FROM HEGEMONY TO PLURALISM: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THE BLACK SEA

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Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the Black Sea region, which includes almost a dozen countries stretching from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea, has become one of the most dynamic and fluid areas in the world, with important implications for European security. The stability of the Moscow-centered imperial order has broken down, perhaps irrevocably. In its stead, dynamic forces of autonomy, independence, flux, and disorder have surfaced, revealing not only the complex ethnic, cultural, and economic diversity of the region, but also many of the historical tensions and rivalries suppressed under the *ancien regime*.

The independence of Ukraine is, without question, the paramount development in recent Black Sea history. As Russian domination has receded, the newly independent Ukraine in the north and Turkey in the south have each sought to play a bigger role in the politics of the region, putting them on an implicit collision course with Moscow. Kiev's independence has left Moscow theoretically exposed to potential security threats from the West, especially if this new buffer state between Europe and

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Russia eventually chooses to align with the West. The test of wills over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet have come to symbolize the power struggle between the two Black Sea countries.

Turkey's activist diplomacy toward many of the newly independent states (NIS) in the region and the responsive chord it has evoked have confronted Moscow with yet another category of perceived threats—the loss of Russia's historical stakes in its own “backyard.” Turkey's pursuit of a share in the anticipated revenue from Caspian Sea oil exports to world markets has recently become the focal point of the new Russian-Turkish rivalry—a rivalry that dominated the Black Sea region for most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The question that prompted me to undertake this study is: how will Ukraine and Turkey, two strategically poised medium powers flanking Russia on its west and southwest respectively, cope with the “contraction” of Russian/Soviet power? As Sherman Garnett has argued, Russia has historically gone through cycles of expansion and contraction.¹ Whether it will or can get out of the “contraction” phase and begin a new “expansionist” phase very much depends on how a host of domestic and external variables evolve.

Black Sea geopolitics today are dominated by the foreign policies of Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey towards one another. Ukraine is determined to ensure that it will never fall prey to Russian power again, a goal that enjoys the full backing of the West, which would prefer a Russia within its current borders. Meanwhile, Turkey is attempting to take advantage of the power vacuum created by the Russian retrenchment by expanding the parameters of its political, economic, and cultural relations in the region. Nevertheless, Russia remains the key actor in this part of the world. The West's attitude towards Russia remains crucial to how the balance of power in the region will develop.

Following a brief review of the forces of change, this article will examine three sets of relationships mentioned above: Ukrainian-Russian, Ukrainian-Turkish, and Turkish-Russian.

Ukrainian-Turkish relations, rather than being an independent force at this point in time, are a function of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Hence, Ukrainian-Turkish relations will not be treated under a separate heading.

From Hegemony to Pluralism

Russia became a Black Sea power in the true sense in 1783, when it annexed the Khanate of Crimea, a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire since 1478. However, Muscovy's advance toward the steppes along the northern shore of the Black Sea had begun over a century earlier when the Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky delivered Ukraine to Moscow through the Pereiaslav Treaty (1654).

Ukraine's December 1991 declaration of independence appears to have reversed the trajectory of history in a single stroke. Russia has suffered an enormous political-territorial retreat in Eastern Europe and a loss of 2,782 kilometers of coastline on the northern Black Sea.² Russian losses included the Crimea, one of the two key strategic points for dominance over the Black Sea, the other being the Turkish Straits. Russia's massive territorial losses, and the corresponding loss of military and industrial power, combined with Ukraine's insistence on full independence, threaten its position as a European and Mediterranean power.

The independence of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, three small states in the southern Caucasus,³ has undermined Russia's position to the east of the Black Sea, throughout the Caucasus region, and in parts of Central Asia. Russia has lost not only formal control over the southern Caucasus, but also its firm grip in the northern Caucasus, as demonstrated by the two year-old war in Chechnya.

These losses have reduced Russia's position in the Black Sea region to that of a medium power with nuclear capability. This new environment marks the end of hegemony and the beginning of pluralism. On the other hand, it is too early yet to know

which way the present trends will evolve, since all major forces are in flux.

From A Closed to An Open System

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have forced the transformation of the Black Sea region from a centuries-old closed system into an increasingly open one. The new spirit of pluralism and openness has borne fruit in various efforts for cooperation and coordination in the region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative (BSEC), launched by Turkey in 1991 and formally mandated to promote cooperation in trade, transportation, communications, and the environment, is one example. However, deep political divisions and competition between resource-hungry economies in transition have literally confined its role to that of yet another new bureaucracy. The six-nation Bucharest Convention for the protection of the Black Sea against pollution has been in force since Spring 1994, and a Strategic Action Plan to save the dangerously-polluted sea was launched at the Istanbul Summit held on October 31, 1996.

Openness implies close interaction with the outside world as well. For example, under NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, former Warsaw Pact countries in the Black Sea region have held joint land and naval exercises with NATO countries. The region is also working to open up economically, led by preparations to make the rich fossil fuel reserves of the Caspian Sea accessible to world markets.

However, the momentum towards greater pluralism and openness in the region also breeds ambivalence between forces for cooperation, on the one hand, and forces of tension and conflict, on the other. To date, the pressures for tension and conflict have prevailed over efforts for cooperation.

Ethnic secessionism in the multinational countries of the region is one major force threatening regional stability. This situation is particularly volatile, because Russian pressure often

prevents the newly independent states from drawing on international mechanisms for containing regional conflicts.

At this historical junction, the region is thus witness to the gradual evolution of a whole new set of relations, issues, opportunities, and frustrations through a dynamic overlap between evolving national, regional, and international concerns.

UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND TURKEY

Russian and Ukrainian goals with respect to each other have shown several continuities as they have evolved since 1991. For Ukraine, the recognition by Moscow of its independence within its current borders has been the ultimate goal, but over the last several years, integration with the West seems to have turned into the paramount priority of Ukrainian foreign policy. Externally it sought, and received, the support of the West in its drive to enhance its independence. Domestically, it has moved to consolidate the process of nation and state-building. This combination of external and internal policies would, it was hoped, help Ukraine emerge from under Moscow's shadow. However, Ukraine is still dependent on Russia for energy supplies and the question of the Black Sea Fleet remains unresolved, leaving Kiev potentially exposed to Russian pressures.

