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Burcu Ozdemir-Sarigil  and Zeki Sarigil 

ABSTRACT

This study provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of patriarchal attitudes and orientations in Turkey, a Muslim-majority country. The following questions direct the current study: What factors account for patriarchal orientations at the mass level? How do social, political, and economic differences relate to individuals' patriarchal attitudes and orientations? The answers are provided by original data derived from a nationwide survey, *Türkiye'de Enformel Kurumlar Anketi* (TEKA 2019) [Informal Institutions in Turkey Survey] (Sarigil 2019). Multivariate analyses suggest that religiosity, Sunni sectarian identity, Kurdish ethnic identity, right-oriented ideological orientations, and low socio-economic status are likely to empower patriarchal tendencies. One major implication of the findings is that modernisation processes (e.g. socio-economic development and secularisation) are likely to undermine patriarchal orientations in Muslim-majority countries as well.

KEYWORDS

Patriarchal attitudes; gender inequality; religiosity; sectarian identity; ethnicity; ideology; class; survey research

This study, through the use of original survey data, provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of patriarchal attitudes and orientations in a Muslim-majority country (i.e. Turkey). An early definition of patriarchy treats it as 'a system of social structures, and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women' (Walby 1989, p. 214; see also Beechey 1979; Millett 1969; Walby 1991). Similarly, for a relatively recent definition, the notion of patriarchy refers to 'a particular complex web of both attitudes and relationships that position women and men, girls and boys in distinct and unequal categories, that value particular forms of masculinity over virtually all forms of femininity, and that ensure that men who fulfil these favoured forms of manliness will be able to assert control over most women' (Enloe 2017, p. 49). Thus, based on an unequal or unjust distribution of power and status between men and women, and a relationship of domination and subordination across various domains (e.g. family, society, economy, and politics), the notion of patriarchy directly contradicts the principle of gender equality.

Although many formal rules and regulations are based on the principle of gender equality, patriarchal understandings, values, and norms are still

widespread and influential in Turkish socio-political life. For instance, according to the Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum, Turkey ranked 105th out of 115 countries in 2006 and 130th out of 153 countries in 2020 (below the global average in each year).¹ Due to Turkey's poor performance in terms of gender equality, it provides a useful socio-political context for the study of patriarchy at the micro or macro level. Consequently, many scholars across various disciplines (such as sociology, anthropology, political science, and economics) have already produced highly enlightening and valuable studies on various gender-related issues in Turkish socio-political life.²

However, most of the existing studies are based on small-N research such as case studies, narratives, and ethnographic fieldwork. In other words, the existing literature provides a relatively limited large-N, quantitative analysis of patriarchy in the Turkish context. It is, however, comforting that we see an increasing number of large-N studies in relatively recent gender-related research in the Turkish context.³ We believe that, in addition to conceptual and theoretical analyses and small-N research, conducting further comprehensive, large-N empirical analyses would be valuable in terms of enhancing our knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon of patriarchy. Given the multifaceted nature of patriarchy, utilising various methods, techniques, and data sources would be an appropriate and fruitful approach in terms of advancing patriarchy research.

Having such motivation and goals, this study raises the following research questions: Which factors increase or decrease patriarchal attitudes and orientations at the mass level? More specifically, how do religious (religious vs. secular), sectarian (Alevi vs. Sunni), ethnic (Turks vs. Kurds), ideological (leftist vs. rightist), and socio-economic differences and divisions relate to individuals' patriarchal attitudes and orientations? Which social circles or groups have relatively stronger patriarchal values and orientations? What broader theoretical and practical implications can we draw from such an analysis? In order to answer these research questions, this study utilises original data derived from a nationally representative public opinion survey, *Informal Institutions in Turkey Survey (TEKA 2019)*. This new comprehensive survey data offers a valuable opportunity for the systematic analysis of the correlates of patriarchal gender attitudes and values in a Muslim-majority setting.

With regard to its theoretical contributions, by conducting a large-N analysis of patriarchy in the Turkish context, the current study contributes to our comprehension of the sources of patriarchal attitudes and orientations at the individual level in a Muslim-majority setting. By doing that, it aims to shed light on competing arguments about the sources of patriarchal attitudes and orientations at the mass level (such as whether and to what extent religiosity, sectarian identity, and ethnicity matter). With respect to its practical contribution, by empirically exposing the strength, extent, and sources of patriarchal attitudes and understandings at the individual level, this study could also help

develop more effective policies to deal with the detrimental consequences of patriarchy in the social and political spheres of Muslim-majority countries (e.g. the various forms of discrimination against women).

The rest of the article is organised as follows: The theoretical section discusses the possible impact of religion-related factors (i.e. religiosity, sectarian identity), ethnicity, ideological orientations, and socio-economic status on patriarchal understandings and tendencies. It also formulates several testable hypotheses. The data and method section presents the survey data, variables of interests, and measurements. The results section first presents the descriptive analyses and findings and then the results of the multivariate analyses. The final section summarises the main findings and discusses the broader implications of the study.

Theoretical discussion and hypotheses

In this section, we draw some testable hypotheses from the existing conceptual and theoretical debates on patriarchy. The debates we look at come from the general literature as well as the literature on the Turkish case. In this study, we are particularly interested in the possible impact of religious, ethnic, ideological, and socio-economic variables and factors on patriarchal values and tendencies at the mass level. There are two main reasons for our particular interest in these factors. First, religious (secular vs. religious; Alevi vs. Sunni), ethnic (Turks vs. Kurds), ideological (left vs. right), and socio-economic divisions and cleavages are regarded as the main fault lines of Turkish socio-political life. Second, the role of those factors is somehow discussed or acknowledged in the existing literature on patriarchy in the Turkish context (see below).

Religiosity

To begin with the religion-related factors, many studies suggest that religion matters in terms of patriarchal understandings. As Walby (1989, p. 227) notes, ‘religions have historically been very important patriarchal discourses, laying down correct forms of conduct for men and for women’. Several empirical analyses also provide support for the linkage between religiosity and patriarchal attitudes and values (e.g. see Diehl, Koenig & Kerstin 2009; Frejka & Westoff 2008; Goldscheider, Goldscheider & Rico-Gonzalez 2014).⁴ Regarding the nexus between Islam and patriarchy, many studies suggest that the patriarchal values and orientations in Muslim societies are rooted in Islamic beliefs and understandings (e.g. see Alexander & Welzel 2011; Inglehart & Norris 2003a, 2003b; Karam 1998; Mir-Hosseini 1999). It is claimed that Islamic norms and beliefs are not really compatible with the principle of gender equality. For instance, using data derived from the World Values Survey, Alexander and Welzel (2011) conduct a large-N analysis of patriarchy across 80 countries and show that patriarchal values are

relatively more powerful among Muslims. Such a relationship holds even under the control of key structural variables and factors.

