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Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region

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Eurasia has been a fulcrum of the developments generated by the radical changes in the international system since 1989. In geographical, political, and cultural terms, Turkey rests along an axis where two worlds blend. Given its central location, the challenges of adaptation to the post-Cold War era have been both promising and demanding. The challenges have been promising essentially because the traditional Soviet threat has disappeared. The postcommunist world in the Balkans and the post-Soviet world in Eurasia seemed to offer new space for mutually beneficial multilateral cooperation, with numerous newly independent states joining the international system.

On the other hand, the ethnic, national, and irredentist upheavals that have erupted in the Balkan and Black Sea regions in the wake of the Cold War have brought many of the most severe and disturbing ramifications of the geostrategic transition to the post-Cold War era up to Turkey's doorstep. These conflicts have created great instability and insecurity in the region. Given the persistence of dynamic forces pressing for a reordering of traditional political, economic, and military hierarchies, uncertainty seems likely to remain the hallmark of the international politics of Eurasia for some time to come.

Turkey's New Security Environment

The strategic withdrawal of Soviet power has led not only to the end of the Cold War but also to the collapse of communism in eastern Europe

and the disintegration of Moscow's centuries-old empire. The global power configuration and dominant patterns of state behavior that have prevailed since the October revolution in 1917, and those that have existed since the end of the Second World War, have been radically altered as a result.

Turkey has been directly and immediately affected by this geostrategic change for several reasons. It is geographically contiguous to the regions where change has been most marked and it has powerful historical, cultural, and ethnic bonds with the peoples in many of the lands that have suddenly found themselves freed from communism and both Soviet and Russian hegemony. Furthermore, the centuries-old common Turkish-Russian border has ceased to exist, a development of historic significance for Turkish security policy.

The fragmentation of power in the region surrounding Turkey is linked with the strategic withdrawal of the Soviets. The monolithic power of Moscow on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea is gone and the littoral is now divided among Ukraine (with the largest part), Georgia, and Russia. An independent Ukraine has claimed its own maritime role in the Black Sea. How the naval balance between Ukraine and Russia evolves will have a direct bearing on Turkey beyond an exclusive concern for the military balance. The Montreux Convention of 1936 will be affected by the evolving situation, possibly raising the difficult question of the treaty's revision. Indeed, the relevance of the Convention was already the subject of debate in the West after the Soviet Union began transporting Kiev-class helicopter carriers through the Straits in 1976.¹

The viability of the Montreux treaty in the post-Cold War era is likely to acquire greater salience in the near future in the context of anticipated increases in the volume of merchant shipping through the Straits. The Black Sea, and therefore the Turkish Straits, are among the alternative routes that are under consideration by international businesses engaged in negotiations with the government of Azerbaijan for the transport of Azeri oil to western markets.²

In the southern Caucasus, Soviet sovereignty has been replaced by three relatively small independent states: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Further to the east, Turkiespeaking republics in Central Asia have been freed from 150 years of Russian rule. Except for Armenia, all the newly independent former Soviet republics in the south share several common attributes with Turkey including ethnicity, language, culture, and history. Together they could represent a dynamic unified force, and perhaps a united political community.³

In the Balkans, too, liberation from communism and the phasing out of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(CMEA) meant the emergence of an entirely new regional political and military landscape. In the Balkans, as in the northeast, the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty had already generated hopes for an improved security environment. As had been the case with the West in the first wave of post-Cold War euphoria, Turkey looked forward to a mutually beneficial liberalization of political, cultural, and economic relations.

Most important perhaps, as Graham E. Fuller reminds us, geopolitical change in the post-Cold War era has involved other elements besides such tangible considerations as military power, geographic assets, and possession of raw materials.⁴ The "neo-geopolitics," in Fuller's terminology, has activated psychological and cultural dynamics among nations. It has thus aroused sentiments, perceptions, and aspirations concerning group identity and lifestyle, as well as memories of cross-national and cross-cultural experiences. Fuller fully captures the spirit of the new geopolitics in remarking: "Without history and psychology...the Balkans is meaningless. It is language and myth, not rivers, mountains, or raw materials that link the Turkish shores of the Mediterranean to the shores of Lake Baikal over the rivers of Western China—in the real political sense."⁵

The new geopolitical undercurrents have indeed mobilized mutual awareness and sympathy among the Turks of Turkey, their ethnic and linguistic kin in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Balkan peoples of Muslim heritage who look to Turkey as a source of moral and material support in the formidable task of transition to post-communist societies. In this spirit, leaders of the Turkic-speaking republics in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the east, and of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania in the Balkans, rushed to Ankara in 1991 and 1992 in order to tap the power of the newly energized emotional bonding for their respective political and economic needs.

Turkish enthusiasm for these peoples was in many respects startling.⁶ In the past, especially within the dominant political elite, Turkish awareness about the Turkic-speaking world outside its borders was very low. Behind this taboo was the wish not to jeopardize relations with Moscow. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's vision of Turkey portrayed Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism as dangerous and unrealistic ideologies. In succeeding decades they were stigmatized as politically and socially incorrect. Only among ultra-nationalists did references to "captive Turks" assert an ideological contact with the Turkic world in the former Soviet Union and China. By and large, the mainstream political elite viewed the Turkic-speaking population in the Soviet Union "as good Soviet citizens [who] would probably be gradually Russianized."⁷

A similar revival of mutual enthusiasm took place between Bosnian Muslims and Albanians. In this case, the common bond of Islam, a sense of shared history, and concern with the challenge to the Balkan balance of power by Serbian irredentism formed the forces of mutual attraction.

The new geopolitics of the Balkan and Black Sea regions has also been instrumental in creating a new domestic force in Turkey, namely the formation of foreign policy constituencies and lobbies representing different ethno-cultural communities and interest groups within the population. Several million people in Turkey are descendants of north Caucasians and Abkhazians who fled Russian conquest in the late 1850s and 1860s and were followed by later arrivals, including Chechens, Kabardans, Karachays, Nogays, Kumyks, Lezgins, Avars, and Azeris.⁸ Among the descendants of Balkan people who migrated to Turkey during the Ottoman era, Turks of Albanian and Bosnian origin are estimated to number two to three million. By and large, these different ethnic groups have successfully assimilated into Turkish life. Now, when their kin in the Caucasus or the Balkans are caught up in conflicts, as the Georgians, Abkhazians, and Bosnian Muslims have been and as the Albanians of Kosovo might be, Ankara finds itself under pressure to take a position in support of their rights and interests. In the case of the separatist war in Georgia, former prime minister Süleyman Demirel's own party found itself caught between the cross-pressures exerted simultaneously by two groups of deputies, one Georgian and the other Abkhazian.

