Turkey's foreign policy implementation in sub-Saharan Africa: A post-international approach

Volkan İpek and Gonca Biltekin

New Perspectives on Turkey / Volume 49 / September 2013, pp 121 - 156
DOI: 10.1017/S0896634600002065, Published online: 05 March 2015

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0896634600002065

How to cite this article:

Request Permissions : Click here
Turkey's foreign policy implementation in sub-Saharan Africa: A post-international approach

Volkan Ipek
Gonca Biltekin

Abstract
Turkey's activism in Africa has been extensively noted. It has been argued that non-state actors like business and civil society organizations take part in Turkey's Africa initiative. Nevertheless, state/non-state interaction in Turkey's foreign policy implementation has not been accounted for in theoretical terms in Turkish foreign policy literature. This paper combines post-international theory and foreign policy implementation in looking at Turkey's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that adapting to the multi-centric world, the Turkish government has moved beyond conventional state-to-state dealings in implementing its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state actors.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-Africa relations, sub-Saharan Africa, post-internationalism, foreign policy implementation.

Introduction
The concept of foreign policy has traditionally been understood in state-centric terms and has been equated to actions and decisions by official decision makers. With the advent of globalization, the state-centrism

Volkan Ipek, Ph.D. Candidate, Bilkent University, Department of Political Science, volkani@bilkent.edu.tr.
Gonca Biltekin, Ph.D. Candidate, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, goncab@bilkent.edu.tr.

of classical and behavioralist foreign policy analysis (FPA) has met with considerable challenge. The increasing effect of non-state actors has been incorporated into FPA by focusing on the contributions and challenges to governments’ decision-making processes by business groups, ethnic groups, political oppositions, public opinion, and the media. More broadly, studies on transnationalism, interdependence, and global governance have all provided a bigger picture about how foreign policy decisions are made with the involvement of non-state actors.

Despite the above developments, FPA has remained a field which almost exclusively focuses on the decision. In other words, theories of foreign policy are mostly concerned with why official decision makers take one specific decision instead of others. The decision-making process is thus highlighted at the expense of foreign policy implementation. Moreover, FPA literature has mostly overlooked the changes brought by globalization and the increasing importance of transnationalization in foreign policy implementation. Whenever input from non-state actors are considered, their effects on foreign policy have mostly been analyzed in terms of their discursive actions aimed at influencing official foreign policy decisions in the form of agenda-setting, framing, lobbying, or norm-building.

6 Ibid., 2.
On the other hand, non-state actors’ participation in foreign policy can also be analyzed in terms of their interaction with the formal state actors and agencies involved in the implementation process, where non-state actors take on operational responsibilities. There is a growing empirical literature about how formal foreign policy makers rely on and work with non-state actors in implementing foreign policy. Issues range from hiring private security companies to wage war to hiring private consultants to promote democracy abroad. In some cases, involvement of non-state actors has been so overwhelming that formal policy makers have been unable to implement a strategic framework due to “ad hoc and incoherent proliferation of actors and policy perspectives.”

With respect to Turkey’s foreign policy towards Africa, there has been a similar focus on decision making to explain why the Turkish government has decided to intensify its relations with African states. This literature, although small, generally explains the interest of the Turkish government in sub-Saharan Africa with reference to globalization and its EU membership process and the ensuing domestic pressure either from business groups to diversify their export markets or from peripheral “religious and nationalistic groups” to take action more independently from Western institutions. With respect to Africa, it has been argued that the Turkish government relies on “Turkish people’s kinship to fellow Muslims.” Another explanation focuses on formal policy makers’ perceptions and the introduction of a new vision for a multidimensional foreign policy. More often than not, the significant involvement of


Mehmet Özkan. “Turkey’s ‘New’ Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications,”
non-state actors in Turkey's opening to Africa is highlighted, and it is argued that there is a "smooth convergence of both governmental and business policies."14

Nevertheless, the involvement of non-state actors is often portrayed in the form of foreign policy output, e.g., the level of trade, or the amount of developmental and humanitarian aid from civil society.15 Such studies usually lack a comprehensive theoretical framework to conceptually account for the interaction patterns among different actors involved in the implementation of Turkish Foreign Policy on sub-Saharan Africa. An implementation perspective, which explicates how Turkey has implemented its decision to open up to Africa, may lead to a conceptually informed discussion of the nature of the relationship between non-state actors and the government during the implementation process.

This article builds upon and integrates two theoretical approaches which have been developed independently from each other and have rarely been brought together: a foreign policy implementation approach and post-internationalism. Looking from a post-international perspective, we argue that there is "an apparent trend in which more and more of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without the direct involvement of nations and states."16 In this multi-centered world, the ultimate resort for realizing goals has become the withholding of cooperation or compliance rather than military force.17 Implementation studies also posit that foreign policy is implemented by coalitions, which have to be maintained over time.18 Accordingly, Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa has been implemented with varying degrees and types of cooperation with non-state entities in a multitude of spheres. We differentiate these interactions into three categories: Cooperative, complementary and supplementary.

The article consists of four parts. In the following part, we provide a

Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2011).
17 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 250.
brief history of Turkey’s relations with sub-Saharan African countries. Most of these interactions were state-centric with minimal involvement from sovereignty-free actors (SFAs). In the second part, we provide a more detailed account of what implementation studies and post-internationalism can offer for the study of foreign policy in general and Turkey’s sub-Saharan African foreign policy in particular. In the third part, we analyze four patterns of interaction between sovereignty-bound actors (SBAs) and SFAs in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa: cooperative, complementary, supplementary, and conflictual. Lastly, we conclude with some comments about Turkey’s prospects in sub-Saharan Africa in light of these interaction patterns.

Sub-Saharan Africa in Turkish foreign policy: A history
During the Second World War and the Cold War, international circumstances and Turkey’s domestic social, economic, and political problems limited Turkey’s outreach to non-Western societies. Nonetheless, Turkish foreign policy did witness brief attempts at a more proactive and multidimensional foreign policy and relative increases in Turkey’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Since the Cold War, along with the newly independent states of Former Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern countries, Africa has emerged as a new focus of interest for Turkish foreign policy.

Until the end of the Second World War, Turkey’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa were based on establishing limited diplomatic contacts. Even though the anti-imperialistic character of the Turkish War of Liberation had triggered sympathetic longings for independence in sub-Saharan African communities, bilateral relations with sub-Saharan Africa could not move beyond that point. In this period, Ethiopia was the first and only sub-Saharan African state in which Turkey opened an embassy.

