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Hybrid Hegemonic Masculinity of the EU before and after the Arab Spring: A Gender Analysis of Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations

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ABSTRACT In the academic literature on EU–southern Mediterranean relations, a focal point of neglect has been the gendered dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This article argues that the Euro-Mediterranean space has been formed within the gendered global West/non-West relations with the purpose of promoting the West’s security interests. Euro-Mediterranean security relations, thus, embody a gendered power hierarchy between the hybrid hegemonic masculinity of the EU (bourgeois-rational and citizen-warrior) and the subordinate (both feminized and hypermasculinized) southern neighbourhood. In addition, it shows that following the Arab Spring the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo by reconstructing these gendered power relations. This gender analysis contributes to the literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations through its specific focus on the (re)construction processes of gendered identities within the West/non-West context in tandem with the EU’s competing notions of security.

In the literature on relations between the European Union (EU) and southern Mediterranean countries (Euro-Mediterranean relations), the issue of gender has appeared sporadically as one of the several dimensions of the EU’s policy towards its southern neighbourhood (Debusscher, 2012; Kausch & Youngs, 2009; Lister & Carbone, 2006; Schmid, 2004). Several studies introduce the issue from the perspective of the southern Mediterranean by evaluating the ostensible contributions of feminist civil society in pursuing a more substantial democracy promotion agenda in North Africa (for example, Jüinemann, 2002). Yet a gender perspective indicates a more major and deeper gap. In the literature, apart from a few studies which argue in favour of gendering security as a way of better realization of ‘human security’ or ‘soft security’ (Harders, 2003; Jüinemann, 2003), gender analysis of the security relations, processes and structures in the Euro-Mediterranean area remains weak.
Simply put, relevant studies have almost always neglected the fact that Euro-Mediterranean security relations are *gendered*. This entails that power operates through the construction of hierarchical hybrid gendered identities with the purpose of promoting certain security interests as an embodiment of global West/non-West relations.

This article will problematize Euro-Mediterranean security relations by situating it within global West/non-West relations and its gendered construction. It will be argued that a hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space has been constructed through feminizing and hypermasculinizing the southern Mediterranean in order to justify the West’s intervention in the region and to promote EU security interests. This leads to hyperfeminization of individuals and societies and to subordination of their security concerns to those of the EU. Although the Arab Spring emerged as a process in which individuals and societies resisted the mechanisms that hindered their security, the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo by preserving gendered power relations. The first theoretical section of this article will discuss the operationalizations of the theory of masculinities particularly within the context of West/non-West relations. The purpose is to examine how different masculinities are constructed in relation to different notions of security. This helps to explain the hybridity of the Euro-Mediterranean space. Based on this theoretical foundation, the second section will perform a feminist reading of the Euro-Mediterranean security relations since its institutionalization in the 1995 Barcelona Process. Specifically, it will analyse how power relations have been (re)constructed through gendered identities with regard to EU notions of security. In the final section, the analysis will direct its scope towards post-Arab Spring EU reactions and will examine the extent to which the EU is reiterating the power hierarchy.

The gender analysis will pursue three objectives. First, it aims to contribute to the growing literature on non-liberal security practices in liberal orders within the context of West/non-West relations. Laffey and Nadarajah (2012: 404) argue that this ‘has encompassed both liberal and non-liberal subjects and spaces, in Europe and its imperial and colonial extensions, generating practices and apparatuses of rule that are also hybrid in nature’. The present analysis explains this hybridity by revealing the complexities of gendered identities constructed through/within Euro-Mediterranean security relations. As Agathangelou (2013: 32) argues, global structures and their reiteration largely depend on gendering individuals, social groups, geographies and communities. Following this, it is argued that feminization and hypermasculinization are essential tools for the construction of the Euro-Mediterranean hybrid space. Second, this analysis aims to bring the gender dimension into the growing critical literature about Euro-Mediterranean security relations with a specific focus on the externalization process and its consequences. Agathangelou (2004) discusses the issue of sex trafficking in the Euro-Mediterranean area and the insecurities associated with it. This analysis will broaden the gender perspective by including new issues such as democracy promotion and counterterrorism in the new framework of hybridity of masculinities, and by specifically focusing on how the EU constructs a Euro-Mediterranean space by recourse to gender hierarchies. Finally, this discussion aims to evaluate whether,
following the Arab Spring, there has been a change within the gendered spatial construction of the Euro-Mediterranean.