The disappearance of the Soviet threat has had enormous adverse repercussions on an entirely different front: cohesion in the western world. For Ankara, this has meant less confidence in the willingness and ability of major NATO allies to continue business as usual with Turkey. It has also contributed to the exclusion of Turkey from the process of European integration. The Turkish bid for admission to the European Community was already rejected in December 1989. Developments in the east had outpaced whatever meager prospects Turkey might have enjoyed in western European eyes. The rebirth of "a Europe free and whole" pushed "Turkey the step child" to the bottom of the list of strategic priorities for western Europe. Hence, the year when the Berlin Wall came down was a very lonely one for Turkey. As one observer of Mediterranean security affairs has put it: "Turkey, as a full participant in neither the EC or the Western European Union (WEU), and whose prospects for full membership in both remain poor, is increasingly isolated from the process of Europeanization affecting the rest of NATO's southern region."⁹

In sum, the changing geopolitical environment in the early post-Cold-War era presented Turkey with many new challenges. These included a fragmentation of power along its northern and northeastern borders

following upon the strategic withdrawal of Soviet/Russian power, the entry into the international community of numerous political entities in Asia and Europe—some old, some new—sharing common attributes with Turkey including ethnicity, language, religion, culture, and history; the simultaneous emergence of local conflicts with the potential to escalate into larger regional conflicts; and the general diminution of western solidarity occasioned by the disappearance of the Soviet threat, further isolating Turkey from mainstream European political and economic developments and movements.

The Context of the Turkish View of the Outside World

Three basic assumptions have exerted a profound and sustained influence on Turkish foreign and security policy choices throughout the republican period.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, specific priorities have been subject to change over the years. Succeeding regional and global phases in world politics necessitated different policies and positions and the exact balance of priorities has shifted over time in response to domestic and external circumstances. Nevertheless, one can detect several continuities in how interests and goals have been conceptualized. The strategies of how to preserve the values and rationales embodied in these basic assumptions have changed but the decisive weight of the assumptions themselves has remained intact.

The following influences have determined the broad parameters of policy: an acute awareness of the geostrategic importance of Turkey's location, especially in relation to the distribution of regional and global power; the inherent fragility of Turkey's relations with its neighbors given the legacy of history (most were under Ottoman rule); and the relative vulnerability of its ideology of westernization, modernization, and commitment to a liberal political regime faced with a deeply-rooted hostility to subservience to the West.

Only in times of deep structural change in the world system has Turkey's strategy been redefined. For the most part, between 1923 and the end of the Second World War circumstances dictated an isolationist and neutral orientation. The end of the Second World War changed that drastically. Turkey came out of its shell to join the western alliance in order to protect itself against the Soviet threat and to safeguard and further consolidate its westernizing, modernizing domestic regime. At this stage regional insecurities were not a result of the Ottoman legacy but rather a function of Soviet influence in the Balkans and the northern Middle East. Today, because the international system has been subjected to another structural transformation of historic proportions, Turkish

strategy has again been redefined, this time in the direction of greater activism and involvement in regard to the issues and political affairs of surrounding regions.

Geostrategic Considerations

The first assumption which defines the Turkish elite's approach to the outside world is almost invariably cast in geostrategic terms. Turkey's location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, occupying, in the east, a commanding position over the northern Middle East and the Gulf and, in the west, over lines of communication from the Black Sea through the Mediterranean to Gibraltar, has instilled a strong awareness of the country's potential strengths and weaknesses in influencing regional and possibly global power balances.

The specific military and political implications of Turkey's geostrategic attributes are dynamic, taking on new meaning in response to structural changes in the international and regional systems, as well as to the changing implications of militarily relevant technologies. The most powerful foundation for geostrategic assumptions, however, are what are perceived to be the lessons of history.

One of the historical constants in Turkey's geostrategic position has always been the Russian factor. The strategic importance of any given geographical location is enriched above all else by its proximity to centers of power. In the Turkish case, geostrategic significance has been related to its proximity to Soviet/Russian power and to the oil-rich Gulf region. With this location, Turkey has potentially been capable of influencing Soviet/Russian interests as well as global power concerns in and around the Gulf. History also provides formative experiences, and since the time of Peter the Great Turkish-Russian history consisted of a seemingly unending series of wars of Russian expansion into the Ottoman lands of the northern Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. It is common knowledge that the Straits were regarded by czarist diplomats as "the 'key' to the Russian house which properly belonged in the Russian pocket."¹¹

In the post-Cold War era, the precise nature and scope of Turkey's geostrategic significance has once again been subjected to a reassessment in light of the profound alteration in global and regional power balances. Despite the uncertainties of this era of transition, however, Turkey's potential ability to influence the course of developments in several of the world's most troubled regions to its north, east, and west continues to assign it considerable importance. This was reaffirmed most powerfully during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91.

The Gulf War crystallized the tendency to view Turkey's strategic significance in the post-Cold War era overwhelmingly within the context of the Middle East and Gulf region. The collapse of the Soviet Union has further reinforced this perception. In the meantime, the security of the Mediterranean in general and of NATO's southern flank in particular has turned into one of the central concerns of European security. The growing importance of the Black Sea given anticipated increases in the foreign trade turnover of the riparian states, projects to use the sea to transport Azerbaijani oil to western markets, the unsettled nature of the security relationship between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and the general instability of the Balkans since the breakup of former Yugoslavia all warn against the simplistic notion that the strategic relevance of the Turkish Straits in particular, and the Black Sea-Mediterranean system in general, may be declining in the post-Cold War era.

Historical Considerations

The legacy of Turkish-Ottoman rule in the regions neighboring Turkey has an impact on perceptions and policy. Except for Iran, all of Turkey's current neighbors were either fully or partly under Turkish-Ottoman rule for long periods. The resentment, on various levels of intensity, felt by these countries as a result of this historical experience, as well as the territorial, ethnic, and property questions inherited from the past have not been conducive to the establishment of mutual trust. An unarticulated but almost constantly present apprehension in Turkish security policy conceptualization is the specter of anti-Turkish coalitions among its former Ottoman neighbors such as occurred in the First Balkan War. Nevertheless, modern Turkish diplomacy has generally succeeded in achieving and sustaining stability in its relations with the former Near East, with the exception of Greece in recent decades.

