustaining element for the longevity of a network. In addition, within Child's (1987) typology of organizational structures, the inter-organizational networks are particularly subjected to the reliance on information technology in formalization of information procedures and exchange. In conclusion, the inter-organizational networks are particularly reliant on the information network and formation of attitudes of trust representing cohesive forces binding different corporations into an extensive inter-organizational network.

5.2.3.2 Inter-Organizational Networks

The intra-organizational model represents rather recent development in respect of organizational theory and practice. The characteristics of internally networked organization are generally more reflective and anticipatory of changes in environment than entities with inter-organization network formations. Within the inter-organizational networks, two hierarchically structured organizations enter into network relationship with each other, affecting partially their processes and functions, however, with intra-organizational structures, the internal changes provide for the reality of change in which “cultures that involve and support these structures and power design based on principles other than the hierarchy-legitimized seniority” (Travica, 1999: 11). This internal transformation represents the changes that through redesign of organizational functioning and design go beyond organizational boundaries (Venkatraman, 1991).

The intra-organizational network structures gained their theoretical underpinnings with the works of Rockart and Short (1991) who identified the information technology as the primary cohesive force in the construction of informal human networks. Rockart and Short (1991: 255) stated that “IT is seen as a design factor in organizational change and innovation, and not just as an enabler of more effective, organizational functioning once a given design has been put into place,” constituting a force of inter-relationships rather than formal organizational design representing a formation of distinct organizational culture.

Rockart and Short (1991: 256) listed the underpinning of the cultural dimensions of the networks as:

- Shared goals as a necessary condition for organization of activities;
- Share knowledge expertise an underlining force for effectiveness;
- Shared work as a mean for incorporation of groups outside of local structure;
- Shared decision-making as a mean for introduction of expertise from across the organizational spectrum;
- Shared timing and issue prioritization as a mean for enhancing the action steps, particularly in response to critical issues;
- Shared responsibility, accountability and trust as elements further strengthening the intra-organizational cohesion; and
- Shared recognition and reward as implicit in the effective functioning of networks.

In the equal manner to the examination of Powell (1989, 2003) where trust became a critical condition for sustainability of inter-organizational networks, Rockart and Short (1991: 257) argued, that “the use of network cannot be truly effective until a certain level of trust is established in the organizations.” The authors significantly note that the issue of trust within network establishments is particularly difficult due to the fact that as trust regularly emerges from face-to-face interactions, the network organizations necessitate trust-formation processes through mediated communication facilitated by means provided by information

technologies. In this manner, the information technology gains a particular status for network organization as tool for integration of information, communication and organizational processes across functional and geographic lines constituting for the emergence of flat, flexible and responsive organizational network structures.

Among other conceptualizations of the networked intra-organizational structures within literature, Bush and Frohman (1992) explored the communication forces within network organizations. As networked organization's composition of the team differentiates from the traditional hierarchical-bureaucratic organizations, as designed to meet global needs of the organization, the individuals and managers within new structures are assigned to the roles of "integrators of information not only from other members of the team but from others both inside and outside the organization" (Bush and Frohman, 1992: 26). The authors, identify the need for additional mechanisms that would enhance the speed of the information transferred within the complex network environment, are developed in order for quick collection and distribution of information through the transformation of responsibilities from function to innovation teams and means of information technology enabling the necessary enhancement for information distribution and management.

Similarly, Quinn (1992: 120) provided for a concept of networked organizations, coining the term "spider's web organizations" due to their "lightness yet

completeness of its interconnection structure.” Quinn (1992: 120) identified the characteristic of network organizations as essentially lacking or with only minimal formal authority of “order-giving” of hierarchies, with individual units operate essentially independently and presenting intensive information and knowledge sharing or responsibility mechanisms. Quinn’s empirical study was sampled on Arthur Andersen & Company’s network design. Yet again, the study pinpointed the role of information technology as an indispensable enabler of a network organization, principle of decentralization and real-time information modes.

5.2.3.3 Hybrid Networked Organizations

Morgan (1989, 1993) introduced a concept of loosely-coupled network, within the typology of organizational models investigate within his study. Within the examination of loosely-coupled networks Morgan (1989, 1997) merged the inter and intra network forms as subsequent organizational design resulting from organizational evolution. At first a small core of individuals “sets a strategic direction and provides the operational support necessary to sustain the network, but it contracts other individuals and organizations to perform key operational activities” (Morgan, 1989: 67), resulting in the initial operationalization of an ideas and central goals of the group. With the central group providing strategic directions, regulating resource flows, the network resembles the ‘dynamic network’ of Miles and Snow (1986). However, as the organizational evolution continues, Morgan (1997: 74) suggested that the central group directing the activities of the

network's functioning;; he illustrated the networked organizational structure resembling a "spider plant" or "umbilical cords," with central part being an entrepreneurial team and of shoots representing subcontractors. Within the network organization the individual elements of the 'spider network' are integrated through information technology that enables for linked information systems, distribution of resources and responsibilities across the network, and significantly bounding separate individuals with shared vision and values through provision of information and intelligence throughout the system. Morgan (1997) significantly addressed the issues of decentralized and self-organization nature of the described network organization arguing that network organizations are cannot be "regarded as having clear-cut goals and objectives that would endure over time" (Morgan, 1997: 8) and that could be managed through bureaucratic governance since the information technology significantly transforms the organizational reality into a form that "transcends traditional barriers of space and time, continually creating and re-creating themselves through changing networks of interconnection based on "real-time" communication" (Morgan, 1997: 8). In this manner, Morgan introduced an evolutionary form of organization subjected to steadily changes, with essentially decentralized and flat structure and subjected to the forces of information technology as enabling and sustaining the self-organization mechanisms of this structure.

In a similar, manner, the evolutionary character of network organizations are defined was noted by Alstyne (1997: 86)

Structurally, a network organization combines co-specialized, possibly intangible, assets under shared control... procedurally, a network organization constrains participating agents' actions via their roles and positions within the organization while allowing agents' influence to emerge or fade with the development or dissolution of ties to others. As decision-making members, agents intervene and extend their influence through association they alter the resource landscape for themselves, their networks and their competitors and in the process can change the structure of the network itself.

In addition to the above, Baker's (1992) study contributed to the theoretical underlining of the network structure as evolutionary that present an intrinsic ability to "repeatedly redesign itself to accommodate new tasks, unique problems, and changing environments [that] enables such organization, to escape the plight of forms such as bureaucracy, which ossify and become incapable of change" (Baker, 1992: 398). The inter-intra hybrid formation of network structure as conceptualized by Baker (1992) was represented in a unique observation that network structures provide for the integration of the corporation across vertical, horizontal and spatial boundaries. The three dimensional paradigm of network organizations include distribution of hierarchical positions, functional division of labor and dispersion of organizational units across space, and high degree of integration across those boundaries constitute a chief structural characteristic of a network organization.

Baker (1992: 400) examined "thick network" organization as integrated across formal boundaries of multiple types of socially important relations such as "strong and weak task-related communication, informal socializing, advice-giving and advice-getting, promotion decision and so on." In contrast, a

“thin network” organization represents firms with extensive electronic communication networks, yet presenting a doubt over the “extent to which the organization is integrated over multiple types of socially important relations” (Baker, 1992: 400). Baker (1992) subsumed network organization to the element of integration, where the formal categories or groups such as formal position, geographic location, and market focus are not significant barriers to interaction. The hybrid understanding of network by Baker (1992) was reflected in the argument that “interpersonal ties of all types – task-related communication, advice, socializing and so on – are as easily established between as within formal groups or categories” (Baker, 1992: 401). Baker’s (1992) study next to building strong theoretical conceptualization of networked organizations, provided for the holistic empirical examination of several real estate development firms as inclusive of various networks of relationship among members and within firms.

In summary, the primary characteristic of networked organization comprise essentially elements of

- Shared goals reinforced through the mechanisms of social networks and informal relations and trust
- Support of information technologies comprising a basis for connection and information flows that essentially bind and maintain the organization
- Low hierarchy and centralization, with managerial responsibilities shared and overlapping across the organization

- The organizational integration over vertical, horizontal and spatial boundaries

5.2.4 Typology of Network Structures

The network organizations come in three types: a *chain network* organization, where end-to-end communication must travel through the intermediate nodes; a *star network*, where a set of actors is tied to a central node of actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate; and an *all-channel network*, where every group is connected to every other (Arquilla et al. 1999: 49). The chain networks, regarded often as traditional network organizations were supplanted by the notion of value networks, or “constellations” (Norman and Ramirez, 1993). In turn globalization provided an ideal environment for the emergence of dense global interconnections promoting more and more complex networks (Monge and Fulk, 1999). The types of networks are illustrated in Figure 2 presented below:




Figure 2. Types of Networked Organizations

Among different types of network organizations, the all-channel networks are of greatest significance as their complex structure, are not only difficult to organize and maintain but also difficult to analyze and intercept (Springer et al., 2009: 101). With ideally no central leadership, the all-channel network does not rely on hierarchical driving-forces for improvement, but allows for autonomous initiatives and influences informational developments. The original design of the network assumes its reliance on quick and broad dissemination of information, which is accomplished through dense, technologically fuelled communications (Springer et al. 2009: 101). Cooper (2005: 165) noted that chain and hub variations of network, as well as, within hybrid forms “attempt to create the optimal compromises between speed or efficiency in communications, on the one hand, and security,” and an all-channel network’s mechanisms for information flow and consensus creation represent its greatest advantage of speedy collaboration and decentralized decision-making despite physical dispersion of the nodes. The all-channel network, therefore, represents a self-organized entity, which relies on local initiatives and autonomy of decision-making in decentralized operations, leaving the original leadership free of blame for an operation (Springer et al. 2009: 101). Arquilla et al. (1999: 51) significantly observed that the capacity of all-channel network “designs for effective performance over time may depend on the presence of shared principles, interests, and goals – at best, an overarching doctrine or ideology – that spans all nodes and to which the members

wholeheartedly subscribe.” It is important to note, that the abovementioned principles, enable the members to be *all of one mind*.³⁷

The presented networks models may exist in different variations placed on the continuum of largeness, with close or loose connection, inclusive or exclusive in membership and clearly bounded or permeable to the external environment. The networks may be “segmentary or specialized – that is, they may look alike and engage in similar activities, or they may undertake a division of labor based on specialization” (Arguilla et al. 1999: 50). More often than not, network organizations are structured in hybrid forms, combining hierarchical and different network designs at specific levels of interaction. McAllister (2004: 303) argued that “network will always prefer an amorphous structure in order to take advantage of both the defensive qualities of the all-channel network and the offensive capabilities of a centralized command node.” The inherent properties of heterogeneous amalgam of diverse network structures allows the organization to adapt to uncertain environments easily and therefore provide for their applicability for a wide-range of conditions and purposes. The example of hybrid network organization is illustrated in Figure 3, on the following page.

³⁷ The notion of *all of one mind* will be addressed in this thesis, through the notion of *collective identity*, in Chapter VII: Subsuming Beliefs About Organizational Structure into Operational Code Analysis, p. 166-167.




Figure 3. Hybrid Network Organizational Structure

5.3. Non-Bureaucracies, State and Non-State Actors

In many cases, the organizations or individuals that form network are engaged in a diverse but overlapping activities and processes with the primary reliance on the cohesiveness of information transformed across the network. Cresswell et al. (2005: 5) identified the individuals and organizations taking part in networks as interacting and referent to the same stakeholders, with whom the separate units interact in different times improving the interoperability of the organizational structure for efficient maintenance of programs and services. In networks constitutes a web of distinct but overlapping policy community in which one unit of organization cannot achieve its goals without the involvement of others” (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 278). Essentially in non-bureaucratic organizational setting, the individual interests of diverse actors are negotiated throughout a structure rather than controlled through the mechanisms of top-to-bottom subordination.

Looking at the organizational arrangements of states, constituent of multiple vertical levels arranged across traditional boundaries of agencies. Modeling the state institutions as economic enterprises becomes often difficult and complex, if not impossible, due to the organizational imperceptible mergence into economic, political and social realities. Pardo and Burke (2008: 2) pointed out that “often government capabilities necessary to affect change across the boundaries of organizations are missing.” Both research and practice have presented that governments are “inconsistent and ad hoc in their abilities to operate in a network form” (Pardo and Burke, 2008: 3), demonstrating little if any capability of the government to achieve a level of interoperability that brings together multiple governmental units based on shared knowledge, interoperable technological infrastructure and decentralized decision-making. The innovation of state institutions is primarily reflected in changing the nature of external relationships through the adaptability of the organizational structures to the needs of organizational recipients leaving the inner functions primarily unchanged.

Conversely, across the spectrum of non-state actors, the structural defining of organization present increased adaptability and re-formatting of organizational structure aimed at changes to components of inner functioning maintaining or improving the linkages with other components. First and foremost, the non-bureaucratic organizational structures are, not only extensively evaluated in theory but also represented in their application, the economic non-state constituents of world affairs, namely multinational corporations (MNC’s) and transnational

corporations (TNC's), that is enterprises controlling activities in different countries. The multinational enterprises are essentially flexible presenting an "inherent volatility of the international business environment" (Giroud, 2003: 14). The economic enterprises are inherently founded on the principle of interconnectivity in order to efficiently cope with increasingly complex decision-making processes across boundaries. Lall and Streeten (1977 as cited in Giroud, 2003: 14) identified multinational enterprises as organizations that aim at the maximization of one overall objective for all its constituent units, treating "the whole world as an operational area, and able to coordinate its functions in any way necessary for achieving maximization and operationalism. Dishman (2005: 238) presented that "the dawn of Information Age, which brought a different set of factors for corporate success, quickly strained the rigid hierarchical organization." With the enhanced technology corporations in order to succeed were required to operate in faster, more flexible, integrative and innovative manner. And while in hierarchy, limitations of the distance between managers and the rank and file and division of functions and specialization disabled the efficient use of technology for organizational purposes, the new forms of organizational structure emerged as a response to the compartmented and slow-communication structures of bureaucracies. Bureaucratic corporations soon realized that their organizational structures were significantly impeding their success and necessitated internal transformation as a mean of adaptation to an external environment.

Deviation from the bureaucratic and hierarchical structure of the organization for international economic enterprises does not represent a solemn tendency across MNC's and TNC's, however, while some corporations remain essentially bureaucratic, those that choose to and chose to undergo an organizational transformation are provided with facilitated means for construction of integrated work configuration, differentiation of subsidiary roles and responsibilities and simultaneous management of multiple innovation processes that collectively constitute an integrated and viable organizational network system. Information Revolution has not just had severe implications in the economical sector but also for other non-state actors, for whom the hierarchical organizational sector began to constitute an obstacle rather than a solid framework for organization.

Among the other non-state actors, the organizational structuring of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) varies in accordance with the origins and internationalization of the organization. The variety of existent organizational structures of NGO's appear essentially as either "ethnocentric structures" that are based on a "tight control of subsidiary offices of centralized headquarters," or "polycentric structures" which are constituent of "a high degree of decentralized local control and interconnectedness" (Lewis, 2001: 178). The differentiation among structures of NGO's is subjected essentially to the need of an organization to "maximize [its] proximity of decision-making processes to its constituent groups wherever they are" (Lewis, 2001: 179). The careful balancing of structures with constituent membership and core values reflects the NGO's emphasis on

communication and participation and as in the case of economic enterprises, allows the organization to adapt according to maximization of its objectives. Therefore, a non-governmental organization wishing to expand its influence globally requires organizational restructuring in accordance with its fundraising capabilities, multicultural sensitivity and local outlook often choose to engage in network building, more often between than within organizations, in order to adapt to a changing circumstances. Fowler et al. (1992: 18) identified that organizational development of non-governmental organizations is subjected primarily to the optimization of its performance in relation to organizational goals, resources and environments. In an equal manner to economic enterprises, the choice of network remains an open option for NGO's and IGNO's due to the fundamental characteristics of their objective and forces maintaining the efficiency of their activities.

Within the last category of non-state actors, the non-bureaucratic structure of VNSA, particularly terrorist organization, becomes embodied within an asymmetric advantage that non-bureaucratic structures provide for non-state actors. The essential characteristics of network originating within the economical-paradigm and theories are not only theoretically but in essence apparent within the realm of conflict. From theoretical perspective, McAllister (2004: 301-302) denoted that both, market competition and warfare, are subjected to the information revolution and its premises necessitating changes in organizational affairs. The nature and extent of the transformation of warfare in the wake of

information revolution, has been a subject of strict analysis by theoreticians of revolution in military affairs (e.g. Van Creveld, 1991; Lind et al, 1989; Tucker, 2000; Murden, 2007), who identify the fourth-generation of warfare as essentially subjected to technological changes that essentially enable non-state adversaries in the management of information acquisition and flows providing them with increased ability to acquire weapons and implement attacks and significantly cause mass casualties in a manner unassociated with the conventional use of violence by states. As Dishman (2005: 238-239) noted, “unlike business community, low-profits did not drive these organizations to seek change; law enforcement and intelligence, which began to successfully root out subversive organizations, forced illegal armed groups to find new ways to evade authority and become more resilient.” The subsequent organizational adaptation to management of technological innovation and information becomes, therefore, apparent in the transition of non-state organization into non-bureaucratic structures in order to gain the advantage in an asymmetrically defined conflict.

Emerging from the information revolution as a pre-eminent organizational paradigm, among all non-bureaucratic organizations, networks became particularly adaptive with an enhanced ability to acquire operational advantage in conflicts (Stepanova, 2008: 128). Flexibility, mobility and adaptation to changing circumstances of networks are particularly contributory to the decreased time for transmission of information and coordination among various nodes, decreased costs for establishing a communication infrastructure and increased scope and

complexity of information shared among organizational members (Zanini and Edwards, 2001: 35-36). In this manner, the organizational survival was ensured in spite of circumstances, when leader is captured or killed, based on the principle of the resilience in networks (Arquilla and Ronfeld, 1997). With these enhanced operational capabilities, the networked-waged war enables a delinquent to “converge on a target from multiple directions, or perhaps on multiple levels, simultaneously (McAllister, 2004: 303), constituting a reality in which changes adversary’s conceptions of strategies from those understood conventionally, and targets from those defined narrowly. The full advantage of networks becomes the essential underlining argument for the emergence of conflict with belligerents presenting fundamentally changed characteristic of engagement. In circumstances, where the general trend for adaptation of network structure is apparent primarily among non-state actors (Stepanova, 2008: 129) combined with the central characteristics of networks and its advantages in conflict environments, the contemporary dimension of asymmetric warfare becomes prominent and essentially important for the future of world affairs.

In summary, the obedience of state institutions to strict bureaucratic structures relies on the lack of structural capabilities, necessity for rigid management of units and social, political and economic paradigms that not only accounted for emergence and maintenance of bureaucracy as the most efficient organization for government and structural affairs throughout centuries. Conversely, non-state actors as essentially unbound by the necessity for rigid and stable management,

present a spectrum of organizational structures deviating in various degrees from bureaucratic structure. Although, the ideal types of both bureaucracy and networks are often the creations of theoretical speculations, the non-state organizations present essentially increased capabilities to approach higher degree of network formation than states. As the choice of network structure remains optional for non-state actors, it is this option and degrees of deviation from bureaucratic structure analogous to state institutions that provides for the fundamental differences between state and non-state organization. The primarily belligerent, non-state entities presenting the identifying degrees of network-based violence are terrorist organizations addressed in detail in the following section.

5.3.1 Non-Bureaucracies and Terrorist Organizations.

Terrorist organizations have diverse origins, ideologies and organizational structures; however, in general terrorist organizations do not employ a bureaucratic style of organization (Mullins, 1988: 214). Variances in the structures of terrorist organizations can be categorized among traditional and new-generation groups (Zanini and Edwards, 2001: 32). The traditional group encompasses terrorist organizations emerging in 1960's and 1970's, e.g. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna's (ETA) or Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Europe or Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other terrorist organizations formally or informally linked to PLO in Middle East. Zanini and Edwards (2001: 32) observed that "these groups have utilized autonomous cells as part of their organizational structure, but the operation of such cells is guided by a hierarchy through clear reporting

relationships and virtually little horizontal coordination.” Although Zanini and Edwards (2001: 32) believed that the traditional terrorist organizations are “relatively bureaucratic,” the level of bureaucracy can be subjected to strict questioning while compared to bureaucracies of state institutions. It is important, however, to note that terrorist organizations originating in 1960’s and 1970’s are often situated within a context of broader movements, involving the creation of political parties, e.g. ETA’s affiliation with Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE) and Herri Batsuna (HB) political parties (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990: 248-249); PLO political and terrorist undertakings within the context of Palestinian National Liberation Movement, or Fatah (Weinberg and Pedahzur, 2004: 95-97); Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism and its politicized nationality (Entessar, 1989: 84-87).

As Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004: 95) correctly noted, “groups or organizations operating within the context of a broad movement such as Palestinian National Liberation Movement may, over time, shift from strategies of terrorism to peaceful party politics and back to terrorism, depending upon prevailing conditions and incentives to behave in one way or the other.” Important, however, remains the fact that differentiation between bureaucratic inclinations of political parties associated with any terrorist organization does not merely reflect the bureaucratic nature of the terrorist entities. While bureaucracy clearly identifies that written rules and procedures of conduct should be formalized and defined, and consequently recorded, it would be difficult to imagine that terrorist organization, even if existent as political parties, would formally identify specific rules for

conduct falling within the range of terrorist behavior or record the achieved results.