**Masculinities and Security: (Re)Production of Power Relations in the West/non-West Context**

Some feminists argue that in global politics, power does not solely operate through a single dichotomy between masculinity and femininity. Understanding and problematizing global power relations require a conception of gender that transcends the dichotomy between single/universal dominant masculinity and subordinated femininity (Zalewski, 1998, 2010: 37–40). Especially with the emergence of Third World feminism which successfully examines western and non-western masculinities in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Mohanty, 2006), many feminists start to focus on ‘the politics of masculinity as a contested field of power moves and resistances’ (Hooper, 1998: 29). In this contested field, different masculinities interact; some of them hold dominating positions, while others are marginalized. How power is institutionalized in and through gendered practices, and for whom the gendered relations of domination work, can be grasped comprehensively by extending the analytical scope to discuss masculinity as a contingent, fluid, multidimensional and pluralistic phenomenon (Beasley, 2008: 87).

Therefore, understanding the relations between different masculinities has become central for feminism, which aims to reveal the gendered dimension of power relations and thus transform them (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2011: 227). The gendered hierarchy of multiple masculinities has enabled feminist IR scholars to approach masculinities along three lines: historicization of masculinities, hierarchy of masculinities within the context of West/non-West relations, and contending security notions in relation to different masculinities.

Firstly, IR feminists examine how masculinities have been historically transformed and, therefore, evolved to survive by being constitutive to political, social and economic conditions. For the purposes of this analysis, two models of masculinity should be explained. ‘The citizen-warrior masculinity’ model carries strong patriarchal elements (such as domination and control) combined with aggressiveness and materialistic power use in order to secure what is considered as the domestic. In ‘the bourgeois-rationalist model’, on the other hand, ‘superior intellect and personal integrity is valued over physical strength or bravery’ (Hooper, 2001: 98; see also Hooper, 1998). By having an enlightened self-interest, patriarchal domination of others is overlaid by guidance and persuasion. In this sense, it is more egalitarian and democratic, and also less aggressive. Emanating from the Enlightenment’s moral and political philosophy, the emergence and gradual construction of the hegemony of the bourgeois-rational model points to the contingency of masculinities (Hooper, 2001: 97). These masculinities can occupy ‘the hegemonic position’ over other ‘subordinated’ masculinities (Connell, 2005: 71).

The contingency and historicity of masculinities leads some feminists in International Relations (IR) to question the ontology of hegemonic masculinity: if
masculinities are constantly in production (constitutive of subjectivities), is it possible to ascertain any type of masculinity as hegemonic (Eichler, 2011)? It is indeed the case that hegemonic and subordinated masculinities often take odd forms in global politics depending on social, political and economic conditions, while defying a monolithic and timeless analysis of masculinities (see Elder, 2005; Munn, 2008). However, as postcolonial feminists forcefully show, contingency of masculinities does not necessarily mean that we can dismiss global political and economic structures that produce gendered individuals, societies and states in the context of West/non-West relations. This structural dimension sometimes manifests itself as a ‘liberal international order’ which feminizes the non-West, and therefore reproduces the hegemony of the West over non-western states, societies and individuals (Ling, 2002). It is sometimes referred to as ‘neo-colonialism’, which reproduces hierarchical power relations deriving from race, gender, sexuality and class globally (Agathangelou & Ling, 2009: 2).

Secondly, as gender ‘is unavoidably involved with other social structures’ (Connell, 2005: 75), the analytical focus on the relational dimension of masculinities has paved the way for studying the global constitution of gendered identities and other identities including race, class and sex. In feminist IR literature, these complex relations manifest as West/non-West, North/South, citizen/non-citizen, heterosexual/homosexual, white/non-white, and capitalist/non-capitalist (Han & Ling, 1998; Hooper, 2001; Kronsell, 2005; Ling, 2000; Ouzgane & Coleman, 1998). Gender is instrumental to constructing these dichotomies where ‘the other’ is represented as subordinated to ‘the self’, which feminizes or hypermasculinizes ‘the other’. For the purposes of this analysis, hierarchical relations between masculinities in global politics are specifically taken in the context of West/non-West relations. The power hierarchy between West and non-West is constructed and reconstructed through hypermasculinizing and feminizing the non-West, which is reproduced as ‘subordinate’ to the West. In the case of hypermasculinization, the non-West is represented as authoritarian, barbaric, violent, reactionary, irrational (or sometimes possessing ‘cold rationality’) (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004). Feminization of the non-West, on the other hand, constructs it as passive, emotional and weak (Han & Ling, 1998: 60–62). The non-West, therefore, becomes ‘the other’ of the West (Doty, 1996; Spurr, 1993). This self/other identity construction through the gendered representation of the non-West is essential for the spatial construction of the non-West as an underdeveloped, uncivilized, non-modern geography that requires the West’s intervention and penetration for its re-ordering (Slater, 2004: 223). Hence, the non-West as geographical space is produced and instrumentalized for the political, economic and social reproduction of the West within the West/non-West gendered power hierarchy.