Today, however, when the Balkans, the southern Caucasus, and the Middle East are undergoing a painful transition and regional power balances are being reordered, historical passions and legacies of mistrust have been revived and once again influence national positions and policies. For example, speculation about Turkey's alleged neo-Ottomanist and Pan-Turkist aspirations have been heard in Moscow, Athens, Belgrade, and even Teheran, reflecting dynamic forces that have brought back collective memories filled with images from the past. Assertions made largely for domestic consumption by high-level Turkish officials and opposition leaders in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union about "the rebirth of the Turkic World from the Adriatic to China" have also heightened perceptions of Turkey's supposed neo-Ottomanism.¹² A

new intellectual and political interest in Ottoman history on the part of many Turks did manifest itself in the first years of the post-Cold War era but the nature and scope of that interest hardly equates to the emergence of Turkish irredentism and expansionism.¹³

The policy corollary to Turkey's trepidation about possible revanchism, and especially a revanchism coordinated among several of Turkey's former Ottoman territories, has been its own repudiation of irredentist aspirations. The National Pact (1920) defined the boundaries of the new Turkey on behalf of which the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal's leadership conducted the war of independence. Together with the Lausanne treaty of 1923, which confirmed the birth of the new Turkey and hence marked the end of the Ottoman state, it forms the basis for a consensus in favor of an anti-revisionist, status-quo foreign policy. However, Turkey's detractors do not always agree. Domestic opponents argue that Mosul in northern Iraq and the Dodecanese islands in the southeastern Aegean should not have been surrendered. Greece, Turkey's major foreign detractor, argues that the accession of Hatay to Turkey and Turkish policies in Cyprus are obvious examples of Turkish irredentism.

Ideological Considerations

Turkey's political elite felt the need to protect the domestic order predicated on western ideas and models of socio-political organization against internal turbulence, or worse yet from direct challenges from the outside. Founded and forcefully led until 1938 by Atatürk, an enlightened professional soldier, the Turkish Republic's domestic political order and international role were defined in radically different terms than those that had characterized state and society in the Ottoman empire which it replaced. The narrowly defined priorities of Turkey's external orientation were primarily a function of domestic exigencies. Its isolationist foreign policy represented pragmatism at its best, for Turkey needed to devote its energies to internal development. It was their mutual isolation from the West that largely helped foster Soviet-Turkish cooperation. Yet Turkey was always careful to confine its relationship with Russia to interstate issues, foreclosing the possibility of ideological interaction.

A thorough transformation of an essentially Islamic society on the model of the West was a formidable task. From the very beginning the new regime had to cope with the inherent tension between the westernizers/modernists and the traditionalists/Islamists. However, under the direction of a one-party government the reforms ultimately prevailed, paving the way for the political and social modernization of Turkey at a steady pace.

A discussion of Turkey's philosophical-ideological world view as a factor in its security decisions is of critical importance because of the close interrelationship between the sustainability of the socio-political order and the nature of the changing external environment. The Turkish case of a traditional Muslim society which has chosen to modernize on the western model through aggressive political and social engineering was unprecedented in its time and to this day remains unique in its scope and comprehensiveness.

Turkey's uniqueness was however inherently precarious. It required an hospitable external environment to sustain and reinforce domestic change. It bred international vulnerabilities by depriving Turkey of a clearly defined sociocultural identity that could be drawn upon as a source of strength in resisting potentially adverse influences and that could serve as a basis for solidarity and affiliation with others. Since Turkey was neither a fully westernized nor an orthodox Islamic society, its pro-western domestic regime was anathema to its neighbors. This in turn made the task of safeguarding the domestic order against external challenges more difficult.

Turkey's domestic socio-political order has been tested severely by external forces. The first test came from Moscow, whose goal of exporting communism was a major threat to the Turkish domestic order throughout the seventy years of Soviet foreign policy until its transformation by Mikhail Gorbachev beginning in 1987. The geographic expansion and increasing political weight of Islamic radicalism, and in particular the anti-western domestic and foreign policies of neighboring Iran under the mullahs since 1979, comprise a new source of strain on the systemic vulnerability of the Turkish domestic regime.

Accordingly, the preservation of Turkey's unique domestic order and socio-political identity as a modernizing "European" country but with an Islamic cultural mold has comprised a fundamental element of Turkish foreign and security policy thinking. This ideological imperative has been almost invariably present in the process of decision-making, promoting, restraining, or constraining Turkey's relations with other actors, especially within the region. Turkey's inward-looking posture during the interwar years was intended to focus the country's energies on the consolidation of the domestic transformation. Later, the initial Turkish decision to join the western alliance in the post-World War II period was driven as much by this ideological preoccupation as it was by the military dimension of the Soviet threat. Turkey endured the criticisms and resentments that emerged from many quarters in the largely anti-western Muslim and Asian worlds. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s it confronted the ideological challenge of the non-aligned world as well.

The same impulse has been at work more recently, when Turkey has approached the newly independent republics in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia as well as some of the post-communist states in the Balkans, but in a thoroughly altered international context. Today, Turkey's effort to safeguard its domestic values based on the western ideas of secularism, democracy, and market economics by "exporting" them to the newly liberated republics in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia is generally encouraged in western circles—much to the resentment of radical Islamic forces. The potential of Turkey to act as a role model, especially in the Turkic/Muslim world in the East, has been portrayed as a factor serving the broader interests of world peace and stability.¹⁴ Yet while western ideals, regimes, and systems seem to have prevailed over communism, and the Second and Third Worlds appear to have embraced them in principle, most political analysts agree that the road ahead for their firm emplacement in these societies is beset by formidable unknowns, if not impassable roadblocks.

These three fundamental assumptions of Turkey's approach to the outside world have recently undergone a substantial refocusing and strategic redirection. No longer do they dictate a narrow, inner-directed focus and strategic perspective. They reject isolation from the international community as the best insurance against foreign interference and meddling. Of equal significance, they no longer confine foreign and security policy thinking to political-military matters but reach out to include a variety of economic and communication dimensions. Political, social, and economic change within Turkey as well as the dynamics of the new geopolitical environment have allowed the Turkish leaders who were at the helm when the Cold War ended, particularly former prime ministers Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, to reinterpret the vitality of the formative concepts underlying Turkish foreign and security policy in larger, international terms.