Russia has formally committed itself to respect Ukraine's independence, but only on the condition that independence does not threaten Russian security. Russia would be most satisfied if Ukraine were to be a member of a new union of former Soviet republics within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Inching from Trauma towards Normalization

Any discussion of Russian-Ukrainian relations in the post-Soviet era needs to begin with the recognition that Ukraine enjoyed a unique place deep in the Russian mind and heart. The shock of Ukrainian separation has therefore been burdened as

much by powerful emotional elements as it has been by practical geostrategic considerations. Dr. Alexander Kononov of the Institute of Strategic Assessments in Moscow adds that the separation is unnatural, because it severs the ties and intimacy nourished over centuries of shared history and culture.⁴

Broadly speaking, Ukraine under President Kuchma has sailed on smoother waters in its relations with Russia as a result of deliberate policy choices by Kiev and the positive shift in the West's approach to Ukraine. However, relations have not been fully normalized due to continuing mutual suspicions. The bottom line in Russia is the fear that Ukraine might be headed for full-fledged incorporation into a Western bloc that might some day turn anti-Russian.⁵ Kiev in turn fears that Russia does not really accept Ukrainian sovereignty and independence within its present borders.

Kiev's Foreign Policy and Russia

Leonid Kuchma campaigned for a pro-Russia foreign policy in the presidential elections in July 1994. Normalization of relations with Russia would bring stability to both countries, he argued. He has honored his word in the sense that many of his policies have signaled Ukraine's intention to refrain from policies that threaten Russian security. At the same time, he has kept Russia at arm's length by insisting on full sovereignty and independence. Therefore, while several of Ukraine's policy positions and moves, such as the return of nuclear weapons, have been reassuring to Moscow, others, such as seeking a "special relationship" with NATO, have raised question marks.

President Kuchma and other high-ranking officials have stressed that "Ukraine's integration in European structures and a deepening of trans-Atlantic cooperation are the 'republic's strategic goals,' while at the same time adding: "Though Ukraine will continue to push for full integration with the European Union, relations with Russia and the CIS are equally vital."⁶

Two fundamental questions with long-term implications underlie the present uneasiness in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The first deals with the nature and future of Ukrainian neutrality, an issue with heavy security overtones for Russia. The second revolves around their divergent views on integration within the CIS.

Ukrainian Neutrality

From Moscow's perspective, the test of Ukraine's declarations of neutrality and non-alignment is simple: Kiev's approach to NATO. Ukraine has not formally sought NATO membership, but it has pressed for a "special partnership". However, in June 1996, Foreign Minister Udovenko defined "associate membership" as Kiev's goal. President Kuchma swiftly clarified that it was a "special partnership" that Ukraine sought.⁷ However, the damage had been done. Ukraine's commitment to neutrality has come to be viewed in Russia with greater skepticism.⁸

Russian apprehensions about NATO's pending eastward expansion are well known. The promise of Ukrainian neutrality dulled the threat of potential containment by the Western alliance. Russian-Ukrainian relations are likely to suffer severely if Moscow loses confidence in Ukraine's commitment to neutrality: "Russia must make it clear to Kiev that joining NATO would be seen as an openly unfriendly act—with all that that would entail."⁹

On the Ukrainian side, one can observe a clear determination to keep the country's options open. For example, as Kiev has withdrawn its opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, it has also demanded "unequivocal" assurances by the European Union, NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU) that they will not close their doors after the first stage of any expansion.¹⁰

Rejection of CIS Supranationalism

Russia has made it known all along that it favors the CIS as the instrument of integration in the so-called "near abroad." A recent document issued by the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy offers fresh evidence that the political class in Russia believes that a union of some sort is indeed possible by the year 2005.¹¹ The chances of Ukraine's joining such a union, wholly or in part, have been evaluated as "great but not decisive."

Ukraine has refused to go along with the Russians on this point. It has objected to supranational institution-building and stayed out of initiatives for collective security. It has also held back from participating in the joint defense of "the external borders of the CIS," a concept that Russia has pushed in the CIS on the grounds that the formerly effective administrative borders of Soviet era had become dangerously porous since 1992.¹²

Kiev is interested in the CIS for two reasons. First, the CIS played a stabilizing role in the early years of independence. Many policy makers believe that Ukraine's status as one of the three founding members of the CIS protected it against the type of domestic turmoil and civil strife that gripped Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, all non-CIS members at first.¹³

Second, the CIS states are still highly dependent on one another in economic affairs. Russia is Ukraine's number one trading partner. In 1995, 52.3 percent of Ukraine's imports and 43.1 percent of its exports were with Russia.¹⁴ Ukrainian officials have sought to tap the resources of the CIS for economic cooperation but with one paramount caveat: that Ukrainian sovereignty would not be compromised by the dictates of any supranational mechanisms.¹⁵ This reasoning forms the basis of Ukraine's refusal to join a customs or payment union within the CIS.

The Crimea

The force of pro-Russian Crimean secessionism in the early

years of Ukrainian independence has been checked under President Kuchma. One important step was the Ukrainian parliament's abrogation of the Crimean constitution and the elimination of the Crimean presidency.¹⁶ On the other hand, the shadow of Moscow is likely to hang over the Crimea as long as the demographic and political balance in the peninsula remains pro-Moscow. The new leadership in the Crimean parliament reflects such a balance. Eleven members of the sixteen-member presidium represent pro-Russian factions, while only three members come from groups that unambiguously support Ukrainian sovereignty over the peninsula.¹⁷

The Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet (BSF) controversy is currently the most visible expression of continuing Ukrainian-Russian suspicions. The BSF issue has been essentially reduced to a test of sovereignty rights over Sevastopol. It raises the question whether Russia is to retain a political and military presence, and thus influence, in the Crimea by keeping its share of the BSF at Sevastopol. Powerful officials and influential figures, such as former national security advisor Aleksandr Lebed, have recently made statements claiming that Sevastopol belongs to Russia by law.¹⁸

It is important to recall that the question of BSF basing sits at the heart of a long-term strategic challenge for Russia: how to anchor itself on the Crimea as a base to build from in the future. There have been numerous agreements to date—Massandra, Yalta, Sochi, and Moscow, and some division has taken place.¹⁹ However, hopes were again dashed in Spring 1996, when President Yeltsin refused to pay his expected visit to Kiev to sign a comprehensive inter-state treaty on the grounds that the Black Sea Fleet issue remained unresolved.

Moscow's linkage of basing rights for the Black Sea Fleet to a treaty of friendship between Russia and Ukraine is extremely discomforting to Kiev.²⁰ For Ukraine, the signing of such a treaty would reaffirm Russia's final acceptance of current

Ukrainian borders.²¹ Even though the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements of December 8, 1991 commit Russia to honoring Ukrainian independence, political developments keep Kiev's apprehensions alive. The Duma resolution of March 15, 1996 to annul the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements,²² Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganov's reintegrationist positions, and the stepped-up activities of pro-Russian and pan-Slavic political forces in Ukraine²³ have all been taken as warning signals by Kiev that a dangerous degree of ambivalence still exists within the political class in Russia about Ukrainian independence. The Russia-Belarus Community, established in April 1996, set a precedent that Kiev hopes to avoid.

