

more deep-seated. Anticipating the dismissal of the government and the suspension of parliament earlier this year, King argues that the failure to secure a socioeconomic pact is the greatest threat to democratic consolidation in Tunisia.

Equally bleak is his analysis of prospects for transitional justice, human rights, and the rule of law. In Egypt, any such hopes have been crushed by Sisi's coup and the "brutal, military-led reconstruction and deepening of the most reviled elements of Mubarak's regime" (p. 143). Violent conflicts in Libya and Yemen are utterly incompatible with the norms of justice and human rights, and even in Tunisia, the "hijacking" of the transitional project by old elites constitutes a serious threat to democratic consolidation.

The Arab Winter has many strengths, not least its broad scope and clear presentation and dissection of the issues that have, in most instances, prevented any possibility of democratic consolidation in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. However, some aspects of King's approach are puzzling. His starting point is that democratic transition has failed to materialize into democratic consolidation in at least three of the four countries on which he focuses. To achieve democratic consolidation, societies in transition must create national unity, place professional militaries under civilian control, and rationalize bureaucracies while institutionalizing political democracy. To establish the rule of law and protect human rights, states in transition should dismantle and reconstruct the judiciary and the security sector from a "brutal instrument of internal repression" to "a neutral political authority that protects citizens' rights and safety" (p. 22). Although all this is indeed desirable, it sets a very high bar for democratic consolidation in the Arab world.

There is a related question regarding King's core assumption that the uprisings were directed toward the achievement of democratic outcomes in the first place. The preponderance of evidence as presented by King is that pro-democratic forces during and after the uprisings were significantly weaker than other actors. In the case of Egypt, King suggests, somewhat benignly, that the mili-

tary in early 2011 "seemed to have accepted as inevitable a transition from military to elected, civilian rule" (p. 112). But this is contradicted by the early assumption of control of the transitional process by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Other actors—whether the Muslim Brotherhood in power, or secular forces who turned to extra-constitutional activity and, ultimately, the military that removed the elected Islamist government from office—were at best ambivalent regarding democracy. Elsewhere, the weakness of democratically oriented actors is even more stark as the aftermath of brief democratic moments in Libya and Yemen testifies.

There is also a somewhat tautologous aspect to the argument on nation-state pacts, one of King's additions to O'Donnell and Schmitter's schemata. Although Tunisia and Egypt conform to the Weberian and nation-state types, neither Libya nor Yemen do, as King makes evident in his discussion of both countries. Small wonder then that transitional elites in both countries failed to secure the sort of nation-state and Weberian state pact that King proposes as essential to democratic consolidation.

Finally, while the strength of the book lies in its systematic treatment of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, the chapter on broken states, although insightful throughout, sits somewhat uneasily next to the others. The detailed and nuanced analysis of the first four settings is here replaced with much briefer consideration of Iraq, the Islamic State, and Syria. The selection of these cases is puzzling. Iraq's democratic transition began not in 2011 as a result of domestic popular mobilization but was externally driven and followed the US-led invasion of 2003. Quite how the Islamic State fits into the overall analytic framework is not at all clear. Syria most certainly does and would have justified the sort of extended analysis that King devotes to the first four countries.

Overall, however, in *The Arab Winter*, King has done an impressive job, not merely in reviewing what we know to date about how the 2011 uprisings came about but also in providing the basis for a deeper understanding of their outcomes.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Relations in the Middle East: Hegemonic Strategies and Regional Order. By Ewan Stein. Cambridge:

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This is a book that could be summed up in a sentence without doing the author injustice: foreign policy is domestic politics. It is a deceptively simple argument, the originality of which rests in the way in which Ewan Stein builds

it by offering further nuance to both foreign policy analysis (FPA) and Middle East Studies (MES) research on regional dis/order. Let me discuss, in turn, the book's contributions to these two bodies of scholarship.

Middle East Studies is where Stein situates his book. Where MES scholarship falters, the author argues, is when considering the role that domestic politics plays in shaping foreign policy; that is, without recourse to familiar tropes such as the Arab street. Stein builds his argument by drawing on tools borrowed from Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser to discuss the role that ideology plays in shaping state–society relations within and beyond boundaries. Ideology, as Stein understands it, does not merely

play a legitimating role but also a constitutive one in rendering state–society relations more robust even as the state fails to deliver the services much needed by society.