Turkey’s membership of the United Nations (UN) in 1946 and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 were key events with respect to its relations with African countries. Turkey’s pro-British stance in Cyprus and the Suez Crisis and its disbelief in the effectiveness of neutrality in the face of Soviet expansionism, led to diplomatic tensions between Turkey and the African states of the Non-Aligned Movement. The pro-Western attitude Turkey displayed in the 1955 Bandung Conference caused further tension between the sides.

19 Nasuh Uslu, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (New York: Nova Publishers, 2004).
20 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, 39th ed. (İstanbul: Kür, 2009), 207.
21 The Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa was opened in 1926.
Moreover, Turkey’s failure to support Algeria’s independence in the UN General Assembly in 1956\(^{22}\) dealt a serious blow to Turkish-African relations.\(^{23}\) Nevertheless, this period also witnessed a number of positive developments with respect to Turkey-sub-Saharan Africa relations. Turkey supported the UN General Assembly decision to send economic assistance to the Sahel region in 1948.\(^{24}\) Turkey also opened a General Consulate in Nigeria in 1956,\(^{25}\) and an Embassy in Ghana in 1957.\(^{26}\)

From the mid-1960s onwards, as Turkey-US relations deteriorated due to the Cyprus issue, Turkey tried to redress its poor relations with the non-Western world.\(^{27}\) This period also coincided with decolonization across the African continent. Turkey recognized newly independent countries and attempted to develop economic, cultural, and political relations with them.\(^{28}\) Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie visited Turkey in March 1967, and Turkish President Cevdet Sunay visited Ethiopia in December 1969.

In the 1970s, relations between Turkey and the US deteriorated still further due to US pressure on poppy cultivation in Turkey, Turkey’s Cyprus intervention, and the subsequent US arms embargo, which accelerated the diversification of Turkey’s foreign relations. Turkey designed an Action Plan and established a new administrative system in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to implement these multifaceted foreign policy objectives.\(^{29}\) One crucial element was the creation of regional desks, one of which was assigned to sub-Saharan Africa. In November 1971, Ethiopian Emperor Selassie paid his second visit to Turkey. The 1976 opening of Turkey’s Embassy in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo), the medical assistance package sent to Zimbabwe in 1978, and the Economic and Technical Cooperation (TET) agreement

\(^{22}\) Meliha Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” in “Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy,” ed. Mustafa Aydin and Kemal Kirişçi, special issue, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (Spring 2009): 174.


\(^{27}\) Mustafa Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjectures During the Cold War,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (2000): 130.


\(^{29}\) Karaca, “Turkish Foreign Policy,” 117-118.
signed with Sierra Leone in 1979 constituted the beginnings of a new sensitivity in Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. However, lack of personnel in the MFA led to the abandonment of the Action Plan.

Economic and political difficulties after 1980 military coup led Turkey to close its Ghana Embassy in 1981. However, there were a few more attempts to boost relations with sub-Saharan Africa. In January 1982, President of Sudan Mohammed Nimeyri visited Turkey. That same year, Turkey’s first graduate program on African Studies opened at Gazi University, and Turkey also signed a TET agreement with Somalia. By the mid-1980s, with the impact of economic liberalization and Turkish Prime Minister Özal’s strong convictions about liberal economic development and foreign policy, “activism” and “multi-faceted” foreign policy was once again on the agenda. While Turkey’s rapid economic liberalization estranged a few sub-Saharan countries, official economic agencies like the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Treasury became assets in Turkey’s new foreign policy implementation mechanism. In 1985, the SPO started Turkey’s first official development program, amounting to $10 million to be used for institutional capacity building in several sub-Saharan African countries. Turkey also signed cooperation and TET agreements with seven other African countries.

Turkey’s foreign policy activism and multi-dimensionalism in the post-Cold War milieu was based on an understanding that Turkey’s future with the West would rely on its relations with the non-West. Accordingly, the Özal administration signed more international agreements with the non-West than any other previous administration in Turkish history. With respect to sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey continued to sign cooperation agreements on health, security, and culture.

31 Hazar, Kuresellesme Sürecinde Afrika.
32 One of these countries was Ethiopia. The Communist Derg regime in Ethiopia forced Turkey to close its embassy there in 1984.
33 These countries were the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect.” Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa.
36 Cf. T.C. Resmi Gazete. For agreements with Sudan, see Dec. No. 91/1634 on health, Dec. No. 92/3632 on

In the late 1990s, Turkey's frustration with the EU led to fresh reconsiderations of the need for a multidimensional foreign policy, and Africa became one of the foci of these considerations. A comprehensive plan was made for a more sustained effort to develop Turkey's relations with Africa in general, and with sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Named the 1998 Africa Opening Action Plan, the attempt was initiated by the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade and involved multiple actors from Turkish politics, diplomacy, business groups, and civil society. Nevertheless, due to insufficient interest in and knowledge about sub-Saharan Africa on the part of non-state actors, the plan received only limited input from wider society. The plan aimed to improve official Turkish representation in Africa, promote bilateral contacts, establish political consultation mechanisms, and provide humanitarian assistance, as well as develop economic and trade relations between sides. The plan's cultural component was designed to introduce sub-Saharan Africa to Turkey and Turkey to sub-Saharan Africa.

The 1998 Opening Action Plan aimed to bring vitality to Turkey's relations with African states. However, the coalitional confrontations and the economic crisis of 2000-2001 pushed Turkey into a period of political and economic turbulence and restricted Turkish policy makers' capacity to implement the plan to schedule. Once the effects of economic crisis began to fade and a single party (Justice and Development Party, or JDP) was brought to power in the general elections of 2002, the plan was revisited. With the support of business groups and civil society, "The Strategy for Developing Economic Relations with Africa"...
was prepared by the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade in March 2003. This strategy was used by the JDP as the catalyst for the 1998 Plan.\(^{43}\) Moreover, 2005 was designated "Africa-Year" in Turkey. From 2005 onwards, Turkey implemented its sub-Saharan Africa foreign policy with the increasing involvement of non-state actors.