The terrorist element of the wider movements relies primarily on underground organization and secrecy. Terrorist fractions or groups essentially depend upon secrecy in order to assure their survival from the counter-terrorist mechanisms of the state, relying primarily on decision-making processes aimed at concealing the whereabouts, movements and exact responsibilities of the members in connection to terrorist undertakings of the organization. Even in the case of relatively open organizations such as PLO in which the primary decision-makers are known to the authorities, efforts are made to remain relatively secret and unknown to the state authorities leaving the terrorist positioning and advances primarily self-evident rather than precisely defined. In this respect, the organizational structure of terrorist organizations fundamentally opposes the bureaucratic dimensions of formalization and reliance on standardized procedure thus constituting hybrid entities, of half-bureaucratic and half-non-bureaucratic nature.

Conversely, the new-generation organizations, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Algeria's Armed Islamic Group or Al Qaeda are "loosely organized groups with religious or ideological motives, [where] operatives are part of a network that relies less on bureaucratic fiat and more on shared values and horizontal coordination mechanism to accomplish its goals" (Zanini and Edwards, 2001: 33). To a

varying extent, the abovementioned organizations, share principles of the networked organization characterized by a “group of organized in loosely interconnected, semi-independent cells that have no single commanding hierarchy” (Arquilla et al., 1999: 56). Hamas presents a distinctively unique hybrid organization, which next to the network structural arrangement also incorporates a “great leader,” in a fashion similar to PLO’s Yasser Arafat (Arquilla et al., 1999: 57). In respect of the other terrorist organizations presenting novel organizational structures, the clear distinctiveness from bureaucratic dimensions can be identified, establishing a factual observation in reference to new structures and processes guiding the behavior of those organizations. Building, dynamic and expansive terrorist network the new-generation terrorist organizations, although detached in their individual pursuance of political objectives, are loosely coupled with each other, despite the geographical dispersion and diversity of social connections (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007: 81). Despite the inherent heterogeneity of entities embraced within the contemporary terrorist networks, the difficulty arising from the deliberate maintenance of low profile of terrorist organizations within the network, it becomes not only difficult to identify the individual components but also trace the activities within the network.

Mapping the contemporary terrorist networks, thereby, becomes challenging in respect of the monitoring of individually undertaken terrorist activities, but also realizing the extensive connection among individual organizations in relation to the wider spectrum of networking relationships among affiliated

terrorists of the world. The duality of Hezbollah, manifesting its primary presence essentially in Lebanon, in addition to representing “highly organized, well-financed and extremely disciplined link in the network of global terrorism” (Byers, 2003: 49), becomes an instance of the complexity of modern new-generation terrorist organizations. Hezbollah in political context of its movement is structured with clear hierarchy responsible for “overall administration as well as executive, legislative, judicial, political and military affairs” (Phillips, 2008: 41), yet disciplining secrecy as a terrorist organization it is a “far-flung multinational organization with a worldwide presence” (Phillips, 2008: 41) maintaining multiple network of terrorist cells in disperse parts of world, including Asia, Europe and South America (Giraldo and Trinkunas: 144-148).

In the light of the strategic importance of organizational structure, the fact that states are bureaucratic, while non-state actors deviate from bureaucratic constitutions becomes of great significance. Operational code beliefs shape the subjective understanding about what exists and how to act, through developing of assumptions that are rarely questioned or scrutinized. Thus to remind reader of the primary argument of this thesis, it is important to note that “most of people assume that organizational hierarchy is a necessary and useful arrangement. When a person encounters superior-subordinate situations; he or she views them as normal, acceptable and unproblematic” (Miller, 2008: 106). In this manner, the perceptions of organizational structure become entangled into decision-making and thus should be recognized within operational code analysis.

The following chapter is devoted to a case study of Al Qaeda, as a terrorist organization exemplifying the highest degree of non-bureaucratic structure. The following chapter through representation of the evolution of Al Qaeda's organizational structure presents a premise that structuring of organizational form account for valuable insights into Al Qaeda's threat-display, as ideological and social dimensions of its activities can no longer account solemnly for coherent explanatory power of the phenomena.

CHAPTER VI

AI QAEDA'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

It has become a commonplace to allude to a general spread and evolution of networked structures, and more specifically, to their employment by and impact on non-state actors, and terrorist organizations in particular. Al Qaeda, as a unique organization among all terrorist organizations in this respect, within its historical evolution seems to have intuitively grasp the advantages of the potential of alternative organizational structures, which have allowed Al Qaeda to move into the realm of flexibility, integration and assumption of provocative role. Subjected to the forces of globalization, Al Qaeda successfully managed to elevate its organization into the global terrorist movement presenting one of the most salient threats to the contemporary international order. While perspectives of political, historian and social scientists overall are both essential in an understanding and addressing the threat posed by Al Qaeda, often the fundamental characteristics of the phenomenon are significantly undervalued and misjudged, while approached with constrains of given specialty. Since the emergence

of religious terrorism³⁸ in the late 1970's and early 1980's, Al Qaeda presented its uniqueness in operational and strategic organizational underpinnings. Al Qaeda has moved terrorism beyond the position of resistance affairs organized in forms of protests and localized low intensity conflicts, by transforming political violence into a globally instrumented threat aiming broadly at challenging the existing international order and the extent of Western influence as the predefined by that order. In order to grasp the ongoing and dynamic processes within Al Qaeda organization requires an analysis of its organizational structure that represents the fundamental essence of its organizational personality distinct from its individual members. The accurate portrayal of organizational dimensions require the examination of the interaction of contextual predispositions and the resultant structural underpinning of Al Qaeda, in the past and today, in order to represent the adjustment of the organization to the environment and consequent strive for effectiveness outcomes.

In view of many Al Qaeda historically represented an efficient, well-financed and sophisticated organization that lead to the spectacular of September 11, 2001 in its greatest capacity. Since then, the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, lead by the United States, unprecedentedly damaged not only Al Qaeda's territorial core for command and control and training camps, but also lead significantly

³⁸ The reference to the emergence of religious terrorism is often described as a *fourth wave* of terrorism (Rapoport, 2004), and is characterized by a predominance of terrorist groups that use religious justifications for terrorist action, whereas the precedent waves were characterized by the secular nature of objectives. While the first wave of terrorism was the anarchist wave (1880's-1914), followed by the anti-colonial wave (1920-60's), the third wave was followed ethno-nationalistic and ideologically defined patterns of political violence (Bowden and Davis, 2008:23)

to the target displacement of the organization's leadership forcing Al Qaeda to undergone extensive restructuring of its organizational foundation. As such, both the academia and counter-terrorism law enforcements must indubitably understand the importance of the organizational state of the organization, through its continuous evolution and devolution. Presently, the variety of analysts pose a question whether Al Qaeda constitutes a re-formed smaller nucleus of previously magnified organization or whether it has evolved into a global social movement encompassing not only active trained terrorists but also self-recruited wannabes who find purpose in terrors and comrades on the Web within the ideological framework provided by Al Qaeda (Sageman, 2008a: 37). In the context of the ongoing debate, the subsequent identification of organizational structure of Al Qaeda would not only bring a reader closer to important aspect of the organizational being but also provide an established answer to the question, whether Al Qaeda should remain classified as organization, or whether should it be evaluated in term of the social movement many appear to identify Al Qaeda with. With the established answer to this question, both academics and policy-makers could analyze accurately and find means of efficient defeat of Al Qaeda worldwide.

Etzioni's (1964: 5) definition of organizations as "social units deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals" would represent the framework for defining and understanding the organizations. Conversely, the benchmark against which Al Qaeda will be defined will be Stojkovic et al. (2003)

framework for evaluation of organizational structure. The unpacking of organizational structure necessitates importantly an incorporation of aspects of organizational purpose and activity as complementary forces assisting organization in its structure formation (Stojkovic, et al. 2003). The three aspects provide for the framework for differentiation between rigidity constructed bureaucratic entity, as characterized by Weber (1947), and a recently emergent networked organizations. With the historical account on the proliferation of nebulous entities with diverse organizational structures, the elements of purpose, as emphasized by Etzioni (1964), and the activities of the analyzed organization bare an important point of reference for an accurate analysis of Al Qaeda. While the purpose specifically designs measures with which an organization effectively calculates the potential for achievement of its objectives, an important question concerning the activities of the organization embraces the preciseness of organizational existence, that is, whether the organization itself carries out the activities or whether it supports the weight of the activities of outside groups acting on the behalf of it. In this respect, the totality of organization's structure in respect of its purpose and activities would constitute a comprehensive review of Al Qaeda's structural being.

To achieve a permanent acceptance of the understanding of Al Qaeda laid down in this thesis, first a brief history of its origins and transformation will be provided. In due course an analysis of its current organizational structure, accounting for the elements of leadership, communications and recruitment will be

brought forth. Identifying the boundaries of organizational formation of Al Qaeda would establish a ground for further analysis of the organization, identification of its operational code through delineation of structurally defined potential vulnerabilities, patterns of activities and consequently add-up a value to the considerations examined by the academia and counterterrorist communities.

6.1. Evolution and Devolution of Al Qaeda

While the ideological origins of the organization reach back to the emergence of Salafi's ideology (Laqueur, 2003: 30) that promoted an utopian vision of united Islamic world calling for the re-establishment of caliphate and ultimate reunification of Muslim *umma* (the community), the organizational underpinning of this radical Islamic ideology, known as Al Qaeda today, came into being in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1980's, although the exact date of its emergence has been disputed among scholars. The decade of conflict in Afghanistan between 1979-1989 gave Islamist extremists a rallying ground for revolutionary activism uniting Arab volunteers from around the world fighting for a common cause. One of the most significant organizational forms of Islamist non-state resistance in Afghanistan, directly preceding Al Qaeda's emergence, was Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK), or Service Office in translation, co-founded by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in 1984. The organization essentially channeled recruits from Afghanistan, provided indoctrination and training, facilitated acquisition of weapons and provided a degree of financial assistance to volunteer

fighters against Soviet Union (Migaux, 2007: 293). So to enable its participation in the anti-Soviet resistance war, MAK assumed hierarchical structure of command and control, with each unit subordinated in a pyramid-like structure to the organization's leadership (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 277). Since the circumstances of a war necessitated high levels of specialization and top-to-bottom subordination in order to acquire efficiently of the processes of collective resistance against Soviet Union, MAK was essentially reflected highly structured hierarchy of authority, centralized decision-making, distribution of assigned task to authorized individuals, as well as, high levels of professionalism ensuring comprehensive training program for militants.

In the wake of Soviet announcement concerning withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, the contemplative discourse between Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden over the future of post-Afghanistan jihad reaching an agreement not to dismantle MAK, but rather to replace it with a 'base,' known in Arabic as Al Qaeda, that would serve as a "headquarters for managing future jihad in other theatres" (Conboy, 2006: 56). The agreement between Azzam and bin Laden was reached concerning the fact that recruitment and funding infrastructures created for Afghanistan should not be dissolved (Gurule, 2008: 30), an agreement that was successfully transformed into a reality where "the new organization [Al Qaeda] relied on the infrastructure of the MAK, but its ideological orientation was unsure and its operational capabilities almost non-existent" (Mendelsohn, 2009: 46).

The ideological uncertainty for organizational objectives following the end of was in Afghanistan began to shape the future of organization's being. Resolved with Azzam's death in a car-bomb attack in 1989, leaving bin Laden in "complete control of MAK's funds and operational mechanisms, which were folded into the evolving Al Qaeda organization" (Gurule, 2008: 31), Al Qaeda was to emerge as a novel organization. This change of strategic realm ignited Al Qaeda as a distinct organization ready to begin its existence independent of the Jihadist activism that existed within the context of Soviet-Afghani war, and prompted further ideological evolution of the organization. Of the greatest importance, becoming the primary figure in Al Qaeda, bin Laden's ideological stand directed the organizational goals towards fighting apostate regimes around the globe, as he aimed to "train Muslim fighters to continue jihad outside Afghanistan to advance the cause of radical Islam" (Gurule, 2008: 30). Since the ideological stand necessitates means of support, primarily through organizational structure, Al Qaeda's designed global reach, fundamentally challenged the bureaucratic pre-existence of MAK and necessitated a transformation into a flexible, loosely knit structure with horizontal communication orientation that would enhance organization's capabilities of reaching international audience.

While the strategic orientation of a newly established organization changed, the end of the Soviet-Afghani conflict in 1989, provided for further significant organizational changes in respect of the organizational size. With the end of Afghanistan chapter, thousands of volunteering *mujahideen* were now ready to look

ahead. While the volunteers comprising MAK decided to return to respective homelands and live mundane lives, other married locals and choose to live in Pakistan or Afghanistan (Mendelsohn, 2009: 45). There were also a number of individuals who recognized that their acquired knowledge of combat and experience on battlefield would significantly enhance the international Jihadist struggle put forward by bin Laden (Migaux, 2007: 297). And it was that small group of jihadists that pledged their loyalty to bin Laden that essentially constituted the core of Al Qaeda and continued to work with bin Laden through the 1990's (Burke, 2003: 7-9; Tanter, 1999: 265). According to 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 56), the early structure of Al Qaeda comprised of a "military committee, a financial committee, a political committee and committee in charge of media affairs and propaganda." The charge over the committees was assigned to the Advisory Council or *Shura Majlis*, headed by bin Laden and comprised of bin Laden's inner circle.

With the end of the Soviet-Afghanistan war, the consequent lack of infrastructural and financial underpinnings for large scale operational functioning, the early years of Al Qaeda remain somewhat ambiguous in respect of its activities and structure. In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia where he began to lay foundation for the future global Jihadist network. Robinson (2001:126) noted that during his period in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden "stayed in almost daily contact with 'his men' around the region, taking over their plans, seeing where he could be of help." These contacts provided a

foundation for many of modern Islamic terror activities, particularly in Egypt and Algeria, with the emergence of local Islamic resistance conflicts³⁹. Maintaining his financial independency, bin Laden regularly shifted large amount of money to his allies channeling the resources “into the bank accounts of those wishing to buy arms and explosives to be used in a struggle at home” (Robinson, 2001: 126).

According to Gurule (2008: 34) bin Laden also “funded military and basic explosives training for al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, and training on how to create cell structures for terrorist operations abroad.” In this context, the financial resources for early Al Qaeda’s existence did not constitute for a major challenge to organizational functioning in respect of its supportive nature in Islamic struggles in theatres of war in diverse parts of the world. The core of human resources, initially gave Al Qaeda a power vacuum with numerous mujahideen, trained in Afghanistan under Osama’s sponsorship, that constituted a force which could be sent to support Jihadist struggle internationally (Robinson, 2001: 118). In context, the organizational constituency of Al Qaeda in the post-Soviet-Afghanistan war was essentially transnational in nature linking “a global platform with local struggles, [where] its members could help to advance the network while retailing their affiliation to local and national based groups” (Mendelsohn, 2009: 53). The transnational composition of Al Qaeda, linked primarily

³⁹ After the war in Afghanistan against Soviet Union, the mujahideen fighters left to their respective homelands with a stronger commitment to jihad and more radical perspectives that lead to an initiation of local Jihadist opposition fronts. Mendelsohn (2009: 46) noted that “with the end of the war, Arab state saw resurgence of Islamic domestic violence as a more zealous and able Afghan returnees started working to undermine local regimes.”

with a shared ideological stand of affiliated groups, provided for ambiguity of the organizational functioning and structure. Until 1998, Al Qaeda's role with respect to terrorist operations was primarily concentrated with "providing funds, training and weapons for attacks carried out by members of allied terror affiliates" (Gurule, 2009: 38). As a result, Al Qaeda represented essentially an organization with substantial influence and degree of absorption of fundamentalist groups dispersed transnational, provided guidance to these groups and encouragement for active participation in fighting in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Somalia, Yemen and Kosovo and further cemented its credentials in the fundamentalist camp. Bin Laden essentially perceived that various components of the Islamic movement in different parts of the world and creation of trust-bonds among fundamentalist groups would strengthen the ambiguity of the responsible actor for the attacks. The element of trust thus become fundamental in the future structural forms of Al Qaeda, as it grounds the foundation for informal organizational structure, with high degree of coherence and intractability.

Al Qaeda's early establishment was situated within a moderately unstable and complex international environment. The complexity of environment impinging upon organizational structure of Al Qaeda became apparent in the context of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. "Osama bin Laden's conviction that he had defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan led him to propose to the Saudi authorities that he Arab mujahideen help them take on the Iraqi armored divisions" (Migaux, 2007: 317), which had lead to the refusal from Saudi authorities and

eventual bin Laden's exile in Sudan in 1991, welcomed by Hassan al Turabi. With the changes in political sector, particularly the invasion of Kuwait which brought a presence of Christian troops on Saudi soil, strengthened bin Laden conviction that Al Qaeda's purpose should be directed against *far enemy*, i.e. United States, rather than maintaining its fight against the *near enemies*, i.e. national regimes as in the past (Gerges, 2005: 191), solidified with 1996 declaration of war on the U.S. and subsequently, in 1998 issuance of *fatwa* calling for all Muslims to wage jihad against Jews and Crusaders. The gradual shift of goals from *near enemy* to *far enemy* made operational control and oversight of organization more difficult to manage.

The Al Qaeda's change of strategic aspect, with United States becoming the prioritized enemy, constituted for further differentiation strategic underlining, that necessitated organizational further drive to informality necessitating further structurally designed security measures such as cell formation, and strengthening of loyalty and trust between not only terrorist groups, but also entrusted financial donors. In this context, bin Laden remained in close relationship with variety of Islamic groups such as Egypt's Al Jihad and al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya, Iran's Hezbollah, Sudan's NIF and jihad groups in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Somalia as well as, "dozens of other like-minded fundamentalist groups were all clamoring to build bridges with Al Qaeda" (Robinson: 2001: 143). In an attempt to coordinate financing and support of various affiliated terrorist organizations committed to global jihad, bin Laden established an "Islamic Army Shura."

Building upon his fund-raising experience from Afghanistan, bin Laden could further ensure financial resources to Al Qaeda through maintenance of contact with sympathizers of the fundamentalist cause back from the days in Afghanistan (Robinson, 2001: 139).

During bin Laden's stay in Sudan, Al Qaeda was given an immense opportunity to advance its structural design. Within the period of five years, between 1991-1996, bin Laden's residency in Sudan proved to constitute a successful Al Qaeda's base for business operations and preparations for jihad (Bevy, 2006: 5). Bin Laden's business network comprised of 134 Arab businessmen, whose combined commercial empire maintained bank accounts in virtually every country and, collectively, routinely shifted billions of dollars around as a part of their legitimate business" (Robinson, 2001: 139), in the greatest extent contributed to the continuation of Al Qaeda's role as an umbrella organization, bringing regional and international terrorist organization through provision of financing and weapons. Sudan provided a stable environment to bin Laden's gradual progression towards a more advanced network with Al Qaeda essentially as the forefront executive organization rather than supportive. The essential cultivation of relationship with like-minded terrorist groups, provision of support in funds, weapons and training ensured Al Qaeda's loyal stand against its cause and slowly mature in structure to independently carry its mission and initiate a greater Jihadist struggle against infidel countries, particularly the United States.

Although the environment in Sudan was relatively stable allowing al Qaeda to enjoy its bureaucratic centralization and hierarchy, began to lose its solid grounds in 1994, when Saudi Arabia stripped bin Laden of its citizenship and frozen his financial assets (Tanter, 1999: 265). The financial sector, was for a large part instrumental in Al Qaeda's efficient functioning, both in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia as well as Sudan, while it ensured the constant provision of support to the like-minded terrorist groups waging jihad in various countries like Egypt, Bosnia, Chechnya, Yemen, Kashmir and Philippines (Gurule, 2008: 33). According to 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 62), money problems proved costly to bin Laden in many ways, particularly hurting bin Laden's companies in an unstable economic environment of Sudan. In nearly two years, Sudan became a doubtful haven for bin Laden, who returned to Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda began to adopt a more coherent and mature organizational structure (Burke, 2004: 8).

It is important, therefore, to note that Al Qaeda, during bin Laden's stay in Saudi Arabia and Sudan, was still structurally immature, with a centralized decision-making in hands of bin Laden, hierarchy of authority distributed among organizational committees, and professionalism of individual members accounting mainly for past-experience acquired in Afghanistan and post-war training camps in Afghanistan and high degrees of informality within Al Qaeda and between Al Qaeda and the like-minded terrorist organizations around the world. In terms of the specialization aspect of Al Qaeda's structure, the organization's essential membership component could not be effectively described within the categories

of either low or high specialization. While the late-Sudan existence of Al Qaeda, proves to provide the examples of cell establishment as in Nairobi in 1993⁴⁰ that lead to 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi in Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, the Al Qaeda's general pattern for division of labor seem to be distributed to specific cells, which were entrusted with the carrying out of attacks against U.S. targets. According to 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 68), the cell responsibilities during the preparation for Nairobi attacks included technical surveillance and on-site management and casing for targets. The cell's operational commander was Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, Al Qaeda's military committee chief, while progress of preparations for attack was regularly reported to bin Laden's indicating the centralized structure of Al Qaeda and its essentially hierarchical structure.