Situating Euro-Mediterranean relations within the West/non-West gendered power hierarchies, since the mid-1990s the EU’s policies at multiple levels have spatially constructed a southern neighbourhood that constantly needs the EU’s political guidance and financial tools as a hypermasculinized and feminized region. This analysis will specifically look at how the southern neighbourhood of the EU as
This leads us to the third point. The third dimension of the analysis of multiple masculinities unpacks the interaction of notions of security with the construction of hierarchical gendered identities in West/non-West relations. Political identities that represent masculinities are constructed, consolidated or transformed in relation to the security notions of political actors. A masculine identity based on the citizen-warrior model is constitutive to the (neo)realist notion of security feeding into statism, inside/outside dichotomy and militarism. Aggressiveness in order to secure ‘the domestic’ and the values inside the borders is accepted as a norm (Hooper, 2001: 103–105). The bourgeois-rational model of masculinity, on the other hand, has a more democratic and liberal approach to security. This type of masculinity manifests in liberal transnationalism, as opposed to the Machiavellian world of (neo)realism (Hooper, 2001: 103–105). Hence its security notion revolves around a liberal-pluralist approach. Democratization and promotion of human rights (and the establishment of a free-market economy as a means to achieve this) are crucial components of the pursuit of security not only domestically but also internationally. Therefore, political actors adopting this masculinity aim to secure themselves by promoting liberal values outside their borders and by being a model for others (see Tickner, 1992).

How does the security notions/masculinities nexus work in the context of West/non-West relations?

Notions of security (meaning ideas and practices about what is to be secured and how it is to be secured) are constitutive to the construction processes of hegemonic western and subordinate non-western masculine identities. The spatial construction of the non-West through feminizing and hypermasculinizing is practised with the trajectory of promoting the West’s security interests. This means that representations of the non-West are constitutive to the notions of security in the West. Hypermasculine representations of the non-West as an excessively violent, barbaric, irrational space produce security notions that prioritize domination and militarization as responses to the violent other. Feminization of the non-West is also a threat to the West’s security because of its incapacity to perform or failure to keep up with the modern, democratic, ‘western’ state. For example, this ‘failure’ provided a fertile ground for communism to take root during the cold war (Slater, 2004: 124). In contemporary global politics, non-western states are sometimes represented as a source of fundamentalist terrorism (Biswa, 2002), and sometimes as a source of ‘illegal migrants’ with their peripheral economies (Agathangelou, 2004: 106–110). In both cases, the West is the referent of security. An interesting dimension this analysis reveals is that while the gendered non-West is represented as a threat to the West, the latter sometimes intentionally feminizes and hypermasculinizes the former to pursue its security interests. It will be shown how the non-West in the form of the southern neighbourhood of the EU is spatially constructed and instrumentalized as an agent of western security through gendered representations.

The exploration of the mutually constitutive relationship between the construction of gendered identities and notions of security unpacks Euro-Mediterranean security relations. Since the institutionalization of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EU’s
masculine identity (European, liberal, proactive, father, but sometimes aggressive) vis-à-vis that of North Africa (non-European, authoritarian, reactive, son) has been built upon reflecting two different security notions: (1) the security notion which relies on the promotion of democratic pluralism and human rights in its immediate neighbourhood and (2) the security notion that has been operationalized as ‘externalization’. These notions are constitutive to the construction of a hybrid hegemonic masculinity for the EU. On the one hand, this masculinity reflects the bourgeois-rational model, which has been increasingly fed by the (neo)liberal vision to spread particular political values and a market economy. On the other hand, in relation to certain political issues, the citizen-warrior model dominates hegemonic masculinity, which generates security practices underlined by militarization and domination. This model involves hypermasculine characteristics, which means exaggerated aggression, oppression, a greater tendency to inflict violence, sometimes in tandem with a cold instrumental rationality. What is fundamental for this analysis is that regarding certain political issues, the EU has reinforced hypermasculine subordinate masculinity and externalized hypermasculinized security practices in the southern neighbourhood by constructing various ‘threatening others’.

The gendered representations of the non-West in compatibility with the West’s security notions are articulated through the process of constructing the self/other dichotomy, which has two dimensions. The first one is about othering the non-West as a threat to the security of the western self, as discussed previously. In the context of Euro-Mediterranean security relations, the southern Mediterranean is hypermasculinized and feminized as the other of the EU and as a threat to the security of the self. In certain areas such as democratization and human rights promotion, the EU’s bourgeois-rational masculinity aims to guide ‘the other’ through adopting political and financial instruments developed by the EU so they can follow the EU member states’ political and economic structures. In other words, it is expected that the southern neighbourhood should emulate the EU, although this does not lead to an abolition of the self/other dichotomy. The second dimension is the hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean. Hypermasculinity is conceptualized in postcolonial feminist literature primarily by Nandy (1983) in the case of India, where both the colonizer and the colonized value excessive aggressiveness against each other. Ling uses the concept to explain the way Asian economies react to recast ‘economic development into a retrieval of cultural-national manhood’ against western capitalist hypermasculinity (Ling, 2002: 118; see also Ling, 2000). However, in the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations and issues such as migration and counterterrorism cooperation, the hypermasculinity of the non-western other is not simply a reaction and a threat to the West for distorting the feminized non-West. It becomes a quality that the EU can utilize.