**Post-international implementation of foreign policy**

Any study of implementation requires the researcher to look beyond the official decision makers and focus on the "context" or "environment" in which foreign policy is made.\(^{44}\) Categorically, the environment consists of *implementers*, i.e. government agencies and (domestic or transnational) non-state actors on the one hand and *targets* of foreign policy, whose beliefs and behaviors are sought to be changed.\(^{45}\) In implementation studies, context is not considered as an exogenous factor against which actors are rendered powerless. Rather, it is defined as "other actors and the set of relations which they entertain."\(^{46}\) In the age of globalization and heightened interconnectedness, foreign policy is no longer solely a domain of state activity and increasingly involves non-state actors. Therefore, looking at the implementation of foreign policy requires a relational approach, embedded in a globalization perspective. An implementation approach looks at pairs or multiplicities of actors—both implementers and targets—in terms of their interaction and the changes in their level and type of interaction over time. As opposed to the hierarchical nature of the decision-making process, implementation is based on coalitions.\(^{47}\) A decision is properly implemented only when at least some of the actors and agencies involved have a consensual relationship over a specific action to be taken, even if they do not agree on the final goal of the overall foreign policy.

Post-international theory may also be useful when considering what this environment means from a globalization perspective and defining

\(^{43}\) Alain Vicky, "La Turquie à l'assaut de l'Afrique," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 2011. Available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2011/05/VICKY/20450. Although the original Africa Opening Action Plan had been designed by a different government, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül announced that his government was determined to implement it. See his statement to the 60th Session of UN General Assembly Meeting, September 21, 2005, 5-6. Available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/tur050921eng.pdf.


\(^{45}\) Smith and Clarke, *Foreign Policy Implementation*, 2-6.


\(^{47}\) Smith and Clarke, *Foreign Policy Implementation*, 170.
major actors in the implementation. Today's polycentric world is composed of actors who are sovereignty bound (SBAs) and sovereignty free (SFAs). According to Rosenau, SFAs are polities which operate in accordance with their capability to initiate and sustain actions rather than by their legal status or sovereignty, whereas SBAs rely on their formal legal status and/or sovereignty. Although they are formally bound by the legal authority of states, the SFAs of the multi-centric world are able to evade the constraints of states and pursue their own goals. Accordingly, in a fully evolved multi-centric world, SFAs and SBAs enjoy relative equality as far as initiating action is concerned. Nevertheless, both SBAs and SFAs require a form of cooperation with each other, maintained over time, to implement their policies. As an adaptation mechanism to globalization, states are increasingly relying on cooperation with non-state actors. As governmental policies become more ambitious, relations between state and non-state actors become ever more crucial in implementing those policies.

Central to both post-internationalism and an implementation approach is a focus on the presence or lack of cooperative behavior between SFAs and SBAs. Unlike in a state-centric world, in a multi-centric world, the mode of such collaboration is temporary coalitions. Both approaches also take sequences of interactions as the units around which their empirical inquiries are organized. While rules governing interactions among actors are situational and mostly ad hoc, some general patterns do emerge over repeated sequences of interactions. These patterns are most evident in the degree of control over foreign policy outcomes and the spheres of co-operative action. In the initial phase, SBAs have full control over the implementation process. This is due to the limited involvement of SFAs and the focusing of policies on spheres of action which are the exclusive domain of SBAs. Examples include signing international agreements, taking part in intergovernmental organizations, or providing troops for peacekeeping operations. In a fully evolved relationship, SFAs gain more autonomy and spheres of action expand to include areas such as humanitarian assistance and academic, professional, or cultural exchanges. As a result, control over foreign pol-

48 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 253.
49 Ibid., 249
50 Smith and Clarke, Foreign Policy Implementation, 171-72.
52 Cohen and Küpçü, "Privatizing Foreign Policy," 36.
icy outcomes become more diffuse. Implementation studies show that decision makers can influence outcomes by becoming more involved in the implementation process through "horizontally structured intermediate organizations" (HSIOs). From a post-international perspective, these organizations are SBAs which are specifically designed to work with SFAs, have an extensive network through their branches inside and outside the country, and receive donations from individuals and private organizations. Most governmental aid and rescue agencies occupy this middle ground.

Based on the above arguments, it is possible to discern four categories of interaction that change in terms of the actors involved, governmental control over outcomes, spheres of action, and timing. The first category comprises cooperative interaction between SFAs and SBAs. Cooperative interaction occurs when SBAs and SFAs directly cooperate in order to achieve a common goal. Although underlying motivations may change for each actor, their actions are congruent, i.e., they are in agreement about what needs to be done. In most cases, there is substantive SBA involvement, and governmental control over outcomes is high. Since it requires high SFA compliance, the common purpose of interaction is highlighted and joint SBA-SFA projects are frequent. Spheres of action are mostly humanitarian: poverty alleviation, development, education and health improvements, etc. Cooperative interaction mostly takes place in the initial stages of engagement between SBAs and SFAs. The second category is complementary interaction. In complementary interaction, SBAs and SFAs have different goals. This interaction type requires more involvement by SFAs as well as HSIOs. They do not actually work on the same project, but coordinate their activities. The spheres of action mostly comprise trade and investment and transportation. There is only moderate SBA involvement and governmental control over outcomes, which last is mostly achieved through HSIOs. The third category is supplementary interaction, where SFAs take on most of the responsibilities. There is minimal SBA involvement and control over outcomes. There may also be partial HSIO involvement, especially in the coordination of activities. The spheres of action are providing humanitarian/developmental aid, establishing mechanisms of intercultural exchange, as well as promoting private interests. The level of supplementary interactions

54 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 250.
55 Smith and Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation," 7.
56 The categories are adaptations of a similar categorization by Cohen and Küpçü, "Privatizing Foreign Policy," 4: direct engagement between states and non-state actors; selective engagement, or episodic burden sharing; NSAs circumventing states; conflictual relations; and agenda setting.
increases in the later sequences of action, as SFAs gain more experience and expand their networks.

On the other hand, SBAs and SFAs do not always see eye to eye on all foreign policy matters. Human rights groups, environmentalists, and business circles pose certain challenges to the formal foreign policies of states. These not only take the form of discursive actions, but also involve foreign policy behaviors which are not in line with the official position of states. Moreover, as noted earlier, SFAs may also impede SBAs' efforts to achieve their foreign policy goals by simply refusing to participate in foreign policy implementation. This form of conflictual interaction occurs when SFAs and SBAs challenge each other's foreign policy goals in fundamental ways. Spheres of contention include human rights and democracy. Either SFAs or SBAs may ultimately prevail, depending on the resources they allocate to the issue, and the domestic and/or international support they receive.