Against this background, Ukraine has recently shown new enthusiasm for enhancing its relations with Black Sea countries, in particular Turkey and Georgia. Kiev has supported Georgia's claims to a portion of the Black Sea Fleet, a position that is opposed by Moscow. During a recent visit to Kiev, the Foreign Minister of Georgia came out openly against "the creation of supranational bodies in the commonwealth."²⁴

Kiev's unrelenting pursuit of full sovereignty provides a role model for other former Soviet republics, such as Azerbaijan, where the desire for full independence from Moscow is powerful but still constrained by the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and Moscow's ability to meddle in domestic politics.

Ukrainian-Turkish Relations

Ukraine and Turkey have shared a common goal since 1991: the preservation of the new geopolitical status quo around the Black Sea. They both hope that Russian hegemony will not return. This fundamental agreement has laid the groundwork for dialogue and cooperation in order to reinforce each other's determination to resist the return of a hegemonic system.

Turkey and Ukraine have formed their bilateral relations as a function of Ukrainian-Russian relations. How Ukrainian-Russian relations evolve is critical to the future course of

Ukrainian-Turkish relations. In a sense, Ukrainian-Turkish relations had no past,²⁵ and their future depends on how Ukraine conducts its relations with its former master and the rest of the world. A genuine rapprochement or union with Russia would obviate Ukrainian incentives to look for regional friends or allies. The basic nature of Ukrainian-Russian relations has not changed since 1991. However, Ukraine has found a powerful source of support in the West. The West's strong backing of Ukrainian independence has dwarfed the potential of Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation, in a sense condemning it to dormancy for the moment.

Ukrainian-Turkish relations flourished during the tenure of President Kravchuk, who, in the trying early years of independence, lacked friends and allies. He was convinced that Turkey possessed the qualities necessary to play a positive leadership role in the region.²⁶ He gave full support to the Turkish initiative of 1991 to establish the BSEC. Presidential visits were exchanged in 1992 and 1994 by Kravchuk and Demirel respectively.

Numerous projects for economic, commercial, and defense cooperation were proposed in this period. In January 1994, an oil pipeline agreement was signed for the transport of Middle Eastern oil through Turkey to Odessa. However, the project has been resisted by the authorities in Odessa for environmental reasons.²⁷

The two countries also cooperated with each other on political and security issues. Ankara sympathized with Kiev's demands for security guarantees as a precondition for giving up nuclear weapons and supported Ukraine's claim to the Crimea. Kiev backed Turkey's efforts to regulate commercial traffic in the Straits for environmental and safety reasons. Ukraine and Turkey expressed common positions on conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, in particular on Nagorno-Karabakh and the need for multinational peacekeeping.

The initial euphoria and momentum in Ukrainian-Turkish relations have disappeared since late 1994 for one basic reason: the West has taken Ukraine under its protection. With new-

found reassurance and prestige, Kiev no longer feels the need to seek regional partners and allies for support against potential Russian dominance.

President Kuchma's visit to Turkey in November 1996 will most likely breathe new life into political relations, as well as boost initiatives to increase bilateral trade and scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges. According to Turkish sources, the volume of official trade today stands at \$1 billion,²⁸ with Ukrainian exports accounting for \$800 million and Turkish exports \$200 million of this total. However, the unofficial "luggage trade" is estimated to bring Turkey another \$1 billion.

Turkey is home to about five million ethnic Crimean Tatars whose ancestors escaped to Turkey during the peak years of Russian/Soviet repression. The Crimean Tatar diaspora includes many distinguished intellectuals and professionals. The Crimea holds an important place in Turkish nationalists' minds not only because of the long Turkish historical presence there, but also because it is the home of Ismail Bey Gaspirali, the father of Turkish nationalism in Russia.²⁹ The interest that Turkey shows in the welfare of the Crimean Tatars is a potentially sensitive issue in Ukrainian-Turkish relations. However, the joint Kravchuk-Demirel emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity serves as a stabilizing factor. In fact, Ukraine officially welcomes the assistance Turkey pledged in 1994 for the construction of 1000 homes for returning Crimean Tatars, who were originally deported by Stalin during the Second World War.³⁰ In Spring 1996, Turkish officials confirmed the pledge to visiting Crimean officials who apparently wish to upgrade economic relations with Turkey.³¹

On the other hand, the Turkish offer to provide funding for housing will definitely fall short of alleviating the recently publicized political and economic problems of the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatar leaders have voiced their frustration with what they say is Kiev's "open neglect" of their situation, especially that of citizenship for some 120,000 of the returnees.³² UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) observers on the scene report that more than half of the 250,000 Tatars who have returned live in such abysmal conditions that violence could easily erupt.³³

TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE CAUCASUS

The collapse of the Soviet Union has been an event of historical significance for Turkey. For the first time in several centuries, the two countries do not directly border one another in the Caucasus—even if the tenuous nature of Georgian independence largely renders its buffer position irrelevant and Russian forces continue to be deployed along Turkey's borders with Georgia and Armenia. For Ankara, reduced Russian power implies above all else increased security for the Turkish Straits. Although Turkey did not have a direct role in the breakup of the Soviet Union, the shrinking of Russia's sprawling empire has been important for Turkish security as the disproportionate power imbalance between the two countries has been reduced.

Adjustment to the new geopolitical reality has seriously strained relations between Turkey and Russia. Turkey has viewed the retraction of Russian power, and the simultaneous opening of Central Asia and the southern Caucasus, as an opportunity to define and implement new political, cultural, and economic goals in these regions. To gain new ground in these newly emerging nation-states, it has stressed common Turkic ethnicity and culture. Playing up its democratic regime, secularism, market economy, and Western connections, Turkey has offered economic, cultural, and military assistance and presented itself as a role model for the Turkic NIS.