6.2. Road to September 11, 2001.

The gradual evolution of Al Qaeda's objectives during 1990's, following bin Laden's return to Saudi Arabia and exile in Sudan until 1996, the organization was essentially maturing into a coherent structure with established boundaries. The general agreement among scholars identifies Al Qaeda as a coherent structure after bin Laden's return to Afghanistan in 1996 (Rabasa et al. 2006: 28), where the organization began to evolve essentially into a networked structure, in

⁴⁰ Bin Laden's involvement in the attacks in Somalia and World Trade Centre in 1993 is unclear, and the extent to which Al Qaeda could be affiliated with the Islamist cells operating in these attacks.

both inter-organizational and intra-organizational dimensions of networked organizational form (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 279).

In respect of the nebulous inter-organizational character of Al Qaeda's activities, the organization's strengthened transnational collaboration with affiliated groups provided for the enhanced global reach and soundness in its global agenda. The inter-organizational networked structure of Al Qaeda began its existence in 1998, with bin Laden's formation of World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (FIMLJC). The transnational advocacy network of Al Qaeda embraced, Al-Jihad and Gama-a al-Islamiya in Egypt, Jemaah Islamayah in Indonesia, Group Islamique Armee and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Philippines, as well as, numerous groups in Kashmir region of Pakistan (Mannes, 2004: 3-99). All of the groups were operating with varying degrees of input and coordination from Al Qaeda's leadership while maintained much of their operational and logistical independence (Asal et al., 2007: 23). Owen (2004: 220) identified that the alliance represented a significant step in organizational structuring of Al Qaeda, providing the organization with "formidable organizational talents of the Egyptian members of Jihad, a highly secretive military group with a long history of assassinations and other terrorist activities."

Importantly, however, maintaining international ties with terrorist groups was regarded as a secondary objective of Al Qaeda, which centered Al Qaeda as

an organization with solemn capabilities to plan, supervise and execute terrorist operations. The eventual attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and attack on the American destroyer USS Cole in 2000 represented the first organizational coherence and strength of Al Qaeda in organizing terrorist attacks. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 67) Al Qaeda no longer “concentrated on providing funds, training and weapons for actions carried out by members of allied groups” but itself planned, directed and executed terrorist attacks under the direct supervision of its commander-in chief, namely bin Laden.

The attacks in Africa and Yemen have established al Qaeda as a sophisticated organization, which managed to adapt its internal structure to achieve its desired goals, despite often challenges imposed on the organization by an external environment. In fact, it was the safe haven in Afghanistan that allowed bin Laden to execute even more ambitious and deadly terror operations, which indirectly linked the influence of external environment upon organizational success. Al Qaeda’s success, however, did not rely solely on the solid organizational base with a strong degree of organizational coherence (Rabasa, 2006: 28), that provided an infrastructure of facilities for the global network of Islamist movements but also strengthened Al Qaeda’s self-reliance on the internal networking that enabled the organization to carry out attacks without establishment of solidly connections to external group’s activities. The internal networked structure

of Al Qaeda began to evolve, providing the organization with means for secretive, flexible and coherent organizational activity.

Central to Al Qaeda's pre-9/11 structure was the central leadership often called Al Qaeda Central, Al Qaeda Professional Cadre or Al Qaeda Core (Dishman, 2005: 243). This organizational core consisted of a "dozen or so inner members surrounded by an outer circle of roughly 100 highly motivated loyalists drawn from around the Muslim world and committed to the Jihadist agenda" (Burke, 2004: 13). At the core structure of Al Qaeda was comprised of three layers, with bin Laden at the top of hierarchical structure, followed by a consultative committee, often referred to as *Shura Majlis* or Advisory Council, made up of veterans from the Soviet-Afghan war, including al-Zawahiri and responsible for reporting directly to bin Laden. At the lowest level, Al Qaeda core comprised four operational committees, responsible for military, finance and business, fatwa and Islamic study, and media and publicity (Guanaratna, 2003: 31), assuming independent roles embracing activities on the specific substantive issues assigned to them. The military committee, for example, "plans and executes for Al Qaeda, conducts surveillance, gathers intelligence and trains members in military tactics" (Dishman, 2005: 244). Like the Advisory Council, combat veterans of the Afghan resistance headed individual committees. Prior to 9/11 attacks, for example, Khalid Sheik Muhammad (KSM) was a head of Al Qaeda's military committee, conceiving and helping planning of the plot to crash the airliners into

symbolic targets in the United States. Figure 4 below represents a simplified graphical illustration of Al Qaeda Central during its early existence.




Figure 4. *The Hierarchical Representation of Early Organizational Structure of Al Qaeda Central.*

In general, for most important terrorist attacks, bin Laden's direct engagement with the executors of the major terrorist attack is, however, questionable and often over-stated whereas the safest assumption remains that at minimum bin Laden was heavily involved in the operational decision-making (Dishman, 2005: 244). The authority of Al Qaeda prior to 9/11, therefore, resided primarily in hierarchy, the Al Qaeda Central Cadre, that essentially directed the organizational behavior through supervision and standardized rules of social control. Within the Al Qaeda central the social relations were essentially role-based, situational and instrumental essentially on the principles of isomorphic distribution of prestige, privilege and power. The core of Al Qaeda was essentially arranged

in closer proximity to bureaucratic-hierarchical structure than the network structure. The core of Al Qaeda, however, did not constitute for the entirety of its organizational underpinning and looking further into the organizational premises of the organization, particularly in respect of the management of attacks, the organization presents essentially a hybrid network structure, allowing the centralized coordination of disperse all-channel networks from Al Qaeda's hierarchical core.

Al Qaeda following the model of the two major Egyptian groups, the Islamic Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, necessitated its entirety of organizational structure to account for operational leader's connection to central leadership receiving logistical, financial and other assistance while operating with considerable autonomy during the attack preparation stage (Springer et al, 2009: 103). In this respect pre-9/11 Al Qaeda represented a hub-network structure of organization, with the leadership of Al Qaeda aware of the whereabouts of the individual cells and the advancement respectively assigned responsibilities, while the recruiters in individual cells conducting the attacks or providing logistical assistance were given only partial information regarding the specific segments of the operation. While individual cells were organized in depending on the location, mission and other circumstances unique to each operation, that in turn resulted in the fact that individual cell members knew at most the target and names of other members of their specific cell, and not being able to reach further into the command-and-control structure (Springer et al. 2009: 106). On this

account, it is important to note that “organizational members may have had considerable latitude as to how they would accomplish their missions, such as the September 11 attacks, but their function was dictated from outside” (Springer et al. 2009: 106).

Al Qaeda, essentially becoming a learning and adaptive organization promoted the increasing establishment of cells with members from different functional areas that were able to self-direct their activities with a limited supervision from a centralized body. The organization deviated from bureaucratic structure since it could not longer rely on strive for efficiency through control, but rather adapted itself to the mechanisms for effective management of organizational affairs. Figure 5, on the following page, illustrates the totality of Al Qaeda’s structure between 1998-2001. It is important to note that the Al Qaeda Central, represented by red dot signifying *Shura Majlis* headed by bin Laden, and light grey dots as representative of operational committees. The illustration presents Al Qaeda central essentially as a hub-network rather than hierarchy in order to illustrate the centralization aspect of the organization rather than its hierarchical layout. The distinction between hierarchy and centralization becomes important in this respect, as hybrid network structures do not assume necessarily decentralization.



Figure 5. Simplified Organizational Chart of Al Qaeda Organization (1998-2001)

An essential aspect of the Al Qaeda's evolution into a networked structure began apparent with the increasing significance attached to organizational ideological stand and the aspect of informality and cohesion. Hoffman (2006: 10) noted significantly, that "Al Qaeda has been able to configure itself into an organization more reflective of ideology than it once was," and this very premise points at the significant maturity of Al Qaeda in its organizational culture that provided for a strong informal cohesion, that through collective identity⁴¹ provided for high degree of internal integration and external adaptation.

⁴¹ The essence of the concept of collective identity resides in a shared sense of "one-ness" or "we-ness" anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of "others" (Snow, 2001:2213). The notion of collective identity is addressed in Chapter 7: Subsuming Organizational Structure into Operational Code Analysis.

In this manner, among all the attacks, the September 11, 2001 provides the most sophisticated example of Al Qaeda's hybrid organizational structure. According to 9/11 Commission Report, bin Laden held essentially leadership role, provided for financial support and supervised the recruitment of leading operatives and "muscle hijackers"⁴² for the operation, although originally the conceptualization of the plot was conducted by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) who subsequently held the responsibility for operational support to the attackers. The terrorists taking part in the attacks were initially recruited from the Arab Muslim communities in Europe, Southeast Asia and the Arab world, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia and consequently trained in Al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 279). The attackers received orders from a central command and control structure of Al Qaeda's establishment in Afghanistan, and logistical support from Al Qaeda's sleeper cells in Europe and Southeast Asia (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005: 279). This transnational organizational structure of Al Qaeda consequently enabled the attackers to coordinate information regarding specific segments of the operation among independent cells in the country-to-be-attacked.

The centralized distribution of decision-making within Al Qaeda has been represented essentially by the recruitment supervision and continuous report provision to bin Laden by selected operatives from sleeping cells in Europe,

⁴² A "muscle hijackers" term denotes individuals who played central role in storming the cockpits and controlling the passengers during the 9/11 terrorist attacks., who were trained in the based in Afghanistan and consequently transmitted to the United States into independent operational cells.

which coordinated the commands from Afghanistan to individuals in United States.⁴³ Mohammed Atta constituted a solemn link from the cells present in the United States to Al Qaeda's organizational establishments in Europe, Middle East and Southeast Asia. The primacy of security of the plotted attacks, became the primary reason behind the representative allocation of information concerning the attacks into individual cells, which of which only one individual held the information concerning another cell. The hijackers were primary assigned into appropriate training, yet without detailed information concerning their role in the attacks. The network structure of Al Qaeda enabled the organization to maintain its operational secrecy through sporadic linkages among attackers and transformation of autonomy for decision-making regarding targets and time of the attack to the leaders of cells. Non of the assisting operatives which facilitated coordinated transmission of attackers in U.S. soil were provided the operational details of the plan, while the "muscle hijackers" were given the details post-training and post-arrival in the United States just days preceding the attacks ensuring the efficient maintenance of the network structure.

In summary, Al Qaeda's organizational structure between approximately 1998 and 2001 was comprised of networked links between organizational elements, peripheral decentralization with autonomous cells yet hierarchical command and control centre. The organization's structure exhibited its adaptability, secrecy and survivability apparent in the formation of informal network

⁴³ Binalshibh was the primary linkage between bin Laden, KSM as operational supporter and Atta as a representative leader from cells in United States.

structures, with limited guides and formally established means for conduct of terrorist operations. In respect of specialization Al Qaeda before 9/11 displayed a degree of specialization in respect of the specifically assigned roles, such as differentiation among pilots and overtakes among “muscle hijackers.” Equally, in terms of professionalism, Al Qaeda’s provides essentially high levels of organizational operationalism of its structure, since it essentially provided a necessary training and education to future terrorists, without professional pre-requirements for the recruitment.

6.3. Al Qaeda’s Network after September 11.

With the extensive counter-terrorist response following the attacks on World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, the global Islamist terrorist threat changes the direction of its evolution. Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, Al Qaeda’s has been specifically targeted by the international community to dismantle and diminish its operational capabilities. The Operation Enduring Freedom commenced wherein the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, that through air and land operations successfully destroyed terrorist training camps, enabled capturing and killing of Al Qaeda core leadership and subsequent cessation of terrorist activities both in Afghanistan and in other locations directed from Afghani terrorist bases. Within weeks U.S. forces and their Afghan allies removed Taliban forcibly from power and consequently caused irreparable damage to al Qaeda’s sanctuaries, headquarters and training camps in Afghanistan, killing at least eight of the twenty Al Qaeda leaders (Conetta, 2002).

Equally, the Saudi authorities in cooperation with international efforts successfully targeted Al Qaeda's finances and significantly disabled a range of al Qaeda's activities. The monitoring of al Qaeda's suspected and known members began to disrupt the communication within the organization, the further arrests and killing of al Qaeda's core leadership provided for significant lessening of al Qaeda's operational capabilities. Dishman (2005: 243) noted that in total "since September 11, Al Qaeda has lost roughly 70 percent of its leadership" and lost an affiliation with an explicit territory and institutional presence in Afghanistan, necessitating the organization to resort to drastic shifts in organizational structure and further improve its adaptability against the challenges of external environment.

The successes of coalition's counterterrorism in Afghanistan provide for the fact that Al Qaeda operates in significantly diminished capacity. Despite the challenges of external environment becoming more complex and unstable for al Qaeda, the organization managed to carry several bombings, including Tunisia synagogue bombing in 2002, Bali nightclub bombing in 2002, suicide bombing in Riyadh in 2003, Casablanca targeting of foreigners in 2003, truck-bombs in Istanbul in 2003, Madrid train-bombings in 2004, London bombings in 2005 and many other. The operational success of the al Qaeda's attacks resulted not from the inadequacy of counter-terrorist measures, but rather from changes in Al Qaeda's organizational structure that provided the organization with ability to main its operational capacity. As Hoffman et al. (2005: 10) noted, "Al Qaeda has proved

itself to be a remarkably nimble, flexible and adaptive entity” as it rebounded from the complex environmental challenge to an extent that is rarely fully appreciated from the structural point of view. It does not present itself structurally as a bureaucratic organization as it was in Afghanistan coherent to be defeated on the battlefield, neither as an entity structurally diverse yet centralized in decision-making as it was in Afghanistan between 1998-2001. Al Qaeda’s organizational patterns go beyond those of modern terrorist structures, with its “amorphous, decentralized network of cells that spread and multiply in a way that in terms of organizational form closely resembles franchise business schemes” (Stepanova, 2008: 133). The organizational innovative transnational, de-territorialized structure with loose communication and coordination transformed Al Qaeda’s into another entity presenting variety of themes of dynamism in form, rationales and spheres of influence.

Remaining devoted to its essential objectives, namely a removal of all Western presence from Muslim lands, reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate and establishment of rule of Islamic law in Muslim countries, Al Qaeda as an entity undoubtedly remains existent in restructured form, as noted by Etzioni (1964), in respect of its designed purposes. In respect of Al Qaeda’s objectives, the group has essentially utilized its purpose for both inspirational as well as operational purposes (Corera, 2004). The continuously emergent proclamations and declarations from Al Qaeda’s core leadership, point specifically at the fact that the organization believes it is at war and it is a duty of every Muslim to participate

or support the efforts against Western powers. The purpose of the organization, therefore, appears to constitute an amalgam of political and religious legitimacy claims for which the organization appears to claim its success with expansion of support, organizational structure and operational capabilities. The consequent evaluation of Al Qaeda's leadership patterns, its span of control, communication and recruitment provide for an overview of Al Qaeda's structure and design that in its highest sophistication aims to support its core objectives and act upon them.

6.3.1. Leadership

A leadership in organization remains one of the most significant aspects of organizational context. Either serving the function of integrating and coordinating force facilitating an effective and efficient achievement of organizational objectives (Carlisle, 1976: 7) or as a force mobilizing and directing of individuals and their ideas (Kotter, 1990: 7), leadership becomes an important element upon which an organizational structure is based on. According to Kotter (1990: 8), "leaders establish direction by developing a vision of the future, align people to move them toward a shared vision," an aspect which is particularly important in respect of Al Qaeda. As much as the "coordination" and "integration" aspect of the Al Qaeda organization remains questionable, due to its neutralized operationalism (Sageman, 2008b: 126), a terrorist coordination of affiliated groups and individuals was instead sanctioned with Al Qaeda's inspirational leadership. The leadership of Al Qaeda as essentially lacking the centralization aspect of

coordination and integration, presents its innovativeness and resourcefulness in providing a charismatic inspiration and guidance to the individuals and groups affiliated with its primary cause and objectives. Increasingly, many authors point out that the effectiveness of Al Qaeda leadership relies on its provision of inspiration and motivation to all affiliated groups which develops into a complex network reliant on the ideological linkage to Al Qaeda's extreme reverence for the leaders (Sageman, 2008b). An increasing portrayal of Al Qaeda's leadership as a greater achiever, symbol of a cause for Islamic extremists (Mangi, 2003: 124), further supported by the historical sophistication and success of bin Laden's terrorist practices places the stress on Al Qaeda's leadership as a core for organizational action. However, with "a core leadership constantly hunted, any communication or contact with them would increase their vulnerability and potentially compromise the security of operation as well" (Borum and Gelles 2005: 476), which necessitated moving operational decisions away from the core and into the field, laying ground for the increasing role of ideological and inspirational stance of the leading masterminds of the organization. Importantly, however, the far reaching connections and global inspiration of Al Qaeda the organization cannot be simply assigned a label of leaderless, as apparent increasingly throughout the literature (Sageman, 2008a, 2008b, Springer et al. 2009), but rather recognition of a spiritual leadership of the organization, the clear boundaries of the organizational structuring would consequently reach beyond the core organizational structure and become thereof complex and interrelated to the external environment of the organization. As an icon, bin Laden appeals to a large portion

of Muslim extremists located in remote parts of the world, constituting a symbolic presence and inspiration through reverence for his actions. Empirically, the effectiveness of Al Qaeda's leadership should be measured in respect of organizational influence embracing leaders' vision, strength and commitment to organizational cause, next to the traditional regard for leadership in terms of his/her competency in situational circumstances. The organizational structure of leadership of Al Qaeda provides increasingly for organization's extensive flexibility in face of new situations.

Hence contemporary Al Qaeda's leadership is relying on wider network to plan and execute operations with the support of its associate cells, groups and increasingly individuals, Al Qaeda's organizational existence in reference to its inspirational rather than coordinative leadership can be adequately presented with the organizational theory coined by Kerr and Jermier (1978) regarding the "substitutes for leadership." This theory, suggests that the organizational characteristics, such as formalization, group cohesiveness, inflexible rules and organizational rewards may become effective substitutes for leadership, providing for efficient explanation of the lack of impact of leadership upon subordinates in variety of situations (Miner, 2007: 169). According the substitutes for leadership theory, the substitution can manifest itself directly or indirectly, the former occurring when "subordinate is influenced by a leader behavior in and of itself," while the latter, when a "subordinate is influenced by the implications of the leader behavior for some future consequence" (Miner, 2007: 170).

Since the substitution of leadership occurs when organization encounters problems with ineffective or weak leadership, the notions of shared leadership may serve as a substitute for a formally recognized leadership. Building upon the substitute for leadership framework of Kerr and Jermier (1978), Manz and Sims (1980) identified a notion of self-management or self-leadership as identifiable notion of organizational existence. The theory of self-leadership assumes that “to the extent that subordinates are knowledgeable about organizational need, had appropriate skills for the task at hand and are motivated to engage in productive activity, self-leadership could alleviate the need for close supervision, direction and control” (Pearce and Conger, 2003: 11). Importantly, as Bass (1985) noted, the non-bureaucratic organizations are more likely to exhibit transformational behaviors of leaders in order to motivate the organization’s members to achieve organization’s objectives beyond expectation, and significantly appear as less institutionalized substitutes for leadership. In this context, Al Qaeda being essentially a network organization appears to stress the motivation and ideological stand contributing to the substitution for leadership in a greater extent.

In this respect, while the environmental complexity and uncertainly imposed on al Qaeda a transformation into essentially decentralized networked structure, allowing for self-recruited individuals to affiliate effortlessly with the organization, the clearly delineated organizational mission of al Qaeda, shared vision and objectives and ideological value system become credible substitutions for the

formal leadership exercised by Osama bin Laden and his respective colleagues in al Qaeda Central.

6.3.2. Al Qaeda's Spam of Control

The importance of evaluation of organizational structure of Al Qaeda lays precisely in its relation to organizational reliance on leadership structure and decision-making. Yet as Stojkovic et al (2003) illustrates, the leadership alone does not become a solemn delineator of the extent of organizational structure, particularly in circumstances of Al Qaeda's decentralized form extends its leadership across the organization and its affiliates. Further alluding to organizational structure Stojkovic et al. (2003: 6) identified a significance of organizational "spam of control" as significantly impinging upon and resulting from the organizational need for structural alignment. In respect of the leadership characteristics of Al Qaeda and bin Laden's spiritual influence, the organizational appears to have expanded since its existence in the pre-9/11 international environment. Bin Laden's decreased importance as a commander and coordinator (Corera, 2004), places Al Qaeda in a unique decentralization realm that represents an informal structure based on ideologue and propagandist activities, that permits for Al Qaeda's core leadership to engage solely with the alignment of strategic objectives leaving the decentralized local groups with autonomy to decide the time and place of the attacks. This division has been particularly apparent in the evaluation of structural consistency and components of Al Qaeda and defines the

organization's span of control as underlining pillar of its organizational structure.

One of the characteristic and expanding dimensions of today's al Qaeda is the organization's historic affiliation and association with variety of terrorist groups. Since, its establishment Al Qaeda has provided spiritual guidance and assistance in form of training, arms and fund to many terrorist and insurgent groups. "During his stay in Afghanistan, bin Laden strengthened the global reach of al Qaeda network, collaborating closely with terrorist groups in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Somalia, as well as the Balkans, the Caucasus, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, the Philippines and Kashmir," (Gurule, 2008: 36) groups, which remained in their capabilities "to undertake attacks on al Qaeda's behest or to provide essential local, logistical and other support to facilitate strikes by the al Qaeda "professional" [al Qaeda Central] cadre" (Hoffman, 2006: 286). On this account, the structure of Al Qaeda encompasses "loose-kit, semi-autonomous groups of Islamic fundamentalists, technologically tied together by global networks"(Aubrey, 2004: 152). Representing a *global Jihadist network* and embodying a highly diversified actors bound by shared ideological and political stands (Hegghammer, 2006: 15), Al Qaeda becomes an 'enclave' name for many independent, remote, collaborative and worldwide spread cells around the world linked by a common purpose (Grudzewski, et al. 2008 :208). Contemporarily, the anatomy of the radical Islamic network structure embraces highly connected hubs, divided into Central Stuff, Core Arab, Core Maghreb Arab and

South-east Asian (Sageman, 2004: 137). Figure 6. below, represents the approximation of current terrorist networks associated with the new-generation terrorist organizations.