In externalizing the spirit of these concepts, Turkey has not turned toward irredentism or expansionism. It has merely assumed a greater willingness to play the role of regional arbiter, intermediary, and role model, while simultaneously attempting to take advantage of new opportunities which promise to expand Turkish political and economic influence. Turkish leaders have often talked about influence but have repeatedly rejected notions of political and territorial hegemony.¹⁵

Potentially the most important initiative that Turkey has taken in the post-Cold War era, indicating its resolve to act as a positive force for regional peace and stability in the long-term, has been its leadership in forming the Black Sea Economic Cooperation project among eleven countries (including Greece, Albania, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which are not Black Sea riparians). It has likewise participated in various

international conflict resolution efforts—in the Minsk Group under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to help find a negotiated solution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and in the difficult UN-sanctioned NATO operation to enforce the no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are clear indications of Turkey's greater responsibility for regional stability in the areas surrounding it.

The Balkans

Turkey is a Balkan country geographically, historically, and culturally. This sense of belonging to the Balkan complex allows Turkey to recognize its legitimate interests and concerns, especially during times of change in the nature of political regimes and the distribution of power in the region.

The Balkans are a strategic link between Turkey and western Europe and a major factor in the range of political, economic, security, and cultural bonds that Turkey has formed with the outside world. Two and a half million Turkish citizens live in western Europe and more than half of Turkish foreign trade is conducted with that region. A reordering of political boundaries and associations in the Balkans that would enhance the dominant position of a single country such as Serbia, or create a *de facto* regional hegemony on the part of an entente between Serbia and Greece, would place Turkish security interests at risk as well as reducing its freedom to cultivate traditional and new interests and relationships.

There is a powerful sense of affinity between the Turks of Turkey and ethnic Turkish and Muslim minorities throughout the Balkans. Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, and others have managed to remain quite friendly towards Turkey, contrary to the general trend of negative collective memories concerning Turkish-Ottoman rule in the region.¹⁶

This affinity has been inspired by emotionally charged perceptions of common cultural and historical bonds. These pro-Turkey leanings have the potential to complicate and even forestall the implementation of anti-Turkish coalitions and policies in the Balkans launched on the pretext of avenging the legacy of Turkish/Ottoman rule.

Turkish Policies

Although Turkey was satisfied with the broad outlines of the political status quo in the Balkans, it was relieved at the dissolution of communist systems and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Turkey originally adopted a conservative position on the simmering Yugoslav crisis, hoping that the

Yugoslav federation could be maintained through internal negotiations and compromise. Ankara did not wish to see the former Yugoslavia's dismemberment. From the Turkish perspective, former Yugoslavia had been a moderating force in the Balkan balance and had ruled over its relatively small ethnic Turkish and large Muslim populations benignly. Viewed through the lens of a state-as-rational-actor paradigm, the fragmentation of former Yugoslavia would serve neither broader regional nor specific Turkish national interests.

Once disintegration ensued and the Bosnian Muslim population of the internationally recognized republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina became the victims of the project to create a "Greater Serbia," Turkey's position changed. New policies were designed to serve three immediate and interrelated objectives: to end the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; to preserve that republic's independence and territorial integrity; and to prevent the engulfment of Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, the Sanjak, and Vojvodina in a larger Balkan war with the potential to drag in other powers with their own interests in the regional politico-military balance. The threat of a wider Balkan war loomed heavily in Turkish perceptions.

Turkish policies have essentially sought to contain Serbian aggression. According to Turkey, the government in Belgrade was the prime force behind Bosnian Serbian aggression against the Bosnian Muslims and its brutal manifestations in policies such as ethnic cleansing. On 7 August 1992, Turkey elaborated the details of an Action Plan to be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. In the face of persistent Serbian aggression and the ineffectiveness of UN sanctions, Turkey called for a selective lifting of the arms embargo to allow the Bosnian Muslims to procure weapons and equipment for their self-defense and for a limited military engagement by the international community to enforce the UN sanctions.

On the other hand, Turkey has consistently shunned the option of a unilateral use of force—despite pressure by the domestic opposition in favor of such an option.¹⁷ The speculation outside Turkey that it intended to exploit the Bosnian conflict through a show or use of force apparently failed to take account of the domestic situation in Turkey. The Turkish government would not risk unilateral military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially knowing that geographical and logistical constraints would seriously complicate a sustained operation. Turkey engaged in an active diplomatic campaign to mobilize the international community to take a more resolute stand against Serbian aggression. In April 1993, it joined the NATO operation for enforcement of the seven-month old no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Turkey's policies have failed to bring about its objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of a complex set of factors whose impact has for the

moment allowed the Serbian dreams of a Greater Serbia to be achieved at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims and possibly the Croats. The international community has allowed Serbian aggression to be rewarded. It is possible that the "Muslim" identity of the Bosnian Muslims has been at the heart of the major European powers' unwillingness to lift the arms embargo that unfairly deprived the Muslims of weapons of self-defense against a disproportionally armed "Christian" Serbian adversary. The example has been a poor one, and the problem will not go away. The next serious challenge facing the international community in the Balkans is likely to be the question of Kosovo.

Turkey's bilateral relations with several other Balkan countries have flourished. Two consecutive agreements on confidence-building measures between Bulgaria and Turkey in 1991 and 1992 and the restoration of the rights of the ethnic Turkish minority by Sofia have had an enormous positive impact, moving Turkish-Bulgarian relations decisively away from mutual distrust.

Albania has received priority attention and assistance in its drive to consolidate the post-communist transition. Turkey was the first state to recognize Macedonia, in January 1992 at the same time that Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were recognized. Macedonian leaders have appealed to Turkey, as did those of the Bosnian Muslims and Albanians, to defend their cause in international fora and for direct assistance. Turkey has been rendering economic, technical, and humanitarian assistance to all of these countries, as well as to Bulgaria.

The Role of the Greek-Turkish Conflict

The Yugoslav conflict is a product of intra-Yugoslav dynamics and tensions. On the other hand, external factors have affected its course, scope, and regional impact. One of these factors has been the adversarial and deeply competitive nature of Greek-Turkish relations.

The past behavior of Greece and Turkey on regional issues indicates that even as allies they tended to approach proposals for cooperation—such as Balkan denuclearization in the Cold War era, projects for economic cooperation, and the question of minorities—primarily with the "other side" in mind. Both states have developed their respective strategies on the basis of zero-sum calculations. The Yugoslav crisis has offered them the most recent and dramatic occasion around which to structure their mutual competition so as maximize their national interests.

Research findings indicate that the pro-Serbian policies of Athens during the Yugoslav crisis have been based to a large extent on Greece's perception of how the evolving situation might or might not work to

Turkey's advantage.¹⁸ Above all else, Greece was uncomfortable with the idea of a new Muslim state almost next door. The possibility of such an entity encouraged worst-case scenarios because of the Greeks' foregone conclusion that a Muslim state, with positive roots in Ottoman history, would be friendly to Turkey. Accordingly, Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs were granted the full support of Greece in their struggle against what the Bosnian Muslims were seen to symbolize both politically and culturally. Greece was initially the key force supporting Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs in the international arena; strong Russian backing came later.