Several studies focusing on the Turkish case also emphasise the nexus between Islam and patriarchy (e.g. see Acar & Altunok 2013; Arat 2010; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu 2011; Engin & Pals 2018; Erdem-Akçay 2013; Erman 2001; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün 2017). For instance, Erman (2001, p. 131) notes that

[t]he radical Islamic movement, as an ideology and as practices embedded in real life, attempts to reproduce patriarchal ideology by defining women in relation to the private sphere, by emphasising women's traditional roles as mothers and wives, and by requiring women to be submissive to their fathers/husbands (the ideological aspect).

Indeed, when we look at the discourses of many conservative social and/or political movements and formations in Turkish socio-political life, we see that these circles entertain or express highly patriarchal views and understandings. More specifically, many conservative circles implicitly or explicitly reject the idea of gender equality and instead emphasise the traditional familial roles of women (such as being wife, mother, caregiver, or domestic labourer) (see also Arat 2010; Erdem-Akçay 2013; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün 2017). For instance, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the conservative AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - Justice and Development Party), which has dominated Turkish politics since the early 2000s, has stated on many occasions that God did not create men and women as equal beings and so they have different innate natures (*fitrat*). Due to these beliefs and ideas, Erdoğan has, on several occasions, voiced his objection to gender equality. He once stated that '[y]ou can not claim that men and women are equal. That would be against their very nature' (CNNTürk 2018).

The officials of Diyanet (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* – Directorate of Religious Affairs) – the highest religious authority in Turkey, which manages religious affairs, services, and institutions such as the country's mosques – sometimes express strong patriarchal views and understandings as well. In November 2019, as part of its public campaign against mobile phone addiction, Diyanet released a video clip on Twitter depicting a woman first serving tea and then a piece of cake to her husband. Responding to criticisms against this portrayal of women, Ali Erbaş, the head of the Diyanet, argued that it is quite 'natural' that a wife serves tea and cake to her husband. Diyanet officials treat and present traditional patriarchal gender roles as something 'natural' and 'taken-for-granted' (Atay 2019). These cases clearly indicate that religion can be utilised to naturalise and legitimise the traditional patriarchal gender roles, in which women are subordinate to men (see also Bulut 2020; Diehl, Koenig & Kerstin 2009).

One might expect this function of religion (i.e. legitimising traditional patriarchal gender roles through socialisation) to be stronger among relatively more religious circles. As Glas et al. (2019, p. 301) note, '[w]hen people are exposed to

religious norms, the devoted among them are probably more likely to “take these norms seriously” and internalise them more strongly than the less devoted’ (see also Alexander & Welzel 2011; Inglehart & Norris 2003b). As a result, one might postulate that:

Hypothesis 1: Relatively more religious individuals are more likely to have patriarchal values and orientations.

Although many studies implicitly or explicitly expect this relationship to exist between Islamic religiosity and patriarchal values and orientations, such claims have not been subject to rigorous and comprehensive empirical testing at the mass level in the Turkish context.

Sectarian identity

Some studies claim that sectarian differences also matter in terms of patriarchal orientations in Turkish society. One particular argument is that, compared to the Alevi minority, the Sunni majority is relatively more patriarchal and so performs poorly in terms of gender equality. As a heterodox and syncretistic Muslim community, Alevis have remained socially, politically, and economically marginal and peripheral for centuries. The Alevi community is regarded as a secular, progressive, tolerant, egalitarian, and democratic community (Erdemir 2005; Erman 2001; Poyraz 2005; Shankland 2003). It is also suggested that Alevi women have better status than Sunni women. For instance, Erman (2001, p. 129) notes

Alevism is a sect in Islam, which differs from the conventional Sunni sect in terms of, among other things, its more liberal attitudes towards women. Alevis, who historically suffered from the oppression of the Sunni Ottoman Empire, have been solid supporters of the secular Turkish Republic, acting as a strong defence against the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism ... In the Alevi culture, emphasis is placed upon humanitarianism and egalitarianism which includes gender equality. Women in Alevi families enjoy more power and autonomy compared to conservative Sunni families. Alevis do not practice gender segregation. However, it should be kept in mind that Alevis exist within the overarching patriarchal Turkish culture and cannot be free of its influence. Especially in rural areas, patrilocal arrangements place young village women in a highly subordinate position.

Other studies, however, are more sceptical towards such claims and arguments. For instance, conducting interviews with some Alevi women, Özmen (2013, pp. 162–163) asserts that

women-men equality and the belief of regarding women as a sacred being–supported by Alevi belief system in theory– does not have reality and continuity in practice. It is seen that there are significant differences between statement and practice, the equality of women and men has a problematic qualification in today’s Alevi community, that

Alevi women are under the dominance of men and have become more dependent on their husbands especially due to economic difficulties and that the opinions and attitudes of men have been legitimised by women.

These competing arguments indicate that the existing literature seems to be inconclusive with respect to the impact of religious sect on patriarchal values and attitudes. Given this, we formulated the following contrasting hypotheses regarding the possible impact of sectarian identity on patriarchy:

Hypothesis 2a: Sunni individuals are more likely to have patriarchal values and orientations.

Hypothesis 2b: Religious sectarian differences should not matter in terms of patriarchal values and orientations.

Ethnicity

We also take into account the possible impact of ethnic differences. Some studies explicitly or implicitly suggest that patriarchal understandings and values are stronger among members of the Kurdish ethnic minority (e.g. see Çağlayan 2020; Cinar & Kose 2018; Grabolle-Çeliker 2019; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits 2008; Him & Hoşgör 2011). Other studies, however, advance the opposite argument. For instance, comparing Arab and Kurdish women, Bengio (2016, p. 43) claims that Kurdish women have enjoyed better status. She notes, '[i]t appears that the difference between Kurdish women and Arab women lies in historically rooted cultural differences, in which indigenous Kurdish culture promoted gender equality. One may indeed argue that prior to the establishment of modern nation-states in the Middle East, Kurdish women were much freer in their societies'. Given these competing claims and arguments about the impact of ethnic identity on patriarchal attitudes, we constructed the following opposing hypotheses to test:

Hypothesis 3a: Kurdish individuals are more likely to have patriarchal values and attitudes.