Figure 6. Global Jihadist Network

The illustration of the current global Jihadist network exemplifies the elasticity and decentralization, with minimalistic hierarchy of organizational structure of the new-generation terrorism. Not only the visual complexity allows the audience to comprehend the loose composite of the current terrorist threat but also its practical dimensions necessitate a need to find effective measured countering the novel organizational structure of global terrorism.

Another organizational dimension of Al Qaeda's span of control embraces Al Qaeda Locals, individuals who "are likely to have had some previous terrorism experience, [and] will have been blooded in battle as part of some previous Jihadist campaign in Algeria, the Balkans, Chechnya and perhaps more recently in Iraq, and might have trained in some al Qaeda facility before 9/11" (Hoffman, 2006: 287). This dimension of Al Qaeda's organization includes the individuals in the environment outside of the actual organization, whose links with the Al Qaeda's core structure and underlining often proves to be tenuous or dormant rather than active and direct. Due to the previous linkage to the organization, the Al Qaeda Locals constitute an al Qaeda-inspired adversary, who experienced the organizational capability of the organization but remain essentially independent from the financial and other support from Al Qaeda Central (Hoffman, 2006: 287).

Importantly, Al Qaeda's newly emergent span of control comprises home-grown Islamic radicals, self-recruited wannabes from Middle East, Maghreb, Asia, and diaspora communities in Europe, who find purpose in terror and comrades on the Internet, without displaying any identifiable connection to al Qaeda Central or al Qaeda's affiliated groups. Marc Sageman (2008a: 39) noted that this new dimension of terrorist forms "fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained," have no physical headquarters and remain largely scattered and decentralized terrorist force managing its existence in the virtual environment of the Internet. According to Hoffman (2006: 287) exhibit the loosely

knit nature of the network of home-grown terrorist, they nevertheless display a preparedness “to carry out attacks in solidarity with or support of al Qaeda’s radical Jihadist agenda.” Displaying the primarily cohesive force as united ideological stand, and perhaps grievance and disappointment towards the Western states, and United States in particular the self-recruited dimension of al Qaeda is often referred to as leaderless (Sageman, 2008b). Hoffman (2006: 7) noted that structurally the home-grown force comprises “small cells of like-minded locals who gravitate toward the cell to plan and mount terrorist attacks completely independently of any direction provided by Al Qaeda.” As Springer et al. (2009: 108) noted, “under leaderless resistance scheme, individuals create small groups that engage in activity without central direction but follow a common inspiration that serves as their motivational ideal,” constituting for the structure of today’s Al Qaeda as an inner core entity of the multinational alliance of Jihadists. The emergent terrorist network organizations became increasingly amounted to a “set of diverse, dispersed cells who share a set of ideas and interests and who are arrayed to act in a fully internetted “all-channel” manner” (Arquilla and Ronfeld, 2001: 7).

Today, the presented network named al Qaeda, is characterized by the independent hubs seemingly operating relatively independent from one another, with sporadic trans-hub communications (Hegghammer, 2006: 15). Sivan (2003: 4) argues that the strength of this enclave “ensures a quality of status among members without hampering decision-making... [doing so by] promoting

charismatic local figures.” This fact contributes to the hampering of repression and endowment of members with a sense of empowerment and group solidarity (Sivan, 2003: 4). This structure significantly bespeaks of an element of shared valued and belief systems that is not merely that of a single individual or single hub embodied within the structure of al Qaeda but represents a phenomenon of a group of like-minded individuals and/or independent organizations that are highly dedicated to the normative bonds shared within the structure of al Qaeda. The most prominent example of those new phenomena include the Moroccan Islamic cell in Spain, which carried the March 2004 Madrid train bombings (Sageman, 2008a, 2008b). As Thornton (2005: 4) pointed out, “the bombing of a Madrid train by Al Qaeda in March 2004 shows that they are perfectly willing to conduct attacks against targets that are relatively minor in order to achieve their ends,” that is moving into a decentralized model that allows localized subgroups to exercise greater autonomy in decision-making and activities provides for Al Qaeda’s structural deviation from bureaucratic hierarchy with control of the underneath levels of activities.

To identify a comprehensive picture of Al Qaeda’s span of control, it is necessary to identify the structural boundaries and characteristic of the organization. Stojovic et al (2003: 27) identified that organizational hierarchical structure can be differentiated among flat and tall hierarchies, as graphically representative of with the horizontal and vertical organizational structure. The flat hierarchies are “organizations with few levels of command [that] typically exhibit wide spans of

control and most level” (Stojovic et al, 2003: 27), presenting typically a wide differentiation among departments. Al Qaeda’s structure in this respect appears to embrace the flat hierarchical alignment within its bounded organizational structure with relational connection to various dispersed networks, identified as tied to affiliated groups and sub-groups as well as home-grown terrorists as categories of organizational composition in respect to span of control. The graphical illustration in Figure 7 below, presents the alignment of Al Qaeda in respect of its hierarchical composition, level of authority and relation to its organizational components.




Figure 7. Al Qaeda’s Span of Control

Importantly, Figure 7. not only represents an extent of Al Qaeda’s control but also identifies Al Qaeda’s relationship and extent of influence on its constituent parts. Often Al Qaeda’s flat hierarchy and sometimes only symbolic connections to those claiming associations with the leadership provide for often labeling of Al Qaeda as a social movement. Contrary, the dotted line represents inspirational linkages, such as those linking Al Qaeda’s ideology and objectives. On the two

extremes of the scheme, home-grown terrorists and Madrid bombers represent the informally constructed affiliation with Al Qaeda's leadership through Al Qaeda's inspirational mobilization (Sageman, 2008a: 31). The two affiliates on the right, represent a direct but rather looser tie to Al Qaeda. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's and Abu Sayaf Group's connection to Al Qaeda's leadership is often identified as tenuous at best (Burke, 2003: 15-16), with a strong connection grounded in Al Qaeda's inspiration rather than direct coordination and support. The two centre groups on the left, however, present more direct links with Al Qaeda, such as organization's direct connection to Al Qaeda in Iraq. As Fishman (2006: 19) noted the connection between Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al Qaeda Central was established primarily through provision of tactical support, publicity and recruiting processes.⁴⁴ Equally, a direct connection between Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah Al Qaeda's regional affiliate creating a "radical splinter group with the nebulous southeast Asian network" (Burke, 2003: 265) responsible for Bali bombings of nightclub in 2002. Although in each examples, links to Al Qaeda's leadership prove to be looser than in strictly formal organizational design, Al Qaeda's strong ideological background and enables the organization to exercise extensive span of control through motivational inducement of change.

⁴⁴ Abu Musab Zarqawi agreed to join Al Qaeda in 2004, 18 months following U.S. invasion of Iraq establishing Al Qaeda in Iraq affiliated organization (Fishman, 2006: 21).

6.3.3. Communications and Recruitment

The historical examples of embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, as well as, the spectacular of September 11, 2001, presents sophistication and point undisputedly at the efficiency of secretive communications embodied in Al Qaeda's organizational structure. However, in face of the dismantlement and decentralization following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the organization has unaccustomedly transformed its communication patterns in order to meet the demands and challenges of external environmental setting for organizational survival. The primary aspect of communication within Al Qaeda, as presented above, reflects organization's adaptability characteristic, with the prioritization of downward communication of spiritual encouragement that through clarification of organizational mission provide direction to its followers. The communication network, however, at closer look proves to identify a complex organism, where the communication became increasingly facilitated with organization's re-formation into a horizontal communication structure, including both individual, affiliated groups and distinct organization with parallel ideological agendas.

Although Al Qaeda's ideology remains largely puritanical, the organization is essentially modern in respect of its recognition of the utility of modern technologies. Al Qaeda exploits up-to date technology relying on virtual activities regarding radical Islamists enhancing and succeeding in the communication efforts. Relying on Internet communication systems such as e-mails, chat rooms, encrypted

communication websites, Al Qaeda's truly global reach was exemplified enabling the organization to engage in sheer range of activities and construct ambitions. The estimated number of terrorist websites that advocate or incite forms of political and religious violence has risen to approximately 4,700 to date (Ariza, 2006: 19). With the ideologically strengthened incentives for violence in face of the ongoing political conflicts, the radicals are presented with a possibility to facilitated communication through the Internet, resorting to the means of virtual communication in an attempt to spread the message. Provided with an explicit information and easier means of communication, Al Qaeda essentially strengthened the pillars of its network by provision of flexibility and survivability of the organization. Sageman (2008b: 115) noted that interpersonal relationships that were developed and sustained by written means of communication differed from those dependent on oral means of communication, making people more introspective." Human relations within the organizational structure transform faster and to an ever-greater degree since the information revolution took its path.

Significantly, it was the utilization of the virtual space and connectivity that enabled the autonomous attackers of Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, where "the open anarchic structure of the Internet support[ed] this chaotic dynamics modus operandi as a way for militants to recruit new members and look for goals and inspiration" (Ariza, 2006: 19). The three attacks as examples of "a new form of terrorist attack ... undertaken by much more locally rooted Jihadis, acting in tighter 'home-grown' groups, with loose and difficult-to-trace

ties to the on-the-run Al Qaeda leadership” (Cruickshank and Ali, 2007: 2), significantly enabled international community to become acquainted with communication patterns of Jihadist terrorists. The responsibility of Bali bombing on October 12, 2002 was assigned to Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamist group led by radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, who is believed to be a close associate of Osama bin Laden. The attackers in Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004 had connections with several leading European jihadis including members of the Moroccan Fighting Group inspired by Al Qaeda’s constituent past, and with significant financial aid from Abu Qatada, the spiritual leader of al Zarqawi’s terrorist group. The suicide London bombings on July 7, 2005 were initially reported to be linked to Al Qaeda through the leader Mohammed Siddique Khan⁴⁵ with operatives associated with the organization and Al Qaeda’s confirmation of responsibility (Cruickshank and Ali, 2007: 10). Importantly, the abovementioned terrorist cells in prototype belonging to Al Qaeda’s Jihadist network were formed autonomously and connected to the core organization in common purpose and assistance to transform it into acts of terror. Importantly, both elements of Al Qaeda organization “unhindered by bureaucratic inertia and unchallenged Western governments, have recognized their operations to take advantage of the Internet’s prosaic properties” (Kohlmann, 2006: 115).

Technology enabled Al Qaeda to provide a general guidance to the participants in the absence of physical command and control found in traditional

⁴⁵ Mohammed Siddique Khan was filmed in an Al Qaeda video production.

bureaucratic organizations. As Stepanova (2008: 133) noted, "Al Qaeda, in fact, is unique among all terrorist groups in this respect, from the start its leadership seems to have intuitively grasped the enormous communicative potential of the Internet and sought to harness this power both to further the movement's strategic aims and to facilitate its tactical operations." In this respect, while Internet allows the organizational leadership to transform its strategic vision into a virtual space, the Web provides operational and tactical cells with necessary information concerning recruitment potential, availability of resources and knowledge of infrastructure, weaponry etc. As Kohlmann (2006: 117) reminds, "terrorist groups also regularly distribute videos online explaining how to make rockets, improvised explosive devices and even crude chemical weapons."

Al Qaeda's loss of physical base extended the organizational communication into a virtual space, allowing Al Qaeda a successful transition into effective communication and recruiting system that proves to be difficult to defeat and disrupt by the law enforcement authorities around the world. As mentioned above, the primary function of the Internet is to provide an access to training manuals and handbooks to Jihadists around the world. However, significantly, the other function of Internet is to "provide an interactive environment where people can discuss training-related issues, exchange personal experiences and communicate with online 'trainers' who can explain and clarify problematic subjects" (Sternersen, 2008: 3). For instance, the volume on intelligence and security

contained in the Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad, Al Qaeda's Training Manual or Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants.

Given the long-established sophistication of the organization's propaganda methods and use of Internet, the organization's choreography and dissemination opportunities for reaching masses is likely to get across the organization's message and provide its recruitment value (Hoffman, 2003: 5). Al Qaeda's operational successes of the past have enhanced organization's pool of recruits, with technological underpinnings playing an equally important role as in communication mechanisms. Al Qaeda's uses websites for indoctrination and declarations, chat-rooms for ignition of personal attitudes towards certain direction and recruitment videos openly extolling virtues of martyrdom, solicit new recruits into Al Qaeda's cause. Al Qaeda uses Internet in order to recruit through creation of social networks, indoctrination and propaganda.

Within the context of a social network, Al Qaeda's recruitment appears to be qualitative in nature, not quantitative that enables the routes of recruitment to follow social contacts and trusted individuals, who serve as a role of linking the targeted population and the group. Al Qaeda's recruitment aims at the personal engagement of an individual in the struggle ensured of Al Qaeda's ability to carry out the struggle. Borum and Gelles (2005: 480) note that "recruiting enhancements have increased the size and quality of jihadists who might be mobilized to participate in an attack." Al Qaeda's virtual means of recruitment and

training not only encourages individuals to join jihad but significantly encourages formation of small cells as parts of the Al Qaeda diasporas. Milward and Rabb (2006) note that “experts are converging on a view that at the operational level the network consists of cells of a few individuals who are recruited by a cell builder, who recruits activates and the leaves. Form the on, contact with Al Qaeda is through the Internet.” In this means, technology again provides a mean of substitution for hierarchical structure, as Al Qaeda’s terrorism became largely conducted on a self-recruitment basis.

The indoctrination and propaganda of Al Qaeda is conducted primarily through websites that present organization’s unremitting recruitment, communicative and morale-strengthening efforts. The websites⁴⁶ usually put forward a strong anti-American and anti-Western stand, with the image of the West as hostile to Islam and call for the necessity of jihad as the only mean through which the West could be defeated. A detailed elaboration of jihad strengthened by appeals to individual’s values concerning issues of personal commitment to the duties dictated by the religion, provides a strong incentive to a wide range of individuals visiting the websites and affected by the political situation in the world (Hoffman, 2006: 226). A widespread availability of the sophisticated and inexpensive communication technologies, therefore, enables Al Qaeda to target the sympathizing audiences.

⁴⁶ The first and one of the most prominent Al Qaeda website was www.alneda.com and served as a source of news and information over which the movement exercised its indoctrination and propaganda.

A careful examination of communications, recruitment and leadership would provide for a comprehensive inclusiveness of organizational constituency of Al Qaeda today. Significantly, as much attention as is contemporarily given to the external horizontal structure, linking a number of terrorist organizations, the internal structural underlining of Al Qaeda, should not be dismissed merely for its integration into an extended form. The structure of Al Qaeda fashioned by bin Laden, thus should be portrayed in respect of different realms of functionality, not merely as a name for network encompassing different fundamental Islamic terrorist organizations organized into cells, but also as an organization with structural underlining allowing for the management and coordination of “distinct recruitment, training and indoctrination divisions, operationally adopting a horizontal structure that mirrors the top Fortune 500 companies”⁴⁷ (Aubrey, 2004: 152).

The lack of physical base contributed significantly to the undermined position of centralized decision-making body and the gradual de-stratification of the hierarchy of authority. Al Qaeda with the loss of external base, lost the privilege to exercise essentially a strict centralized control over the subordinate cells. Significantly, majority of descriptions of a home-grown terrorist phenomena associated with Al Qaeda point at the decentralized and inspirational attributes of the adversary. In fact, the decentralization points to the reality of diminished influence

⁴⁷ Fortune 500 is an annual ranking list of the top 500 largest corporations compiled by Fortune magazine. Aubrey attempts to make an analogy between the network structure of Al Qaeda to increasingly apparent network structures of economic enterprises.

of Al Qaeda Central and increasing self-defining of targets, attack methods etc. Importantly, however, the often-mentioned leaderless nature of the new dimension of Al Qaeda, and reference to the common ideological stand of self-recruited elements increasingly become referent to Al Qaeda as a social movement rather than an actual organization. However, as Stepanova (2008: 132) noted Al Qaeda's "go beyond those of standard modern anti-system network that, for instance, characterize the anti-globalist movements," and the structural elements of al Qaeda delineated by Hoffman (2006: 285) point at the fact that Al Qaeda "retains some important characteristics and aspects of a more organized entity, mixing and matching organizational and operational styles as dictated by particular missions or imposed by circumstances." Strengthened with the new organizational structure operating within a realm of collective belief system, the global lengthening of Al Qaeda and not only constitutes a novel form of organizations but importantly becomes a model for organization of political violence for the next generations of terrorists. The following chapter attempts to bring the reader closer to the premises of cognitive theories and identify the structural influences on decision-making in a manner consistent with the spirit of the operational code analysis.

CHAPTER VII

SUBSUMING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE INTO OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS

In order to advance the analysis further it is important to understand in full the theories of decision-making as they appear prevalently within fields of policy analysis and organizational theory. The primary purpose of this chapter, thus, is to present a preliminary formulation of analytical scheme, that would serve as a frame of reference for the study of operational code within decision-making paradigm. In face of theoretical requirements for subsuming prepositions about organizational structure into operational code analysis, it is particularly important to distinguish a role of organizational structure for decision-making against the background of the theories on cognition. In this manner, through the specific focus upon the premises of cognition-based approach to decision-making a further problematic on the influences of beliefs about organizational structure can be identified. This scheme may be of sufficient substance and clarity to permit further investigations of operational code analysis in a manner that would constructively provide means for understanding of political actors' behavior and

motivations. This is intended to suggest in a general way the nature of operational code analysis that is subjected to the reversionary inquiry of this thesis.

7.1. Cognitive Approach to Decision-Making as Frame of Reference

In order to address the notion of decision-making from the perspective of operational code analysis it is important to describe and explain through providing definitions, categorizations and assignment of properties to the observed phenomena. This is to categorize selected phenomenon within the framework of particular field of interest in a larger intellectual context. Therefore, decision-making in the context of international politics as an object of inquiry needs analysts' attention to its properties as a social phenomenon, concerned specifically with the political behavior in certain instances. Delineating clear boundaries for decision-making studies constitutes for means of requirement as a prior condition for establishing a meaningful connection with related academic disciplines at large. This is to establish an organizing principle that would serve as a coherent frame of reference that ought to put the analysts on the *qui vive* to possible inconsistencies of purposes (Snyder et al. 1962: 28). Different intellectual operations concerning the problematic in question may result in different understandings of the subject inquired; thus while some frames of reference may accommodate for more comprehensive approach, other will not. It is important to point to the fact that the evaluation of decision-making process may not correspond to the attempt to portray the world of decision-maker as it is perceived by him or her.

In this respect, it is necessary to account for the fundamental aspect of the field of decision-making, namely the concepts of *objective* and *subjective* realities. The fundamental distinction between the two postulations is embodied in two preliminary conceptualizations:

- I. Whether the decision-makers address perceives the reality objectively; that is independent of decision-makers' perceptions; and that can be described by the analysts as *real* social world, or
- II. Whether, the decision-makers address themselves to the subjective reality; that is represents merely his/hers image of the world; and that constitutes a social system in terms of which human behavior can be explained.

In this manner, assuming an objective reality would merely set "limits to what can happen when the decision is executed" while assuming subjective reality would delegate a frame of reference "to which an individual defined choices and makes decisions" (Sprout and Sprout, 1957: 314). However, assuming that the world is single and coherent within which an analyst interprets the decision-making can underestimate the role of the way in which the decision-makers perceives the problem or the situation. Although acknowledging the fact that there might be a set of objective factors that can affect the behavior of decision-makers, whether they realize it or not; the frame of reference of this thesis focuses upon

the notion of multiple realities in which *there is no objective reality* shared in all respects among decision-makers. The decision-makers perceive and construct images of the world through which they define situations. Relating this conceptualization into the primary focus of inquiry in this thesis, Snyder et al. (1962: 30) observed that:

Anything the participants ignore is not a part of the situation, though any subjective efforts the participants make are... an objective situation is recreated by the observer on the basis of what the participants tell him *plus* what he knows which they do not. In the other case, the situation is recreated on the basis of how the participants each define it.

Within this thesis, recognizing importance of decision-makers' (shared) perceptions upon the political behavior shifts the focus of reference into a cognitive realm. The non-cognitive aspects of factors affecting decision-making will not be evaluated in this thesis *per se*, although a preliminary review of literature addressing this subject will be provided. To initiate a designed discourse, focusing upon cognitive aspects of decision-making, it is important to identify in detail the nature and limitation of subjectivity as it presents itself to the decision processes of a political actor.