The second dimension of the self/other dichotomy is the construction of ‘threatening others’ that are targeted by hypermasculine practices in the southern Mediterranean. Postcolonial literature reveals that the gendered self/other construction is strongly detectable in non-western contexts, especially when the non-western state begins to emulate the western model of modern, liberal, and
developed state (Agathangelou, 2004: 106). It is shown that one of the most important dimensions of ‘postcolonial insecurities’ is the generation of insecurity towards the constructed ‘others’ (Das, 2003). While in some cases the ‘other’ is ethno-religious minorities and dissidents, it can sometimes be another state (Muppidi, 1999) or the whole ‘West’ itself (Niva, 1999). ‘The other’ in different contexts is feminized as weak and emotional, but generally hypermasculinized as a violent threat to the self. In this way, violent responses are justified while the agent of security, which is either a postcolonial state or a leader of a non-state entity, is reproduced as the sole representative of the non-western self (Agathangelou & Ling, 2009: 17–21).

Agathangelou (2004) shows that Euro-Mediterranean relations are gendered with specific reference to the economy of sex and domestic labour which produces racialized, sexualized and commodified women and men as sex workers, prostitutes, housemaids and traffickers. The desire of ‘white but not quite’ locals in Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to African and ‘white but not quite’ eastern European women feeds into an economy of sex and domestic labour which positions these individuals hierarchically. While those most oppressed are sexualized, racialized and commodified sex workers and domestic employees as ‘the others’, in the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations, ‘the others’ are individuals and societies that disrupt the EU’s spatial construction of the southern Mediterranean as a non-threatening space for EU security. In the case of irregular migration (including human trafficking), individuals are racialized as non-white sub-Saharan migrants, commodified as goods to be smuggled, and sexualized in the case of the sex trade in white women (Agathangelou, 2004). Through externalization, hypermasculine practices of North African states are encouraged to stop these racialized, commodified and sexualized ‘others’ before they enter EU borders. Individuals and societies in the southern Mediterranean space, on the other hand, are hyperfeminized. This means that individuals and societies are rendered submissive to the state’s policies with the purpose of constructing a society that is compatible with the interests of non-western states (Ling, 2002). Before the Arab Spring, the hyperfeminization of certain individuals and societies was profoundly expressed by rendering them targets and/or tools of realizing the EU’s security objectives in cooperation with North African authoritarian regimes. These hyperfeminized groups disrupted the process in 2011.

To reiterate, the theoretical foundation of this analysis is mainly derived from a postcolonial feminist approach that focuses on global West/non-West relations. However, Euro-Mediterranean relations reveal particular dynamics that have been neglected in this literature. First, the EU’s hegemonic masculinity has a hybrid character, which also reproduces a hybrid subordinated masculinity for the southern Mediterranean. Agathangelou (2004) strongly shows hypermasculinized political and economic processes in the Euro-Mediterranean area which result in racialization, commodification and hyperfeminization of individuals in the specific case of sex trafficking. The current analysis brings the issue of counterterrorism into the hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean while highlighting the feminization of the same region in relation to democracy and human rights.
promotion. The focus on only one side of the gendered spatial construction of the southern Mediterranean is analytically incomplete. Secondly, in the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EU’s hybrid hegemonic masculinity not only involves hypermasculine characteristics but also reinforces hypermasculinity in order to promote the security interests of the EU. Therefore, hypermasculine ideologies and practices are not simply a strategy of the non-West against the West (for example, Bin Laden’s hypermasculinity, Agathangelou & Ling, 2009: 16–17). They can also be assets that are reinforced by the West. Hypermasculine practices can be instrumentalized to keep the West secure as a result of processes such as externalization, which will be discussed below. Finally, a postcolonial feminist approach studies security mainly in relation to the self/other dichotomization. However, this dichotomy takes a different form when the West governs its security through subcontracting the non-West. Externalization is a novel process where ‘seemingly subaltern actors can and do appropriate, and even “refine”, “Western” security ideas, practices, institutions, and discourses for their own interest’ (Hönke & Müller, 2012: 388). As a result, power relations are reproduced to prioritize the EU’s and its collaborators’ security interests: a construction of the southern Mediterranean as a non-threatening space for the EU while rendering hypermasculine North African states as the agents of European security (see Table 1).