Russia has resented these Turkish overtures. Moscow's primary method for keeping Turkey at bay has been indirect, through greater emphasis on integration within the CIS. Russia's attempts to draw the Turkic NIS back into Moscow's orbit, by manipulating the legacies of Soviet-era interdependence and regional conflicts, are part of this policy. Moscow's strategy to contain Turkey also involves military instruments, such as

basing and border arrangements for Russian forces in Georgia and Armenia. Russia has also maintained heavy weapons in the Northern Caucasus, in excess of the ceilings permitted by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990/92. Moscow's stress on the role of nuclear weapons to deter regional wars and defend allies is at least partially motivated by its desire to deter Turkey from playing a more assertive role in the southern Caucasus. Coalition-building has also been considered as a long-term strategy, with Greece, Armenia, and Iran viewed as potential partners in a future anti-Turkish coalition.³⁴

The Burden of History

Turkey and Russia have a long history of conflict, marked by a succession of major wars, beginning in the seventeenth century. Turkish-Russian relations in the post-Soviet era have been burdened by the historical images and myths in the collective national memories of the two countries. Lenin was the first Russian leader to accept the territorial status quo between the two countries, but when Stalin reversed Lenin's policy at the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey entered into a full-fledged alliance with the West, thus gaining considerable security against its big northern neighbor for more than forty years.

Turkey has traditionally perceived Russia as an expansionist state, which not only relentlessly pursued a policy of expelling the Ottomans from the Black Sea, the Balkans, and parts of the Caucasus, but also raised the banner of Christian Orthodoxy against Turkish/Muslim rule in these lands and ultimately sought control of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits.³⁵ Tsar Nicholas I's 1853 appeal to England to carve up "The Sick Man of Europe" once and for all has not been forgotten by the Turkish people.

As intimated previously, two sets of issues have strained Turkish-Russian relations: first, Turkey's desire to be an active player in Central Asia and the southern Caucasus and

second, tensions resulting from secessionist movements in both countries, namely Kurdish separatism in Turkey and Chechen separatism in Russia. Considering the intensity of these political tensions, the recent record levels reached in economic activity between the two countries have been quite impressive.

Turkey Looks to the East

At the heart of Turkey's interest in Central Asia and Azerbaijan lie common ethnic, linguistic, and cultural bonds. Turkey hopes to build on these common bonds and weave a new set of political and economic relationships that would help it increase its political and economic options in the international system. At the same time, it has sought to pull the newly liberated Turkic world together and promote a collective Turkic identity, analogous to that of "the Arab World."

The end of the Cold War also spurred Turkey to diversify its foreign policy options. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Turkey's importance to Western Europe as a NATO ally and a prospective EU member lost its urgency. "A Europe Whole and Free" did not seem poised to embrace Turkey, at least in the short term. The Gulf War reinforced a growing assessment in the West that Turkey's strategic importance had shifted to the northern Gulf region. The West, apprehensive that the newly liberated Turkic/Muslim world might come under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism, encouraged secular, democratic, and free-market Turkey to forge new ties with the Turkic republics.

Turkey's new policy orientation towards the East took place against the background of these changing international forces. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Turkic republics had their own reasons to come rushing to Ankara. Turkey offered them a total of \$1.2 billion in credits in 1992 and seized the initiative in convening a series of Turkic conferences. Turkey also urged the adoption of the Latin alphabet in order to facilitate educational and cultural exchanges.³⁶

Today, the initial mutual exuberance has been replaced in both Turkey and the Turkic republics by a more somber assessment for several reasons. First, the leaders of the NIS quickly learned that foreign powers could be balanced for their own advantage. Second, the Turkish economy was no match for the enormous needs of the NIS economies, and integrationist pressures within the CIS perhaps presented a stronger counterpressure. Moreover, Russia did not abstain from employing more blunt methods of pressure to compel the Turkic republics to distance themselves from Ankara.³⁷ It is with a new sense of realism and balance, therefore, that the Fourth Summit of the Turkish Speaking Peoples took place in Tashkent on October 21, 1996, with the participation of Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey.

The Special Place of Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan has enjoyed a special position of importance in Turkey's approach to the new world emerging to its east. Like the Crimea, Azerbaijan is one of the birthplaces of Turkish nationalism. Among all the Turkic languages, Azeri Turkish comes closest, after Gagauz, to the Turkish spoken in Turkey. The republic's proximity to Turkey; its position as a bridge to the other Turkic countries of Central Asia; its abundant oil reserves; and its pro-Turkish orientation until the overthrow of nationalist president Abulfaz Elchibey in mid-1993 have all contributed to Turkey's special focus on Azerbaijan in the early post-Soviet period.

The new Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliiev, a former Soviet Politburo member and KGB officer, rebuked Turkey and tilted heavily toward Moscow, joining the CIS with the hope of winning Moscow to his side in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. He canceled the international oil deal signed by Elchibey, reducing Turkey's shares while increasing those of Moscow and allotting some to Iran. Over time, he has adopted

a more skillful and balanced approach to relations with Moscow, Ankara, and Teheran, giving the impression that Baku is determined to keep an equal distance in dealings with its larger neighbors, especially Russia and Turkey.

In practice, Azerbaijan's relations have moved closer to Moscow than to Ankara. Clearly, Baku feels the heavy-handed pressure of Moscow on issues related to the Caspian Sea oil, such as legal status, delivery routes, and Russian shares.³⁸ Russian presidential adviser Dr. Sergei A. Karaganov stated, "You can have Azerbaijan but the oil is ours!"³⁹ As long as Moscow views Caspian Sea oil as the new Great Game, Baku will feel itself very much constrained in its dealings with the rest of the world, including Turkey. Soviet-era apparatchiki continue to exercise considerable power in favor of Moscow despite the disapproval of opposition and civil society groups.⁴⁰

Azerbaijan's attitude toward Turkey today is perhaps best captured by the following statement by Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov: "We, Azerbaijan and Turkey, are one nation but two states."⁴¹ Azerbaijan wavers between despair over the Armenian occupation of some twenty percent of its territory and confidence in its future as an oil producing country. Baku wants to assert its independence from both Moscow and Ankara, but the struggle with the former clearly presents the greater challenge.

Turkey as seen from Moscow

Turkey's bid to enter the former Soviet space in the south alarmed and infuriated Russia from the very beginning. As in Turkey, the historical memory of constant adversity is at least partly responsible. There are also contemporary reasons. According to former Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, a report issued in 1994 by Yevgenii Primakov, then director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, heavily contributed to the new negativism.⁴² Professor Vitaly Naumkin argues that domestic politics is one cause of the chorus of Turkey-bashing among

politicians and bureaucrats.⁴³ The military has been more explicit, as exemplified by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's open designation of Turkey as an external threat to Russia's security.⁴⁴

Russian perception of Turkey as a threat to Russian interests in Central Asia, and more acutely in the southern Caucasus, generally falls into three categories: Turkey as a challenger in Russia's backyard; Turkey as a provocateur of Turkic/Islamic secessionism; and Turkey as a military threat in collusion with the West. These themes will be discussed below.