7.2. Prevalent Approaches to Organizational Decision-Making

The underlying assumption of prevalent approaches to organizational decision-making is the recognition of the limitations upon decision-making observed through propensities of the actor (the decision-making unit) and the properties of the system (organizational structure and processes). The first premise underlines subjective perceptions and interpretations of the decision-making reality in the

light of past experience (Sprout and Sprout, 1957). It is due course of decision-making processes that these perceptions are afterwards applied rationally in choosing objectives and formulating means for their achievements. The second limitation as “traceable to organizational pathology suggest that decision-making can be constrained from the system” (Snyder et al. 1962: 103). Although it may appear as though the limitations in the setting (structure and processes) are objective to the decision-maker it cannot be over-emphasized that the estimates of such limitations by the analysts and by decision-makers themselves may not be identical. Snyder et al (1962: 101) observed that “for the most of the part the decision-makers do not confront external limitations directly on a personal, face-to-face basis, so to speak. Rather their perceptions and judgments result from their participation in a decision-making system.” The focus upon subjectivity of decision-making as a focus of this chapter, thus, conforms to the requirements for further progress of the inquiry. The most influential work that has been felt far beyond the study of decision-making was the Allison’s *Essence of Decision Making* (1971), which’s preliminary purpose was to chart a course for others to follow.

7.2.1. Rational-Actor, Organizational and Governmental Politics Models of Decision-Making – Allison (1971)

Allison (1971) offers three conceptual models that since have become the dominant frame of reference most analysts of decision-making processes use: the Rational Actor (Model I); Organizational (Model II); Governmental Politics (Model III) models of decision-making. Allison (1971) conceived these three

paradigms as alternative approaches for analyzing decision-making in that they emphasize different forces operating at the stages of decision-making namely formation, choice and implementation.

Model I conceives that a decision-maker is a unitary and purposive actor that approaches the problem of decision-making in consistent and value-maximizing manner (Allison, 1971: 30). Allison's (1971) Model I is similar to the models developed by Lindblom (1959) and Simon (1972) and it describes decision-making process of setting objectives, designing options, examining consequences and choosing the option that maximizes the value of the outcome (Allison, 1971: 24). Allison (1971) contends that in general foreign policy analysts utilize Model I in order to draw attention to the evaluation whether the actor followed the best strategy or whether the decision-maker deviated from the course of a rational approach. The rational approach of the political actor, according to Allison (1971: 18) is in itself constrained by the subjectivity of perceptions of the actor, a notion addressed in Allison's study as a *bounded rationality*.

Despite of the acknowledgement of the prevalence of Model I in analysis of decision-making, Allison (1971: 254) noted that:

We [the analysts] are forced to recognize that in treating happenings as actions, and national governments as unitary purposive actors, we are 'modeling.' The fact that the assumptions and categories of this model neglect important factors such as organizational processes and bureaucratic politics suggests that the model is inadequate.

Allison's (1972) primary assumption rests upon the conclusion of Model I has to be supplanted by the findings from Model II and Model III. The crucial aspect in which Model II represents a revision of Model I is that organizational routines constrain decision-making behavior. On this account, Welsh (2001: 117) importantly noted that “

Model II does not operate at the moment of decision; rather it explains deviations from ideal rationality at the moment of decision by highlighting the ways in which organizational routines constrain *formation of options*, and it explains deviations from perfect instrumentality after decisions are made by revealing how routines affect implementation.

In a similar manner, Model III supplants both, Model I and Model II, by stressing that decision-making results from “negotiating and sparring among the main actors” (Bernstein, 2000: 140). Model III diverts analyst's attention to the fact that the decision-making unit is not a monolithic or unitary actor and thus decision-makers within the unit, approach decisions “not by a single rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics” (Allison, 1971: 144). Welsh (2001: 118) argued that “Model III does not suppose that the individual players behave irrationally in the games in which they participate, merely that the net effect of those games is to deflect [decision-making] behavior from the course that would have been chosen by a unitary rational actor.” This is to divert the attention of the analyst from assumption that premises governing decision-making in organization are essentially dissimilar to the decision-making of lone individuals.

Allison's (1971: 400) conception of "lenses" through which an analyst can approach decision-making allowed researchers to fragment and thus observe selectively and derive precise conclusions decision-making reality. Depending upon the chosen theory, the analysts were given a chance to focus upon specified assumptions for rigorous inquiry. However, how to converge the conclusions of these three theory-driven models was not explicitly addressed by Allison (1971) and thus can be opened to question.

As the frame of reference for this thesis necessitates the inquiry into cognitive limitations upon decision-making, Allison's (1971) Model I would present the closest resemblance to the purpose of this thesis.⁴⁸ In this respect, it is important to further specify the underlining premises behind the Model I paradigm, as it was presented by Allison (1971) and proceed to address how the organizational setting, as embraced in Models II and III, can be converged into Model I. For that, it is important to conceptualize in detail Allison's (1971) referral to cognitive limits bounding rationality of the actor.

7.2.2. Cognitive Limits On Decision-Making

Traditional theory of rational choice, prominently presented by Mach and Simon (1958: 137-138) assumes that in the decision-making situation, the decision-makers face set of *given* alternatives from which the action is chosen.

⁴⁸ This thesis does not aim to adopt Allison's (1971) Model I as a framework for analysis; rather it aims to identify the notion of *bounded rationality* against the framework of Model I for the better understanding of the concepts in further analysis. It is essential to note that Allison's (1971) conceptualization did not address in detail the implications of bounded rationality for collective actors, which is a primary focus of this thesis.

Consequently, each of these alternatives becomes associated with a number of consequences in a manner that prescribe events, which will occur if that particular choice is taken. At the outset, the decision-maker engages in a “preference-ordering” that “ranks all sets of alternatives from the most preferred to the least preferred” (March and Simon, 1958: 137). However, as the notion of the rationality in objective terms would necessitate a reality in which options, consequences attached, and utilities for decision-making exist independently of the perceptions of decision-maker, it is necessary to account for rationality to exist within a frame of reference that is relative to decision-maker’s positioning both against the external environment and the setting of decision-making (Sprout and Sprout, 1957; March and Simon, 1958; Snyder et al. 1962). This frame of reference is determined by the limitations of the rational man’s knowledge that presuppose that all alternatives are not necessarily “given,” all consequences attached to each alternative are not necessarily “known” and that rational decision maker cannot hold an utility-ordering function for all possible sets of consequences (March and Simon, 1958: 137).

In this manner, the two primary prepositions concerning rationality would account for the reality of decision-making. The first preposition would indicate that the choice is always exercised with respect to a limited, approximate and simplified model of the situation embracing chooser’s *definition of the situation*. The second preposition would indicate that “elements of the situation are not ‘given’ but are themselves the outcome of psychological and sociological

processes including chooser's own activities and activities of others in his environment" (March and Simon, 1958: 12). These two preposition account for significant limitations on rational decision-making, as efforts achieving *pure rationality* are subjected to constrains that limit political actor's information about situations, his knowledge about end-means relationship which impinges upon the accurate prediction on the consequences attached to specific course of action, and consequently limit the judgment whether the choice of alternative becomes the best option (George, 1969: 197-198). These circumstances result from the very fact that "humans, whether inside or outside administrative organizations, behave rationally, if at all, only relative to some set of 'given' characteristic of situation" (March and Simon, 1958: 150). Through the knowledge of the "given's" an analyst can identify the situation as it appears to the decision-making actor, rather than specifying the objective reality, or situation as it appears to an outside analyst.

The abovementioned observations account for a notion of *bounded rationality*, which fundamentally "recognizes inescapable limitations of knowledge and computational ability of the agent," (Allison, 1971: 20). As March and Simon (1958: 151) observed the subjectivity of perceptions led to the conclusion that "for an actor [decision-makers] defining the situation in a particular way involves a complex interweaving of affective and cognitive processes." Cognition refers to people's understandings of their surroundings and the mind-sets, attitudes, beliefs, expectations and representative perceptions that form through their

experiences and acquaintance with the surrounding phenomena (Young and Schafer, 1998: 66). In this respect, focusing on the bounded rationality, an analyst does not merely assume that a comprehensive deduction of rational choice by an agent solemn information concerning agent's goals and objective characteristics of the situation are sufficient. Rather the analyst "must know the choosing organism's goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses" (Simon, 1985: 294). Upon these conditions, operational code analysis comes of significance, addressing in particular the means through which a decision-makers cope with cognitive limits to rational decision-making, as they become filters of the information received and communication distributed within the decision-making body. In order to advance the analysis further it is important to understand, however, the nature of the passage from individual to organizational cognitive limits on rationality.

7.3. Organizational Cognition

The search for explanation of how organizations think leads ultimately to the factors, which determine choices made by them. Organizational theorists have often moved "from theories of individual cognition and choice to theories of organizational cognition and choice" (March and Shapira, 1982: 11). As noted before, most of the organizations, however, are characterized by multiple interactions among individuals rather than independent action of a single decision-maker (March, 1997). Thus a question arises whether the psychological activity of

individuals can be expanded to the level of organizations. A number of psychologists have criticized the theories on organizational cognition on the grounds that it could not be studied with the same techniques as analysis of people's thinking and behavioral patterns (Weick, 1979). In the spirit of this differentiation, Walsh (1995) examined how organizational cognition is shaped through knowledge structures or schemas used by individuals. The argument stated that while thinking is a solemn property of individuals, the sources for developments of cognitive schemata and knowledge structures arise from environmental factors, such as organizational and social settings.

This theory gave a rise to subsequent studies on organizational cognitions: a shared cognitions perspective and top management cognition perspective. The former perspective holds that organizations think through the spectrum of shared beliefs and assumptions (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Dutton and Durkerich, 1991) as well as, through the common culture and values (Schein, 1985; Alvesson, 1995; 2002); while the latter perspective sees organizational cognition in terms of thinking processes of top managers (Fligstein, 1990; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The two presented perspectives, however, are bounded by problems apparent in organizational structuring. Whereas in certain organizations the first perspective would not account for decentralized nature of information processing (Radner, 1997); in other organizations, the second perspective would not adjudge the circumstances of highly diverse specialized units, groups

or individuals and thus importantly account for difference of opinion over organizational policies.

At this point of analysis, it is important to identify the difference of operational code beliefs in instances as indicative of shared beliefs of organizational incumbents and the notion of *organizational culture*. Although the definition of organizational culture has been a source of scholarly discourse, to understand the concept this thesis employs definition provided by Schein (1989: 278):

Organizational culture... is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration – a pattern of assumptions that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

Schein (1989: 279) further noted that organizational culture is about a “the problem of developing shared assumptions about the nature of the world in which it [any new group] exists, how to survive in it [the external environment] and how to manage and integrate internal relationships so it can operate effectively.” The question arises, what then differentiates operational code’s implicit assumptions of the operational code. To note the difference, it is important to recognize that operational code exists in much narrower actuality than organizational structure. Whether defined as “doctrinal” (Leites, 1953: 15), or indicated as embracing a “particularly significant portion of the actor’s entire set of beliefs about political life” (George, 1969: 197), operational code appears as much limited in conceptualization than organizational structure, as it embraces the political aspect of

organizational being solely. George (1969: 197), significantly noted on this account that operational code does not attempt to address decision-maker's ethical and normative beliefs, while organizational culture would embrace them not only in the context of ethics within politics (Schein, 1989: 281). Operational code, therefore, appears to be one of the constituents of organizational culture, yet cannot be in solemn correspondence to organizational culture itself.

The fundamental premises of studies on organizational cognition recognize that "it is meaningful to talk about an organization thinking in ways that cannot be reduced to the thinking of its individual member" (Ocasio, 2001: 41). The general approach taken by organizational scientists is not only to delineate how individuals in organizations think but also how individual cognition is situated in organizations, how definition of situation is structured through organizational processes and how cognition and definition of situation are driven by the political, social, economic and cultural circumstances surrounding organizational affairs (Ocasio, 1997). Thus, according to theories of organizational cognition, thinking in organizations becomes an amalgam of individual cognition, as well as, organizational structuring, organizational environment as they bear in turn upon individual perception of the situation. These theories of organizational cognition assume incorporation of Allison's (1971) Model II, as a variable constraining organizational cognition.

The abovementioned reference to organizational cognition through references to non-cognitive aspects of organizational structure influencing the shared cognition of individuals as incumbents of the organization are advocated through theories of choice situation and choice processes (March and Olsen, 1976), environmental enacting (Weick, 1979) and situated action and cognition (Ocasio, 1997). The central argument of March and Olsen (1976) identified that decision-making processes are concerned with choice situations (occasions for problem-solving and individual preferences as well as delegation of power), as well as, choice processes (occasions for executing standard operating procedures, role expectations, commitments to organizational goals, socialization processes). March and Olsen (1976: 259) stated:

We remain in the tradition of viewing organizational participants as problem-solvers and decision makers. However, we assume that individuals find themselves in a more complex, less stable, and less understood world than that described by standard theories of organizational choice; they are placed in a world they often have only modest control

Conversely, the fundamental characteristic of Weick's (1979) theory relies upon the idea of organizational enactment of its environment. Enacting becomes an output of organizing activities, which command the conduct of organizational actors by distributing the cognitive schemata of individuals on the objects of action.

Into the bargain, Cohen et al. (1972: 4) summarize that the elements of organizational structure influence outcomes of decision making by "affecting the time pattern of the arrival of problem choices, solutions, or decision makers..."

by determining the allocation of energy by potential participants in the decision, and... by establishing linkages among the various streams." In a similar manner, Ocasio (1997) links individual information processing and communication channels with attention on structural aligning, thus points out that organizations learn through noticing organizational decision-making, encoding, interpreting and focusing of time and effort on both issues and answers and embraces three elements: focus of information, situated attention and structural distribution of attention.

A more comprehensive account on the role of organizational structure and cognition in decision-making processes was provided by Steinbrunner (1974), who identified that information channels, personnel's background and level of organizational hierarchy significantly determine the *cognitive experiences* men will have in an organization. Steinbrunner (1974: 144) observed that natural information channels refer to the "information input for the decision-maker," personal background provides for the structure of memory, while level of organizational hierarchy determines "the range of decision problems which the decision-maker encounters" as well as "scope of those problems." Identifying that sources and channels of information flow are restrained by the limited information-processing capacity of real individuals, Steinbrunner (1974: 145) points out that they indispensably shape basic thinking processes. The decision makers starting point for these processes are uncertainty inherent in the decision-making space (Steinbrunner, 1974: 145).

The abovementioned theories specifically recognize the role of organizational structure as it bears effect on decision-making. Specifically to the attention of the reader comes the fact that organizational structure influences decision-making by affecting communication and information. The relationship between cognition and organizational can be summarized in the statement by Fredrickson (1986), who acknowledges that

Organization's structure imposes 'boundaries of rationality' that accommodate members' cognitive limitations. By delimiting responsibilities and communication channels, structure allows organization to achieve 'organizational rational outcomes' in spite of their members' cognitive limitations

This argument is also apparent in Bower's (1977: 287) observation that when decision-makers choose "a particular organization form, it is providing not only a framework for current operations but also the channels along which strategic information will flow. The prevalent approaches to organizational structure, thus assume the role of organizational structure in terms of the framework for operations. The approach in this thesis proposes to identify the premises of organizational structure as they appear in the context of shared beliefs of organizational members and decision-makers in particular as so the organizational structure enters the "systems for the organization of information, observation and thought in the process of individual and group problem-solving" (Bobbitt and Ford, 1980: 17).

7.3.1. Organizational Cognition in Non-State Terrorist Organizations

In general, researchers recognize that beliefs embraced within operational code construct are more likely to influence the decision-making particularly in situation of innovative, long-terms decision-making situations, decisions under ambiguous, complex and unanticipated conditions, decisions under stress; and decisions by individuals at the top of bureaucratic hierarchy (Holsti, 1976). Although this range of situation is sufficiently broad for state-actors, as it necessitates the researcher to reach beyond the knowledge of the situation into the attributes of the decision-making bodies, the problem occurs in respect of structurally more ambiguous non-state terrorist organizations. The nature of decision-making in non-state terrorist organizations, the very idea of *decision*, when it is made and who makes it have all turned out to be problematic (McCormick, 2003).

Leader's responsibility for shaping of organizational characters; infusing perceptions and generating a sense of distinctive competence of organizational structure among members must retain in high correlation to the perceptions of individual members of the organization. In fact, specifically for terrorist organizations, the interaction among constituent parts of the organization marshal into common purpose and objectives emanating from a sphere of strongly enforced shared principles, interests and goals that transverses all organizational parts to which individuals unequivocally subscribe. Within non-state terrorist organizations attempt to induce change so that individual organizational members' own

internal values and work preferences are brought in line with the organization's values and goals, reinforced essentially through the creation of strong collective identity within terrorist organizations. Post et al. (2003: 176) in their analysis of non-state terrorist organizations noted:

As an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making. As this occurs, individuals' measures of success become increasingly linked to the organization and stature and accomplishment within the organization. Subjects are unable to distinguish between personal goals and those of the organization.

As the dominant collective identity results in the reinforcement of the beliefs of the terrorist members regarding their organization and is further reinforced by the absence of competing belief structures tolerated within the organization. This increasing pressure for conformity and de-individualization results in a monolithic belief-system. Strong leadership clarifies boundaries within which employees exercise their own knowledge and discretion, when no mechanisms for formal control of action are established and the organization relies on shared values and trust among its members as mechanisms for controlling action. In this manner, what was originally the founder's individual view of the world leads to strongly reinforced shared perceptions among members of the organization. While individuals internalize the behavioral patterns, collective identity and subsequently perception for organizational goals, the new *character-within-structure*, emerges providing foundations for the circumstances subjected to operational code analysis.

7.4. Towards a New Frame of Reference for the Study of Decision-Making within Operational Code Analysis

Within the literatures on foreign policy decision-making and organizational behavior the postulates about organizational structure are described to pose non-cognitive constraints on rationality. The majority of researchers who study decision-making and organizational behavior tend to argue that organizational structure becomes predominantly important for decision-making in that it affects a content of decision-making “at the moment of decision by highlighting the ways in which organizational routines constrain the *formation of options*” (Welsh, 2001: 117). The general argument prevails that weight of the information input, and communication constraints on decision-makers tend to result from the structurally determined constraints on the range and scope of decision-problems which the decision-maker encounters.

This does not imply that the model of organizational decision-making necessarily rejects rationality – though some of its proponents mistakenly treat organizational influences as opposed to assumptions of rationality. Taking upon this point, the focus of this study attempts to transform premises about decision-makers’ perceptions of organizational structure as they blend into the concept of bounded rationality. Focusing on the notion of bounded rationality, an analyst does not merely assume that a comprehensive deduction of rational choice by an agent and solemn information concerning agent’s goals and objective characteristics of the situation are sufficient. Rather the analyst “must know the choosing

organism's goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses" (Simon, 1985: 294). Upon these conditions, operational code analysis comes of significance, addressing in particular the means through which a political actor copes with the boundaries to its rational conduct of decision-making. In this respect, whereas organizational structure is generally perceived in respect of "action as organizational output," the aim of this study is to construct a guide for systematic analysis of how beliefs about organizational structure affect the 'acts' and 'choices' of a rational actor. It is important to note that the framework for addressing cognition assumes organizational level of analysis, where cognition is perceived in respect of a shared belief system, and thus constitute a constrain upon rational choices of the decision-making in organizations. Thus, this study attempts to highlight the ways in which perceptions on organizational structure constrain both the formation of options (in cognitive terms) as well as decision-making performance at the moment of decision.

7.4.1. The Role of Perceptions on Organizational Setting⁴⁹ - Snyder et al. (1962)

As the primary purpose of operational code analysis is to identify why political actors behave as they do, it is important to determine factors which determine constrains upon the choices made by the decision-makers. The first assumption is

⁴⁹ Snyder et al. (1962: 72) identify that decision-making is affected by "combination of selectively relevant factors in the external and internal setting as interpreted by the decision-makers." Within the work of Snyder et al (1962) for most part the factors that lie in the "setting," understood as internal environment, were differentiated from factors that lie in the "environment" as it exists outside the decision-making unit

that decision-making needs to be regarded in organizational context, in respect of the rules, activities and relationships among the decision-makers. Complementary to that assumption are three major determinants of action in decision-system, as identified by Snyder et al (1962: 105), and they are: competence, communications and information and motivation. For the purpose of this thesis, the factor that decisively affects the nature of operational code beliefs is the *competence*, as it directs the attention at the propensity of decision-makers in cognitive terms (Snyder et al. 1962: 106-124) in contrast to communication and information determinants that embrace non-cognitive propensities of the system (Snyder et al 1962: 124-137), and motivation aspect that address psychological propensities of decision-maker (Snyder et al. 1962: 137-171).

The *competence* as defined by Snyder et al. (1962: 106) refers to “the totality of those of the activities of the decision-maker relevant and necessary to the achievement of the organizational objective.” The concept in itself does not reflect a direct linkage to the cognitive aspect of decision-making; therefore a detailed inquiry is necessary to be presented, in particular consideration of the point of view of decision-making actor. Since the definition highlights the process of decision-making rather than decision itself, it is important to perceive decision-makers’ competence through set of rules guiding the relationship of the actor to the other actors in the system, whether explicitly prescribed or implicitly accepted by that actor. Snyder et al (1962: 107) noted that “the rules guiding the activities that constitute the actor’s competence are subject to interpretation by

the actor.” This point is essential in the consideration of the delineation of the nature of the patterns of action within the organization as:

- I. **Prescribed Patterns of Action.** In circumstances when explicit rules of the organization determine the pattern of decision-making activities, an analyst can predict with a high degree of probability decision-makers’ behavior given the availability of information on the framework within which the decision-makers operate, such as structure of authority, information flows, division of labor etc. (Snyder et al, 1962: 107).