Hypothesis 3b: Ethnic differences should not matter in terms of patriarchal values and orientations.

Ideology

Ideological orientations might also matter in terms of patriarchal values and orientations. Since leftist ideology is, in general, more concerned with values and principles such as non-discrimination and equality and social justice, one might expect that leftist circles are relatively more likely to embrace the principle of gender equality and women's human rights. Given the relatively stronger emphasis on humanitarian and egalitarian values and norms in left-oriented

ideologies (Çağlayan 2020), a left-oriented person would develop a stronger consciousness of women's subordination to men and so have weaker patriarchal attitudes and tendencies. On the other hand, one might expect right-oriented individuals to exhibit relatively stronger patriarchal attitudes and values. Engin and Pals (2018, p. 393) note that 'traditional attitudes toward gender roles have also been linked to political conservatism. Characteristics of radical right parties are associated with conservative family values and traditional gender norms that promote women's roles as wives and mothers'. This reasoning yields the following hypothesis about the possible role of ideological orientations:

Hypothesis 4: Compared to right-oriented individuals, left-oriented individuals are less likely to have patriarchal attitudes and orientations.

Socio-economic status

Studies subscribing to the modernisation perspective, in particular, suggest that socio-economic status is likely to shape patriarchal attitudes and orientations as well (e.g. see Inglehart & Norris 2003b). More specifically, it is expected that individuals with better education and higher income levels are more likely to be aware of male domination and female subordination. In other words, individuals with better socio-economic status are likely to get socialised into more egalitarian norms and values; they are then more likely to question and reject traditional patriarchal gender roles (see also Alexander & Welzel 2011; Engin & Pals 2018; Goldscheider, Goldscheider & Rico-Gonzalez 2014; Inglehart & Norris 2003b; Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Otherwise stated, increasing socio-economic status would facilitate the development of more egalitarian attitudes and orientations and so undermine patriarchal tendencies. To test the impact of socio-economic status, we constructed the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: Individuals with better socio-economic status should be less likely to have patriarchal values.

Data, variables, and method

As mentioned above, to analyse patriarchal orientations in the Turkish context, we employ data derived from an original nationwide public opinion survey, *Informal Institutions in Turkey Survey*. As the title suggests, the survey aims to investigate various informal institutions in Turkish society, including patriarchy. After reviewing the existing scholarly analyses, media discussions, and various reports on male dominance and gender inequality in Turkey, we formulated draft survey questions related to patriarchy. Before implementing the survey, we conducted a pilot study in late September 2019 with 45 participants (drawn randomly from the provinces of Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakır). Based on

feedback from the pilot studies and suggestions from several other experts, we revised the survey questionnaire. On October 12–13 and 19–20, trained and experienced interviewers (of a private public-opinion research company based in Istanbul) conducted the survey through face-to-face interviews with 7,250 participants, aged 18 or above, in 300 neighbourhoods and villages from 50 (out of 81) provinces. With respect to sampling, the procedure involved two main stages. During the first stage, a multistage, stratified, cluster-sampling technique was applied to identify households. In the second stage, age and gender quotas were used to select one individual from each household.⁵

Dependent variable

Patriarchal attitudes and orientations at the mass level constitute the dependent variable in the statistical analyses. As indicated above, patriarchy simply refers to male domination and female subordination. As several studies acknowledge, women might be subordinated to men in different forms and ways across various domains (e.g. see Beechey 1979; Walby 1989, 1991).⁶ Therefore, the survey included multiple questions on whether respondents agree or disagree with women's subordination across multiple domains, such as family, religion, education, social life, politics, and economy. Hence, we utilised the following patriarchy-related survey items:

Please state if you *agree* or *disagree* with each of the following statements:

- One's family lineage should come from his/her father's lineage, but not from his/her mother's lineage.
- The most important duty or responsibility of a woman in life should be 'motherhood.'
- The leader or the head of a family should be the husband.
- Among marrying individuals, even if a man is not a virgin, a woman must be a virgin.
- In a family, it is inappropriate for a wife to earn more money than a husband.
- In business, male managers are much more successful than female managers.
- Politics is not for women; it is for men.
- In science, men are more successful than women.
- In a family, a woman should not work outside the home; instead, she should take care of housework, such as the cleaning and cooking, and the care of children and the elderly.
- Men's university education is much more important than women's university education.
- In inheritance sharing, men should get a double share compared to women.

- A man's testimony is much more important than, and superior to, a woman's testimony.
- In a family, decisions about having children, such as when and how many, should belong to the husband.
- In a family, a husband should be able to beat his wife.

We treat respondents' support for male domination and female subordination across these various public and private domains as an indicator of patriarchal attitudes and orientations in Turkish society (for a similar measurement strategy, see Alexander & Welzel 2011). Most of the existing data sets (such as the World Values Survey) try to capture male-dominance at the mass level through a couple of questions. Studies utilising such data provide only limited empirical analyses of patriarchy. However, our survey questionnaire, which includes the above 14 different items on male-dominance, is fairly comprehensive and able to capture various aspects of patriarchy at the mass level.

To check whether these multiple survey items might be reduced to a few underlying dimensions, we conducted factor analyses, which generated three factors (see Table 1). Since patriarchy-related survey items are dichotomous variables (agree vs. disagree), we utilised a polychoric correlation matrix to conduct factor analyses. Items related to women's subordination in the private realm had relatively stronger factor loadings on the first component, so we labelled it '*private patriarchy*'. Patriarchal statements mostly related to the public domain had higher loadings on the second component and we named it '*public patriarchy*'. Finally, patriarchal assertions about one's family lineage, women's main responsibilities, and the head of family clustered around the third factor. These are also the items that received the highest approval from the respondents (supported by the majority of men and women). Because these patriarchal orientations are widespread in Turkish society, we named the third factor '*extensive patriarchy*'. Adding the respective items together, we composed three additive indices of patriarchy, which constituted the dependent variables in multivariate analyses. Each patriarchy index has a fairly large alpha score, marking acceptable degree of reliability and internal consistency ($\alpha_1 = 0.74$; $\alpha_2 = 0.80$; $\alpha_3 = 0.72$). Each of these variables is measured on an ordinal scale, with low values marking 'weak,' and high values denoting 'strong,' patriarchal positions and attitudes (see Table 2). Since our dependent variables are categorical and ordinal, we estimated several ordinal logit models as we conduct multivariate analyses.⁷

Independent variables

Religiosity, which refers to a commitment to religious beliefs, values, norms, and practices, constitutes one of the variables of interest in this study. To capture the level of, as well as various aspects of, religiosity (such as belief, practice, and

Table 1. Factor analysis of patriarchy.