Challenging Russia in Its Backyard

By pushing for a political and economic role in the traditional backyard of Russia, Turkey aims to take advantage of the power vacuum—a favorite Russian term—created by the loss of the former “strategic cordon sanitaire,”⁴⁵ built over several centuries. In the Russian logic of a zero-sum game, Turkey's gain would translate into a loss of Russia's vital interests in this vast geopolitical space. Karaganov is perfectly clear when he says, “These places are Russia's backyard. Nobody can play in this field without Russia's consent.”⁴⁶

The locus of the most intense clash of interests and policies has been the southern Caucasus. Russia views the Caucasus as a priority area in its backyard, a view magnified several times since the Chechen War began in 1994. The Caucasus has been assigned prominence and urgency in Russian security thinking not only because Russia feels its territorial integrity is threatened by internal and external enemies, but also because the Caucasus lies directly adjacent to the enormous known reserves of Caspian Sea oil.⁴⁷ Chechnya would be the key to the transport of Caspian Sea oil to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk.

However, the focus on the Caucasus in Russian security thinking precedes the war in Chechnya. Pavel Felgengauer, writing in March 1993, pointed out that between Summer 1992 and March 1993, the deployment pattern of Russian forces had changed from an emphasis on the Western Military District to

the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD). This implied that Russia would now have “a very important strategic defense line [with] the Transcaucasus [serving] as Russia’s main strategic forward defense area, directly affecting the military situation in the NCMD. Many Russian forces still remain in the Transcaucasus, deployed on the old strategic frontier, on the border with Turkey, a NATO member.”⁴⁸

Hence, Turkish, and for that matter all foreign, engagement in the Caucasus is perceived as detrimental to Russia’s vital interests. This logic runs through most strategic analyses in Russia today, including the following remark by Vadim Pechenev, a member of the Presidential staff, published in May 1996: “The Caucasus is acquiring strategic importance for Russia from the standpoint of ensuring the security of its new southern borders.... [For] the axis of *global world contradictions* has been increasingly shifting to the ‘North-South’ line and now passes, precisely, through the Caucasus [emphasis added].”⁴⁹

Russian opposition to the Turkish bid for a share in the Caspian Sea oil profits is based on this reasoning.⁵⁰ Russia and Turkey have been locked in a fierce competition since 1992 to secure the pipelines that will transport Caspian Sea oil to world markets. Both have engaged in an active campaign to influence Almaty and Baku, as well as the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, the two international consortia that will play the key role in oil production and export. The Russian-Turkish contest in the Caucasus is over potentially enormous economic gains during the next several decades and the political influence that oil wealth would accrue to the winner.

The prospect of the export of millions of tons of Caspian Sea oil through the Black Sea have added yet another item to the agenda of Black Sea politics: the potential environmental impact of transporting oil. In 1994, Turkey moved to impose stricter controls on the traffic of merchant shipping through the Straits in order to minimize damage to the environment and secure the safety of Istanbul.⁵¹ The Montreux Convention of

1936 mandates freedom of navigation through the Straits for merchant vessels. However, the Turks feel that the lack of environmental awareness more than fifty years ago cannot be used to justify irresponsible use of the Straits.

Russia, the principle user of the Straits, views the Turkish move as a deliberate attempt to undermine the Russian project to ship Caspian oil from Novorossisk through the Straits to world markets.⁵² Frustrated by Turkey, Russia has entered into negotiations with Bulgaria and Greece for alternative pipelines that would bypass the Straits.

Turkey as a Provocateur of Turkic/Muslim Secessionism

Because Russia is ethnically a Russian-Turkic entity, the Russian/Soviet political elite has historically been highly sensitive to any signs of Turkic/Islamic nationalism in the federation. Turkish interest in Russia's Turkic peoples has traditionally been interpreted as an attempt at Pan-Turkism. One leading Russian specialist on the subject defined pan-Turkism as "an aggressive racist and chauvinistic doctrine of the militant circles of Turkic nationalism, proclaiming as its object the unification of all Turkic-speaking nations into a single 'Turan state' ('Great Turan') under the aegis of Turkey."⁵³

Post-Soviet Turkish interest in the Turkic republics has been viewed in a similar light. The idea of Turkic unity has raised the specter, especially among radical nationalists, of "a foreign conspiracy to split Russia along a Turkic line from Kazakhstan to Yakutia and obstruct the 'rebirth' of Russia."⁵⁴

Chechen secessionism has conveniently fit this perception even though Chechens are not ethnically Turkic. Moscow has accused Turkey of supporting the Chechen fighters, if not directly then through mercenaries and private donations clandestinely channeled into Chechnya.⁵⁵ In any case, there is a strong tendency in Russia to view the Chechen conflict as the work of foreign powers, including Pakistan, Iran, and Ukraine.⁵⁶

Turkey's motives seem to be clear in the minds of many

informed Russians: in the long-term, to facilitate the breakup of the Russian Federation; in the short-term, to block a resolution of the crisis in Chechnya so that the international consortia will not export Caspian Sea oil through Russia.

Turkey is also irritated by what it believes to be Russian support for the separatist guerrilla war conducted by the Marxist-oriented Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Next to the competition over the oil pipeline routes, mutual suspicions about each state's support of ethnic secessionism in the other has become the most divisive irritant in Turkish-Russian relations.⁵⁷

Turkey as a Military Threat in Collusion with the West

Turkey's position as a member of NATO, the West's encouragement of Turkey to act as a role model for the southern tier of the NIS, and Turkey's military capability create in the minds of a large part of the Russian political elite an image of a country which is a military threat to Russia in the south, both on its own and on behalf of the West. Continuing cynicism about NATO and the inability to end the Chechen war fuel suspicions that the West seeks to undermine Russia as a great power through allies such as Turkey. Even former President Gorbachev has claimed that, "the West, especially the United States, decided to take advantage of Russia's temporary weakness and started a new geopolitical game whose aim was to alter Russia's status as a world power. In Europe, NATO began stepping up its activities. An attempt was made to play the 'Turkish card.'"⁵⁸

This perception appears most often in analyses of Russian security interests in the Caucasus and is the basis for Moscow's policy of maintaining a regular military presence in Georgia and Armenia.⁵⁹ NATO's increasing visibility in the Black Sea through the Partnership for Peace, together with the relative increase in Turkish naval strength as a result of Russia's decline, have led Russia to believe it is being cornered into becoming a mere coastal state.⁶⁰