Post-international implementation of Turkey’s sub-Saharan Africa policy

a. Cooperative interaction:
Cooperative interaction between SFAs and SBAs consists of implementation phases during which the Turkish government and non-state organizations directly cooperate in order to achieve common goals. With respect to Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, the AKP government's goals of establishing new connections with African countries and creating new export markets correspond to the needs of small and medium-sized Anatolian businesses and faith-based Turkish NGOs endeavors to recreate links with Muslim communities in Africa. The collaboration is based on a convergence of goals that arise from different motivations. Whereas secular NGOs or government agencies employ a rights-based language in their actions, faith-based NGOs utilize the language of religious duty and obligation when explaining their involvement. For example, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) provides water and sanitation services as a contribution to African countries' development by preventing deaths from water-borne diseases, decreasing the daily burden of carrying water, and hence increasing the life quality of the people. As such, it is part of the organization's raison d'être. For Muslim religious organizations, providing access to water is commensurate with religious duties and teachings.


58 Atalay, "Civil Society as Soft Power," 176-177.
as cleanliness is seen as a religious duty, especially in Muslim purification rituals (*abdest*). Similarly, for the Turkish Red Crescent, food-aid programs are part of the organization’s official mission to provide health to those in need. For Muslim NGOs, it is imperative that every Muslim share his/her fortune with the poor by donating money for animal sacrifices around the world. Therefore, although government agencies’ missions are secular and Muslim NGOs are religiously inspired, there is a high degree of de facto convergence between their activities.

The spheres of action where most cooperative interaction takes place are consultation, humanitarian aid, and development. In most cases, there is substantive governmental involvement in terms of initiative, funding and coordination. Accordingly, governmental control over outcomes is high. Since cooperative interaction requires high compliance by SFAs, the common purpose of interaction is highlighted and joint SBA-SFA projects are frequent. These actions involve international meetings about sub-Saharan Africa, development and health promotion services in sub-Saharan Africa, and the education of students from sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, crisis-stricken countries which need the above services, such as Sudan and Somalia, become foreign policy targets in which cooperative engagement between SBAs and SFAs is most visible.

To establish consultative mechanisms, the Turkish government began an initiative to address the problems in Somalia by organizing two international conferences in May 2010 and on May 31–June 1, 2012. Even though the funding and logistics for these conferences were provided by the Turkish MFA, the international private sector, civil society, women’s groups, youth, and the Somalian diaspora were all encouraged to discuss how a stable peace could be brought to Somalia. The significance of SFA involvement was highlighted in the final declarations of the two conferences. In May 2011, Turkey also hosted the 4th United Nations Conference on the Least Developing Countries conference, again with the participation of Turkish and African business groups and civil society organizations. Over 400 participants from civil society took part in discussions. The final declaration expressed the need

---


for further association between private sector and political elites to provide development for the least developed countries. In May 2012, the Turkish government also organized the Turkey-Africa Media Forum to increase cooperation between Turkish and African media organizations as well as intercultural exchange between Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa. The event was a result of cooperative interaction between the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Press and Information (BYGM) and Africa Media Endeavor (AMI), a transnational NGO. The forum brought together 270 media representatives from 54 African countries, and led to agreement on a journalist exchange program under the auspices of the BYGM and AMI.

Regarding representation, cooperative interaction takes place between Turkey’s Honorary Consuls in sub-Saharan African states and the Turkish MFA. According to diplomatic routine, settled or accredited missions represent de facto states in a foreign land. Nevertheless, a given mission might occasionally not operate due to physical incapacities, such as geographical distances or international political conditions. In such circumstances, Honorary Consuls act on behalf of their state by collecting visa applications in target countries and cooperating with officially accredited missions in issuing them. Moreover, they also help to promote bilateral trade relations and cultural relations between the host country and the state which they represent.

Currently, fifty-four Turkish citizens represent thirty-one sub-Saharan African states in Turkey, and twenty-one sub-Saharan African citizens represent Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa. Honorary consuls are private individuals with personal links to foreign states. This interest may be economic, cultural, or intellectual. They agree to cooperate with foreign states by representing them in their home countries. Mostly Turkish businessmen, sub-Saharan African Honorary Consuls represent states that have no settled diplomatic missions in Turkey yet, such as Burkina Faso, Burundi, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Similarly, Turkey has been represented by sub-Saharan African citizens who are also mostly businessmen from states in which Turkey does not yet have

---

settled diplomatic missions, such as Eritrea, the Central African Republic, Benin, Botswana, Togo, Swaziland, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Congo. The Honorary Consuls are very significant because they are usually the initial point of contact between two countries. Most of the time, empowering honorary consuls precedes all other official and private interactions between the two countries. Moreover, assigning a foreign national with powers usually associated with the sovereign rights of a state (such as visa issuing) implies a high degree of mutual trust.

The Turkish government also cooperates with SFAs to provide development aid and health promotion services in sub-Saharan Africa. As the official aid agency of the Turkish government, TİKA operates as the intermediary organization. In 2001, TİKA was designated the sole coordinator of all Turkish development aid, which was previously allocated in an uncoordinated manner by various Turkish SBAs.

In 2005, TİKA opened its first office in Ethiopia, followed by offices in Senegal and Sudan. In 2005, Turkey’s overall official development assistance to Africa was $11.8 million, comprising 1.96 percent of total Turkish official aid and covering five sub-Saharan African countries, including Libya. From 2005 onwards, TİKA cooperated with several Turkish and African SFAs to allocate humanitarian assistance. By 2011, sub-Saharan Africa's share of Turkey's aid budget had risen to 22 percent, with $131.2 million.

For instance, the Africa Cataract Campaign initiated by TİKA and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İHH) in 2007 covers ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2009, similar projects have been initiated by TİKA and several other NGOs like Doctors of Hope, and the Kimse Yok Mu (“Is Anybody There?”) Association, as well as professional organizations like the Health Members Association

71 Ibid., 103.
The Anatolian Support of Healthy Life Association (ANSEDER), and the Aegean Health Volunteers Association (EGESADER). These projects have provided free health checkups, circumcisions, and cataract surgeries, as well as free medicines and medical supplies. In December 2012, the Deva Hospital was opened in Somalia through the cooperation between TİKA, the Aegean International Health Federation (ESAFED), and the Turkish Ministry of Health. Moreover, these health programs also cover the education of Somalian doctors and nurses by TİKA and ESAFED.

Furthermore, under its program to provide clean water, TİKA began to open water wells in Ethiopia with the cooperation of General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ). Later in 2007, TİKA began to cooperate with the İstanbul Municipality (İBB) and İstanbul Chamber of Commerce (İÇOC). Cooperation between TİKA and SFAs continued to develop as more SFA partners like the Kimse Yok Mu Association and İHH joined TİKA in drilling water wells in several sub-Saharan African states. This form of long term humanitarian and sanitary projects introduces wider segments of the two societies to each other and can be considered as an important point of contact between Turkish and sub-Saharan African people.