Variables	Factor loadings		
	Factor 1: Private	Factor 2: Public	Factor 3 Extensive
Father's lineage	0.141		0.552
Women to be mother	−0.166	−0.138	1.203
Husband as family head	0.227	0.148	0.522
More inheritance to men	0.470		0.127
Women's chastity	0.594		
Husband to decide on the number of children	0.783		
Housework for wife	0.813		
Violence against women	1.136	−0.206	−0.252
Husband to earn more	0.542	0.214	
Superiority of men's testimony	0.395	0.329	
Business for men		1.054	
Politics for men		0.931	
Science for men		0.952	−0.111
University education for men	0.229	0.537	
<i>SS loadings</i>	3.758	3.436	2.162
<i>Proportion Var.</i>	26.80	24.50	15.40
<i>Reliability analysis</i>	$\alpha_1 = 0.74$	$\alpha_2 = 0.80$	$\alpha_3 = 0.72$

Source: Authors' elaboration of TEKA 2019 data.

Notes:

(1) We employed 'polycor' package in *R* to conduct factor analyses.

(2) Because the components seem to be correlated, promax rotation, which is a method of oblique rotation, is employed.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables.

Variables	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
<i>Dependent</i>					
Public patriarchy	7,067	0	4	1.26	1.468
Private patriarchy	7,005	0	7	1.68	1.810
Extensive patriarchy	7,159	0	3	2.07	1.099
<i>Independent</i>					
Religiosity (index)	6,968	0	7	3.81	2.048
Sunni	7,135	0	1	0.92	0.270
Kurdish	7,158	0	1	0.12	0.330
Ideology	6,938	1	5	3.18	0.871
Education	7,240	1	7	4.27	1.381
Income	6,755	1	11	3.63	1.849
<i>Control</i>					
Female	7,240	0	1	0.50	0.500
Age	7,240	18	94	40.17	14.405
Rural-urban	7,240	1	4	3.12	1.026
Region (east and southeast)	7,240	0	1	0.14	0.348
Married	7,240	0	1	0.66	0.475
Unemployment	7,240	0	1	0.33	0.470

Source: Authors' elaboration of TEKA 2019 data.

attitude), we included several religion-related items in the survey questionnaire (i.e. believing in God and the afterlife; practicing daily prayer five times; fasting during Ramadan; supporting the headscarf at primary schools; viewing financial interest as *haram*; demanding Friday to be an official holiday; supporting gender-segregated schools; and believing in the priority of religion over science). To identify the underlying dimensions of religion-related items, we conducted factor analyses (see Table A1 in the Appendix available online at

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2021.1924986>). Because almost all participants expressed their belief in God and the afterlife, we excluded those items from the analyses. Factor analyses utilising the remaining religion-related items generated one single factor that we labelled as '*practice/attitude*'. Utilising those seven items, we constructed an additive index of religiosity ($\alpha = 0.73$). Thus, we have a direct and comprehensive measure of religiosity. Like patriarchy indices, the religiosity index is ordinal, with high values designating stronger religiosity.

To test the possible impact of sectarian differences, we utilised the respondents' self-identification regarding sectarian orientations. In modelling the impact of religious sect, we utilised Sunni sectarian identity, which constitutes the majority in Turkish society. If being a member of the Sunni religious sect creates any difference, then, we will be able to conclude that sectarian identity does matter in terms of patriarchal values and attitudes. Thus, we incorporated a '*Sunni*' variable ('1': Sunni; '0': Other) into the models. In regard to measuring ethnic identity, we also used self-identification to identify one's ethnic origin. Following the hypothetical expectations on the impact of ethnicity on patriarchal attitudes and orientations presented above, we incorporated a Kurdish identity variable into the models. The *Kurdish* variable is a binary variable that codes '1' if the respondent self-identifies as Kurdish, and '0' if otherwise.⁸

As another independent variable, *ideology*, is measured by utilising participants' responses to the question that asks participants where they would place themselves on the left-right ideological spectrum. This variable ranges from 1 (far left) to 5 (far right).

Finally, to measure socio-economic status, we used *education* and *income* levels. The education variable is measured on an ordinal scale, which ranges from '1' for illiterate to '7' for highly educated individuals with a graduate degree. We measure income level by utilising respondents' answers to a question asking for monthly total household income. We then recoded the reported household income into a new variable with income groups. This ordinal variable ranges from '1' for the group of individuals with low income to '11' for the group of individuals with high income.

Control variables

In multivariate analyses, we control for the possible impact of various other variables and factors. Several studies indicate that individuals' sexual and generational differences matter in terms of patriarchal values and orientations. It is claimed that women and younger individuals are more likely to have egalitarian attitudes and understandings (e.g. Alexander & Welzel 2011; Blaydes & Linzer 2008; Diehl, Koenig & Kerstin 2009; Goldscheider, Goldscheider & Rico-Gonzalez 2014; Inglehart & Norris 2003b; Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Thus, we control for the impact of being *female* ('0': male; '1': female) and *age* (as reported by each respondent at the time of interview).

Rural-urban distinction might matter as well. It is a widely held argument that in rural areas, traditional patriarchal understandings and practices are much more powerful than in urban centres (e.g. see Çağlayan 2020; Erman 2001; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits 2008). We should acknowledge that various forms of gender inequality and discrimination against women do exist in urban settings (e.g. see Cinar & Ugur-Cinar 2018). However, given the fact that women are relatively more visible and active in various domains of urban public life, people residing in urban centres are more likely to observe and experience relatively higher degrees of gender equality in city life; they then develop more egalitarian attitudes and values. In other words, urbanisation is likely to weaken, if not eliminate, traditional gender roles. The *rural-urban* variable is an ordinal variable, ranging from '1' for village to '4' for metropolitan areas.

Another regional factor that we take into account is the east-west distinction. It is widely believed that people living in eastern and south-eastern regions have more traditional lifestyles and cultures and so are more likely to exhibit stronger patriarchal values. As a result, these regions are characterised by a lower level of women's empowerment (see Cinar & Kose 2018, p. 371; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits 2008, pp. 107–110). Our *region* variable is a binary variable ('1': residing in eastern and south-eastern regions; '0': residing in the rest of the country).