This logic, together with fears that Turkey is encroaching on Russia's backyard, explains one of the primary reasons behind Moscow's pressure on NATO to revise Article V of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This provision dictates limitations on the amount of equipment that can be kept in the flanks. The same article designates the Northern Caucasus as part of the southern flank. Moscow demanded changes in flank limits due to the changed political and military circumstances.⁶¹ The war in Chechnya in particular seemed to give credence to Moscow's arguments. Russia was in breach of the treaty on November 17, 1995, the deadline for the completion of the mandated reductions. At the First Review Conference held in Vienna in May 1996, a compromise was reached, effectively allowing Russia another three years, until May 31, 1999, to comply with the numerical limitations. In addition, the size of the flank area in the Northern Caucasus was reduced, allowing Russia to concentrate the same amount of force in a much smaller area.⁶²

Turkey had resisted such concessions since 1993, but caved in under American pressure. The CFE had been an important factor in Turkish security assessments, even in the post-Cold War era. The Turks believe that the pressure to revise the treaty was a US concession to Russia in order to soften the latter's stand on NATO expansion.⁶³

A Glimmer of Hope

Economic relations between Turkey and Russia have fared better than political and military relations. The Turkish foreign policy establishment hopes economic relations will act as a locomotive to pull political relations out of their current doldrums.

According to official figures, the total volume of trade in 1995 is estimated to have reached \$8 billion in official and \$4.5 billion in unofficial sectors.⁶⁴ (Unofficial trade refers to the "luggage trade" of goods by Russian tourists who return home

with inexpensive Turkish consumer goods for resale in the Russian market. Recently, the Russian government has considered restricting this type of trade).

Natural gas has been Turkey's largest import from Russia since 1987. Turkey now imports six billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, and plans are under way to raise this volume to thirty billion cubic meters. Turkey is a favorite customer of Russia, because its payments are largely in hard currency.

Turkish companies have also been engaged in construction projects in Russia. Between 1987-1996, they have received \$5.7 billion in construction contracts. The Turkish Export-Import Bank provides credits to Russia to help finance these projects. Between 1989 and 1991, Russia used \$600 million worth of credits. In December 1995, Russia was awarded another \$350 million of project credits.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has sought to clarify the nature of the historical change in the power structure in the Black Sea region, with all its positive and negative implications for European stability and security. On the positive side, hegemony and the closed system have been replaced by a pluralist and open system of relations among multiple actors and forces. Ukraine and Turkey joined Russia as the major powers, and their foreign policies have been adapted to take advantage of the new-found pluralism.

The tensions and frictions experienced in Ukrainian-Russian and Turkish-Russian relations indicate that the collapse of hegemony also creates new instabilities. In the case of Ukrainian-Russian relations, the inner dynamic that has produced instability has been Ukraine's refusal to accept the return of even a reformed *status quo ante*. In the case of Turkish-Russian relations, the dynamic has been the Turkish drive to penetrate the fallen boundaries of the former hegemon, a move which could ultimately contribute to the consolidation of the post-Soviet political status quo. The Turkish-Russian contest over the

prosperity and power that are expected to flow from the Caspian Sea is only part of the Great Game that is now emerging.

In short, therefore, the nature of Ukrainian-Russian and Turkish-Russian relations will be among the leading influences in the consolidation of the post-Soviet status quo. The tacit alignment between Ukraine and Turkey against the re-emergence of Russian domination is unlikely to culminate in more active cooperation or alignment, but its very existence may facilitate future collaboration in the event that domestic developments in Russia create an impulse to begin a new "expansionist" cycle.

Looking back over the past five years, one reaches the conclusion that two other sets of influences will play powerful, perhaps defining, roles in how the geopolitics of the region evolve in the future: the degree to which the West is committed to the maintenance of the post-Soviet political map and the future of political and economic developments in Russia.

As outlined at the beginning of this article, the post-Soviet political system in the region is characterized by a degree of pluralism and openness unprecedented in history. However, without a continuing commitment by the West, neither Ukraine nor Turkey, nor the two together, are capable of guaranteeing this pluralism and openness. Moreover, the region lacks mediating institutions and forces. The West might need to play such a role, as it did on the nuclear weapons issue in Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Future political and economic developments inside Russia will be significant, as they will determine how Russia will come to reassess its future role in the region: as a medium power, which it is today; as a great power, which it insists it is today; or as the dominant power which most Russians wish it were today? A possible slide to authoritarianism nourished by extreme nationalism—which still cannot be ruled out—might trigger a national mood that expects the resurgence of Russia's dominance in the region. Although Russia does not have the kind of economic and industrial power necessary to attain this goal in

the near term, its re-emergence, even as a political motive, would be sufficient to threaten regional stability.

Notes:

¹ Sherman Garnett, "Russian Power in the New Eurasia," *Comparative Strategy*, 15:1 (January-March 1996), p.31.

² *The World Factbook 1993* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc. for the Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), p.352.

³ The Caucasus is divided into two sub-regions, the Northern Caucasus and the Southern Caucasus. This study uses the term "Southern Caucasus" instead of Transcaucasus, a Russian/Soviet designation, since the former more precisely reflects the geographic location.

⁴ Dr. Aleksandr Konovalov, interview with the author, Institute for Strategic Assessments, Moscow, 28 August 1996.

⁵ "Russia-Ukraine Summit: Breakthrough, or More Fog?", *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (henceforth, CDPSP), XLVII:23 (July 5, 1995), p. 11.

⁶ "Ukraine: Kuchma Stresses Stability in Relations with Russia," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (henceforth, FBIS) SOV-96-137 (16 July 1996), p. 44; "Ukraine: Kuchma Seeks Further Integration Into Europe," FBIS-SOV-96-110 (6 June 1996), p. 44. For statements by members of the establishment, see Oleksandr Moroz, "The Path to Europe," *Politics and the Times* (Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, Kiev) (October-December 1995), pp. 6-9; Volodymyr Horbulin, "Ukraine's Place in Today's Europe," *Politics and the Times*, (October-December 1995), pp. 10-15; Henadii Udovenko, "An Open, Predictable and Pragmatic Foreign Policy," *Politics and the Times*, (October-December 1995), pp. 16-24.

⁷ "Ukraine: Kuchma Denies Ukraine Seeking Associated NATO Membership," FBIS-SOV-96-125 (27 June 1996), p. 35; "Ukraine: Kuchma Wants NATO 'Partnership,' Not Membership," FBIS-SOV-96-127 (1 July 1996), p. 36.