Here, the author offers one of the two key concepts of the study—“ideological externalization”—which is understood as the ways in which regional regimes subcontract or outsource their ideals to nonstate actors to maintain the illusion of their being a trustworthy ally that they have carefully cultivated with their great power allies. This could take, for example, the form of the Saudi regime literally exporting its own extremists to Afghanistan while projecting itself as playing a moderating role in the Arabian Peninsula. The reason why regional regimes have resorted to outsourcing the fulfilment of their ideals to nonstate actors, Stein argues, is because they have sought two things that are not entirely compatible: they need societal elements to feel that the fulfilment of their ideals are not put on the back burner, but they also need the great powers to view them as trustworthy local allies that are able to prioritize and further great power interests, be it defense against the Soviet Union or holding in check regional challengers (such as Iran after 1979).

This is where the author offers the book’s second key concept—“competitive support-seeking”—which is about the ways in which regional leaders engage in foreign policy maneuvering to garner material support that is much needed for their domestic political projects. Such maneuvering involved playing great powers against each other throughout the Cold War and beyond. For the non-oil-rich states, it has involved pandering to the regime security needs of Saudi leaders with the aim of receiving financial and other aid. Stein’s argument is that much of regional foreign policy can be understood as attempts to prevail on their peers in making themselves useful to great powers’ interests.

Ideological externalization, then, was deemed necessary by regional actors insofar as the ideological dimension that glued the state and society together was something that the regime did not want to be seen as being directly fulfilled, in case their great/regional power backers were disillusioned and went in search for new allies, which would cause their competitive support-seeking to fail. For example, Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to continue to claim ownership of Arabist and egalitarian ideals by subcontracting action to nonstate actors at home and abroad while offering Egypt to the United States as a trustworthy ally. More recently, Turkey’s policy makers subcontracted Islamist ideals to nonstate actors throughout the region while portraying Turkey as a potential dealmaker that could be trusted by both the United States and Israel.

Here is the novelty of the argument: although the domestic drivers of foreign policy are well understood in MES, more often than not societal actors are viewed as limiting the choices of foreign policy leadership. Stein, in contrast, presents domestic factors as constitutive. Here is the bold claim of the book that challenges much of the

MES literature: “regional ‘master conflicts’...have often been epiphenomenal. To the extent they have been ‘about’ something, these antagonisms have reflected the hegemonic strategies of exclusionary and authoritarian states” (p. 220). Those hegemonic strategies, in turn, have been about prevailing on domestic rivals at home to render state–society relations cohesive and beating off regional rivals abroad. Indeed, Stein does not locate the sources of Middle East dis/order in primordial differences, whether ethnic or sectarian. He also does not locate the sources of such dis/order in great power manipulation alone. Stein’s fresh and insightful analysis offers a domestic politics argument through and through.

This brings me to the book’s contribution to foreign policy analysis. It is worth underscoring that the author does not draw out the theoretical implications of his analysis of Middle East dis/order until the concluding chapter. Although the introduction highlights the limitations of FPA literature, it is in the concluding section that the theoretical implications of the book are drawn out. The role that ideology plays in shaping regional dis/order, argues Stein, is larger than recognized by FPA or international relations insofar as it is not only about making use of external allies to balance local rivals (“omnibalancing”) or diverting attention away from domestic ills (diversionary theories of action) but also creating and sustaining the relations that hold state and society together and define who “we” are in world politics. This is why Stein views ideology as constitutive and not only instrumental. As such, Stein offers what remains underanalyzed in David Campbell’s 1992 analysis of foreign policy as identity politics. Where Campbell’s *Writing Security* looked at the ways in which US foreign policy defined who “we” are while rendering others “foreign” (i.e., self/other relations), Stein offers an analysis that is better able to explain socioeconomic factors inside and across state boundaries. Relatedly, Stein’s book offers a crucial corrective to Michael Barnett’s *Dialogues in Arab Politics* (1998). Where Barnett bracketed security to focus on identity politics on the regional scale, Stein defines security in terms of state-building and regime maintenance and understands the making of regional dis/order as regional actors’ attempts to maintain domestic hegemony in socioeconomic terms.