Finally, we control for the possible impact of *marital status* and *unemployment*. One might anticipate that married individuals have stronger patriarchal attitudes because, through marriage, individuals are likely to socialise into the traditional familial roles and understandings that are largely patriarchal in Turkish society. With respect to unemployment, one might expect that individuals who participate in the workforce are likely to develop more egalitarian attitudes. Hence, we might expect unemployed individuals to exhibit stronger patriarchal values (see also Blaydes & Linzer 2008; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits 2008, p. 111; Inglehart & Norris 2003b). The unemployment variable is a binary variable that codes '0' for employed individuals and '1' for unemployed respondents (including housewives). For the descriptive statistics of all the variables, see Table 2.

Statistical results

Descriptive analyses and findings

To begin with the descriptive findings, Figure 1 indicates that, as one might expect, we see stronger patriarchal attitudes among men across all categories. Male respondents lend from three to 20 per cent higher support for those patriarchal statements. In a male-dominant society, it is not surprising to see higher approval rates of those patriarchal assertions among men. It is, however, interesting to see high approval rates even among women. For instance, the majority of women think that one's family lineage should come from his/her




Figure 1. Patriarchal attitudes among men and women.
Source: Authors' elaboration of TEKA 2019 data

father's lineage (69 per cent); the most important duty or responsibility of a woman in life should be motherhood (73 per cent); and the leader or the head of the family should be the husband (51 per cent). This major support for the statement that the head of the family should be the husband is particularly interesting because, although until the early 2000s Civil Law recognised the husband as the head of the family, in 2001 a new Civil Law was adopted and this principle was removed from the law. The new Civil Law embraced the principle of equality and stated that a husband and a wife represent a family together and share equally in familial responsibilities. Despite such a formal institutional change, the majority of women still subscribe to traditional gender roles within the family. In other words, there is still a major gap between formal, legal arrangements and informal practices and institutions.

In several other categories, we also see substantial approval rates among female respondents: among marrying individuals, even if a man is not a virgin, the woman must be a virgin (34 per cent), and it would be inappropriate if a wife earned more money than her husband (32 per cent). Moreover, at least one-quarter of women believe that in business, male managers are more successful than female managers; that politics is not for women but for men; and that men are more successful than women in science. Furthermore, around one-fifth of women believe that a woman should not work outside the home (instead she should take care of housework such as cleaning, cooking, and caring for children and the elderly), and that men's university education is much more important than women's university education. In addition, 12 to 15 per cent of women think (in line with Islamic beliefs and practices) that men should get a greater share of a family's inheritance; men's testimony is superior to women's testimony; and decisions about having children (such as when and how many) should belong to the husband. Finally, 6 per cent of female participants state that a husband should be able to beat his wife.⁹ Given the relatively higher possibility of a social desirability bias within this category, we might expect the support for physical violence against women to be higher than expressed here. All these findings confirm that even women can learn and internalise patriarchal roles, values, and norms.

Multivariate analyses and findings: ordered logit models

Tables 3–5 present the multivariate analyses of public, private, and extensive patriarchy, respectively. One might suggest that the variables of interests (i.e. religiosity, sectarian identity, ethnicity, ideology, and education and income) are likely to be correlated in the Turkish context. This would create a multicollinearity problem in multivariate analyses, which would result in unreliable and unstable estimates of coefficients. Taking that possibility into account, we conducted several tests, such as cross-tabular analyses and the variance inflation factor (VIF) test. The tests confirm that there are indeed high correlations among the

Table 3. Ordered logit models of public patriarchy.

Predictors	Dependent variable: Public patriarchy						
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d	Model 1e	Model 1f	Model 1g
Religiosity		0.213*** (0.012)					0.121*** (0.014)
Sunni			0.432*** (0.090)				−0.004 (0.101)
Kurdish				0.406*** (0.073)			0.209** (0.078)
Ideology					0.383*** (0.027)		0.250*** (0.031)
Education						−0.307*** (0.022)	−0.239*** (0.024)
Income						−0.040** (0.014)	−0.032* (0.015)
Female	−1.056*** (0.059)	−1.014*** (0.060)	−1.069*** (0.059)	−1.059*** (0.059)	−1.039*** (0.060)	−1.090*** (0.061)	−1.072*** (0.064)
Age	0.014*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Rural-urban	−0.341*** (0.022)	−0.317*** (0.022)	−0.332*** (0.022)	−0.348*** (0.022)	−0.307*** (0.022)	−0.311*** (0.023)	−0.281*** (0.024)
Region (east and southeast)	0.525*** (0.064)	0.409*** (0.065)	0.521*** (0.064)	0.376*** (0.070)	0.602*** (0.065)	0.337*** (0.067)	0.296*** (0.073)
Married	0.329*** (0.052)	0.230*** (0.053)	0.307*** (0.052)	0.313*** (0.052)	0.261*** (0.053)	0.212*** (0.054)	0.131* (0.056)
Unemployment	0.585*** (0.062)	0.403*** (0.064)	0.572*** (0.063)	0.570*** (0.063)	0.524*** (0.064)	0.281*** (0.068)	0.213** (0.071)
Log likelihood	−9,526.342 (df = 10)	−9,099.371 (df = 11)	−9,405.876 (df = 11)	−9,440.14 (df = 11)	−9,107.011 (df = 11)	−8,843.035 (df = 12)	−8,226.333 (df = 16)
AIC	19,072.68	18,220.74	18,833.75	18,902.28	18,236.02	17,710.07	16,484.67
N	7,067	6,863	6,974	7,011	6,823	6,628	6,233

Source: Authors' elaboration of TEKA 2019 data.

Notes:

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

predictor variables. Therefore, as we modelled each type of patriarchy, we estimated a separate ordered logit model for each predictor. We first estimated a baseline model with only control variables and then added each predictor, one by one, to the baseline model. Adding predictor variables reduces AIC scores, which marks improvement in model fit and so model quality. Despite multicollinearity, we also report the results of the full model, including all of the variables of interest and control variables.

Religiosity

Regarding the main findings, as expected, religiosity has a positive and statistically significant impact on all dimensions of patriarchy. That is, increasing the level of religiosity appears to empower patriarchal understandings and attitudes, and this positive relationship between religiosity and patriarchy holds across various model specifications, including full models. These results indicate that religious values and norms constitute one main source of patriarchy at the mass level. In other words, Islamic religiosity appears to be a major obstacle to gender equality (see also Alexander & Welzel 2011;

Table 4. Ordered logit models of private patriarchy.