⁸ Arkady Moshes, "Ukraine's Shaky Neutrality," *Moscow News*, 10 July 1996.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ "Ukraine: Kuchma Outlines Ukraine Security Guarantees at Summit," FBIS-SOV-96-132 (9 July 1996), p. 48.

¹¹ Volodymyr Zviglyanich, "Russia Discusses Plans to Restore the Soviet Union by 2005," *Jamestown Foundation Prism, Part 4*, [brdcast@jamestown.org], 14 June 1996.

¹² Theresa Raphael, Claudia Rosett, and Suzanne Crow, "An Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3-28 (15 July 1994), p.37.

¹³ Ukrainian Foreign Ministry official, interview with the author, Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, Kiev, 21 August 1996.

¹⁴ Ustina Markus, "New Trends in Trade," *OMRI Transition*, 2:16 (9 August 1996), p. 45.

¹⁵ Paul D'Anieri, "Interdependence and Sovereignty in the Ukrainian-Russian Relationship," *European Security*, 4:3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 608-9. D'Anieri maintains that overall Ukraine has taken an extreme position, at least in the current international context, in favor of preserving sovereignty at the expense of the economic efficiency which could be pursued through integration.

¹⁶ "Crimea No Bar to Accord on Kiev's Debt to Moscow," CDPSP, XLVII:2 (19 April 1995), pp. 1-2.

¹⁷ "Pro-Russians Strongly Represented in Crimean Leadership," *Jamestown Foundation Monitor*, [brdcast@jamestown.org], 23 October 1996.

¹⁸ "Ukraine and Georgia: Looking for Allies," *The Fortnight in Review*, [brdcast@jamestown.org] (20 September 1996).

¹⁹ According to an Itar-Tass (Moscow) report, the entire northwestern part of the fleet from Izmail to Ochakov had been transferred to Ukraine by the middle of 1995; one hundred and forty installations were transferred after December 1, 1995. See "Ukraine: Russian-Ukrainian Commission on Black Sea Fleet Meets," FBIS-SOV-96-066 (4 April 1996), p. 36.

²⁰ "Ukraine: Black Sea Fleet Stance To Be Based on New Constitution," FBIS-SOV-96-148 (31 July 1996), p. 44; "Kuchma Interviewed on Relations with Russia," FBIS-SOV-96-013 (19 January 1996), p. 54-55. Incidentally, because of territorial disputes over Bessarabia, Bukovyna, and a small island in the Black Sea have prevented Romania and Ukraine from concluding an interstate treaty as well. See "Ukraine: Romanian Senator: 'All Romanians' Want Lands Returned," FBIS-SOV-96-098 (20 May 1996), p. 48.

²¹ Roman Laba argues that the location of the Russian-Ukrainian state border is not accidental and meaningless, but is the result of the conflict between Ukrainian aspirations for autonomy and independence and the

Russian and Soviet states. Soviet leaders, hoping to eliminate the Ukrainian problem once and for all, made a Ukraine incomparably larger than national aspirations could have achieved. See his "The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: State, Nation and Identity," *European Security*, 4:3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 480-81.

²² For President Yeltsin's countermoves on the Duma decision, see "Yeltsin sends Duma bill to settle doubts after CIS vote, 'sources say,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (henceforth, SWB) SU/2566 (21 March 1996), p. B/3.

²³ "Ukraine: Pro-Russian Parties Increase Activity in Ukraine," FBIS-SOV-96-113 (11 June 1996), p. 49. Konstantin Zatulin, a former member of the State Duma and chairman of the State Duma Commission on CIS Affairs, was declared persona non grata in Ukraine for alleged violation of the law in the Crimea, see "Ukraine: Foreign Minister Interviewed on CIS, Chechnya, Zatulin," FBIS-SOV-96-098, (20 May 1996), p. 97. For opposition voices and movements, see "Communists say adoption of constitution was rigged," SWB/SU/654 (3 July 1996), p. D/1.

²⁴ "Ukraine, Georgia oppose supranational development in CIS," SWB/SU/2706 (2 September 1996), p. D/7.

²⁵ For Turkish-Ukrainian encounters in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Halil Inalcik, "Struggle for East-European Empire, 1440-1700: The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire," *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, XXI (1982-1991), pp. 1-17. For Ukrainian perspectives on the same topic, see Danylo Husar Struk (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol. V (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 319-321. Hetman Khmelnytsky seriously considered union with the Ottoman Empire but gave up the idea mainly because of differences in religion.

²⁶ Leonid Kravchuk, interview with the author, Kiev, 20 August 1996.

²⁷ For an excellent survey of Ukrainian-Turkish relations in this period, see Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukrainian-Turkish Relations," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, LI:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-34.

²⁸ Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, interviews with the author, Ankara, 26 September 1996; Turkish Foreign Ministry, interviews with the author at the Turkish Embassy, Kiev, 19 August 1996.

²⁹ For Crimean Tatar-Turkish relations at the close of the nineteenth century, see Hakan Kirimli, *National Movements and National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars: 1905-1916* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 150-169.

³⁰ For a recent study on "deported peoples" in the former Soviet Union, see Vladimir I. Mukomel and Emil A. Pain, "Deported peoples in Central Asia" in Vitaly Naumkin ed., *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia: A Post-Soviet Critique* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), pp. 144-161.

³¹ "Ukraine: Crimea: OSCE Mission Not Needed," FBIS-SOV-96-100 (22 May 1996), p. 45.

³² "Ukraine: Tatar Leaders Voice Resentment at Kiev's Open Neglect," FBIS-SOV-96-130 (5 July 1996), p. 48.

³³ James Rupert, "Tatars Return to an Inhospitable Home in Crimea," *International Herald Tribune*, 11 January 1996, p. 2; Mathew Brzezinski, "For Tatars, Coming Home to Crimea Brings Yet More Dislocation," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 August 1996, p. 1.

³⁴ From an historical perspective, Iran seems an unnatural partner. Yet, Iran enjoys an important position in Russian thinking as a counterweight to Turkey. See Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian National Interests," in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov, eds., *Damage Limitation or Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 1994), p. 71.

³⁵ For a collection of recent essays on imperial Russia's ambitions and policies toward the Ottoman Empire, see Hugh Ragsdale (ed.), *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge and New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1993), Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 9.

³⁶ For a brief survey of Turkey's approach to Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the early post-Soviet era, see Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States," *Middle East Journal*, 47:4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 593-610; Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's Political and Security Interests and Policies in the New Geostrategic Environment of the Expanded Middle East," Occasional Paper, No. 19 (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 1994), pp. 9-17. For a more up-to-date assessment, see Heinz Kramer, "Will Central Asia Become Turkey's Sphere of Influence?" *Perceptions*, (Ankara), 1:1 (March-May 1996), pp. 112-127.