- II. **Conventional Patterns of Action.** As no organization can be planned *a priori*, “the planned or explicitly prescribed structure of the organization is supplemented over a period of time by patterns of action established and sanctioned by precedent, habitual ways of doing things” (Snyder et al. 1962: 108).⁵⁰

The two identifiable patterns of action represent a formalization aspect of organizational structure as they represent a guideline for a decision-making behavior. The importance of formalization for the totality of organizational structure is particularly significant as it identifies the criteria for other structural dimensions,

⁵⁰ Snyder et al (1962: 108) explicitly note that organizational structures that are essentially “informal” are characterized primarily through conventional patterns of action, which are necessary for the achievement of formal goals but not explicitly stated in formal writings of the organization.

such as complexity and centralization. The question arises at this point where does cognition enter into the consideration of the dimensions organizational structure? Snyder et al (1962: 109) provide an answer to that question by stating that an analyst “must consider not only the kinds of activities comprising it [the decision system], but also the way in which the actor interprets the rules relating to these activities.” At the centre of this argument lies an assumption, stated by Stebbins (1976: 149) that “the basic feature of the situation for any individual is how it will affect his orientations, for it is in these terms that certain situational elements become meaningful. These elements are selected out of the objective situation to become part of the subjective situation.” In this manner, in respect of organizational decision-making, it would be the perceptions on organizational structure, that describing the situational setting, would filter the information and communication patterns and allow the decision-makers to bypass existent constraints represented by the propensities of the system.

7.4.2. Management Styles and Models – George (1980)

Although George’s (1969, 1979) prominence in strengthening of operational code approach is indisputable, it was in his work entitled *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy* (1980) where George acknowledged the perceptions on structuring of decision-systems. In the chapter entitled *Presidential Management Styles and Models*, George (1980: 145-168) discovers that presidents often reorganize of decision-making agencies according to the needs each individual feels to be necessary for effective coordination of decision-making processes. George

(1980: 146) noted: “each president is likely to define his role in foreign-policy-making somewhat differently and to approach it with a different decision-making and management style.” The individual leader’s learning process in respect of the latter defining of his role in decision-making system, becomes the initiative step in consequent structuring of the system in practice. And this becomes the significant aspect of George’s (1980) theory. George (1980) identifies that management styles result from a *cognitive style, sense of efficacy and competence and orientation toward political conflict* of decision-maker. The first component refers to “preferred ways of acquiring information from those around him and making use of that information, and to his [the decision-maker’s] preferences regarding advisers and ways of using them in making his decisions” (George, 1980: 147). The second component relates to management and decision-making tasks inclusive of “types of skills that he [the decision-maker] possesses and the types of tasks that he feels particularly adept at doing and those that he feels poorly equipped to do” (George, 1980: 148). The last component relates to the attitudes the decision-maker holds “toward interpersonal conflict over policy among his advisers” (George, 1980: 148).

While George’s (1980) theory appears elegant for operational code analysis, the author himself failed to incorporate the individual leader’s perceptions on his/ her decision-making system into the operational code approach. Although George’s (1980) model focuses primarily on managerial styles of individual decision-makers, thus, employing individual level of analysis, important

observations need to follow from George's (1980) acknowledgment of the role of structuring of decision-systems. Furthermore, if incorporated this model would serve not only as a mean for understanding decision-making of organizations *per se*, but would also constitute for greater anticipatory power in utilization of operational code for individual leaders.

7.4.3. The Organizational Structure Through Bounded Rationality

As the notion of boundaries upon rationality of collective actors assumes that decision-makers in organizations essentially approach the *process* of the decision-making through *shared perceptions* of organizational structure rather than deals with the *structure per se*. That is to say, at any given time there is a significant amount of interaction between the decision-makers and their competences stemming from structural alignment of relationships. Snyder et al. (1962: 113) importantly noted:

Any effort in the direction of scientific analysis assumes *ex hypothesi* that the universe being treated is an ordered one, that there are no random elements in any absolute sense. The assumption of order does not, however, carry with it any implication of omniscience on the part of the observer, nor does it require that the model of the actor omit the possibility of his making choices.

In the consideration of the above, since the decision-makers' choices may be concerned with the organizational structure, or at minimum may have consequences for at least one of the structural dimensions, the capacity to elucidate decision-makers' shared perceptions would seem to be required.

The perceptions on organizational structure, however, are to be identified in consideration of the limits of decision-makers' shared interpretation. The problem occurs when the decision-makers are given the possibility to unanimously interpret the organizational structure at its greatest latitude, in which the "organizational system would cease to exist or change into another unit because the authority relationships and the patterns of communication would be so altered that another type of unit would come into existence" (Snyder et al. 1962: 114). This statement identifies an important aspect of the role of shared perceptions of political decision-makers in respect of the organizational structure, as it exists within the framework of objectified reality. When the shared perceptions of the decision-makers change, the primary forces come into the existence recognizing the necessity for aligning organizational structure with the environment, which ignite the change in the beliefs. In this respect, the shared perceptions of decision-makers become primarily concerned with identifying a route diverting, avoiding or circumventing a problem that appears within the organizational environment or internal conjunctures.

Focusing upon the definition of the situation as the decision-makers define it, Britton (1973: 101) suggested that it embraces a "kind of shorthand summary of all the internal processes mediating between the impinging of situational stimuli and the selection and evocation of responsible lines of action." It is that evocation that points to the fundamental fact that the nature of reality for political actor is grounded within the subjectivity of perceptions, including the saliency of the

role-identities the political actor brings into play in the situation. As the level of analysis in this study is organizational, the state of the organization becomes a compound of symbolic and effective sets, which together combine to give the organization its composition characteristics. Structuring becomes as one of those variables. To conclude it is essential to note that the organizational activity consists of a meeting a flow of situations in which the organization has to act, and that its action is build on the basis of what it noted, how it assesses and interprets what is noted. This is to note, conversely to prevalent theories of organizational decision-making, that organizational structure leads the organization towards the direction of behavior rather than constitutes merely a tendency, which is supposed to casually push the organization to actions.

7.4.4. Possible Advantages of the Present Scheme

The alternative approach for inclusion of premises about organizational structure within operational code analysis is designed to be more inclusive of cognitive variables having significant implications upon the decision-making processes. It attempts to include a sole variable of beliefs about organizational structure for the operational code and to provide cues for the identification of key variables or factors, which serve as a representation of these beliefs within the conceptual framework of the operational code. Adopting cognitive-structural analysis makes it possible to emphasize that decision-making behavior is purposive without assuming the deterministic nature of the process. Simply, the decision-makers in organizations are viewed as operating in relation to dual

considerations: one that accounts for conceptions of their relationship with the outside world and another that establishes their conceptions for the action as it is governed from within the bounds of their organization in general and decision-making unit in particular. In this manner apparently unrelated internal and external realms become related in the actions of the decision-makers.

It is, therefore, suggested in this thesis that the role of cognition in decision-making can be clarified by inquiry into interpretation of rules governing the paths of action for as well as propensities of the decision-maker. Operational code analysis as a methodologically sound approach if complemented with the premises about organizational structure appears to represent a sound technique for the examination of how relations among values, strategies and particular aspects of organizational setting are established by the decision-makers.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF OPERATIONAL CODE

The foundation for the projected operational code was essentially built upon Leites' (1951, 1953) original accountancy of cognitive premises concerning organizational structure and methodological soundness of applied unit of analysis embodied in, what George (1969: 196) have defined a "tightly knit set of beliefs about fundamental issues and questions associated with the classical problem of political action." The proposed revision of operational code analysis, thereof, is structured to include five questions, "answers" to which provide for efficient accountancy for structural beliefs analogous to the ten-question construct of George (1969). The structural content of an operational code analysis refers to the identification of beliefs about organizational structure, as they are, for the purpose of preliminary inquiry extracted from the available writings, statements and declarations of Al Qaeda's most prominent ideologists and strategic thinkers.⁵¹

⁵¹ The primary sources include contemporary writings of Al Qaeda's ideological thinkers among all Azzam and al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda's strategic thinkers among all Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji, as well as, historical writings of ideological thinkers influencing Al Qaeda's ideology such as Sayd Qutb.

It is of outmost importance to note that the proposed additional codification of the research approach on operational code does not encourage future researchers to provide the exact answers to the questions and to solemnly delineate the structural foundation of a studied organization, but to recognize its political implications and dimensions of the structure upon which the conceptions of political strategy are formed. That is to say, the factual representation of the structural context can be extracted from primary sources on Al Qaeda, while presenting it within the construct of operational code methodology requires for an insightful inquiry examining on how does the structure presents itself of importance to the rules of conduct within an organization and upon the shared beliefs of its members.

8.1. The Structural Query of an Operational Code Construct

The indirect influence of operational code belief system upon decision-making can be identified through analysis of information-processing tasks that pave the way and accompany the decision-maker's choice of action (George, 1979). Depicting information-processing tasks in standard terminology are characterized in substantive terms and embrace fundamentally the "definition of the situation," and "option-development;" in a corresponding manner, the functional classification of information-processing tasks identifies the search, evaluation and choice phrases of decision-making (George, 1979: 101).⁵² In the face of

⁵² Within the literature on strategic decision-making, Minzberg et al (1976) anatomize strategic decision-making into three central phases (identification, development and selection), three supportive routines (decision-control, decision-communication and political) and six dynamic factors

above considerations, what emerges is the evaluation of structural content of operational code in respect of their utility in information-processing tasks, constituting an evidence for their effect on decision-making within cognitive framework.

Due to the profound effect of the abovementioned structural dimension on strategic decision-making, the structural query needs to be inclusive of their consideration. Questions II, III embrace the centralization and formalization aspects of organizational structure respectively while questions IV and V of the query relegate the separate attention on the complexity dimension of organizational structure. An additional question for the query (Question I) is formed addressing the communication element among the constituent parts of the organization, with the particular focus upon the element of information.

Question I - How are information flows into and within organization controlled most efficiently? What is the degree of desirable openness or secrecy vis a vis the external environment?

Theme: Availability of specific modes of communication and information channels presents a capability to determine, in large part, the way in which decision-making functions and/or is distributed throughout the organization for effective achievement of desired objectives (Simon, 1976). Elements of the

(interrupts, scheduling delays, feedback delays, timing delays and speedups and comprehension cycles). Due to the fact, however, that this composition of strategic decision-making is not provided in the light of information-processing per se, the model will not be utilized for the purpose of this thesis.

information control in structural terms are reflected in the differences in the structure of organizational units providing for greater security of information. Establishments of minimal or easy connections with other parts of the network constitute for the primary attribute of this question. The general image of the dependency upon secrecy encourages the actor to define situations of inter-organizational and outer-organizational relations as a mean for achievement of security or, in extreme cases, survival. At every opportunity an organization would prioritize the efforts to conceal the whereabouts, activities and detailed responsibilities of the members of the organization. Encountering discrepant information that challenges a belief concerning secrecy would be dismissed as lacking conformity with the formal goal of the organization. This notion would primarily result from the fact that the achievement of a formal objective would necessitate the organization to display efficiency and effectiveness of their strategies. Contradicting the fundamental aspect of the belief that secrecy is necessary would relegate the conflicting information to the consideration of counter-efficiency and counter-effective strategic delineations, particularly when the organization depends upon secrecy for survival.

Definition of Situation: The particular definition of a new situation formulated by decision-makers may come influent into decision-makers' response to that situation. This is due to the fact that this definition bares significance upon elimination or favoring of certain action stemming from decision-making considerations in respect of perceived availability of options. The presented assumption

is that decision-makers' shared attitudes towards openness or secrecy is particularly important in shaping the definition of situation particularly in respect of the assessment of threats and opportunities available within its environmental setting.

A general perception of a need for rigorous control of information as requiring fundamentally secure organizational setting, both directed internally and externally, prompts the decision-makers' to define situation of interaction with external environment and other incumbents of the organization as potential of posing survival-threatening circumstances. This is due to the fact that ambiguities and uncertainties stemming from the environmental setting are essentially perceived as threatening; thus among the decision-making stimuli, the actor would prioritize the perceptions of threat to those of opportunities. This is not to say that opportunistic behavior would not be present; rather until the decision-makers would not structurally secure the organizational setting, the perceived necessity for countering threats would either take primacy, or attempt to offset the threat through aggressive opportunity search.

Option-Development: An actor's operational code structural belief concerning control of information also influences the focus and extent of the search and evaluation aspects of information processing. Thus if the decision-makers share a view concerning high level of security as a prerequisite for organizational action, it is likely that they will engage in more extensive research for opportunities.

This view, conversely, raises the likelihood that the organization can compromise its pursuit of objectives through innovative means that cannot be detected with the security mechanisms of its opponents, proving the organization with a possibility that causes the organization to respond to opportunities and depends the search for them in the environment.

Choice: In addition to the diagnostic propensities of decision-maker's in accordance with the rigid control of the information, operational code belief system can also introduce inclinations towards certain choices into information processing. Choice can be affected by the shared belief in the need for covertness in a sense that if the organization is perceived to survive essentially through secretiveness, it is more likely to display a pro-active behavior towards achievement of the goals and is thus likely to pursue knowingly a high-risk options.

Question II - What is the structure for most efficient distribution of authority and power in organization? Should the right to make decisions and evaluate activities be concentrated or dispersed?

Theme: As mentioned earlier, centralization denotes the concentration of the right to make and enforce decisions. Centralization importantly relegates the knowledge regarding likely implications of opportunities and limitations and through reciprocation of hierarchy of authority it delivers decision-making

authority to the top-level executive unit.⁵³ Conversely, decentralized structures encompass learning dynamics with most effective use of local knowledge and provide greater motivation factor for peripheral units. Decentralization requires a strong incentive initiatives, alternative means of coordination and information sharing (Brickley et al., 2002: 73).

Definition of Situation: Approaching the shared perceptions on centralization/decentralization of authority as essentially encourages the decision-making unit to omit certain decision-making criteria and paying particular attention to others within the lines of the approved action. The perception on the utility of decentralization would encourage decision-makers to perceive a broader decision-making realm. Broadened organizational setting is perceived as posing constraints on coordination of the organizational action. The increased amount of information in decision-making process is likely to be interpreted as overabundant and risky, thus, is likely to promote strengthening of alternatives substituting the role of leadership in the organization. The primacy of leadership would be maintained strong, yet means through distribution of leadership will be emphasized throughout organizational realm. This belief introduces another diagnostic propensity of the perceived utilization of centralized/decentralized system in information-processing.

⁵³ Since individual solely cannot control all strategic processes due to their complexity, even in highly centralized organizations the decision-making rests with a coalition of decision-making individuals (Mintzberg, 1979).

Option-Development: The choice of decentralization or partial decentralization promotes real-time information mode of organizational decision-making by accommodating cognitive limitations of organization's members through dispersing decision-making responsibilities (March and Simon, 1958). The search and evaluation in respect of information-processing acquires a greater potential in decentralized system, where the shared assumption prevails that any level of organization is permitted to participate in decision-making process. Holding a belief that opening information-processing to accommodate for greater amount of decision-making stimuli can exert significant degree of progress and effectiveness is more likely to undertake extensive search and development of option routines. This raises the likelihood that option search and development are not homogenous throughout the organization.

Choice: To illustrate choice propensities of a shared perceptions on efficiency of centralization/decentralization it can be noted that if there is a strong belief in the efficiency of decentralized authority, the organizational decision-making is likely to or even give incentive to pursue more ambitious objectives. The organization may perceive greater effectiveness of action from broadening decision-making realm rather than settle for control of high-risk behavior prescribed by other alternatives.

Question III - What is the nature of processes for the control of activity? Is the control formalized or characterized by informal relationships? What is acceptable degree of self-regulation?

Theme: Structural formalization refers to the presence of standardized rules and procedures that influence decision-making behavior. Welker (2004: 39) identified formalization as a “degree to which decisions, activities and working relationship are controlled and coordinated by formal, explicit rules and procedures.” Rules and procedures of formalized system provide for development of explicit response repertoire of decision-making responsiveness. The structural dimension of formalization is tightly knitted to the competency of the decision-makers (Snyder et al. 1962).

Definition of Situation: A general image of the organizational system as being fundamentally governed by explicit rules and regulations, without a room for the interpretations of the decision-makers’ prompts decision-makers to share a definition of the situation concerning the interaction with the external world, and governing rules within organization as highly constrained. Constraining the organizational activities may be perceived as threatening the effectiveness and efficiency of any political action if the constrain impinge upon the availability of opportunities for and threat to the advancement of desired objectives.

Option-Development: Search and evaluation can be affected by the shared belief of how much formality is necessary for monitoring of organizational

action. If the organization perceives the formalization merely as a constraint, a search and evaluation of options would be encouraged to reach beyond the prescribed search and evaluation spheres of information processing. The informational requirements of the decision-makers who share a beliefs in the effectiveness of informality are thus greater than those of a decision-maker unit that perceives it can do little to seek for opportunities and counter threats due to the formal constrains.

Choice: A political decision-makers who share a believe that formalization is a necessary requirement for organizational management are likely to engage in a reactive behavior rather than proactively seeking new opportunities for organizational action. Belief that formal rules bounding the behavior of organization's incumbents are indispensable leads further to more emphasis on complying with the rules rather than advancing a political action regardless of means assigned. Choice is also likely to be influenced by shared beliefs regarding formalization in a manner that perceiving the priority of formal rules over the objectified ends may impinge upon the aspect of the continuity of goals in the long-term.

Question IV - What is the acceptable degree of horizontal and vertical differentiation of the organization?

Theme: As the intra-component of complexity dimension of organizational structure, the horizontal and vertical differentiation becomes indicative of the organizational division of labor, the number of organizational levels and broad

span of intra-organizational control (Fredrickson, 1986). High horizontal and vertical differentiation promotes and selectively distributes different responsibilities and interests among organizational units. The division of labor promotes the structural binding of rationality of organizational members through delineating boundaries of their specialization.

Definition of Situation: Complementary to the shared belief concerning decentralized distribution of decision-making in the organization, another collective belief concerning minimal specialization can significantly affect decision-makers' cognitively constructed definition of the situation. Perceiving organizational incumbents as evaluating situational stimuli through highly specialized lenses of competence may significantly impinge upon the perceived homogeneity of organizational action. The multiplicities of discrepancies of information that challenge the unity of goals and commitment may introduce significant diagnostic predispositions into information-processing of the decision-makers.

Option-Development: The consideration for specialization may introduce search and evaluation propensities into decision-making unit's information processing. If the decision-makers unanimously perceive organizational environment as benefiting from specialization, they are more likely to avoid knowingly the reliance upon the notion of talent or inherent predispositions while searching and evaluating possible options for the action. That is, sharing a perception that human capacity can handle a variety of complex phenomena at the

same time allows decision-makers to utilize a greater number of individuals rather than constitutes a constrain on search and evaluation to the few of expertise.

Choice: Amplified perception advocating high degree of specialization may constitute constrain on the decision-making routine of choice. A prevalent believe in the necessity to disperse specialization among the greater number of individuals is more likely to influence the mechanisms through which risks are controlled. The risks in this instance are connected to the lack of the agreement upon the means; thus informational requirements of the denunciators of specialization are greater as they necessitate single-objective-driven propensities.

Question V - What is the optimum level of organization's spatial dispersion?

Theme: Organization's special dimension refers to the outer-organizational realm and organizations multiplicity of geographic locations.⁵⁴ This realm of organizational structure pertains to the perception on the utility of organizational units in various geographical locations (inter-organizational dispersion) (Fry, 1982; Hall, 1987). Organizations disperse specially in the recognition of the need to service different geographical location and it is thereof important for understanding of intricacies of design and limitations of these organizations in respect of decision-making implications.

⁵⁴ Traditionally, special dispersion reflected the distribution of operating sites of an organization (Blau and Schenherr, 1971).

Definition of Situation: A general image of the need for spatial dispersion stems from the fundamental belief of the universality of organizational objective. The sharing of this belief in turn announces to organizational member a necessity of universal commitment to the cause and is likely to be interpreted as evidence of solidarity. Discrepant information that challenges this belief in unity of commitment regardless of geographical boundaries is likely to be discounted, and therefore introduces the diagnostic predispositions into information-processing of decision-making unit.

Option-Development: Evaluation and search for options can be affected by this structural belief in a manner that, if organizational doctrine holds that the organization manifest universal capability, the organizational members are likely to engage in extensive analysis of the possible consequences of various decision-making options, as to find possible means of exploring this universality.

Choice: A final illustrative example of the choice propensity of this collectively constructed structural belief holds that, if within the conceptions of political strategy the decision-makers collaboratively assume the necessity for spatial dispersion in order to increase the effectiveness/pay offs of actions, the organization is more likely to pursue ambitious objectives by means of controlled risk that trade-off the possibility of high-value returns in preference to alternatives that entail low risk.

8.2. Reinforcement of Other Operational Code Beliefs

Operational code beliefs of a political actor cannot be classified merely as an unconnected collection of code beliefs but are said to comprise rather a *belief system*. That is, the beliefs are bound together by some form of functional interdependence (Converse, 1964 in George, 1979: 100). The internal consistency of the beliefs must hold not only within their specified categories but also for the entirety of the operational code. In other words, there must be a visible interconnectedness among all of the *structural* beliefs as well as proven effect of their influence upon *philosophical* and *instrumental* beliefs of the code. In this instance, operational code evidences the supposed interconnectedness in the sense that a change in the dominant belief (S-1) and, related to it, the image concerning degree of secrecy – seems to require a compensating change in the status of other beliefs within the configuration. As the belief for maintenance of high degree of secrecy persists, the individual member's isolation from the external environment promote the comparison between the group-members and directly relevant out-group environment. The exemplified distinction between *us* and *them* further grounds in the negative portrayal of the enemy (Crenshaw, 1986), thus affecting the first philosophical belief related to the image of the opponent.