Predictors	Dependent variable: <i>Private patriarchy</i>						
	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d	Model 2e	Model 2f	Model 2g
Religiosity		0.334*** (0.012)					0.222*** (0.014)
Sunni			0.776*** (0.087)				0.167 [†] (0.098)
Kurdish				0.712*** (0.070)			0.414*** (0.075)
Ideology					0.494*** (0.027)		0.268*** (0.031)
Education						-0.500*** (0.022)	-0.376*** (0.024)
Income						-0.065*** (0.014)	-0.054*** (0.015)
Female	-1.215*** (0.056)	-1.231*** (0.058)	-1.231*** (0.057)	-1.218*** (0.056)	-1.213*** (0.058)	-1.313*** (0.060)	-1.323*** (0.062)
Age	0.020*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Rural-urban	-0.270*** (0.021)	-0.236*** (0.022)	-0.251*** (0.022)	-0.282*** (0.022)	-0.224*** (0.022)	-0.209*** (0.022)	-0.182*** (0.023)
Region (east and southeast)	0.836*** (0.063)	0.626*** (0.064)	0.824*** (0.063)	0.588*** (0.067)	0.876*** (0.063)	0.597*** (0.066)	0.389*** (0.071)
Married	0.349*** (0.050)	0.199*** (0.052)	0.326*** (0.051)	0.333*** (0.050)	0.254*** (0.051)	0.206*** (0.052)	0.082 (0.054)
Unemployment	0.721*** (0.059)	0.480*** (0.061)	0.709*** (0.060)	0.702*** (0.059)	0.686*** (0.061)	0.268*** (0.065)	0.213** (0.068)
Log likelihood	-11,570.49 (df = 13)	-10,904.33 (df = 14)	-11,404.68 (df = 14)	-11,459.5 (df = 14)	-11,036.85 (df = 14)	-10,549.68 (df = 15)	-9,755.593 (df = 19)
AIC	23,166.99	21,836.66	22,837.35	22,947.00	22,101.70	21,129.35	19,549.19
N	7,005	6,817	6,916	6,959	6,767	6,568	6,193

Source: Authors' elaboration of TEKA 2019 data.

Notes:

[†] < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

Inglehart & Norris 2003b, pp. 49–73). One practical implication of this finding is that promoting gender equality in Muslim-majority societies requires policies and measures that take into account religious sources and the dynamics of patriarchal understandings. Discussions on whether a more egalitarian and progressive interpretation of Islam is possible, and how such an understanding of Islam can be promoted, would be worthwhile in terms of promoting more egalitarian norms and values in Muslim-majority countries.¹⁰

Sectarian identity (Sunni)

With respect to sectarian differences, the results show that sectarian identity does matter: being Sunni has a statistically significant and positive correlation with patriarchal attitudes and orientations, refuting hypothesis 2b. In full models, the Sunni variable becomes insignificant, but this is due to a high correlation between religiosity and Sunni variables. Overall, the results confirm that sectarian differences appear to create some difference with respect to patriarchal values and norms. Even if we estimate the models by replacing the Sunni variable with the Alevi variable, we get quite similar results: moving from non-

Table 5. Ordered logit models of extensive patriarchy.

Predictors	Dependent variable: <i>Extensive patriarchy</i>						
	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 3d	Model 3e	Model 3f	Model 3g
Religiosity		0.239*** (0.012)					0.153*** (0.015)
Sunni			0.607*** (0.081)				0.081 (0.092)
Kurdish				0.639*** (0.079)			0.421*** (0.086)
Ideology					0.436*** (0.028)		0.285*** (0.032)
Education						-0.408*** (0.023)	-0.303*** (0.025)
Income						-0.044*** (0.014)	-0.041** (0.014)
Female	-1.000*** (0.056)	-0.981*** (0.057)	-1.014*** (0.056)	-0.996*** (0.056)	-0.972*** (0.057)	-1.032*** (0.058)	-0.989*** (0.060)
Age	0.018*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
Rural-urban	-0.283*** (0.023)	-0.230*** (0.024)	-0.262*** (0.023)	-0.284*** (0.023)	-0.226*** (0.024)	-0.246*** (0.024)	-0.182*** (0.025)
Region (east and southeast)	0.272*** (0.068)	0.077 (0.070)	0.252*** (0.068)	0.037 (0.073)	0.296*** (0.069)	0.020 (0.072)	-0.189* (0.079)
Married	0.537*** (0.051)	0.462*** (0.053)	0.521*** (0.052)	0.536*** (0.052)	0.509*** (0.053)	0.431*** (0.054)	0.397*** (0.057)
Unemployment	0.749*** (0.060)	0.580*** (0.062)	0.751*** (0.061)	0.752*** (0.061)	0.738*** (0.062)	0.385*** (0.066)	0.348*** (0.069)
Log likelihood	-8,318.363 (df = 9)	-7823.37 (df = 10)	-8,151.981 (df = 10)	-8,186.466 (df = 10)	-7,822.479 (df = 10)	-7,597.95 (df = 11)	-6,866.633 (df = 15)
AIC	16,654.73	15,666.74	16,323.96	16,392.93	15,664.96	15,217.90	13,763.27
N	7,159	6,943	7,066	7,093	6,885	6,706	6,287

Source: Authors' elaboration of TEKA 2019 data.

Notes:

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

Alevi to Alevi citizen does not have a statistically significant impact on public patriarchy, but it has a negative and statistically significant impact on private and extensive forms of patriarchy. Thus, all these results suggest that members of the Sunni majority appear to be relatively more patriarchal than members of religious minority groups. Given these results, it would be worthwhile to conduct further empirical research to better illustrate why, how, and when sectarian differences matter in terms of patriarchal orientations and attitudes.

Ethnicity (Kurdish)

Another striking finding is that ethnic differences do matter: compared to other ethnic groups, members of the Kurdish ethnic minority appear to be relatively more patriarchal. This relationship holds across various model specifications, including full models, and disconfirms hypothesis 3b. This finding is interesting because the Kurdish ethnopolitical movement in Turkey, with its secular and leftist roots and tendencies, puts substantial emphasis on gender equality and women's empowerment in socio-political life.¹¹ Indeed, we see several egalitarian policies and practices within Turkey's Kurdish movement (such as the system

of co-chair - women co-chairing with men - and quotas favouring women).¹² As a result, women have become increasingly visible and influential within the legal and illegal branches of the Kurdish movement in the last decades, serving in various echelons and positions, such as politicians, deputies, mayors, party officials and administrators, civil society representatives and activists (see also Al-Ali & Tas 2018; Bengio 2016; Çağlayan 2020; Grabolle-Çeliker 2019; Gunes 2012). The statistical results, however, indicate that there is still a major gap between the Kurdish ethnopolitical movement and the Kurdish masses in terms of patriarchal orientations. One might even interpret the Kurdish movement's strong emphasis on women's rights and freedoms and gender equality in socio-political life as a result of the prevalence of strong male-dominance and patriarchal values among Kurds (see also Grabolle-Çeliker 2019).