³⁷ For forms of direct pressure by Russia on the "near abroad," see Mark Galeotti, "Russia and Its Neighbors: Partner, Threat or Problem?" *Jane's Defence '96: The World in Conflict*, p. 61.

³⁸ For a survey of Azerbaijan's oil politics, see Sabit Bagirov, "Azerbaijani Oil: Glimpses of a Long History," *Perceptions* (Ankara), 1:2 (June-August 1996), pp. 22-51. Dr. Bagirov was formerly president of the Azerbaijan National Oil Company (SOCAR).

³⁹ Interview with Dr. Sergei A. Karaganov, adviser to President Yeltsin, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 22 August 1996.

⁴⁰ Interviews with politicians and civil society groups, August 5-9, 1996, Baku. For a strong denunciation of Moscow's regional policies by the media, see "The Caucasus in the Strategy of Russia," *TURAN News Agency*, Baku, 13 August 1996.

⁴¹ Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov, interview with the author, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku, 6 August 1996.

⁴² Interview with Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, Foreign Policy Association, Moscow, 28 August 1996. For the report, see "Text of FIS Report Presented by Primakov," FBIS-SOV-94-185 (23 September 1994), pp. 1-9.

⁴³ Interview with Professor Vitaly Naumkin, Deputy Director, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, September 23, 1996. See also his, "Russia and the States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus," in Robert D. Blackwell and Sergei A. Karaganov, "Damage Limitation or Crisis," CSIA Studies in International Security, no. 5 (Washington: Brassey's Inc., 1994), p. 207.

⁴⁴ "Russian Views of Turkey," *OMRI Daily Digest*, [omripub@omri.cz], (31 May 1996).

⁴⁵ Richard Woff, "Russia's Armed Forces: A Troubled Evolution," *Jane's Defence '96: The World in Conflict* (1996), p. 30.

⁴⁶ Dr. Sergei A. Karaganov, interview with the author, Institute of Europe, Academy of Sciences of Russia, Moscow, 22 August 1996.

⁴⁷ For useful insights into the regional and international aspects of the Caspian Sea oil issue, see Rosemarie Forsythe, "The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia," Adelphi Paper, 300 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), and Robert V. Barylski, "Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub," *Middle East Journal*, 49:2 (Spring 1995), pp. 217-232.

⁴⁸ "Tensions Force Change in Military Doctrine," FBIS-SOV-93-048 (15 March 1993), p. 66.

⁴⁹ "Russia: Significance of Caucasus Region for Russia Viewed," FBIS-SOV-96-126-S (June 28, 1996), p. 58.

⁵⁰ For the views of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, see Temel Iskit, "Turkey: A New Actor in the Field of Energy?" *Perceptions*, 1:1 (March-May 1996), pp. 58-82.

⁵¹ For the text in English of the Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region, promulgated on 11 January 1994, see République de Turquie, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (RTMAE), *Rapport Annuel sur le Mouvement des Navires à Travers les Détroits Turcs* (Ankara: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, August 1995), pp. 53-84. For Turkish arguments, see Istanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, *Bogazlardan Gecis Güvenligi ve Montreux Sozlesmesi* (Safety of Passage through the Straits and the Montreux Convention), Publication no. 3875 (Istanbul: University of Istanbul, 1994).

⁵² Turkish official statistics show that in 1994, a total of 19,630 merchant vessels passed through the Straits. With 5,114 vessels, Russia was the biggest user of the Straits followed by Ukraine, Malta, Syria and Greece. See RTMAE,

op.cit., pp. 46-48. For Russian views on the Turkish position, see "We Cannot Consider it Lawful," CDPSP, XLVI:26 (27 July 1994), p.23; "Dispute Over the Straits," op.cit.; "Russia's Transportation Links Threatened," CDPSP, XLVI:13 (27 April 1994), p. 26.

⁵³ Victor A. Nadein-Raevsky, "Some Opinion on the Turkic Factor," in Nikolai A. Kovalsky (ed.), *Russia: The Mediterranean and Black Sea Region* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe, Council for the Mediterranean and Black Sea Studies Publication, 1966), p. 254. Professor Sergei A. Zenkovsky's *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) remains one of the classic scholarly works on the topic.

⁵⁴ Irina D. Zviagelskaya, "Central Asia and Transcaucasia: New Geopolitics," in Vitaly V. Naumkin ed., *Central Asia and Transcaucasia* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 137-138.

⁵⁵ The Caucasian diaspora in Turkey is estimated to number 8-10 million. It includes Georgians, Abkhazians, Chechens, and Cherkessians, among others. They moved to Turkey in the second half of the nineteenth century to escape Russian invasion, see Paul B. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty First Century* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), p. 29.

⁵⁶ "Ukraine: Foreign Minister Interviewed on CIS, Chechnya, Zatulín," FBIS-SOV-96-098 (20 May 1996), p. 47; "Moscow Will React," SWB/SU/2511 (17 January 1996), p. B/5.

⁵⁷ Dr. Alexandre S. Dzassokhov, Deputy of the State Duma, insists that Russian diplomats must be more outspoken with Turkey about the Turkish "complicity" in the Chechen conflict. Interview, Moscow, 22 August 1996.

⁵⁸ "Mikhail Gorbachev on Relations Between the West and Russia," CDPSP, XLVII: 37 (11 October 1995), p. 25.

⁵⁹ "Georgia: Russian and Georgian Border Troops Find A Common Language," CDPSP, XLVI: 11 (13 April 1994), p. 24; Felgengauer, op.cit.

⁶⁰ Nikolai A. Kovalsky, "The Mediterranean Process: Towards a Closer Cooperation" in Nikolai A. Kovalsky (ed.), *Russia: The Mediterranean and Black Sea Region* (Moscow: Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1996), pp. 52-54.

⁶¹ For Russian views, see Jeffrey D. McCausland, "Conventional Arms Control and European Security," Adelphi Paper, 301 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 37-40.

⁶² "Russia Allowed Time To Fulfill CFE Treaty," *Moscow Times*, 4 June 1996), p.5. "Russia: Grachev Praises Vienna Conference on CFE Treaty," FBIS-SOV-96-112 (10 June 1996), p. 37.

⁶³ "Russia: CFE Compromise Seen as 'Major' Success," FBIS-SOV-96-112 (10 June 1996), p. 26.

⁶⁴ The figures in this section have been obtained from the Turkish Foreign Ministry.