Another example of cooperative engagement is offering scholarships to African students. Until recently, undergraduate and graduate scholarships to students from all African states have been offered by the government agencies with limited involvement from SFAs. 6280 students from sub-Saharan Africa have been enrolled in Turkish universities between 2000 and 2012. More than two thousand of these students were

granted Turkish government scholarships. In 2010-2011, 390 scholarships were granted to sub-Saharan African students.\textsuperscript{85}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan African students as % of all foreign students in Turkish universities</th>
<th>Number of sub-Saharan African students' countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2012, the Directorate of Turkish Diaspora and Related Communities (YTB) introduced a special Turkey-Africa Scholarship Program, for which only African students are eligible. Turkish universities, civil society organizations, and public bodies like the Higher Education Council (YÖK), the Ministry of National Education (MEB), YTB and TİKA work together to provide educational opportunities for sub-Saharan African students. To publicize the scholarships, SBAs like MEB and YTB worked together with SFAs, like the Yunus Emre Foundation and the Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (Foundation of Turkey's Religious Affairs), as well as thirteen civil society organizations, thirteen high schools, and two universities in fifteen sub-Saharan African countries.\textsuperscript{86} As a result, more than six thousand sub-Saharan African students applied for the scholarships. With 2,080 applicants, Ethiopia has become the country


\textsuperscript{86} Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (Directorate of Turkish Diaspora and Related Communities), official website, "Türkiye Scholarships 2012-2013 Introduction, Application and Evaluation Presentation." Available at http://www.ytb.gov.tr/images/genel/yayinlar/kitaplar/2012_2013_Tanitim_Basvuru_ve_Degerlendirme_Sunumu.pdf
with the third-most applicants, after Afghanistan and Pakistan. Overall, out of the 3,916 international students granted a scholarship, 878 are from sub-Saharan Africa. With 301 students, Somalia has been the country with most recipients. With these offers, a larger number of sub-Saharan African students were granted scholarships. It is also important to note that the number of recipient sub-Saharan African countries also increased from 25 in 2000-2001 to 43 in the 2012-2013 academic year.

In its first instances, SFA-SBA engagement takes a cooperative form because SFAs that are less experienced in transnational activities often need a SBA partner to introduce them to foreign countries and assist them in organizing their efforts internationally, as well as acquiring permissions from target countries. This has been especially true in health campaigns and water well projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, working in crisis situations requires effective security arrangements, which can only be provided by traditional interstate cooperation. In subsequent campaigns, the SFAs take more initiative, and begin to operate more independently, as has been the case with Turkish humanitarian NGOs in Africa.

b. Complementary interaction:
Complementary interaction involves SBAs and SFAs acting in coordination or loose cooperation but to achieve independent objectives. Most complementary engagement involves business and trade actors who act in line with official foreign policy objectives but with the open intention to make private gain. This kind of engagement benefits SBAs and SFAs in different ways. While pursuing their private interests, SFAs also gain access to host SBAs, influencing their future decisions and pressuring them to implement policies in due time and manner. SBAs, on the other hand, benefit from private funding and legitimize their policies and increase their credibility in the eyes of target countries. In complementary interaction, governmental control over SFAs’ actions is moderate to low. Examples include official visits with mixed delegations, international conferences, and the operations of Turkish Airlines (THY) in sub-Saharan Africa.

Regarding official visits to sub-Saharan Africa, complementary interaction involves mixed delegations composed of Turkish state authorities, private businessmen, academics, and artists. To promote bilateral diplo-

---

87 Interview with Mehmet Akif Altan, the MÜSİAD Bursa member, Ankara, January 10, 2013. Altan said that the primary consideration of businessmen participating in these international visits is to gain access to government officials to further their domestic business interests. An interest in doing business in sub-Saharan Africa usually develops after the visit. In subsequent visits, they convey their demands to government officials, such as proper implementation of trade agreements and increased speed of transactions.
matic relations, the Turkish government has been paying regular official visits to sub-Saharan African states. While the primary aim of these visits is to sign cooperation agreements in areas such as trade, transportation, visa regulations, health, and tourism, an increasing number of these visits have also been opened to participation by SFAs such as business leaders and artists. In this context, whereas state authorities meet with their counterparts, business leaders and artists accompanying the Turkish authorities on these visits follow their own agendas. Through special programs designed by Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), business elites have been seeking ways to start, review, or develop their related investments in local markets. Academics may gain first-hand knowledge of Turkey’s policies in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas artists increase their prestige and popularity as well as engage in humanitarian activities.

A closer look at the high-level visits from Turkey to sub-Saharan African states in 2009-2013 period shows that the number and type of accompanying SFAs increased. In presidential visits to Kenya and Tanzania in February 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Gül has been accompanied by SBAs such as the transportation and state ministers as well as SFAs, including fifty-five businessmen from the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) and several journalists. In his visits to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon in March 2010, the number of accompanying businessmen rose to seventy, while Presidential visits to Ghana and Gabon in March 2011 included more than a hundred Turkish businessmen and academics.

It is possible to discern a similar pattern in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visits to sub-Saharan Africa. In his visit to Somalia on August 19, 2011, he was accompanied by music artists Ajda Pekkan, Nihat Doğan, Sertab Erener and Muazzez Ersoy. This visit was unique since it was the first time the Turkish state’s foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa sought to work with Turkish artists. This interaction has led to more independent actions by artists about Somalia: Erener and Pekkan both gave concerts, income from which was donated to Somalia, whereas

88 Correspondance with the Marmara Businessmen’s Association.
Doğan declared that he would donate half the income he earned from his subsequent album to Somalia. On his January 2013 visits to Gabon, Niger, and Senegal, Erdoğan invited more than 300 business leaders. It is reasonable to expect that these mixed-delegation visits will continue as Turkey implements its decision to increase its trade volume with sub-Saharan Africa to $50 billion by 2015.

In addition to visits from Turkey, visits from sub-Saharan African officials to Turkey are also scenes of complementary interaction between SBAs and SFAs. The MFA and the Ministry of Economy act in coordination with SFAs such as DEIK, The Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (TIM) and TUSKON to enable visiting sub-Saharan African statesmen and businessmen to attend multilateral business conferences, bilateral trade and investment forums, and workshop breakfasts organized by business groups. These events are organized and funded by SFAs, but are also attended and supported by SBAs. For example, TUSKON and TIM have organized Turkey-Africa Trade Bridges since 2006 in order to bring African and Turkish business and political elites together in six trade summits. Since 2011, more than ten bilateral trade forums have been organized by TUSKON, all of which were attended by high-level officials from sub-Saharan African states. TUSKON also cooperates with Turkish MPs. A recent example is the meeting organized by AKP Zonguldak Deputy Ercan Candan, a member of Turkey-Gambia Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group, which brought together TUSKON businessmen and the Gambian ambassador to initiate a project to build and sell fishing ships to the Gambia, Mauritania, and Senegal.