The Greeks' pro-Serbian position complicated the development of a coherent western strategy to protect the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina against Serbian aggression. Greater Serbia owes its present position to a large extent to Greek diplomacy, whose central concern was to deny Turkey opportunities for attracting new friends and potential allies in the Balkans. The destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the form in which it was recognized by the international community in spring 1992 and the informal Greek-Serbian entente, together with the evocations by both Greek and Bosnian Serb leaders of the common bond of Orthodoxy as the emotional basis of their cooperation, have reinforced Turkish concerns that the Balkans might become dominated by a strong anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim coalition in which Greece would play a decisive role.

The Yugoslav crisis might have evolved differently had Greece and Turkey chosen to cooperate rather than compete in the evolving geopolitical environment in the Balkans. They might not have been capable of preventing the breakup of Yugoslavia but they could perhaps have contained the conflict and prevented it from radicalizing and polarizing Balkan politics to the extent that it has. Therefore, one of the key elements of Balkan security in the post-Cold War era should be a radical reconceptualization of Greek-Turkish relations.

The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia

"Turkic" Diplomacy Begins

As with former Yugoslavia, Turkish thinking about the future of the Soviet Union did not envision its final disintegration until it had nearly occurred. The tradition of assigning the highest priority to relations with Moscow and of abstaining from relations with the Soviet Turkic peoples was sustained almost until the end of the existence of the USSR.

Following the decision to change its policy in the fall of 1991, however, Turkey moved quickly. In September 1991, teams of Turkish diplomats

visited the capitals of each Soviet republic and upon return recommended granting formal recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. "By the end of 1991, Turkey had totally abandoned its Moscow-centered stance and embarked on a program of active relations with the Soviet successor states."¹⁹

Turkey became the first country to recognize Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics. In fall 1991 and spring 1992, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan paid visits to Turkey upon the invitation of then president Turgut Özal. Özal had stopped in Alma Ata (Almaty) during his visit to the Soviet Union in March 1991. Former prime minister Süleyman Demirel crowned the budding relationship at its early stages with a high-powered visit to the four Central Asian republics on 27 April-4 May 1992 where he pledged financial assistance to the tune of \$1.2 billion.²⁰ His scheduled visit to Dushanbe was canceled at the last minute due to the sudden escalation of the crisis in Tajikistan. On 4-15 April 1993 president Özal went on an official tour, stopping in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.

A series of inter-governmental meetings were held between Turkey and the Turkic countries throughout 1992-93, culminating in numerous cooperation agreements. The summit meeting held on 30-31 October 1993 in Ankara among the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey committed the six countries to the institutionalization of their contacts at all levels, including the summit, and to the establishment of joint working groups in several fields. The Ankara Declaration issued at the end of the summit meeting constituted the most important expression up to that point of a will to work together. Another significant development, offering substance to the so-far vague concept of the "Turkic World" has been the agreement reached on 10 March 1993 among the six on the creation of a common Turkish alphabet based on the Latin alphabet. The conference held in Ankara on 6-7 May 1993 to found the "Eurasian Chamber of Commerce and Industry" is another milestone. In 1992 Turkey pledged to admit 10,000 students from former Soviet republics into Turkish universities.

Turkey also hosted the second summit meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Istanbul on 6-7 July 1993. The ECO, originally composed of Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, was enlarged in 1992 by the admission of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The ECO is generally perceived to be the major forum within which Turkish and Iranian philosophies of political and social organization subtly compete. Former prime minister Demirel refused to define the ECO as a "Muslim Common Market," insisting that it had only an economic cooperation dimension, not a political one.²¹

Turkish Objectives

On the basis of hindsight gained from two years experience, today one might be better able to answer the following critical questions. What were and are the fundamental Turkish objectives in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia? To what extent have they been fulfilled?

Turkey had hoped for the democratic transition and increasing interdependence of the former southern Soviet republics, which would serve two interlocking purposes simultaneously: it would contribute to peace and stability in Eurasia and it would allow Turkey to deepen its relations with a region that was anticipated to be inherently friendly and responsive as well as profitable.

Did Turkey entertain hegemonic aspirations? Was it motivated by Pan-Turkic and Pan-Turanian dreams? The answer is a resounding "No!" There is no question that "the historical embrace of the Turkic world," as prime minister Süleyman Demirel described it upon his return from visiting the Central Asian republics, was accompanied by a heavy dose of sentimentality on both sides. Behind initial exuberance, high-ranking Turkish officials were aware that the newly evolving relationship needed to be defined as one among equals. Prime minister Demirel underlined this point repeatedly, saying; "Our cooperation with those republics does not mean we will put our mortgage in their economic and political policies. If we do that, they would move further away from us. Respect for their identity should be the main principle of Turkey."²²

On the other hand, it is in the nature of the international system that states compete for political and economic influence and advantage. Such competitive behavior is an accepted norm so long as it is carried out peacefully and with respect for sovereignty, independence, and equality. The very fact that these states were young and weak—however rich in natural resources—made them appear vulnerable to the political domination of external powers determined to exploit such weaknesses. The record so far indicates that Turkey was not motivated by an intention to dominate the "Turkic World"; nor did it have such capability even if it wished to do so. Besides, leaders in each of the new republics appeared sufficiently competent, nationalistic, and independent from the very beginning as not to have aroused such illusions in external powers interested in the region—with the possible exception of the Russian Federation. In fact, if one takes a narrow, short-term perspective, the relationship until now has been on the debit side for Turkey. Turkey has not only allocated greater resources to the domestic development of the new republics than it has received in actual economic links with Turkic countries, it has also striven hard to facilitate their incorporation into the

network of international diplomacy, and especially the powerful and prestigious western community.

Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanianism enjoys neither official nor broad popular support in Turkey.²³ The National Action Party (MAP) of Alpaslan Türkeş represents the major organized political movement identified with ultra-nationalism. Even within this party, the territorial dimensions of the "Turkic World" remain unclear. The MAP had 13 deputies in the 450-member Turkish Grand National Assembly and its vote potential in 1993 was presumed to be around 3 percent of the electorate. There are extreme nationalist groups inside the two major center-right parties; the True Path Party currently in power and the Motherland Party founded by Turgut Özal. But the Great Unity Party, a splinter party from the MAP, had only six deputies in parliament.