This finding begs the following questions: How can we account for the relatively stronger patriarchal values among Kurds? Our further analyses indicate that while religiosity is relatively stronger, education level and labour force participation are relatively lower among Kurds (these differences are statistically significant). In other words, Kurds and Turks have different levels of religiosity and socio-economic development (see also Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci 1999; Sarigil 2018). In addition, we see sectarian differences across Turks and Kurds (i.e. mostly Sunni-Hanefi Turks vs. mostly Sunni-Shafi Kurds). Such differences across the Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority might lead to relatively stronger patriarchal values and orientations among Kurds. That being said, given this interesting finding, it would be worthwhile to conduct further theoretical and empirical research on the nexus between ethnicity and patriarchy.

Ideology

Concerning the impact of ideological orientations, compared to left-oriented individuals, right-oriented individuals are relatively more patriarchal, confirming hypothesis 4. This finding indicates that the conventional left-right ideological division or cleavage shows itself in the case of gender inequality as well. This outcome is probably because the stronger emphasis on ideas and values such as social justice and equality and greater concern for disadvantaged or vulnerable groups, which we see in the leftist ideological outlook, leads to more awareness about women's subordination in socio-political life. This in return facilitates the development of more egalitarian attitudes among leftist circles.

Socio-economic status

In terms of the impact of socio-economic factors, education and income variables have a negative and statistically significant impact on all types of patriarchy, verifying hypothesis 5. Increasing education and income levels is likely to weaken patriarchal values. This finding suggests that socio-economic development is likely to undermine or weaken patriarchal values and understandings.

Control variables

Moving to the impact of control variables, not surprisingly, compared to men, *women* show relatively weaker patriarchal values and orientations (see also Blaydes & Linzer 2008). Furthermore, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between *age* and patriarchal values. This result suggests that traditional patriarchal roles and norms are relatively more powerful among senior individuals. This finding confirms that generational differences do matter in terms of patriarchal tendencies (see also Alexander & Welzel 2011; Inglehart & Norris 2003b; Inglehart & Welzel 2005).

The statistical results suggest that *regional factors* count as well. Compared to individuals living in rural areas, individuals living in urban centres exhibit relatively weaker patriarchal attitudes and orientations. In other words, urbanisation appears to undermine patriarchal values and norms. Furthermore, moving from the western to eastern and south-eastern regions generally empowers patriarchal attitudes and tendencies. Thus, the east-west divide in the country appears to be a factor in patriarchal values and orientations as well (see also Cinar & Kose 2018; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits 2008).

Marital status also seems to create difference in terms of patriarchal values. The results show that being married is likely to empower patriarchal orientations. This is probably because, through marriage, individuals are socialised into traditional gender roles and develop certain degrees of patriarchal attitudes.

Finally, *unemployed* individuals exhibit a stronger degree of patriarchal value and attitude. This finding indicates that men and women's participation in the workforce is likely to undermine traditional patriarchal roles and values. In other words, participation in the labour market is likely to facilitate the development of more consciousness or awareness about the notion of gender equality and so promote more egalitarian attitudes and orientations. Although employed women are likely to face other forms of patriarchal structures in the labour market (e.g. unequal payment and the glass ceiling), this result suggests that participating in the work force still has a certain degree of emancipatory impact.

Predicted probabilities

To better illustrate the substantive impact of some of the key variables on patriarchal attitudes and orientations, we calculated the predicted probabilities of *public patriarchy* (see Figure 2).¹³ To begin with the effect of religiosity, moving from the lowest to highest level of religiosity (from '0' to '7') reduces the probability of the lowest level of public patriarchy (i.e. category '0') by 36 per cent but increases the probability of the highest level (i.e. category '4') by 14 per cent. These results also confirm the religiosity hypothesis. In terms of sectarian identity, being Sunni reduces the probability of the lowest level of public patriarchy by 11 per cent and increases the highest level by 4 per cent. Regarding the Kurdish variable,




Figure 2. Cumulative predicted probabilities of public patriarchy.
Source: Authors' elaboration of TEKA 2019 data.

being Kurdish decreases the probability of the lowest category by 10 per cent but increases the highest category by 4 per cent, which confirms that patriarchal values are relatively stronger among Kurds. With respect to the impact of ideology, moving from a strong leftist orientation to a strong rightist orientation (i.e. from '1' to '5') decreases the probability of the lowest level of public patriarchy by 36 per cent, while it increases the probability of the highest level by 15 per cent. These results also confirm that right-oriented individuals exhibit stronger patriarchal values and orientations. A shift from the lowest level of education to the highest level increases the probability of the lowest category of public patriarchy by 43 per cent, while reducing the probability of the highest category by 20 per cent. This finding confirms that education has strong negative impact on patriarchal attitudes and orientations.

Conclusions and implications

Utilising original, comprehensive, and nationwide survey data (i.e. TEKA 2019), this study provides an empirical investigation of the correlates of patriarchal values and attitudes in Turkish society. Thus, we focus on patriarchy in a Muslim-majority country and examine the within-country variance at the micro level (i.e. individual level) with respect to patriarchal values and orientations. The empirical analyses indicate that patriarchal values and understandings are still powerful and widespread in Turkish society. Furthermore, the results show that there are both material and ideational factors behind patriarchal values.

As religiosity increases, patriarchal understandings and tendencies also increase. In other words, religiosity seems to empower patriarchy. Another religion-related factor (i.e. sectarian identity) matters as well: an individual with Sunni sectarian identity exhibits relatively stronger patriarchal attitudes and values. Regarding ethnic identity, compared to the Turkish majority, the Kurdish ethnic minority appears to have stronger patriarchal orientations and tendencies. In terms of ideological factors, compared to a left-oriented person, a right-oriented person is more patriarchal. The results show that socio-economic status matters: individuals with a higher socio-economic status (i.e. higher levels of education and income) are less patriarchal.

Regarding other notable findings, not surprisingly, sexual differences also matter: compared to women, men exhibit much stronger patriarchal values. Moreover, patriarchal tendencies increase with age, indicating that generational differences matter with respect to patriarchal values. Regional factors also play a role in patriarchy: patriarchal attitudes and understandings are relatively stronger in the country's rural and eastern regions. Finally, marital status (i.e. being married) and unemployment seem to empower patriarchal values and understandings.