Another form of complementary interaction takes place at international conferences organized by Turkish SBAs and SFAs. Since 2005, the Turkish-Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM) has been organizing annual Turkey-Africa Congresses where academics, experts,
and business groups meet to discuss the role of Turkey vis-à-vis the contemporary problems of Africa. The first of these congresses was supported by several SBAs, such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) and TİKA. The later congresses, however, were organized without the direct involvement of SBAs. In addition to these congresses, TASAM organized a Turkey-Africa Civil Society Organization Forum in August 2008, concurrently with the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit. This forum provided opportunities for SFAs to extend their network and share ideas and experiences, leading to the establishment of the International Development and Cooperation Platform of Non-governmental Organizations (USTKIÎ).

The African operations of THY can also be categorized as complementary interaction between the Turkish government and non-state actors. As the private national airline company of Turkey, THY has been a strong actor in implementing Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa by starting direct flights to several regional cities since 2006. Moreover, the company also shares the responsibility of issuing Turkish visas to sub-Saharan African businessmen who already have Schengen or USA visas in their passports if they buy their plane tickets to Turkey from THY offices. Thus the company both promotes its business and coordinates with the MFA in the visa issuing process.

c. Supplementary interaction

The third category of interaction between SFAs and SBAs in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa is supplementary interaction. This takes place between SFAs and SBAs, when SFAs initiate, fund, and implement policies which are in line with official foreign policy. SBA involvement is mostly minimal and in the form of indirect support, such as providing the necessary legal and in-
frastructural background, tax deductions or exemptions, exemption from prior fundraising permission, and Public Benefit Status. Among the SFAs active in sub-Saharan Africa, the primary SFA recipients of such support are İHH, the Kimse Yok Mu Association, the Turkish Red Crescent and the Diyanet Foundation. Moreover, SBAs give moral support to SFAs through occasional visits and symbolic awards. Accordingly, governmental control over outcomes is low. Despite limited SBA involvement, supplementary activities are mostly inspired by earlier cooperative or complementary interactions with the SBAs, as apparent in their previous involvement in similar projects implemented in direct cooperation with governmental agencies. This is especially visible in spheres like humanitarian and developmental aid.

TİKA's extension of its activities to sub-Saharan Africa began in 2005, when it opened its first office in sub-Saharan Africa. Its activities are arranged in three specific development programs concerning agriculture, health, and professional training. These projects were initially implemented in cooperation with other SFAs such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. Incrementally, Turkish and sub-Saharan African SFAs have begun to cooperate with TİKA in its projects. As their network and know-how have improved, these SFAs have initiated independent humanitarian and developmental projects. In other words, these supplementary activities are mostly spin-offs from cooperative or complementary interaction between SFAs and SBAs.

Before TİKA began its operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the activities of SFAs were ad hoc, single country emergency aid campaigns in the form of supplying food, clothing and medicine, mostly at times of crisis or religious holidays. In 2005, development aid from SFAs to sub-Saharan African countries amounted to $2 million. In 2011, it rose to $120 million, making sub-Saharan Africa the focal point of all SFA aid. Traditionally, these campaigns were organized by Diyanet Foundation, an organization which is directly linked to an SBA, the

---

107 Ibid.
Directorate of Religious Affairs, with the cooperation of Turkish Red Crescent and the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD). For example, the Diyanet Foundation sent 222.5 million to Somalia through a campaign it organized. It also sent forty certified butchers to provide food to eighteen sub-Saharan African states for Ramadan. These campaigns have generated interest among the general public, and other individuals and organizations have created similar initiatives, including Ramadan campaigns by the İHH, food assistance to Somalia from the Aksaray Businessmen Association in 2011, financial assistance from the Muhammediye Taşköprü Foundation and the Bodrum Businessmen Association.

Such campaigns have also evolved into more sustainable and long-term development assistance in the form of construction and infrastructure projects. By 2011, these long term projects amounted to 60 percent of all SFA aid. For example, since 2005, İHH and Kimse Yok Mu have taken part in TİKA projects, such as building schools, providing medical check-ups, and drilling water wells. Initial cooperation with TİKA provided know-how and new networking opportunities for these SFAs and helped them accelerate and extend their activities. For example, according to the İHH report “Hayat Bulan Projeler,” İHH had no construction projects in sub-Saharan Africa until 2005. After 2005, the number of target countries increased to twelve, with more than sixty construction projects. While it has been argued that several health NGOs were operating in sub-Saharan Africa before 2006, the Gönüllüler (“Vol-

108 Ibid.
109 Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Services in France official website, http://www.fransaditib.com/2Syf=18&Hbr=212709&_D%4C%4BoYANET-%C4%8BYER%E4%8E%EB%BA%CD%&EKBANLI%C4%9EC%99%96EININ-BA%C5%9ELATTI%C4%9EBI-KAMPANYADAN-AFR%C4%80KAYA-222-M%4C%4BoLYON-416-B%C4%80N-TL.
115 İhsan Comak, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy to Africa and the Effect of Projects Which Were Implemented by Turkish NGOs Working on Health Sector in Support of TİKA, to This Policy,” Avrasya Etüdleri 40 (2011-2): 201-222.
unteers") platform for professional health associations reports that the earliest project—a free circumcision and cataract operation campaign in Niger—began in 2006. Over time, such independent initiatives began to increase and the network of these organizations started to include other local and international SFAs. These included the Zamzam Foundation in Somalia, and the Qatar Red Crescent, who helped build a Tropical Disease Center in Somalia, as well as other Turkish SFAs like the Cansuyu Association, the Çare Association, the Kimse Yok Mu Association, the İstanbul International Brotherhood and Solidarity Association. In addition, Worldwide Doctors has initiated the “Africa Life Operation” project with the cooperation of the Bezm-i Alem University of İstanbul, and TİKA has initiated an agricultural development project in sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish SFAs have only recently extended their services to agricultural development in the form of building irrigation canals and establishing farms in the region.