In short, ultra-nationalism has persistently been a marginal force in the legitimate Turkish political-ideological spectrum. Yet, the inherent power of nationalism to mobilize people for expansionist or irredentist causes cannot be underestimated, especially in the post-Cold War era. Ultra-nationalism might find recruits in Turkey but it would be less in response to the appeal of the so-called "Turkic World" than because of mass frustration with rising terror by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (the PKK or *Partiye Karkeran Kuridistan*), anti-Turkish Kurdish nationalism, Armenian advances in Azerbaijan, and the plight of the Bosnian Muslims. Coupled with mounting economic stress at home, these issues may even facilitate the merger of Turkish nationalism with Islamic radicalism, as appears to be already occurring.

Turkey's specific goals in approaching the former Soviet republics have been to "export" its own ideology and regime based on western ideas and ideals and to cultivate cultural and economic relations. The first objective is very much in line with Turkey's constant sensitivity to its position as the single and most advanced westernizing state in the entire Islamic world. Given the deteriorating regional climate over the last decade, the adoption of the "Turkish model" by the former southern Soviet republics would offer Turkey security by expanding the liberal, democratic, and secular belt to the border of China. Turkish anticipation in this regard was reinforced, and possibly took cues from, the encouragement of influential western circles.

Expanded relations with these countries seemed simultaneously to offer new possibilities for cultural and economic development, especially at a time when Turkey's position in Europe was faltering. The post-Cold War era brought to the surface the inner tensions between Turkey and its western allies. Its "European" identity was questioned as Europe and the U.S. began to redefine their historical responsibilities. Turkey needed to develop new ties and relationships in an era of geostrategic change that

threatened to leave it isolated. While the new geopolitical space to the east could not offer a real strategic option to Turkey in the foreseeable future, at least it could help cushion the impact of a seemingly inevitable exclusion from an evolving united Europe.

The Special Position of Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan has enjoyed special importance in Turkish perceptions and policies.²⁴ Historically, culturally, linguistically, and geographically the Azerbaijanis have been the closest among the Turkic peoples to the Turks of Turkey. Former nationalist leader president Abulfaz Elçibey's admiration for the Turkish model, which he reiterated in strong terms in an address before the Turkish Grand National Assembly during an official visit to Turkey in June 1992, complemented the Turkish vision of a rising new liberal, secular, and democratic geopolitical area to the east.

Though the small autonomous enclave of Nakhichevan directly borders on Turkey, as well as Armenia and Iran, Azerbaijan's potential natural wealth, including most importantly oil, is a great source of interest for Turkey, which is a net importer of fossil fuels. The richness of the common heritage and the importance attached to relations with Azerbaijan recently led foreign minister Hikmet Çetin to describe the essence of the relationship as one between "one nation but two states."²⁵

Azerbaijan's post-Soviet domestic development has traced a turbulent course primarily under the strain of the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, which in turn has put a great deal of stress on Turkey's regional diplomacy and bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. While giving political support to Baku's position that Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory, Turkey has urged a negotiated settlement. It has desisted from providing direct military assistance to Azerbaijan—a source of deep frustration to Turkish nationalists—of the sort that would alter the balance of power between the belligerents.

The difficulty of maintaining a balance between Turkish sympathies for Azerbaijan and the desire not to get involved directly in a conflict with larger regional implications has ultimately satisfied no one. The defeat of Azerbaijani forces and the occupation of over 20 percent of the country by Armenia led to the downfall of Elçibey, its first elected president, at the hands of a military leader who chose Gaidar Aliiev, an ex-KGB and Politburo official under Leonid Brezhnev, as his replacement.

The venue for a negotiated settlement has been the eleven-nation Minsk Conference (which includes the United States, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) mandated by the CSCE's Council of Ministers on 24 March 1993. Pending the convening of the conference, its members have been meeting as the Minsk Group since June 1993, parallel

with the advances by Armenian forces deep into Azerbaijan. Turkey has undertaken an active role in this first conflict-resolution mission by the CSCE in one of the most troubled regions of the former Soviet Union. It has appealed for a special dialogue with Moscow on the basis of their mutual interest in and responsibility for peace and stability in the region. However, there were basic differences in their approach concerning the first steps. While Turkey insisted on both a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories, Russia only demanded the former.

Regional Rivalry in the Southern Caucasus

The effect of the armed conflicts in the southern Caucasus on Turkey's interests and policies in this region has been extremely unfavorable. The initial Turkish goal of acting as a positive force by assuming a responsible leadership role in the difficult transition period has been frustrated. Scenarios that might have fostered regional peace and stability through economic and commercial cooperation have been scaled down, perhaps indefinitely. In earlier and more promising times, Paul B. Henze, a close Turkey watcher, anticipated that Turkish mediation efforts could be a responsible and effective force for regional peace.²⁶ The role of Russia in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia, however, has frustrated the effectiveness of Turkish initiatives and policies.

At the bilateral level, the prospects for normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations received a major setback. Despite the heavy legacy of history, Turkey had looked forward to a new stage in Turkish-Armenian relations and in that spirit extended recognition. The moderate tone of Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrossian encouraged Turkey to forgo its initial demand that Armenia formally and publicly renounce irredentist claims on Turkish territory as a precondition for recognition. Turkey also invited Armenia to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone.²⁷ It extended humanitarian assistance in the form of wheat deliveries in fall 1992 while at the same time allowing the transport of international humanitarian aid across its territory. Bilateral talks were held in winter 1992-93 for the supply of electric energy, which failed to materialize largely due to the project's adverse impact on Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.²⁸ The course of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict through 1993 reversed the momentum achieved in Turkish-Armenian relations. The Armenian refusal to agree to a cease-fire and withdrawal from the occupied Azerbaijani territory remains an extremely serious challenge to regional peace and Turkish security interests.