To give another example, a belief concerning centralization/decentralization aspect of organizational structure would significantly reinforce directly the entirety of the instrumental belief system. A general image of the utility of centralized/decentralized system (S-1) encourages the actor's approach for selecting

goals or objectives for political action (I-1) through defining of the actors initiating the process of decision-making. Decentralized structures are perceived as more ambiguous for decision-making yet more receptive to the environmental stimuli (opportunities and limitations). Then, political actor's approach to the maximization of receptiveness from environment (S-I) is more likely to influence that actor's search, development and choice of options that offer preference ordering for optimization of strategic outcome (I-I).⁵⁵

8.3. The Specification of Beliefs About Organizational Structure for Al Qaeda

Variety of terms used to denote the structure of Al Qaeda has ranged from a "terrorist group to ideological movement, from a 'brand identity' for Jihadist terrorist to a 'global tribe'" (Jackson, 2006: 242).⁵⁶ In order to establish a connection between the analytical framework and practical demands of assessing a non-state terrorist organization it is necessary to identify, which complexity of organizational design is appropriate to be a subject of the examination?⁵⁷

⁵⁵ As George (1969: 208) noted "The optimizing strategy provides an opportunity to achieve maximum payoff in a given situation, but should that prove infeasible or emerge as too costly or risky; it will enable one to settle, if necessary, for one of the lesser of the graduated objectives."

⁵⁶ The linguistic variety of descriptions of Al Qaeda stem necessarily from the transformation of its terrorist activities into a relatively uncontained, amorphous and decentralized structure as compared to relatively well-defined and stable terrorist organization in the past.

⁵⁷ Approaching Al Qaeda as an adversary in practical realm, key political and counterterrorism questions would receive different answers depending upon the specific labels that are attached to it, as "preventing a clear and systematic way of articulating important differences between these labels" (Jackson, 2006: 242)

Anticipating Al Qaeda as an organization in this regard, the delineation of the scope of beliefs about organizational structure necessitates identification of the boundaries of the organization as a referent object of analysis. The nature of decision-making in non-state terrorist organizations, the very idea of *decision*, when it is made and who makes it have all turned out to be problematic, thus, identifying Al Qaeda in its broadest context would provide for the significant emphasis on the strategic elements of an organizational decision-making as it exists in all levels of the organization. The element of focus on strategic aspect of the group importantly shifts the focus of emphasis on the political driving forces for the movement, unlike the specific tactical and operational model. The political element of broadening of the classification of Al Qaeda is of direct relevance to the contextualized construct of operational code developed by George, which aims primarily at the understanding of political beliefs and forces according to which choices are selected from the response repertoire. Since operational code analysis attempts to analyze the potentiality of threat stemming from political action of an adversary, a highly inclusive model of Al Qaeda would provide a framework for encompassing threat in its entirety of action, strategic underlining and structural predispositions for enlargement of a group.

CHAPTER IX

OPERATIONAL CODE OF AL QAEDA: STRUCTURAL CONTENT

This chapter presents a portion of the finding of the political strategy of Al Qaeda and is based on the writings of Al Qaeda's primary strategists, among all Abu Mus'ab Al Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Ayman Al Zawahiri; and Islamic ideological thinkers, among all Sayid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam. The chapter is limited to a formulation of strategic content of the operational code of Al Qaeda. Evidences for the conceptions of political strategy in respect of perceptions on organizational structure have been found within the writings and accordingly the examples of the evidences have been presented.

9.1. System of Action

The conception of political doctrine held by Al Qaeda is a relevant and direct avenue to the delineation of Al Qaeda's spirit – a conclusion that is not surprising to the reader who realizes that, to Al Qaeda, political action is an all-

consuming activity, a way of life. Abu Mus'ab Al Suri in 2004 conveyed the particular place of military in Al Qaeda's political doctrine stating:

... in general, political success is connected to factors... which are concerned with the military performance (2004: 363)

Al Qaeda's doctrine alludes that the "organizational machine" is strictly subjected to the changes of the environment,

The times have changes, and we must design a method of confrontation, which is in accordance with the standards of the present time (Al Suri, 2004: 359)

The element of environmental determinism in Al Qaeda's doctrine states that:

We live in an unstable international situation or more correctly in a transitional period to which the rules applied in normal conditions do not apply. It also does not have the prerequisites to survive for long (Center for Islamic Studies and Research, 2003 in Aaron, 2008: 126).

Al Qaeda's doctrine does not attribute an absolute value to particular organizational structure; rather Al Qaeda perceives its importance as a mechanism for political strategy that can be subjected to adjustment in times of change:

It is for certain that the weakness is not in the machine, because it is perfect and suitable for working in its time, but the new surrounding conditions have made it outdated, and its natural place has become the museum (Al Suri, 2004: 365).

Discontinuity of organizational structure in the transition from the past to contemporary period, according to Al Qaeda's doctrine, is identified through a belief in a *systemic* character of organizational structure at any given time. Al Suri inaugurated this belief with explicit call for:

... building the cells of the Resistance units as a 'system of action' (*nizam al-'amal*) and not as 'a secret organization for action' (*tanzim lil-'amal*) (2004: 393).

Explicit reference to a system indicates that Al Qaeda's decision-makers hold a belief that their organization constitutes an unbreakable and perhaps complex whole through which the human relationships are interconnected, organized and ordered.

9.1.1. Preeminence of Effective Organization

According to Al Qaeda doctrine, *all* organizational activities must be made and kept in line with organizational ends. Dedication to organizational effectiveness rather than efficiency, thus, not only permits but also requires certain indulgences concerning a degree to which an organization achieves its goals. Although sharp dispositions towards prioritization of means over ends is felt as absorbing and defeating the organizational existentiality, Al Qaeda does not disregard the importance of means through which organizational energy is directed to the cause. Illustrating this conception of political strategy, Ayman Al Zawahiri wrote in 2001:

Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land, that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing more than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the aspired goal, which is the restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal of the invaders from the land of Islam... This goal must remain the basic objective of the Islamic jihad movement, regardless of the sacrifices and the time involved (in Aaron, 2008: 111).

Al Suri expressed the acute approach of Al Qaeda to the primacy of organizational goals and moderation in choice of means:

As we are obliged to build up the Resistance forces and to spread its Units, we are also obliged to tear down, destroy and remove the important bases of the opponent's forces in our midst, as long as it does not divert our attention from our main focal point for strategic attack, namely resisting the occupation and the foreign enemies (Al Suri, 2004: 423)

In the esoteric doctrine of early Jihadist writings, the requirement for effectiveness was displayed through different argumentative logic. Historically, Jihadist scholars implicitly attributed effectiveness with the presence of the moral values. To the dedicated Jihadist, the purpose is indubitably meaningful through spiritual rather than material dedication, apprehended by Jihadists as efficiency-driven behavior. In 1949, Sayid Qutb said:

Islam has always represented the highest achievement in universal and comprehensive social justice; European civilization has never reached the same level, nor ever will. For it is a civilization founded on pure materialism, a civilization of murder and war, of conquest and of subjugation (1949: 202).

In 2004, immorality of materialism resurfaced in Abu Bakr Naji's writings:

The aim which motivates the enemies is a material aim... Their principle absolutely does not submit to any moral value; rather, all the other principles are subordinate to it – friendship or enmity, peace or war – and are all determined according to self interest (2004: 88)

Thus, in Al Qaeda's doctrine effectiveness is the *only* perfect motivation for political action not only in the content of organizational objectives but also in its form embracing moral values and implicit code of behavior.

In the face of the ethicality and invaluableness of effectiveness in action Al Qaeda must assure success of organized procedures. Naji expressed Al Qaeda's tendency to believe in the need for more effective administrative efforts and focus upon organizational structure as strategically significant element:

By the grace of God, the organized Islamic work is beginning to be managed on the highest administrative level in our Islamic world, especially the jihadi organizations. However there still needs to be more mastery, general training, and advancement in order to encompass the greatest amount of the sectors of the Islamic movement, especially since we are approaching... a stage in which our administrative needs will be expanded in what we have called the stage of the administration of savagery, where we will mix with hundreds of thousands of people and they will require the administration of regions from us as diminished governments. If we are not prepared to deal with that, we will face dangerous problems, to say nothing of the harm (that results from) random behavior or (from) a rigid management organization, which stops action by its inflexibility and prevents development and advancement. Therefore, the numerous small and medium jihadi groups, which upheavals have created and which have appeared, by the grace of God, in every part of the Islamic world, must begin to abandon random behavior from now on and also administrative rigidity (2004: 54).

In the transition of organizational structure, the estimate of both the importance of abandoning both uncoordinated activities the administrative skillfulness came to be viewed as crucial. Correspondingly, Al Suri wrote:

Structuring an organization requires a lot of thought and foresight, it should take into account the nature and strengths of the enemy, the type and strengths of its security system, the geographical nature of the country, what has worked and what has failed in similar situations.....etc. the particular conditions on the ground should determine the best structure for the organization (2002: 29).

In effort at unmasking the most efficient organizational structure, Al Qaeda historical condition of outlawry and creation of organization's central theme that

by all means contributed to Al Qaeda's tendency towards gaining insight into its organizational design.

9.1.2. Danger of Being Infiltrated

The Al Qaeda's doctrine holds that the organization should enhance its security through which it can strenuously resist the enemy's attempts to penetrate its network. The success of the enemies in penetrating the organization would threaten Al Qaeda's obliteration, and in the absence of solicitous structuring against infiltration Al Qaeda would be substantially penetrable and its survival would thus be threatened. Al Suri expressed the Al Qaeda's tendency to believe in the omnipotence of secrecy:

Creating a method for sacred action in which we are able to overcome the problem of security weakness inherent in the traditional secret organizations where the whole organization is destroyed when some of its members are arrested, are tortured, and are pursued by security services across international borders after security coordination moved from a national level up to the international level (2004: 420).

According to Al Qaeda's attitude the danger of being infiltrated expresses the role of organizational structuring, and leads to the insistence on the role and pursuit of minimal links among organizational units. This is illustrated through the evidence in the writings of Al Suri:

Our secret organizations were defeated in terms of security, their cells were exposed and disbanded, and the attempts to build them were aborted. The security system of the enemy reached a level where even attempts to build cells were subjected to abortive strikes, before they were founded, or at their embryonic stage... in the end, and due to the complete failure in the details, the complete failure manifested itself in the inability to realize the goals of the general project (2004: 354-5).

This statement's implication is pointing at the fatality of reality in which Al Qaeda would be exposed to the penetration of its organizational domain; and thus this statement illustrates a shared belief that *any* structural predispositions for enhancement of security is highly desirable for Al Qaeda.

9.1.3. Defense Against Being Infiltrated

Al Qaeda's doctrine urges the decision-makers to establish a system in which an internal control information flows is secured, in order for its enemies to be isolated from the knowledge of whereabouts and activities of the organization. This conception becomes a preliminary rule of conduct to the organizational security against the enemies. Al Suri conveyed this point through the reference to the invincibility of communications:

Communications could be the weak link and expose the mujahideen to the enemy... Communication on all levels is a vital role of this fight, it should be researched and studied, and solution should be found (2002: 23).

Importantly, against the vice of those groups belonging to the school of *tanzim*⁵⁸ who presented great deal of hierarchy, centralization and regionalization as organizational values, Al Qaeda evolved to continue the tradition of secrecy through other means, a tradition that embraced, in Al Suri's statement:

... [a method] which enemy has no way of aborting,... susceptible to self-renewal and to self-perpetuation as a phenomenon after all its conditions and causes are present and visible to the enemy itself... [a method] of individual terrorism jihad (jihad al-irhab al-fardi) and secret operational activity of small units totally separated from each other (2004: 371, 420).

⁵⁸ Al Suri uses the word *tanzim* in reference to secret military organizations such as EIJ, JI, LIFG, GIA etc referring to specific regional, secretive and hierarchical characteristics of these organizations.

For Al Qaeda the idea of individualism – particularly with reference to operational activity – is not new. While, in a sense, organizationally individual initiative has not been employed as a prevalent tactic, ideologically Jihadist writings were keen on emphasizing it. Al Suri limited the analytical link of individual terrorism to ideological position through the reference to Qu’ran:

“thou art held responsible only for thyself” (An-Nisa 4: 82 in al-Suri, 2004: 455).

The esoteric ideological foundation influencing individualism in Al Qaeda doctrine,, however, was conveyed before Al Suri’s writing, by Qutb in 1949:

Thus rank or upbringing, origin or class should not stand in the way of any individual, nor should anyone be fettered by the chains which shackle enterprise (1949: 49)\

A number of consecutive Islamic scholars further strengthened the fundamental belief that of individual obligation to wage Jihad (Faraj, 1979: 200; Azzam, undated: 102; Al Zawahiri, undated: 192).

The primary value of individual jihad against the danger of penetration became yet another aspect of Al Qaeda’s doctrine, namely, the advantage of ‘spontaneity.’ In Al Suri advocated this belief:

They [individual jihadists] have not transformed into a phenomenon, because they are spontaneous, and nobody had occupied themselves with making them part of a program and presenting them as a strategic operational method (2004: 391).

9.1.4. Danger of Isolation from the Public

In keeping with the points discussed, according to Al Qaeda's doctrine, a secure communication between the organization and the external world would enhance the effectiveness of its actions. Particularly, Al Qaeda's doctrine combats the tendency of negligence of contact with the public. Al Zawahiri in 2001 made an overall statement favoring contact with the public as gesture of general and philanthropic assistance:

The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honor, fend off injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory. It must step forward in the arena of sacrifice and excel to get its message across in a way that makes the right accessible to all seekers and that makes access to the origin and facts of religion simple and free of the complexities of terminology and the intricacies of composition (in Aaron, 2008: 202)

And in 2005 he expressed the utility value of communication with the public for the organizational effectiveness:

But you and your brothers must strive to have around you circles of support, assistance, and cooperation, and through them, to advance until you become a consensus, entity, organization, or association that represents all the honorable people and the loyal folks in Iraq. I repeat the warning against separating from the masses, whatever the danger." (in Aaron, 2008: 252)

However, Al Qaeda's doctrine holds that the organization should engage in contact with the public only to the extent required for its effectiveness. Naji wrote:

Masses are difficult factor... our meaning is not that we make our movement dependent on them... (as for) whoever ignores the masses and presumes expects that they will (represent) the majority, the role... is to gain their sympathy, or at least neutralize them...(2004: 52)

The requirement of Al Qaeda, is thus, to cautiously and, to a limited extent, openly communicate with the public. In 1964, Qutb displayed considerate attention to potential problem of communication with the public:

This movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs; and it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing the organizations and Jihaad for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the Jahili system. (in Aaron, 2008: 60).

In 1979, Faraj limited his own advocacy of total openness with the public by identifying interferences into communication:

But then, how can (nonviolent) propaganda be widely successful when all means of (mass) communication today are under the control of the pagan and wicked (State) and (under the control) of those who are at war with God's religion? (1979: 186)

Even in situations which seem particularly favorable for establishment of unlimited communication with the public, Al Qaeda's doctrine assumes that the organization needs to employ a variety of mechanisms for propaganda embracing "a comprehensive jihadi, behavioral and educational doctrinal method" (Al Suri, 2004: 445) without details of operational characteristics of its activities. As to the propaganda-oriented contact with the public, Al Qaeda's doctrine would hold a proclivity towards polarization of masses and upholding of a negative image of the enemy.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ This notion is brought by identifying present enemy with the enemies of the past, such as referring to the United States and its allies as Crusaders , who conducted an onslaught of Muslim lands in the twelfth century.

9.2. Loyalty and Separation

Al Zawahiri in 2002 introduced a scholarly doctrine of 'loyalty and separation' (*al-wala wal-bara*) which became a polemical tact grounding Al Qaeda's shared belief that all Muslims should remain 'loyal' to one another and refuse any dealings with non-Muslims. Al Zawahiri supporting this doctrinal statement quoted Quranic verses:

Let not the believers take for friends or helpers Unbelievers rather than believer: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from God, except by way of precaution, that you may Guard yourselves from them (3:28 in Al Zawahiri, 2002: 209)

The intense indoctrination of Al Qaeda displays a continuous application of the belief in 'loyalty and separation.' Implicitly, this doctrinal statement can be distinguished in its application to organizational structure in the writings of Al Suri, who said:

... no organizational bonds of any kind between the members of the Global Islamic Resistance Units, except the bonds of a 'program of beliefs, a system of action, a common name and a common goal (2004: 422).

Al Qaeda's doctrine serving its ultimate objective assumes a tendency to reduce the amount of operational links and continuation of organizational activities that strengthen other means of organizational coordination of members working towards a desired end; this is believed to rely upon the loyalty to organizational cause.

9.2.1. Preeminence of Leadership

According to Al Qaeda's doctrine leadership is a core of political action. Based on this belief, Al Qaeda's doctrine holds that homogeneity and continuity of leadership are necessary condition for effectiveness of action. Al Zawahiri said:

Loyalty to leadership and acknowledgment of its primacy and merit are confirmed duties and fundamental values. But if loyalty to leadership reaches the point of sanctification, and if the acknowledgment of its primacy and merit lads to claims that it is infallible, the movement will suffer from methodological blindness. Any leadership flaw could lead to a historic catastrophe, not only for the movement but perhaps also for the community as a whole (2001a: 195).⁶⁰

This belief has a cornerstone in the writings of Qutb, who in 1964, alluded to the historical role of Islamic leadership:

Islam is again to play the role of the leader of making, then it is necessary that the Muslim community be restored to its original form (in Aaron, 2008: 60).

Al Zawahiri further emphasized the general point on leadership, yet, expressed a characteristic dismay concerning a guiding-role of the leader:

The importance of the issue of leadership in Islamic action in general and jihad in particular, and the community's need for an educated, militant and rational leadership that can guide it toward its goal through storms and hurricanes, with awareness and wisdom, without losing its way, striking out blindly, or reversing its course (2001a: 196)

The particular stress upon qualities of leadership affirms Al Qaeda's belief that leadership is chosen selectively. This belief is grounded in the ideological writings of Qutb who wrote in 1964:

⁶⁰Al Zawahiri was aware at that point of the upheaval that the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan would entail for Al Qaeda.

The leadership of mankind by Western man is now on the decline, not because Western culture has become poor materially... but because it is deprived of those life-giving values which enabled it to be the leader of mankind (in Aaron, 2008: 161).

The same belief, however, does not seem to hold true organizationally. The sober and proud acceptance, in Al Qaeda's contemporary doctrine, of the primacy of leadership forms a contrast to the operational distress of centralization of authority as it is expressed emphatically in Al Qaeda's strategic literature. This point is vindicated in A Suri writings:

Spreading the legal, political and military and other sciences and knowledge that the Mujahidun need in order to carry out Resistance operations, without this being in a direct way that leads to a series of arrests in the network, as happened in the centralized organization (2004: 392).

9.2.3. Substitution for Leadership

Disclosing the desire and fear behind the centralized leadership, Al Qaeda's doctrine preserves the centralization in different operational realm, the realm of commitment and shared values. Al Suri embraced that thought pinpointing advantages of a structure that comprises:

... a form of centralism on the level of commitment, slogans, symbols and ideas on the one hand, while at the same time avoiding links to a centralized authority, so that it cannot be aborted security-wise, on the other (2004: 420).

According to Al Qaeda's doctrine, this method allows for a coordination of organizational efforts in order to combine their result in a mechanism, which confuses the enemy.

The required Al Qaeda sentiment seems similar to that expressed by Qutb (in Azzam, 1987) in that it links the authority with the concept of values:

Hence, certainly there must be Jihad . . . assuredly in every form. Unquestionably, it should begin in the realm of ideas, and then appear in and pervade the world of truth, reality and experience. . . . Undoubtedly, armed Evil must be taken on by armed Good. . . . Falsehood strengthened by numbers must be confronted by Truth garbed with preparation . . . otherwise it would be suicide, or jest not befitting Muslims (in Aaron, 2008: 61).

Dedication to the organizational principles does indeed imply sever restriction on the notion of leadership in operational sense and a mere substitution of leadership with an ideology. Al-Suri identified Al Qaeda's requirement for "program of beliefs, a system of action, a common name and a common goal" (2004: 422) as the essential denominators of the decentralization of authority. Al Suri said:

Spreading the ideology of resistance, its programme, its legal and political bases and its operational theories so that they are available for the Islamic Nation's youth who strongly wish to participate in the Jihad and Resistance (2004: 392)

9.3. Guidance

Al Qaeda tends to view all political relations from behind the curtain of secrecy and deception. It applies to its political doctrine the view that "what can't be seen, can't be known." This belief displays Al Qaeda's search for effectiveness in informality. Against the danger of disorder and unreliability, however, the Al Qaeda's doctrine requires guidelines, education that if firmly-rooted within organizational realm yet undetectable from the outside.