Supplementary interaction can also emanate from private business interests. Complementary interactions between SBAs and SFAs have sparked independent interest on the part of Turkish companies towards Africa. Even though they work independently from the state, these companies have been the primary actors implementing Turkey’s 2003 Strategy for Enhancing Trade and Economic Relations with African Countries. In 2011, total direct investment from Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa has reached $191.6 million. For example, the VTG Holding, founded by three Turkish businessmen, operates three coal mines in South Africa. Again, another Turkish corporation called Pet Oil

Ltd. will begin oil prospecting activities in Uganda pending permission from the Ugandan Ministry of Energy.\(^{128}\) Furthermore, Latek Holding, already a part of the Senegalese cashew nut production sector, also became interested in the Kenyan construction sector.\(^{129}\) While Turkey’s Gürmen Group has signed an energy delivery agreement with Ghanaian state,\(^{130}\) the Çetin Group has won the rights to operate the International Mogadishu Airport.\(^{131}\) Similarly, BEKO has entered the Tanzanian white goods market,\(^{132}\) and Florence Nightingale has decided to open a branch in Nigeria.\(^{133}\) African corporations have also opened some consultancy companies in Turkey, such as African Innovation and Development Ankara, which promotes bilateral trade and investment between Turkish businessmen and those in Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Mali. This business interest took a more institutionalized form with joint business councils. Turkish business councils were founded with Ethiopia in 2008, with Kenya in 2010, with Nigeria, Tanzania, Mauritania, Ghana, Uganda and Angola in 2011, and with Gambia and Rwanda in 2012.\(^{134}\) Moreover, the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Union of African Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture Professions (UACCIAP) have met to strengthen cooperation and establish a Turkey-Africa Chamber.\(^{135}\)

The cultural sphere is the area where supplementary interaction in Turkish foreign policy is most visible. SFAs such as university programs and think tanks have contributed to state initiatives to provide an academic background on Africa. In 2006, the African Studies Center opened in the private Kadir Has University.\(^{136}\) It organizes several conferences on subjects ranging from African migrants in Turkey to Turkey-Africa relations. Similarly, in 2008, Ankara University opened the Afri-
can Studies Center (AÇAUM). AÇAUM invites professors to lecture on sub-Saharan Africa in its master’s program, and past visitors include Dr. Nancy Walker and Dr. Getie Gelaye. It also publishes a monthly bulletin, “Afrika Gündemi” (The African Agenda), and published two issues of a biannual scholarly journal, Afrika. AÇAUM organizes cultural events about African poetry, film, and literature, as well as occasional seminars on African countries. Following AÇAUM, the private İzmir Economy University and Kirkkareli University opened African Studies Centers in 2009 and 2011 respectively.

Moreover, Africa branches have been set up in established think tanks to specifically cover Africa. TASAM opened its African branch in 2004, renamed the TASAM Africa Institute in 2006. TASAM has published regularly reports on sub-Saharan African countries (Afrika Günlinüğü), and has organized seven Turkey-Africa Congresses since 2005. While the first four of these congresses were supported by SBAs, the latter three were more independent activities, with the participation and cooperation of several NGOs from African countries. The issues covered have also become more diverse; while the first congresses concentrated more on intergovernmental relations and organizations, later congresses were more focused on issues related to Africa and inter-societal cooperation. Moreover, the last two congresses were organized in Sudan, and in Ghana. One of the most important consequences of these congresses was the formation of USTKİP in 2008, which brought together over ninety SFAs from Africa as well as eighty-five from Turkey. Indeed, since 2009, USTKİP has become the primary partner of TASAM in organizing Turkey-Africa Congresses.

Cultural interaction has not only been limited to academic initiatives. Civil society organizations have emerged to promote intercultural exchange as well as promote humanitarian projects, such as the Africa Brotherhood and Cooperation Association, founded in 2010. Alongside the Somali aid concerts and pledges by prominent musical artists mentioned previously, there have been other cultural initiatives. For instance, the art gallery İstanbul Modern organized an Africa Film Festi-

---

140 Ibid.
val in 2012. Furthermore, Turkish media and private cultural institutions have also become more interested in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Turkish education sector has not only accepted African students, but also reached out into sub-Saharan Africa by setting up private Turkish nurseries, primary schools, colleges and, in one case, a university. Opened by private businessmen, these schools are usually referred to as part of Islamic Gulenist movement. The earliest of these schools were opened in countries where the Turkish government already had a presence, such as Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Nevertheless, a closer look at the years of opening of these schools shows that they were opened in three waves corresponding to Turkey's official declaration of interest in sub-Saharan Africa. The first wave begins in 1998, the year of the Opening Action Plan, when Turkish schools were opened in five new sub-Saharan African countries. In 2003, with the introduction of Turkey's Strategic Plan, Turkish schools were opened in five more countries. After the declaration of the Turkey-Africa Year in 2005, schools spread to six more countries in 2006. While Turkey's opening of embassies and honorary consulates often preceded the establishment of these schools, there are currently Turkish schools in six sub-Saharan African countries where Turkey has no settled diplomatic mission (Rwanda, Malawi, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and the Central African Republic). African statesmen refer to these schools as informal embassies for Turkey and praise their quality of education. Although these schools are run...
by private entrepreneurs, Turkish officials give moral support to these schools through visits during their stay in sub-Saharan Africa and symbolic support through attendance at their events. Such SBA support for these schools might have accelerated their spread into the continent.

Table 2: First Turkish schools in sub-Saharan African countries by year opened

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First Turkish school in country</th>
<th>Year opened</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Yavuz Selim Turkish-Senegalese College¹</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Feza Boys Secondary²</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudanese Turkish School³</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Light Academy⁴</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigerian Turkish International College⁵</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Republic</td>
<td>Star International Primary and High School⁶</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Turkish Light Academy⁷</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Bedir High School⁸</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Galaxy International School⁹</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Complexe Scolaire International¹⁰</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>College La Lumiere International¹¹</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>College Horizon¹²</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>College Horizon International¹³</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>College Citadelle¹⁴</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Yaounde Amity International School¹⁵</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Willow International School¹⁶</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Complexe Scolaire Bedir¹⁷</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Nejashi Ethio-Turkish International Schools¹⁸</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Burj El Ilm¹⁹</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>International Central African Turkish School¹⁰</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>L’ecole Internationale Ufuk²¹</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Ecole Internationale Zodiac²²</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Groupe Scolaire Safak</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Safak Turkish School²³</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Liberian-Turkish Light International School²⁴</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>L’ecole Internationale Turco-Gabonaise²⁵</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Colégio Esperança Internacional²⁶</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Yavuz Selim Educational Institutions Anatolian School²⁷</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Horizon Schools²⁸</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Bedir Academy²⁹</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Hope Kids Academy²⁰</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Confictual interaction

Even though most interactions between state and non-state actors are harmonious, there are a few cases where SBAs and SFAs disagree on
issues regarding Turkey’s foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Conflictual interaction occurs when either SBAs or SFAs try to limit each other’s room for maneuver based on divergent views about how Turkish foreign policy should be conducted.