Constructing Hybrid Euro-Mediterranean Space

As part of the construction of a hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was a milestone in 1995. The EMP’s three-basket structure (political–security, economy, social and cultural) was formulated to promote the EU’s security interests through facilitating political dialogue, democracy and human rights promotion, building a liberal economy that would contribute to the creation of political stability (Bilgin et al., 2011: 12) and to the construction of a common identity in a Euro-Mediterranean space. With the EMP, the EU aimed to show southern Mediterranean states and societies how to resolve conflicts (through Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and Partnership Building Measures (PBM)), how to prosper (through replicating a European model of free trade) and how to conduct domestic politics in the (neo)liberal world as a persuasive liberal ‘father’. Having an enlightened self-interest, it also financed the partnership through instruments like Mesures D’Accompagnement (MEDA). As a result, a hierarchical relationship between the EU and the southern Mediterranean emerged. This hierarchical relationship has been problematized within the literature as paternalistic – as Holm put it, ‘like a asymmetry between the teacher and the pupil’ (quoted in Bilgin, 2009: 14).

A gender reading of the Barcelona Process reveals that the EMP articulates the EU’s hegemonic masculine identity, including, but also going beyond, paternalism. This hegemonic masculine identity has predominantly been framed based on the bourgeois-rational model of masculinity. In this political framework, the EU’s masculine identity is constructed as a political actor who values dialogue over aggression and violence in conflict resolution, promotes capitalist development
Table 1. Hybrid Euro-Mediterranean Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Masculinity of the EU</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Notion of Security</th>
<th>Subordinated Masculinity of Southern Mediterranean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Bourgeois-rational</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Feminized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rational, democratic, capitalist,</td>
<td>(Democracy, free-market economy and a balance between</td>
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<td></td>
<td>developed, guiding father)</td>
<td>state and security is a way to security)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen-warrior</td>
<td>Migration control and counterterrorism</td>
<td>(Neo)realist</td>
<td>Hypermasculinized</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>(Threats should be externalized; militaristic tools are</td>
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through free trade, and empowers civil society against the authoritarian practices of southern regimes. Like a father, it is willing to show its son how things should be done in the neoliberal world order. As a result, a power hierarchy is tailored between the EU – whose identity is masculinized in accordance with the bourgeois-rational model (European, liberal, proactive, father) – and the southern Mediterranean – feminized vis-à-vis the former as being non-European, authoritarian, reactive, son. This gendered relationship was constructed to serve the security interests of the ‘father’ by creating a liberal-capitalist, and therefore stable, geographical space in which ‘he’ can ostensibly be secured.

The bourgeois-rational masculinity of the EU has been (re)constructed through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. Motivated by a goal to create a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the EU (Solana, 2003), the ENP was formulated to answer the question: ‘how best can we support our neighbours’ political and economic transitions, and so tackle our citizens’ concerns?’ (quoted in Bilgin et al., 2011: 14). Action plans were formulated to pursue a more passionate democratization agenda while the EU Commission was given a mandate to monitor how southern regimes implement the action plans. It can be argued that the EU’s bourgeois-rational masculinity has found a new institutional manifestation with the ENP. However, in addition to this, another type of policy, which has constructed a hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space, was also adopted. Illiberal practices, as a result, were institutionalized in liberal Euro-Mediterranean space.

The ENP reflects the insecurity atmosphere in the EU, which ‘acquired new urgency’ after several terrorist attacks since 9/11 (EU Council, 2004: 3). As a response to this security concern, the EU has formulated a new security policy, identified in the literature as ‘externalization’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009). Externalization can be defined as ‘the mode of governance through which the EU seeks to ensure the European Neighbourhood Policy’s countries’ participation in the realisation of its internal security project’ (Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009: 83). The EU’s major internal security project is the construction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for EU citizens. Externalization deals with security concerns of the West in the non-West with the cooperation of southern neighbours, in order to prevent them from becoming internal security problems for the EU.

The process of externalization points to an alternative notion of security which underlines the citizen-warrior model of masculinity. According to this model, the citizen-warrior’s main responsibility lies solely with his own community, and with protecting and promoting its interests even if this means inflicting harm on others. In this sense, instrumental rationality is powerfully in effect. It is possible to observe instrumental rationality underlying the ethnocentric security notion of the EU in irregular migration prevention policies. For example, it has been argued that the militarization of the Mediterranean actually contributed to directing migrants to more dangerous routes (Lutterbeck, 2006; Spijkerboer, 2007). The EU has been criticized by both scholars (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011) and international human rights organizations (Statewatch, 2012) for violating the right to asylum. In addition, the actor with the citizen-warrior model of masculinity does not hesitate to increase
its control and domination of others (in this case, potential partners) by using a ‘stick’. For example, in the Seville Presidency Conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2004) it was strongly emphasized that ‘insufficient cooperation’ of a neighbouring country with the EU in the area of irregular migration prevention would hinder ‘closer relations’ (para. 35). Other manifestations of such an approach include the increasing association of receiving developmental aid with capacity-building (Adepoju et. al, 2010) and rendering visa facilitation for citizens of North African states conditional upon signing readmission agreements with the EU. Although the literature has been critical to the EU’s policies in the southern Mediterranean (Boswell, 2011; Messari & Klaauw, 2010), what has been overlooked is that these security practices are constitutive to the EU’s identity reflecting the citizen-warrior model.