9.3.1. Danger of Programmed Behavior

Al Qaeda's whereabouts, actions and exact responsibilities must never be visible to the enemies; the organization must remain in the shadows of informality, which would provide it with certain degree of invisibility. Al Suri warned over the danger of programmed behavior when he wrote:

We also observe that the ones performing these operations are not programmed [i.e. part of an organized program] in order to become a phenomenon for the sake of setting an example, pushing the Islamic Nation's youth to follow it, and building upon it. They are merely emotional reactions (2004: 391)

Naji wrote about a specific operational tactic that alluded to the notion of autonomy and toleration of self-regulatory behavior:

Frequently, the way of infiltrating and reaching a good center for gathering information requires a long period of time so that he can master his role in the institution which he is infiltrating. In that situation, it is possible to give the freedom of action to the member after giving him a long (educational) program on movement, the particular kind of information that is required, how to compile it and preserve it until the time when it is requested from him or how to communicate it quickly if it is critical information that cannot be delayed (2004: 122)

Thus Al Qaeda's doctrine holds that the organization must resist means through which it can be visible, and also leave its operational domain to the interpretation of the independent organizational units, which are implicitly coordinated through ideological guidelines in belief system.

9.3.2. Common Method and Common Program

As illustrated above, according to Al Qaeda's doctrine the conduct of the organization at any given time must be determined in accordance with the loyalty

to the common cause and in view of shared values. The belief concerning the effectiveness of informal links requires in a similar manner for organization to:

... regulate and correct these efforts with a common method and a common program, in order to achieve the result (Al Suri, 2004: 432)

The particular emphasis of Al Qaeda's doctrine is given to the means of education. Al Suri wrote that leader's inspirational role must embrace a general guideline for the organization that enables it to transmit "educational styles, the methods of ideas, thinking and operations in a correct manner" (2004: 444). Al Suri said:

... we will set forth the idea and spread it in full, with whatever requires, if God the Supreme permits, and make it available in every way, directly or through correspondence, or through communication networks, the Internet, and the different means for spreading it, in written, audible and visual formats... (2004: 425)

9.4. Autonomy and Continuity

Al Qaeda's shared belief system appoints the organization to do all that enhances the autonomy but that at the same time preserves the continuity of its power; for Al Qaeda is the primary instrument for the realization of the Islamic state, which is the primary objective. Thus, in pursuing its goals, the only condition is that the pursuance of objectives is maintained until reached. Al Qaeda doctrine assumes that the organization continues emphasis on its survival becomes strongly reflected in its conceptions of political strategy and interpretation of organizational foundation and constitution.

9.4.1. Danger of Specialization

According to Al Qaeda's doctrine, the organization should not strive to achieve high levels of specialization of its organizational units, unless such a requirement is necessary for the realization of organization's objectives. Naji said:

... it is necessary that each individual be trained in all or a large part of the branches so that it is possible to pass on skills, according to need, from one place to another (2004: 55)

In a similar manner, Al Suri observed the fundamental aspect of Al Qaeda's belief that an individual is limited in his specialization only to the extent of his capabilities, rather than preferences:

... expanding your understanding of the doctrinal program and implement its educational program and gong by it according to the extent of your capabilities... preparing yourself and those with you to the extent of your capabilities (2004: 438).

9.4.2. Primacy of Continuity

The premises of Al Qaeda's doctrine recognize that the mechanism for counteraction against the danger of departure from the ultimate goals would require an organization to maintain its operational continuity. Naji alluded to that belief saying:

The most important skill of the art of administration that we must use in learning how to establish committees and specialization and dividing labor so that all the activities do not fall on the shoulders of a single person or small group of people, in addition to training all of the individuals and passing on practical knowledge until (the point is reached) that if one manager disappears another will rise (to take his place) (2004: 55)

This belief is ideologically grounded in the writings of Al Zawahiri who in 2001 pinpointed the necessity for continuity and persistence of goals:

The persistence of the resistance will keep the volcano in a state of continual eruption and ready to blow up at the least provocation. The persistence of the resistance will transfer the popular wrath from one generation to another and keep the desire for revenge alive in the people's souls. In contrast, the spread of the concepts of conciliation, acquiescence, and acceptance of the facts will make our generation leave a legacy of despair and a willingness to surrender to the next generation (in Aaron, 2008: 71).

Thus, according to the perceived dangers of specialization, the Al Qaeda must maintain its continuity through a low degree of vertical and horizontal differentiation so as to prevent the disturbances in their activities which would come with their exposure to complicated and uncertain environment, now reserved for the entirety of the organizational realm.

9.4.3. Talent for Terrorism

With these challenges, however, there is an unvarying Al Qaeda's position: the organizational members, next to acquired skills and preparation, must display a degree of knowledge, information and the general terrorist culture, what is considered by Al Qaeda as a *talent for terrorism*:

A talent for terrorism when it comes to selecting targets and the operation's nature, the ability to execute them, to meet the requirements, assess their impact and consequences from political, security-related and other perspectives (Al Suri, 2004: 434)

Al Qaeda's expected degree of expediency of organizational members in deciding whether means should be adopted would necessitate a 'terrorist' to hold a general knowledge regarding all possible contingencies, which are the essence of organization's political strategy. According to the implicit point of Al Qaeda's doctrine, which comes into view in here, a true 'terrorist' is indeed a skilful in

himself. Thus professionalism becomes associated with individual characteristics in much the way that if one presents a natural aptitude for 'terrorism' one avoids the ineffectiveness of the 'terrorist' actions.

9.5. Unity and Universality

Al Qaeda's doctrine holds that the organization must be prepared to operate in any region in the world if it displays the characteristic of expediency for the organizational cause. Al Suri wrote:

... a method should therefore guide the Muslim who wants to participate and resist, to operate where he is, or where he is able to present in a natural way (2004: 393).

This advocacy of limitless spatial dispersion of the Jihadist struggle was already advocated by Qutb:

Islam grew up in an independent country owing allegiance to no empire and to no king, in a form of society never again achieved. It had to embody this society in itself, had to order, encourage, and promote it. It had to order and regulate this society, adopting from the beginning its principles and its spirit along with its methods of life and work. It had to join together the world and the faith by its exhortations and laws. So Islam chose to unite earth and heaven in a single system, present both in the heart of the individual and the actuality of society, recognizing no separation of practical exertion from religious impulse (1949: 26-7).

Setting precedent for the willingness of individuals to participate in call for action, the Al Qaeda's doctrine holds that the organization demands unity of struggle and universality of commitment.

9.5.1. Unity of Struggle

Al Qaeda's beliefs system embraces a premise that in order to have an over-reaching influence, the organization must assume the unity of struggle, as to enable the structural enlargement and its utilization in respect of the goal achievement. Al Suri recalls the verses of Qu'ran to clarify further the Jihadist idea behind the concept of unified struggle:

What we now need to establish in the minds of the Mujahidun who are determined to fight, is the sense of belonging and commitment, which is according to the words of the Almighty: Verily, this brotherhood of yours is a single brotherhood (2004: 368).

Despite the ideological underpinnings of the unity aspect in Al Qaeda's doctrine, Al Suri provides the evidence for operational effectiveness:

Coordinating a method in which all efforts are joined, in order to combine their result in a mechanism which confuses enemy, exhausts him and heightens the spirit of the Islamic Nation so that it joins the Resistance phenomenon (2004: 93).

Thus unity becomes regarded as a strategic value and constitutes for a general quality of the organization. The belief in unity has its roots in the historical experience of Muslims as recalled by Qutb:

Islam grew up in an independent country owing allegiance to no empire and to no king, in a form of society never again achieved. It had to embody this society in itself, had to order, encourage and promote it. It had to order and regulate this society, adopting from the beginning its principles and its spirit along with its methods of life and work... So Islam chose to unite earth and heaven in a single system, present both in the heart of the individual and the actuality of society, recognizing no separation of practical exertion from religious impulse (1949: 26-27).

9.5.2. Universal Commitment

According to Al Qaeda's doctrine, the unity of struggle displays yet another dimension and quality of organizational structure. To the dedicated Al Qaeda member, a universal commitment equates with the feeling of brotherhood a point emphasized by al-Qaradhawi in 2001:

Islam treats Muslims everywhere as one nation, and it does not recognize geographical borders or [differences of] race, color and language. It sees Muslims as one nation in Dar Al-Islam, united in Islamic beliefs and Muslim brotherhood (in Aaron, 2008: 76).

And Al Suri added:

This helps those who are not supported by belief and understanding, to move towards this universal (*ummami*) thinking, which is among the fundamentals of our religion ... it is absolutely necessary to have a sense of commitment to the Islamic Nation and its world, in the geographical, political and military dimensions and in every field (2004: 369-70).

Qutb emphasized the strategic importance for the upsurge of movements driven by universality of perceived values:

Islam reckons itself to be a worldwide region {sic} and a universal religion; therefore, it could not confine itself to the limits of Arabia, but naturally desired to spread over the whole world in every direction (1949: 198).

Al Qaeda must do all that enhances its power and extensiveness of its struggle; for Al Qaeda the insinuation of its activities in the maximum scope becomes a powerful organizational tool in the realization the effective alignment of its organizational structure with the environment, and so through structural means it ensures a protection of the message so that it reaches and becomes clear to everyone.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

This study has formulated and illustrated that operational code analysis as an enduring mean for understanding of motivations and behavior of political decision-making bodies provides an important input needed for systematic analysis of political entities threatening international peace and stability. The basic purpose of this study is to demonstrate that operational code construct as restricted primarily to studies of state institutions, has been inadequate in its methodological design to provide a useful extension for studying of non-state actors within international arena. In light of the positive potential of operational code analysis for systematic studying of non-state adversaries pressurizing violence upon civil societies around the world, this study puts forward an idea for adjunction of structural content to operational code analysis for further consideration or discussion by others. In reference to studies of political collectives, this proposition relies fundamentally on the observation that the term *operational code* has been misemployed following the work of George (1969), in its reference to studies of

organizational decision-making and embraced instead a set of beliefs about nature of politics and political action held by individual leaders.

As study presented, the initial understanding of operational code belief system provided by Leites (1951, 1953) aimed at delineation of *conceptions of political strategy* for a collective political actor, as reflective of shared beliefs about the nature of politics and notions of correct strategy and tactics, as well as, beliefs about governing relations within the decision-making unit. The proposed designation of the concept of *operational code* stems from the fact that Leites' understanding of the concept aimed to embrace participants in a system of action, rather than address their personality and historical experience instead.

Primarily, since its first surfacing (Leites, 1951, 1953), operational code approach represented an inconsistent and unstructured methodology for studying of political elites. This was significantly reflected in the absence of similar-design-driven research and thus impinged upon perceptions on the utility of operational code analysis for comparative studies. The initial approach, however, unlike its consequent successors, constituted a comprehensive framework, collective in its level of analysis and inclusive *rules of conduct* existing within an organization. As presented in the Table 1 on the following page, Leites' Model (1951, 1953) comprised beliefs through which the decision-making unit addressed itself to the external world and internal realm. While the external influences account merely for the image of the outside world, the internal relations provided a mean

of acknowledgment of decision-maker’s interpretations of internal behavioral aspects affecting the processes of policy formulation. Shifting the frame of reference into cognitive realm, allowed Leites (1951, 1953) to divert the attention of the analysis to the sphere of subjectivity, through which the decision-making constrains are formed.

Operational Code Analysis	Leites’ Model (1951, 1953)	
State Actors/Non-State Terrorist Actors	Governing Relations With the Outside World	<p>Identifies the relation between studied entity and the outside world.</p> <p>Allows capturing actor’s image of outside world and in respect delineating <i>rules of conduct</i> an actor believe to be necessary for effective political action in respect of that image.</p>
	Governing Relations Within the Organization	<p>Identifies the alignment of internal relationships among constituent parts of an organization.</p> <p>Allows capturing of the image of the governing relations within the organization and delineating <i>rules of conduct</i> an actor believes to be necessary for effective action in respect of that image.</p>

Table 1. Leites’ Model of Operational Code.

Leites’ Model (1951, 1953) provides for an accurate illustration of actor’s *conception of political strategy* thus holds a predictive function on actor’s decision-making activities. The utilization of Leites’ Model (1951, 1953) would constitute a constructive account on limits on actor’s rationality as one of the important

inputs needed for behavioral analysis of political decision-making and leadership styles.

Attempting to systematize Leites' Model, George (1969) constructed a set of philosophical and instrumental questions allowing for an identification of the set of beliefs and strategies underlining the premises of political action. The development of operational code approach into a structured technique, however, provided for an important omission of the internal context of the Leites' Model (1951, 1953). The applicability of the Georges's Model (1969) to variety of actors, whether collective or individual, state or non-state have not been questioned adequately, while the evolving model did not account for differences in the decision-making of various groups. The primary purpose for utilization of operational code in Leites' Model (1951, 1953) was to conduct a study into the political orientation of an adversary towards an opponent as well as internally defined political action and change; George's (1969) philosophical and instrumental questions, however, focused on the former aspect of operational code, while significantly omitted the means for extraction of the latter.

Table 2, presented on the following page attempts to visualize George's Model (1969) closely in order to understand that omitting internal influences and diversifying solely external influences becomes the primary weakness of the model and its consequent evolutions. As indicated in the table, operational code analysis in George's Model aims to evaluate the belief system of individual

leaders, rather than organizations. The shift of the level of analysis from that of Leites (1951, 1953) does become problematic in organizations that display a well-built belief system that has a potential to substitute for the operational role of leadership, such as the case in terrorist organizations. That is to say, in circumstances where the leadership within the organization holds merely an inspirational role, rather than directly authorizing and coordinating political action, George's Model (1969) proves to be inapplicable as a means of measurement of the governing rules of organization's conduct.

Operational Code Analysis	George's Model (1969)	
Political Leaders	Philosophical Questions	Identifies relation between the state and the outside world in respect of beliefs about the nature of politics. Constructs diagnostic propensities of actor's cognition by identifying actor's diagnosis of the situation in certain directions
	Instrumental Questions	Identifies relation between the state and the outside world in respect of beliefs about the effective strategies. Constructs choice propensities of actor's cognition by identifying the means through which an actor favours certain types of action alternatives over others

Table 2. George's Model of Operational Code

Significantly, George's Model (1969) of operational code analysis presents a disputable utility in political forecasting. Despite the systematization of George's (1969) construct as restricted or limited to individual level of analysis, it proves

inadequate for studying of organizations, and anticipate the conceptions of political strategy through which an actor decides to act one way rather than the other.

The model proposed in this thesis, attempts to adjust George's Model (1969) as to account for differences between varieties of actors. This study attempted to identify the structural content of the organizational decision-making as an integrator of the rules governing actor's relation with the outside world and within the organization. Significantly, adopting the technique of systematization and coding of operational code into a query, the Prospective Model becomes academically sound and permissive of studies for comparison and contrast purposes.

Recognizing a "pressing need for a more nuanced approach by experts in organization theory in their study of the structures of underground terrorist and other anti-system actors" (Stepanova, 2008: 127). Operational code analysis would efficiently provide for valuable contribution to analysis of the rules of conduct, embracing influences upon decision-making insofar as it would encompass, alongside the spectrum of beliefs about political nature and effective strategies, the aspect of the organizational design within which decision-makers operate; and which would significantly contribute to the advancement of the intended objectives of the political actor. With the recognition of strategic importance associated with the perceptions on organizational structure, the proposed

model of operational code analysis would provide for a differentiation of the conceptions of effective political actor between state and non-state terrorist actors, since they present different conceptions of organizational structures that come into influent contact with behavioral patterns in organization. As states and non-state terrorist organizations are likely to attach different utility values to organizational structures, a premise stemming from an argument that state institutions are essentially bureaucratic, the structural context becomes indispensable for utilization of operational code for non-state terrorist organizations. In this manner, the utility of the Proposed Model, would not only effectively reflect the Leites' (1951, 1953) initial idea of operational code, but also would effectively provide for technical and methodological means for its applicability to diversity of actors unlike the preceding George's Model (1969). Constituting, a preliminary proposal for an incorporation of the context of organizational structure into operational code analysis should be useful for delineation of the rules of conduct and their reflection upon a leadership styles and its enactment in the realm of real-life political action.

The Proposed Model of operational code allows capturing actor's perceptions of outside world and identification of cognitive limits on rationality inclusive of organizational structure account for the anticipation of political actor's definition of the situation. In the exploration of actor's leadership style through examination of the political actor's perceptions and structuring of political world to which he relates, and within which he attempts to operate thus addresses

accurately the actor’s problem of making casual inferences from decision-makers beliefs and from environmentally constrained behavioral patterns to the actions of the organization. In this respect, in search for solutions associated with theory development and description, the Proposed Model proves its theory-building utility as inclusive not only of its revised applicability to variety of actors, but significantly involving an appraisal of its enhanced forecasting effectiveness.

Operational Code Analysis	Proposed Model	
	Philosophical Questions	<p>Identifies relation between the state and the outside world in respect of beliefs about the nature of politics.</p> <p>Constructs diagnostic propensities of actor’s cognition by identifying actor’s diagnosis of the situation in certain directions</p>
State Actors/ Non-State Actors	Instrumental Questions	<p>Identifies relation between the state and the outside world in respect of beliefs about the effective strategies.</p> <p>Constructs choice propensities of actor’s cognition by identifying the means through which an actor favours certain types of action alternatives over others</p>
	Structural Questions	<p>Identifies the relation between the constituent parts within an organization capturing the decision-making properties</p> <p>Constructs the option propensities of actor’s cognition by identifying the means through which actor interprets decision-making setting in order to increase the effectiveness of the action.</p>

Table 3. Proposed Model of Operational Code

On that account, I have argued in this thesis that the knowledge of the organizational structure provides an important differentiating input needed for comprehensive analysis of political decision-making in non-state terrorist organizations as contrary to those of state institutions. Consequently, I have attempted to codify the unaccounted for constituent of operational code analysis, having existence in Leites' (1951, 1953) construct, consisting of general issues and questions around which an organization is structured.

Since operational code construct finds its best utilization in studies essentially focusing on the understanding of an adversary for that reason among the non-state actors the focus of this study has been given to terrorist organizations. The choice of Al Qaeda has been intended to specifically reflect the differences between the structural pillars of state and non-state terrorist organizations. Provided with an extensive background on Al Qaeda's organizational structure, the consequent analysis of an organization according to the additional structural context represent importantly an essential link between beliefs about politics, perception and alignment and efficiency of organizational structure influencing political action. Al Qaeda example significantly establishes importance of organizational structure in decision-making by presenting that an image of an opponent may play a less central role in the belief system, particularly when other non-state organizations share Al Qaeda's image of opponent and ideology, yet attempt to influence international scene without resorting to the means of violence, or unable structurally to pursue its objectives. In this respect, while

the image on an opponent presents a somewhat different role, other elements of operational code will be structured with greater emphasis. Encountering these circumstances, the example of Al Qaeda presents that it is important to increase the attention to structural context of organizational influences within the framework of the philosophical and instrumental context of operational code analysis.

One limitation associated with the construction of an operational code stems from the question concerning methodology employed and data used for the research. This aspect has not been undertaken within the focus of this thesis, yet represents a recommendation for continuation of a study-subject of operational code touched upon this thesis. As this thesis did not aim at the actual construction of an operational code but utilization of its construct for efficient construction of such code in the future, the following guidance concerning its methodological aspects would help future scholars in a formulation of comprehensive operational construct for designed studied-subject, whether state or non-state. I would suggest that the selection of data and methodology of inquiry could be selected upon individual pragmatism and assorted preferences of a researcher, therefore. Operational code analysis presents a preliminary construct setting the choice of methodology open to research depending on the studied political entity. The researchers could utilize the proposed operational code analysis merely as guidance for undertaking a provisional research, attempt to identify a unique code employing qualitative methods modeled by Leites (1951, 1953) or construct a quantitatively identified *rules of conduct* for future comparative purposes.

In respect of the use of materials, researchers could employ already available data or when circumstances permit could attempt for systematic acquisition of a new data sets contributing to the construct of a code. Substantially, however, the fact that *operational code* is a unique construct in itself, the importance of the acquirement of an understanding particular to the studied organization becomes an essential part for the construct of the operational code of that entity due to the fact that operational code does not merely signify a presentation of hard facts of the organizational *rules of conduct* but incorporate the construct it into a cognitive forces translated into motivational and behavioral factors. On this account, this thesis provided a sample of operational code analysis in respect of its structural content, as employing the qualitative technique of content analysis and evaluation.

To the attention of consequent scholars of operational code analysis should come another limitation. Reaching back to the historical evolution of an operational code, an analyst should take into account that operational code represents a specific approach to study of political behavior. It is important to note that as much as the term *operational code* may appear as a set of repertoires for political action, the term signifies factors that constitute an influence upon a decision-maker rather than conclusively determining unilaterally resolution of a question in consideration. The extraction of beliefs and the structurally defined behavior pattern represent a significant portion of the influences on a political actor upon its actions. Not only not all the beliefs can be extracted by operational code, as the construct does not account for ethical and normative behavioral underlining,

but also it is hard to differentiate between the behavior constituent of operational code and one resulting as a part of it.

Deriving from the assumptions and premises of the thesis recognizing the necessity for incorporation of the context of organizational structure for effective utilization of operational code analysis for non-state actors, I hope that this preliminary project will encourage and facilitate systematic research of variety of non-state actors, particularly those perceived representing a threat to national or international stability. The extended contextual composition of the operational code represents but a preliminary project for the potential operational code constructs, and with all the necessary elements for the applicability of operational code analysis for non-state, in particular terrorist organizations, I believe that this approach merits consideration for future studies of elaboration on and construction of an operational code analysis in its greatest explanatory capability.

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