The first example of conflictual interaction is related to Turkey’s foreign policy in Sudan. Several SFAs challenge Turkey’s official foreign policy of supporting Sudanese President Omar al-Basheer against claims of genocide by the international community. Before his visits to Turkey in 2008, \(^\text{151}\) an umbrella organization of Turkish human rights groups named the Coalition for the International Criminal Court issued a press release urging the Turkish government to carry out the ICC’s arrest warrants for Ahmed Muhammed Harun (former Sudanese Minister of Interior) and Ali Muhammed Ali Abdal Rahman (senior Janjaweed commander) and to pressure al-Basheer. In 2009, the ICC also issued an arrest warrant for al-Basheer, \(^\text{152}\) which led to strong resistance from Turkish non-state actors against the Turkish government’s invitation for the Sudanese President to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting. \(^\text{153}\) The Turkey-based Human Rights Agenda Association and Amnesty International Turkey both condemned the invitation of al-Basheer to Turkey. \(^\text{154}\) Moreover, al-Basheer’s visit to Turkey was harshly criticized by columnists in Turkish newspapers. \(^\text{155}\) The Turkish government declared that they had no intention of arresting al-Basheer. Under pressure from the international community, however, Turkish decision makers did decide to lower the profile of the subject, undertaking some “quiet diplomacy” \(^\text{156}\) which culminated in al-Basheer’s decision not to attend the OIC meeting.


A second example of conflictual interaction between SBAs and SFAs can be observed with respect to Turkish foreign policy on Somalia. On July 27, 2013, the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was bombed by the Al-Shabaab radical Islamist terrorist group, killing one Turkish Special Forces officer and injuring three others. Al-Shabaab argued that the Turkish government was intervening in Somalia's affairs and "bolster[ing] the apostate regime and attempt[ing] to suppress the establishment of Islamic Shari'ah." The group also accused Turkish officials of plotting against Somali people and "attack[ing] the home of the Muslims."157 The Turkish Parliament Speaker Cemil Çiçek argued that the attack was directly aimed at disrupting Turkey's humanitarian actions in Somalia,158 while the Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ stated that Al Shabab could not stop Turkey's actions. Nevertheless, the attack led to increased security measures, which implies that Turkey's foreign policy implementation in Somali has become even more challenging.159 From a theoretical point of view, the attack was important since it arose not between state and non-state actors in Turkey, but between the Turkish state and a Somalian non-state actor.

There are also instances where SBAs try to impede SFAs activities concerning Turkey's relations with sub-Saharan African countries and citizens. The academic journal Afrika published by AÇAUM was suspended by the Ankara University administration in early 2013, amid allegations of government pressure.160 The third issue of the journal had been dedicated to Turkey’s policy towards African immigrants and refugees. It has been argued that a case study criticizing Turkey’s handling of Nigerian citizen Festus Okey’s death in a police station was the catalyst for the administration’s attempts to censor the journal and its subsequent suspension.161 In response, AÇAUM researchers protested the general inclination to see research centers as units existing to reproduce the views of the bureaucracy, arguing that academics should contend with those colleagues who operate within the confines of a bureaucratic

mindset. Unlike in the first two cases, here it was the state actor that intervened to impede the activities of the non-state actor.

The conflictual cases between state and non-state actors in Turkish foreign policy on sub-Saharan Africa have two implications: Controversy over Al Bashier and the Somalia attack show that Turkish opening up to sub-Saharan Africa has not been received positively by all and that Turkish and African non-state actors are able to make it difficult for Turkey to implement its foreign policy. The Afrika journal incident, on the other hand, demonstrates that the government, relying on its legal and institutional prerogatives, can still impede the actions of non-state actors whenever these actions are deemed detrimental to the implementation of its sub-Saharan Africa foreign policy.

Conclusion
Despite an early call to redirect some of the attention from decision making to the implementation process where foreign policy is enacted, there are still few studies that focus on foreign policy implementation. \(^{162}\) In this study, we attempted to redress this lack of emphasis by concentrating on Turkey’s implementation of its sub-Saharan African foreign policy. Employing a post-international perspective, we analyzed the interaction of SBAs and SFAs in various spheres and observed that SFAs take on more responsibilities as the relations with the foreign policy target intensify.

Apart from taking foreign policy decisions, SBAs set the rules by signing trade, visa, and transportation agreements with target actors, providing a suitable background for intensified relations. They also sometimes provide SFAs with public funds and expertise. Nevertheless, in the later phases of implementation, SFAs become more self-reliant and taken more initiative. Because of increased know-how and extended transnational networks, Turkish SFAs have become increasingly proactive, covering more elusive spheres like intercultural exchange. Such proactive and independent behavior seems to be a spin-off from previous experience in collaborative projects between SFAs and SBAs. The SFAs which had more experience in collaborating with the SBAs also became more active in taking initiative in the later periods compared to other SFAs with less collaborative experience.

Our findings support the post-international argument that SFAs, with their non-hierarchical and less bureaucratic organization, are more adaptable to different circumstances and more efficient in utilizing new technologies, leading to an increase in their overall involvement in for-

\(^{162}\) Brighi and Hill, “Implementation and Behavior.”
eign policy. Nevertheless, greater collaboration with SBAs increased their access to target countries and helped them to broaden their range of activities. If the trend continues, it is reasonable to expect that Turkish SBAs will become more dependent on SFAs as the breadth of issues covered and their efficiency and flexibility increase in the coming years. On the other hand, conflictual interactions are also more probable than ever as the consequences of Turkey’s foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa become more visible and available to scrutiny by wider domestic and international publics.

References
Volkan Ipek and Conca Biltekin


Coom, ihsan. "Turkey’s Foreign Policy to Africa and the Effect of Projects Which Were Implemented by Turkish NGOs Working on Health Sector in Support of TiKA, to this Policy." Avrasya Etüdleri 40 (2011-12): 201-22.


—. “First Turkish School to be Opened in Zambia.” November 13, 2009.

—. “Turkish School is Like a Diplomatic Mission in Burkina Faso.” November 24, 2009.