Arguably the book’s greatest strength is also its Achilles heel. On the one hand, Stein’s focus on domestic state and nonstate actors in the making of regional dis/order is a much-needed corrective to MES and FPA scholarship. Yet, on the other hand, the ways in which regional actors have responded to an already constituted world (i.e., the international) remain underemphasized. The answers to the questions of what constitutes a proper “state,” what entails “sovereignty,” and what it means to be “modern” have already been given by the time Middle East actors enter the international arena: what they can and cannot achieve via hegemonic strategies has already been circumscribed. This is not to deemphasize the domestic politics

point made by the author but to highlight that not only the domestic but also the international deserve deeper analysis by going beyond great power geopolitics to consider the international as shaping who and where “we” are in the world.

Why Nations Rise: Narratives and the Path to Great

Power. By Manjari Chatterjee Miller. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 208p. \$99.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

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Manjari Chatterjee Miller’s *Why Nations Rise* asks an important question about great power politics: Why do some potential great powers become actual great powers while others do not? Material explanations fall short because numerous states have the material power potential to be great powers, but there is no evident material reason why some of those states are unable to realize their potential. Instead, Miller argues that the explanation lies in the narratives that attend the trajectory of great powers. Those states that are able to tell themselves and others a convincing narrative of their rise and their rightful place in the international system are able to continue their rise to great power status. Those that do not—that either do not try or that cannot locate a captivating enough narrative—fall short and are relegated to a secondary status in international politics.

Miller’s book is commendable for three reasons. First, scholars of great power politics have a tendency to choose the dependent variable when it comes to rising great powers. Scholars study the rising powers that made it and the consequences of their rise, giving less attention paid to those that fell by the wayside. A complete analysis of the dynamics of rising powers requires attention to both successes and failures. Second, the focus of those who study power transitions does tend to be on the material dimensions of state power. The prospect that a rising state’s power might overtake a relatively declining state’s power is what makes power transitions so dangerous, but Miller points out that rising powers and the power transitions they precipitate have an important ideational dimension that demands attention. Third, Miller studies cases empirically that have garnered less attention than some of the more familiar cases of rising great powers. Her study of the Dutch experience, for example, will be unfamiliar to many readers, and her examination of contemporary China and India is a comparison that is not as commonly seen as one might expect.

That said, as compelling as these three reasons are, the book ultimately falls short of making a wholly convincing argument about the role of narrative in the rise of great powers. The first significant issue with the argument

involves the claimed direction of causality. In Miller’s telling, narrative is the locomotive that drives a state either toward great power status or some alternative; yet it seems equally plausible that foreign policy behavior and others’ reactions to that behavior are driving the narrative that states choose to adopt. Whether a state adopts a narrative that is more “active” or “reticent” is likely to depend not just on the exogenous generation of a narrative but also on both the experience of that state in enacting its foreign policy and the growth in that state’s capabilities. Any narrative is likely to be used strategically to frame certain foreign policy decisions to make them more palatable either to domestic or foreign audiences. Thus, narrative is as much a product of foreign policy and the growth in a state’s power as it is a cause, and Miller’s analysis fails to recognize this endogeneity.

A second concern with the argument involves its falsifiability. Miller provides the reader with little indication of how one would know *ex ante* whether a particular narrative is going to facilitate a state’s continuing rise to great power status or will impede its rise. Instead, we know that a narrative was a well-chosen one only when we know the outcome. That is, the indication of a narrative that facilitates a country’s rise is that the country rises, and the indication of a narrative that impedes a country’s rise is that the country does not rise. The outcome of the dependent variable itself becomes the only way to measure the value of the proffered critical independent variable. As a consequence and in the absence of a clearly specified way to assess the viability of certain narratives, it becomes difficult to imagine a case in which the argument could be shown to be false. Moreover, it is also not clear whether a particular successful narrative was a uniquely successful one or whether some other narrative conceivably could have also facilitated a state’s rise. The result of these concerns is diminished confidence in the validity of the theoretical argument.

Finally, although Miller makes an interesting case for the importance of narrative in explaining why some great powers rise more successfully than others, she also punts on perhaps the most important question of why some narratives prevail over others. Miller identifies the narratives that accompanied the trajectories of various powers as they attempted to rise but provides little indication of why each particular narrative was adopted. This is a critically important question. If the adoption of a narrative is, for example, a product of domestic political dynamics, that is important for scholars of great power politics to understand. If alternatively, it is driven by the underlying material power that a country possesses, that, too, would be of fundamental importance to understand. What narrative prevails may indicate a deeper spurious relationship between narrative and the outcome in any particular case where some other factor—domestic politics, capabilities, or perhaps the political acumen of a particular leader—is