The civil war in Georgia became another source of frustration for the Turkish vision of regional peace and stability through cooperation. The demographic fabric of Turkish society, including many Turks of Georgian and Abkhazian origin, as well as the friendly attitude of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, had fostered a positive image in Turkey about Georgia in general, reconfirmed by prime minister Demirel's visit to Tbilisi on 30 July 1992. There were no conflicts between the two countries except the indirect implications of the civil war on Turkey's regional diplomacy. Turks of Abkhazian origin also have a positive link with the separatists, creating a delicate situation for Turkey not only in its diplomacy but in its overall approach to ethnic separatism. The head of state of Abkhazia visited Turkey in late July 1992 seeking recognition of the Abkhaz parliament's declaration of independence.²⁹

The impact of the conflicts in the southern Caucasus has perhaps taken its biggest toll on Turkish-Russian, and to a lesser extent on Turkish-Iranian, relations. Turkey's interest in post-Soviet Azerbaijan and the Turkic countries of Central Asia appears to have triggered apprehension in Moscow and Teheran about presumed Turkish intentions to create a monolithic Turkic world centered around Ankara. Conversely, Turks tend to see Russia more in the role of an actual party to the local conflicts than as an arbiter. Iran is perceived as the major force behind the increased penetration of fundamentalism in Central Asia.³⁰

The importance attached by Moscow to the "south" within its "near abroad," the dominant voice of the Russian military on the issue of security in the near abroad, and overt and covert pressure on former Soviet republics to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are clear indications that Russia is not resigned to the loss of its empire. Russia does see Turkey and Iran as its most important regional rivals. Clearly, Russia has important interests in the former Soviet republics, including the welfare of twenty-five million ethnic Russians and the security of its borders in areas of local conflicts. On the other hand, these conflicts have offered Moscow the opportunity gradually to re-establish political and economic control along its periphery. Recent developments in Georgia and Azerbaijan support this assessment. After having openly charged Moscow throughout 1993 with direct military involvement on the side of the Abkhaz separatists, president Shevardnadze finally joined the CIS in September 1993 in a move to elicit Russian support for his cause.

The forced removal of president Elçibey, a strong nationalist and a vocal anti-Russian, and his successor Aliiev's decision to reorient Azerbaijan towards Moscow are indications of the resumption of a predominant influence by the Russian Federation in the region. The change of government in Baku in early summer 1993 saw the *de facto* suspension of the preliminary Turkish-Azerbaijani agreement signed on

13 March 1993 for a pipeline to transport Azeri oil from Baku through Turkey to the Ceyhan terminal on the Mediterranean. The state-owned Turkish Petroleum Company holds a 17 percent share in the international consortium. Turkish authorities argue that the Baku-Ceyhan route would be the most cost-efficient among the alternatives.³¹ The Turan news agency in Baku has reported that according to the most recent Russian-Azerbaijani agreement, Azeri, Kazakh, and Turkmen oil would be transported to western markets through Russia.³²

The armed conflicts in the southern Caucasus have also strained Turkish-Russian relations because of their repercussions on the CFE treaty negotiated in 1990. They have allowed Moscow to claim that the flank limits established by the CFE treaty no longer correspond to its security needs in these new circumstances. Turkey rejects the Russian arguments, maintaining that tampering with the CFE treaty would pave the way for its ultimate collapse.³³

Conclusions

Formidable challenges lie ahead for the principal foreign policy objectives of Turkey in the early years of the post-Cold War era with regard to the Balkan and Black Sea region. Restoration of peace and stability is needed so that the plethora of ethnic, national, and territorial conflicts and wars that have seized the region will not spiral into a regional war. The radicalization and polarization that have distinguished Balkan and southern Caucasian politics since the break-up of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations threaten such a war.

A most worrisome aspect of the developments in the region from the perspective of Turkish foreign and security policy interests has been the revival of the Muslim-Christian dichotomy in the Balkans and to a lesser extent—at least for the moment—in the southern Caucasus. Religious militancy against “the other” has become an important element of Balkan politics. The Serbian nationalist leaders, joined by Greece, have invoked the traditional image of “the Muslims” in order to sustain their irredentist war. Moreover, one can detect the beginnings of an anti-Muslim Orthodox coalition between Athens, Belgrade, and Moscow. While the trend seems to have more subtle manifestations in the southern Caucasus, there is no question that pro-Armenian sympathies on the part of the Russians are shaped to an important degree by a sense of a shared Christian identity and culture.

The intensification of these trends and developments would be especially detrimental to long-term Turkish interests. This could eventually mobilize a more powerful movement in the spirit of “the

Crusades" against Turkey, the only major Muslim country in the Balkans, in a region which has not yet come to terms with its Ottoman past. And it could further penetrate Turkey's domestic politics, strengthening the power base of radical Islamic politics and supporting movements for a stronger Muslim identity among the Turkish population.

Developments in Central Asia do not look promising either. Instability within the Central Asian region, as well as the scale of problems within each individual republic, present very fundamental obstacles to the development of meaningful, long-term relationships. Not least, Turkey's overall resource base is too limited to allow it to act alone as a major force for change.

In contrast, Russia seems well-positioned to regain its pre-eminent influence in this region. For one thing, powerful patterns of economic dependence inherited from the Soviet era demand the return of Russian influence. Second, the West seems to have little interest in the long-term independence of the Central Asian republics if that would mean deterioration of relations with Russia. The West seems in effect to have conceded to Moscow's claim to be the sole peacekeeper in the so-called near abroad, especially in its "southern" section. Encouraged by western ambivalence, Russia has increasingly assumed an assertive, if not intimidating, posture in its approach to Turkey in connection with the "south" of the near abroad.

Iran is likely to be the major outside influence next to Russia. Russia seems less apprehensive about the long-term implications of Iran's growing role in Central Asia than about the revival of the concept of the Turkic world. Also, Iran's contiguity and oil wealth place it at an inherently advantageous position. In the two years since independence, the southern Soviet republics' options in developing in a westwardly direction have considerably narrowed. Turkey might have been the fundamental force to help lay the domestic and external basis of that orientation. But its own inherent limitations and vulnerabilities, the scope of the region's needs and problems, and the pre-eminence of Russian influence have greatly constrained Turkey's potential to serve as a role model for a liberal, democratic, and secular reconstruction of the states and societies in the former southern Soviet republics.

Notes

1. For a representative view see Ted Greenwood, "Soviet Intimidation of the West: The Violation of the Montreux Convention," *Global Affairs* III, no. 4 (Fall 1988): 50-71.

2. The Turkish Oil Pipeline Company (BOTAŞ), a state enterprise, represents Turkey in the International Oil Consortium founded in 1992 to negotiate a deal with Azerbaijan for the right to develop its oil field. For estimates of possible increases in tanker traffic if Azerbaijan oil were to be transported through the Straits see BOTAŞ, "Note on the Passage of Tankers Through the Straits," mimeographed manuscript (Ankara, 1993).

3. For a description of the five major groups of Turkic languages see Türküya Alaöv, "The Language Bond: The Turkic-Speaking People of the Former USSR," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (Special Issue) 38, no. 4(1993): 67-79.

4. Graham E. Fuller, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment: Turkey, the Gulf, and Central Asia," in Ian Lesser and Robert Levine, eds., *The RAND Institute Conference on the New Mediterranean Security Environment: Conference Proceedings* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 45.