In particular, patterns of cooperation in the areas of irregular migration prevention and counterterrorism come forward in the literature because of certain security practices of some European states, which appear to contradict the EU’s vision to construct a democratic North Africa where human rights are promoted effectively. In relation to the former, the EU has aimed to construct North Africa as a buffer zone where asylum applications can be processed, irregular migrants can be contained and irregular migrants in the EU can be repatriated (Betts & Milner, 2006; Bilgic, 2013: 113–124; De Haas, 2007). While some EU states funded the construction of migrant camps in North Africa (EU Commission, 2004), the Mediterranean Sea has been militarized to detect smuggling boats (Lutterbeck, 2004), even though violating international law (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011). An implication of hypermasculine security practices to control migration is the othering of sub-Saharan migrants in particular. Gendered representations of migrants as threats to national security and societal identities as hypermasculinized and feminized ‘others’ in the Mediterranean area have been documented (Kambouri & Zavos, 2011). In the southern Mediterranean, sub-Saharan migrants are often represented at state and societal level as a source of crime and violence (hypermasculinization) and of prostitution, sickness and immorality (feminization) (Bensaad, 2007). As a result, the hypermasculine security practices that the EU has reinforced, such as migration camps, are justified. The use of migrant camps in North Africa, despite reports about severe human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2004; Fortress Europe, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2006, 2011b) and attempts to convert North African countries into a buffer zone despite the well-documented insecurities of migrants in these countries (see Bensaad, 2007; FIDH, 2011) point to how the hypermasculinized southern Mediterranean is used by the EU.

In addition, counterterrorism cooperation has been perceived in southern Mediterranean societies as the most advanced between the EU and southern regimes (Wolff, 2009), although the practice suggests otherwise. As Kaunert and Leonard (2011: 302) show, the rhetoric of cooperation in this area is more powerful than in operational cooperation. However, through this rhetoric precisely, southern Mediterranean states are hypermasculinized and societies hyperfeminized. The EU’s rhetoric on counterterrorism cooperation with the southern Mediterranean regimes holding questionable democratic credentials has repeatedly appeared in
Euro-Mediterranean documents. This rhetoric on the EU’s willingness to cooperate has provided, as Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (2007) highlight, ‘a new lease of life’ to the pre-Arab Spring authoritarian regimes (quoted in Bilgin et al., 2011: 30). Throughout the 2000s, problematic counterterrorism policies (such as illegality of forming a crowd in Algeria, searching domiciles without a warrant in Morocco) were introduced (Bilgin et al., 2011: 18–19). For this reason, Kausch and Youngs (2009) strongly criticize the ENP for moving away from a security vision based on democratization and human rights to a vision about control and surveillance, due to EU member states’ reservations towards Islamist civil society. Hence, in some sectors of the southern Mediterranean, the idea has emerged that North Africa is doing the ‘dirty work’ of the EU (Bilgin & Bilgic, 2011: 7). With these policies, hypermasculinized southern Mediterranean states obtained a stronger grip on hyperfeminized societies. As a result, ‘the individual [wa]s manifestly less protected on both sides of the Mediterranean’ (Galli, 2008).

These dualities have served to continue the gendered power hierarchy since 1995 in an institutionalized way. The illiberal security practices are constitutive to hypermasculinized southern Mediterranean states within the liberal, feminized southern Mediterranean space. The Arab Spring, however, has created a disruption of these hybrid gendered identities, as some partners of the EU were toppled. The last section of the article will examine the EU’s reaction to the transformations in some southern Mediterranean countries, and its consequences for the EU’s hybrid hegemonic masculinities.

Post-Arab Spring Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations

What happened following the self-immolation of Muhammed Bouazizi in Tunisia and the brutal murder of Khalid Said, blogger and activist, in Egypt can be considered, in Arendt’s words (1978: 7), as an ‘event’ that interrupted ‘routine processes and routine procedures’ in many North African countries. The event, in its best-known Euro-centric name, was the Arab Spring, which was the uprising of individuals who tackled their powerlessness (ajz) in order to obtain dignity (al-karama) (Hassan, 2012: 234). Given the current situation, it is too early to pass judgement about the consequences of the uprisings for the region. Yet it is possible to argue that ‘life-shattering experiences’ such as oppression and poverty led people who were previously considered as ‘traditional’ in the western imagination ‘to organize, against and also intervene in the repressive mechanisms that limit their lives’ (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2013: 2–3). The Euro-Mediterranean space has been constructed at the expense of individuals’ and social groups’ security, which concerns the removal of repressive mechanisms that limit human freedoms. In other words, this hybrid space has been one of those repressive mechanisms within global West/non-West relations.