What are the broader implications of these results? To begin with, these micro-level findings are enlightening for gender-related political debates and developments at the macro level. Consider, for instance, the recent debates around the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (a.k.a. Istanbul Convention). Ratified by Turkey in March 2012, this human rights treaty aims at preventing violence against women, protecting victims, and ending the impunity of culprits. However, disturbed by certain provisions of the Istanbul Convention, conservative circles (such as several religious orders) criticised the convention and demanded that the Turkish government withdraw from it. Facing increasing pressure from Islamist circles, in summer 2020, the conservative AKP government revealed its intention to withdraw from the convention. Many women's rights organisations strongly protested such intentions and so, for a time, the conservative government had to back down. However, in March 2021, president Erdogan signed a decree to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention. Our findings provide some insights into why conservative social and political movements and circles, in particular, are critical of the legal and institutional arrangements that promote women's rights and empowerment in socio-political life. One natural corollary to this is that the control of political power by Islamist political parties and the promotion of Islamist values and norms in Turkish socio-political life would increase the likelihood of such demands and initiatives, irreconcilable with the principle of gender-equality (see also Bulut 2020; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün 2017).

The findings also have some implications for the problems with the implementation of egalitarian formal laws and treaties. Turkey has signed many international agreements and conventions that aim to promote gender equality and eliminate gender-based discrimination, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).¹⁴ However, as the Gender Gap Report cited above confirms, Turkey has failed in terms of establishing gender equality and minimising, if not eliminating, gender-based discrimination in socio-political life (see, for instance, Yildirim & Kocapinar 2019; Yildirim, Kocapinar & Ecevit 2021). As a result, many domestic and international women's organisations have criticised Turkey's poor record of implementing those formal agreements and treaties.

The findings of this study shed some light on the implementation failures. They suggest that one reason for implementation problems and difficulties is the persistence of strong patriarchal values and understandings and discriminatory attitudes towards women in the informal domain of socio-political life (hence the gap between *de jure*/formal arrangements and *de facto*/informal practices). This implies that egalitarian policies and measures should have both formal (e.g. legal reforms and arrangements) and informal components (e.g. targeting traditional patriarchal norms and values).

The findings are also revealing for patriarchy in Muslim-majority countries. Alexander and Welzel (2011, p. 272) conclude that 'Muslims are by no means a homogenous social category with respect to patriarchal values. Instead, Muslim support for patriarchal values varies considerably over inner-societal group divisions by sex, cohort, religiosity, and education ...' Our results confirm that it would be problematic to treat Muslim-majority countries as homogenous entities in terms of patriarchal values. As confirmed by the Turkish case, certain circles might be relatively more patriarchal than other groups in Muslim-majority countries.¹⁵

Finally, our empirical findings generally support the modernisation perspective. The results show that modernisation processes (such as increasing levels of education and income, secularisation, urbanisation, and industrialisation) are likely to undermine traditional patriarchal values and orientations (see also Inglehart & Norris 2003b).¹⁶ Practically speaking, this implies that although patriarchal values might be relatively stronger in Muslim-majority countries (Alexander & Welzel 2011), modernisation processes are likely to weaken or undermine harmful traditional gender roles in Muslim societies as well.

Notes

1. Available online at: <https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2020>.
2. For some examples, see Acar and Altunok (2013); Arat (1989, 2000, 2010); Ayata and Tütüncü (2008); Cindoğlu and Toktaş (2002); Coşar and Onbaşı (2008); Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2011); Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün (2017); Kandiyoti (1987), Kandiyoti (1988); Sirman (1989); Tekeli (1986, 1995); Ugur-Cinar (2017); White (2003).
3. See, for instance, Altınay and Arat (2009); Bulut (2020); Cinar and Kose (2018); Engin and Pals (2018); Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2008); İlkkaracan (2012); Yildirim and Kocapinar (2019); Yildirim, Kocapinar and Ecevit (2021).
4. See also Glas et al. (2019).
5. The average time to complete the survey was around 15 minutes. Kurdish-speaking interviewers implemented the survey in provinces with a substantial Kurdish population. The sample included the following provinces: İstanbul, Ankara, Çankırı, Kırıkkale, Çorum, Adapazarı, Kocaeli, Bursa, İzmir, Erzincan, Elazığ, Malatya, Adıyaman, Kahramanmaraş, Şanlıurfa, Samsun, Gaziantep, Burdur, Aksaray, Sivas, Eskişehir, Zonguldak, Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Batman, Afyon, Isparta, Manisa, Kilis, Denizli, Mardin, Van, Osmaniye, Aydın, Antalya, Nevşehir, Edirne, Adana, Giresun, Mersin, Trabzon, Hatay, Balıkesir, Kayseri, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Konya, Erzurum, Rize, Çanakkale.
6. Walby (1991, p. 20), for instance, identifies six different patriarchal structures spanning across various domains: the patriarchal mode of production in the household, patriarchal relations in waged labour, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal sexuality, and patriarchal culture.
7. Even if we treat the dependent variables as interval variables, and so estimate linear regression models, we get the same patterns. However, given the categorical and ordinal nature of the dependent variables, ordered logit would be a much more appropriate estimation technique (see also Long 1997).

8. For the purpose of robustness check, we used 'mother tongue' as an alternative indicator of ethnic origin, but it generated the same patterns.
9. Altınay & Arat's (2009) survey research on violence against women, which was conducted in Turkey in 2007, had similar results: 10 per cent of female respondents agreed that under certain circumstances, beating could be justified.
10. Some studies (e.g. see Glas et al. 2019; Goldscheider, Goldscheider & Rico-Gonzalez 2014) suggest that it is possible to have and promote less patriarchal and more egalitarian interpretations of religion.
11. For a detailed discussion on this issue (i.e. the Kurdish movement's attitude towards women's rights and freedoms and gender equality), see Çağlayan (2020).
12. For instance, during the 2018 general elections, 38 per cent of the seats controlled by the pro-Kurdish HDP (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* - Peoples' Democratic Party) in the parliament were occupied by women, and it was the highest rate among all political parties represented in the parliament.
13. Due to space limitations, we report only predicted probabilities for public patriarchy. For predicted probabilities for private and extensive patriarchy, see the Appendix Figure A1 and A2, respectively.
14. CEDAW is an international treaty adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. Turkey signed the convention in 1985.
15. See Glas et al. (2019).
16. See also Glas et al. (2019).

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