5. Ibid.

6. Nearly all major newspapers ran informative serials on the Balkan Muslims and Turkic people in southern Caucasus and Central Asia in the first wave of curiosity about these little known "kin" and "brothers." See Bilal N. Şimşir, "Asya Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Türkiye" [The Asian Turkish Republics and Turkey], *Milliyet*, 28 December 1991; Fatih Yılmaz, "The Turkic Republics in the Former Soviet Union: Central Asia Awakens," *Cumhuriyet*, 15 December 1992; and Abdurrahman Yıldırım and Bülent Kızıl, "Turkish Capital on the Silk Road," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1992.

7. Paul B. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), p. 31.

8. Ibid., p. 29.

9. Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier: Turkey and the West After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), pp. 88-89.

10. This conceptual framework has been developed primarily on the basis of data obtained from records of statements by high-ranking public officials. One of the most important primary sources for this are the official records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) published in the *Tutanak Dergisi* [The Journal of Minutes—TGNA-JM]. For this study the TGNA-JM has been reviewed every three years for the period 1930-1990 and every year for 1990-1993.

11. Ivo J. Lederer, "Russia and the Balkans," in Ivo J. Lederer, ed., *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Russian Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 420.

12. For examples of such statements by Turkish officials see Turgut Özal, "21. Asır Türkiye'nin ve Türklerin Asrı Olacak," [21st Century Turkey Will Belong to Turkey and the Turks], speech at Çelik Palas, Bursa, 22 May 1991; "The New Year Message," Ankara, 1 January 1992; opening statement at the International Symposium on Turkey's Strategic Priorities [Türkiye'nin Stratejik Öncelikleri], Marınara Hotel, Istanbul, 5 November 1991.

13. For a similar assessment see Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), p. 39. For a feature story on how some intellectuals and politicians see Turkish influence in a neo-Ottomanist light see "The Neo-Ottomans," *Aktuel Weekly Journal*, 20 June 1992, pp. 7-12.

14. For samples of editorials and opinions in the western media in support of Turkey's potential to act as a role model, with special emphasis on its unique position in the Islamic world, see "The Importance of Being Turkey," *The Economist*, 24 August 1991; "Star of Islam," *The Economist*, 14 December 1991; "The Sick Man Recovers," *The Times*, 28 January 1992; "The Turkish Model on Display," *Newsweek*, 3 February 1993; and "A Gathering of Ideas: Special Report," *Newsweek*, 3 February 1992.

15. Süleyman Demirel, *Başbakan Süleyman Demirel'in Türkiye Cumhuriyetleri Gezisi ile İlgili Olarak TBMM Genel Kurulunda ve DYP TBMM Grup Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşmalar* [Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's speeches at the TGN General Assembly and the TDP's Assembly meeting], Ankara, May 1992, pp. 11-13 and *Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel'in TBMM'nin 19. uncu Dönem, 3. İnci Yasama Yılı'nın Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma* [Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's speech for the inauguration of the TGN's 19th session, 3rd legislative year], Ankara, 1 September 1993, pp. 11-12.

16. For official descriptions of Turkish interests and policy see Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü on Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina, TGN-JA, Period 19, Legislative Year 1, Vol. 16, 18 August 1992, pp. 23-113; Statement by Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin at the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 1992, New York; Statement by Ambassador Mustafa Akşin (Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations) at the United Nations Security Council, 13 November 1992, New York; and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, *Herşey Türkiye için* [Everything For Turkey: A Report on the Performance of the 49th Government], Ankara, 24 August 1992, p. 37.

17. On the opposition's demands for more coercive diplomacy towards Armenia see TGN-JM, Period 19, Legislative Year 1, Vol. 16, 18 August 1992.

18. For a detailed discussion of this argument see Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkish Security in the Balkans," in Costa Tsipis, ed., *Balkan Security* (forthcoming).

19. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, p. 29.

20. For the specifics of the credits allocated to each republic and types of humanitarian assistance delivered see Demirel, *Everything for Turkey*, p. 52.

21. Demirel, *VII. Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma*, [Statement at the Seventh Press Conference], 21 July 1993, p. 21.

22. Cited from the *Turkish Daily News*, 8 May 1992.

23. On 1 July 1992, *Milliyet*, a major national newspaper, reported that the Danıştay, the High Administrative Court, rejected the appeal by the nationalist Aydımlar Ocağı to be classified as a public-service association. In its negative opinion, objected to by one member, the High Court determined that in a democratic regime the state could not fund an association dedicated to the promotion of Turkish nationalism.

24. For official positions and opposition views on Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan see the records of the general debate in the parliament in the wake of the Armenians' 1993 spring offensive into Azerbaijan: TGN-JM, 90th Session, Period 19, Legislative Year 2, vol. 34, 13 April 1993, pp. 13-17, 61-86.

25. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı, Dışışleri Bakanı Hikmet Çetin Tarafından Dışışleri Bakanlıđı 1994 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarısının TBMM Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu'nda Görüşölmesi Vesilesi ile Yapılacak Konuşma, [Statement by Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin before the TCNA's Commission on the Plan and the Budget, Meeting on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1994], 17 November 1993, p. 23.

26. HENZE, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, p. 31.

27. The president of the Gagauz republic in Moldova expressed his county's wish to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone (apparently frustrated by Moldova which is itself a member) in "The Gagauz want to join the BSECZ," *Milliyet*, 2 February 1992. The Republic of Macedonia has also sought to join, but to date without success.

28. For the parliamentary opposition to assistance to Armenia see TCNAJM, 74th Session, Period 19, Legislative year 2, Vol. 30, 25 February 1993, pp. 342-346.

29. "We Want Friendship, not War," *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1992.

30. The Office of the Secretary General of the National Security Council (MGK), the highest decision-making body in the Turkish system of internal and external security, has recently issued a publication, MGK Genel Sekreterliđi, *Neden Hedef Türkiye?* [Why is Turkey the Target] (Ankara: Kiyap Yayın Dağıtım, 1993), detailing the activities of various religious sects in Turkey as well as those in Iran in an attempt to export its regime.

31. BOTAS, *Rapor* (Ankara, 1993).

32. "Azeri Oil Will Flow Through Russia," *Cumhuriyet*, 26 November 1993.

33. For Turkish views see "Russia Objects to CFE Treaty," *Cumhuriyet*, 23 September 1993; "Warning from Russia," *Sabah*, 25 September 1993; and "Signals to U.S.A. on CFE Treaty," *Milliyet*, 27 September 1993.