It has so far been argued that the EU has constructed a hybrid gendered identity regarding its southern neighbourhood. This hybrid identity has reverberated onto the southern neighbourhood by constructing a Euro-Mediterranean space where both liberal and illiberal practices can be performed in order to promote the EU’s security
interests. Feminization and hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean in relation to different security issues are instrumental to constructing this space. However, the EU’s southern partners were generally unpopular regimes, some of which were eventually toppled during the Arab Spring. Given the criticisms that the EU previously received in relation to cooperation with the former unpopular regimes (see above), the EU seems to perceive the novelties in the region and has tried to reformulate its policies (EU Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). However, the question appears: to what extent can the new policies of the EU and the new perspective underlining them create a difference in the gendered power hierarchy in Euro-Mediterranean security relations? The difference can be traced in two areas. First, will feminization of southern Mediterranean states and societies in relation to democracy and human rights promotion continue? Or will the EU, abandoning its liberal ‘father’ who teaches his son how to do things in a neoliberal world, accept the agency of southern Mediterranean societies not as ‘a footnote to the West’s history nor [as] an appendix to neoliberal capitalist projects’ but as direct contributors to ‘global just politics’ (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2013: 2)? Second, will hypermasculinization of the southern neighbourhood continue through the policies of externalization, which hyperfeminize certain individuals, particularly irregular migrants? In other words, the question is whether the security of individuals and societies in the Euro-Mediterranean space will be taken into consideration in the post-Arab Spring era or whether the Euro-Mediterranean space will again be constructed to justify western intervention for the promotion of EU security interests.

In spite of the new rhetoric adopted in the EU documents about democracy promotion and more substantial civil society participation, along with new financial documents with increased budgets for capacity-building for democratization (for example, SPRING – Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth – with €540 million in the southern Mediterranean, see EU Commission, 2013: 10), the new perspective seems to re-bottle the old wine. As such, it aims to maintain the hybrid gendered power hierarchy in Euro-Mediterranean security relations. Among the wide range of policies, two are selected for discussion due to the bourgeois-rational and citizen-warrior models of masculinity crystallized in them: the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean (PDSP) and migration control.

One of the most important policy practices, which can potentially challenge the gendered power hierarchy in Euro-Mediterranean security relations, is promotion of individual and societal securities through empowerment. In this way, local security concerns such as lack of political rights and freedoms, poverty, unemployment and domestic violence are prioritized. PDSP was launched by the EU Commission in 2011 in order to support democratic transitions in the southern neighbourhood. In fact, PDSP involves a potential for constructing a different Euro-Mediterranean space. For example, the document explicitly shows that the political transformation of North Africa ‘will be developed by listening not only to requests for support from partner governments, but also to demands expressed by civil society’ (EU Commission, 2011a: 3). While southern Mediterranean states are encouraged to
reform in order to achieve ‘advanced status’ in their relations with the EU, civil society actors are considered the source of ‘much-needed support for the reforms and involvement in areas close to citizens’ concerns such as human rights, the environment, social and economic development’ (EU Commission, 2011a: 6).

However, a detailed analysis of the programme reveals that the EU has maintained (and reconstructed) the bourgeois-rational hegemonic masculinity towards the southern Mediterranean. First, the EMP, similarly to previous attempts, prioritizes the bourgeois-rational approach of having a free market for democratization while merely acknowledging the importance of social justice; second, the programme is black-boxing civil society without touching the important well-known problems such as quasi-governmental NGOs or governmental control over financial aid from the EU to civil society in the southern Mediterranean; third, crucial civil society actors during the Arab Spring, trade unions and other labour organizations, are not given the necessary importance in the programme (Teti, 2012: 273–275). Hence, the ‘new’ partnership maintains ‘the distinction between political and socio-economic rights characteristic of “minimalist” (neo)liberal definitions of democracy’ (Teti, 2012: 276). It is indeed the fact that the EU has not paid attention to, for example, Islamist civil society organizations which resisted alongside the secular movements during the Arab Spring (Mamdani, 2013: 13). Real individual security issues such as domestic violence were also overlooked, while gender equality is limited to lip-service regarding equal participation of women in ‘political and economic life’ (EU Commission, 2011b). The Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility is already a questionable formation while its predecessor, the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Society Forum (founded in 1995), was eventually disempowered and the Commission itself stopped sending a representative. In other words, the EU seems to continue to feminize southern Mediterranean states and civil societies by expecting them to follow the EU’s democratization agenda without giving due attention to the realities of southern Mediterranean countries.

The second dimension of the EU’s ‘new’ approach in the post-Arab Spring era towards the southern Mediterranean is the issue of migration control. It must be noted that the EU has adopted a more comprehensive and practical mobility scheme between EU and southern Mediterranean states. However, as in the previous attempts, this mobility scheme is made conditional upon partner states’ willingness to cooperate with the EU in the area of irregular migration prevention (EU Commission, 2011b: 11). In other words, the mobility partnerships seem to be a ‘re-branding of existing visa facilitation policies’ (Echagüe et al., 2011: 331). In terms of capacity-building in the fight against ‘illegal’ migration following the fall of authoritarian regimes, EU member states have been quick to sign new bilateral agreements (for example the Italy–Tunisia agreement of 2011 promising aid in return for Tunisia’s cooperation in stopping further departures), while the EU has also followed member states’ practices.

In a visit to Tunis by Commission President Barroso in April 2011, it was made clear that the EU’s offer of around €400 million of aid to support
Tunisia’s democratic transition would necessitate reciprocal actions to counter irregular migration. (Carrera et al., 2012: 5–6; for member state ‘fears’ of migrant influx from the southern Mediterranean, see Dennison, 2013: 125)

In addition, the EU has so far shown no inclination to revise the much-disputed The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) operations in the Mediterranean (for criticisms of FRONTEX operations between 2011 and 2013, see Human Rights Watch, 2011a; Statewatch, 2012; Sunderland, 2013). None of the documents the EU produced after 2011 on southern Mediterranean relations offered a specific policy to address the security problems that irregular migrants face in North Africa (FIDH, 2011). Irregular migration only appears as a problem to be tackled through control and domination. Hypermasculinized externalization is likely to continue.

Given the aforementioned continuities in the EU’s approach to the southern Mediterranean in the post-Arab Spring era, it can be argued that the EU aims to reconstruct the hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space by subordinating the southern Mediterranean through feminizing and hypermasculinizing it. In the area of democracy promotion, the EU adopts the bourgeois-rational masculine identity by acting like a capitalist, developed, paternal figure towards ‘infant’ southern Mediterranean countries, especially towards southern Mediterranean civil society. The EU’s security is still regarded as conditional upon a democratic southern Mediterranean, which can be built on the EU’s terms. On the other hand, when it comes to the issue of migration control, the EU’s citizen-warrior masculine identity dominates, and the EU continues its externalization practices, which result in a hypermasculinized subordinated southern Mediterranean.

Conclusion

In this article, I argued that Euro-Mediterranean security relations embody a gendered power hierarchy between the hybrid hegemonic masculinity of the (bourgeois-rational and citizen-warrior) EU and the subordinate (both feminized and hypermasculinized) southern neighbourhood. In addition, since the Arab Spring, the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo by preserving these gendered power relations. This is because feminizing and hypermasculinizing the southern neighbourhood is instrumental to constructing a secure geographical space for the EU. This gender analysis differs from the literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations because of its specific focus on the (re)construction processes of gendered identities in tandem with the EU’s competing notions of security. Therefore, it can be called a feminist intervention on the issue. Departing from the idea that the notions of security and political identity construction processes are inseparable, it was highlighted that examination of the gendered dimension of identity construction processes can provide a more insightful perspective to reveal how power operates in the Euro-Mediterranean security–identity nexus. In addition, this gendered perspective can enable an analysis of
feminist ideas and practices challenging the hierarchical identities in Euro-Mediterranean security relations.

The EU’s hegemonic masculinity is a fluid and dynamic identity, which can be transformed in accordance with changing political and social conditions. The increasing inclusion of the characteristics of the citizen-warrior model in the hegemonic masculine identity of the EU in the post-9/11 era points to this adaptability and dynamism of masculinities. Second, masculinities (hegemonic or not) are not monolithic, but inclusive to different, even clashing, elements. The most explicit expression of this argument is the duality of the EU’s hegemonic masculinity. On the one hand, reflecting the bourgeois-rational model, it acts like an enlightened father who is willing to teach his son the conditions of peaceful co-existence in the liberal world by upholding democracy, human rights and freedoms, and the values of a free market economy. On the other hand, the citizen-warrior EU prioritizes its own domestic security and takes ‘necessary’ measures even if these measures have the potential to harm others. An important contribution of gendered analysis is to show that these two competing masculinities generating the EU’s hegemonic masculinity co-exist because they jointly serve the EU’s competing security notions. The hegemonic masculinity of the EU dominating the EMP period was effeminizing southern Mediterranean masculinities as politically, economically and socially underdeveloped, and therefore in need of guidance and support from a superior authority. In this way, the EU has been able to reconfigure relations where power lies with itself as opposed to the non-European, authoritarian, economically and socially weak southern Mediterranean. However, with the ENP, and especially the policy of externalization, conflicting with its earlier position, the EU has reinforced the hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean.

Note

1. This is different from ‘mimicry’, which is a survival strategy of the colonized by emulating the colonizer (see Bhabha, 2004; Ling, 2002: 116–117). In this analysis, emulation is encouraged by the EU to create a non-threatening non-western space.

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